2. On April 2, 2009 following a four-week jury trial, the jury in thismatter found in favor of Professor Churchill on his Second Claim for Relief-FirstAmendment Retaliation in Terminating Professor Churchill’s Employment.3.The Defendants move this Court to enter judgment as a matter of law in their favor on Professor Churchill’s Second Claim for Relief on the ground that itis barred by the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity.4.Professor Churchill requests the Court order his reinstatement of employment to his former position of fully tenured professor at the University of Colorado, and to provide such further equitable relief as is necessary to vindicate hisrights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.5.For the following reasons I grant Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and deny Professor Churchill’s Motion for Reinstatementof Employment.
I. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of LawBackground
6. As specified in the pleadings and Trial Management Order, theUniversity preserved the defense that it was immune from liability. The parties agreedthat the University would present its immunity arguments after the jury’s verdict because judicial immunities are a legal issue to be determined by a court, not a jury.
See Miller v. Davis
, 521 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that “whether a public official isentitled to absolute immunity is a question of law.)
Crooks v. Maynard
, 913 F.2d 699,700 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating “judicial immunity is a question of law”);
Brewer v. Blackwell
, 692 F.2d 387, 390 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that “whether an official is2