Committee Sensitive
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Event:
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) interview with Terry Biggio, Facility
Deputy
Manager, Boston Center.
Type
of
event: Recorded Interview
Date:
Monday, September 22, 2003
Special
Access Issues: None
Preparedby:
Geoffrey
Brown
Team
Number: 8Location: FAA Boston Center, Nashua, New Hampshire
Participants
- Non-Commission: Chris , FAA General Consul
Participants
- Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara,
Geoffrey
BrownNOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of
the
interviewee. Please
refer
to the
interview transcript
for a
complete account.
Background
On
9-11 Biggio was assigned as Operations Manager Areas A and D with duty as
OMIC
(Operations Manager
in
Charge)
in
conjunction
with
the
Traffic
Management Unit(TMU). Biggio reported to Glen Michaels, assistant deputy for Boston Center who was
away
on 9-11, and has since retired, and HeatherAckerman,an administrative manager
who
was away at a joint managers meeting on
9-11.
Therefore, Biggio was the managerresponsible
for the
performance
of
Boston Center
on
9-11.
Prior
to
becoming theOMIC,
Biggio
worked
at
Boston Center
as a
Quality Assurance
officer,
an
instructor,
an ATCsupervisor,
an Operations manager, a support manager, and as acting deputy.
Biggio's
statement
signed
on Sep 15,
2001
indicates
that
he
worked
the
OMIC
position
from
0630-0958
EOT
on the
morning
of
9-11.
Morning
of
9-11
On
9-11,
after
the
morning rush
was
over, Daniel Bueno,
the
Traffic
Management
Supervisor,
paged Biggio,whocameto the TMU and was
briefed
byJohn Schippaniand
Bueno
about
a possible hijacking, based on three
factors—no
communications,
transponder
turned off,
and
possible unusual communications
from
the
cockpit. They
displayed
AA11 as a primary target [no transponder] on the 46R (Boston Sector) radardisplay, which
was
being
worked
by ATC
PeterZalewski
at the
time.Zalewskihadheard something unusualbut was notsure what,sorequested that
the
tape
be
pulled
and
replayed
Bob
Jones, Quality Assurance
was
asked
to
pull
the
tape
and
review
for
possible unusual communications. Jones told Biggio within minutes
of the
threatening
communication, and that the speaker clearly had a Middle Eastern accent, and
had
said something like"wehave some
planes"
and
"don't
doanything
stupid".
Biggio
had
the Regional Operations Center and, he said, the Washington Operations Center on aspeaker phone
andimmediately relayed
that information.
He perceived his subsequent
role
as a
"conveyor
of
information
to the
ROC."
According
to Biggio, prior to9-11,an airplane that had gone NORDO (no radio
communication)was a
frequent
occurrence.
An
airplane that lost transponder
was
relatively
infrequent,
but not
unheard
of. An
airplane that
had
seriously deviated
from
itscourse
was indicative of a serious mechanical problem, and Biggio had never
experienced
those three factors
in
combination before. Those factors, when applied
toAA11,
were enough
for
Biggio
to
deem
it
necessary
to
contact ROC,
but
without
thethreatening
communication
from
the
cockpit,
he
doubts AA11 would have beenrecognized or labeled a hijack. Biggio noted that though he did not call the WashingtonOperations Center (WOC) directly to
inform
of the hijacking, he was placed in aconference
call
through
the ROC
that
was
being
actively monitored,
as far as he
knows,
by
the
WOC.The attack was not anticipated. He thought they would have gotten something
from
the
aircraft,
a
special code Specifically, ATCs
are
taught that
a
hijack would
include a
covert sign
from
the
cockpit, either
use of the
transponder code 7500, which
flashes
"HIJACK"
on the
data block
for the flight on the
ATCs
TMU
(traffic
monitoring
unit),
or the pilot would have used covert language (the word
"trip"
to describe theairplane's course) to signal the ATC. In simulated hijack exercises the pilot would be in
contact
with
the
ATC,
and
they would
be
able
to
verbally confirm
"7500"
for a
hijack,
"7600"
for a malfunctioning transponder, and
"7700"
for an emergency.Biggio stated that though there was no drill, simulated scenario, or previous real-
life
scenario
that mirrored
the
events
of
9-11,Boston Center
was
able
to
respond
effectively
through
the
benefit
of
numerous
air
traffic
situations during
the
summer stormseason and the combined extensive experience of the ATC
staff.
Biggio noted that part
of
Boston
Center's
subsequent ground stop success can be attributed to their authority
over air
traffic.
Biggio
was
able
to
stop
air
traffic
through
the Sparta/Carmel air
corridor
and was
able
to
ground stop Logan Airport directly.Biggion characterized
the
Traffic
Management Unit
function
as the
management
ofinformation
by
facilitation
and as one of the
better
functioning
parts
of
government.
Information
is
free-flowing
because
of the
need
to
deal with severe weather
and
with
other
constantly changing conditions. He noted three main points of the collectiveknowledge brought to bear on
9-11
by Boston Center:
1)
Coordination
and
communication were
key
since
the
situation
had not
been
planned
for,
but the
instinct
and
capability
to
deal with crisis scenarios
had
been
firmly
developed;
2)
quality personnel enabled solid communication in Boston Center, but Biggio
had
serious concerns
after
the
impact
at the
Pentagon that
his
Center's
urgency
and
information
was not
being translated
to FAA
operations nationally;
and
3) the
responsiveness
of
Boston Center allowed
for the Sparta/Carmel
corridor
and
all
west bound
traffic
to be
shut down, which saved valuable airspace
for thecoordination of the
complete clearing
of the
skies
to
commercial
air
traffic.
"Airplanes
on
the
ground
can't
hurt you."
Regarding
Boston Center,
FAA
and the Military
Pre-9/11
protocol
for
communicating
a
hijack threat
to the
military
had
been
practiced by as far as
Biggio knew they
had
never practiced intercept procedures.
In
such
exercises
all communication was handled through the ROC.
Once
the first WTC collision was reported, Biggio clearly believed it to be AA11,
and
communicated this
to the
open line with ROC.
It is for
this reason that Biggio
wassurprised
to hear that military and civiliancontrollers in the New York region were stilllooking
for
AA11
after
impact.Biggio noted that there is tension with the military at times over the use ofairspace,
specifically
regarding
use of the
Whiskey
105 and
106 warning areas
off the
coast, but that the tension is normally negligible.
Regarding crisis management preparation and response post-9/11
Biggio noted that
ATC
procedure
has
shifted
from
a
service
focus
to a
homeland
security
focus,
and that some of this change in concentration was due to the critical
incident
stress
debriefing
for the
ATCs
post-9/11. Biggio believes both sides,
FAA and
military,
need education on each-others procedures and capabilities. The Dynamic
Simulation
exercises required for ATCspre-9-11did not stress combinedFAA/militaryscenarios, and Biggio is concerned his ATCs would not have been successful in
coordinating
a military intercept with United Airlines
175.
He
is extremely concerned with the air vulnerability of the
nation's
nuclear powerplants. Since 9/11he hasexperiencedascenarioinwhicha fighterscramblehad not
reached a
nuclear plant
cap in
time
to
escort
an
aircraft
out.
The
incident
had no
adverse
result,but
served
as an
example
of the
need
for
quicker communication
and
response
time,
despite steps like
the 24
hour
DEN
(Defense Event Network), increased attention
toNORAC
communication,and 360degree "confidence
turns"
(an ATCsupervisorcan
request
a pilot
perform
a complete 360 degree circle if there is cause for suspicion of the
aircraft).
Biggio believes that permanent airspace caps over these high risk sites may benecessary.
The
ROC is central, he wouldn't say
"clearinghouse,"
but they have the
communication
bridges. Training-wise they knew information
had to go
through
theROC
because of experience with accidents in the past.
Biggio
was not aware of a "five-minute" standard concerning lostcommunications, per se. His perception was that a controller [and others] just keep going
and
quickly run though a mentalchecklist—checkhis owncomms,try other company (in
this
case
AA)
planes,
try
AFRINC
(ground-based communications system with
thecockpit), and try
Guard (UHF
and VHF
frequencies
devoted specifically
to
emergency
communications.)
Search History:
Result 00 of 00
00 results for result for
p.
T8 B3 Boston Center Terry Biggio Fdr- 9-22-03 2 MFR and 2 Sets Handwritten Notes 749
1.1K
Reads
0
Readcasts
0
Embed Views
More From This User
Notes
Load more
