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The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan

The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan

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Published by امام دین
A research article by
Patrick B. Johnston
RAND Corporation
Anoop K. Sarbahi
A research article by
Patrick B. Johnston
RAND Corporation
Anoop K. Sarbahi

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Published by: امام دین on Sep 29, 2013
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The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism inPakistan and Afghanistan
Patrick B. JohnstonRAND CorporationAnoop K. SarbahiStanford UniversityJuly 14, 2013
Abstract
This study analyzes the effects of US drone strikes on terrorism in Pakistan
and Afghanistan. Some theories suggest that drone strikes anger Muslimpopulations, and that consequent blowback incites Islamist terrorism. Others
argue that drone strikes disrupt and degrade terrorist organizations, reducing
their ability to conduct attacks. We use detailed data on U.S. drone strikes
and terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan from 2004-2011 to test each theory’s
implications. We find that drone strikes are associated with decreases in the
incidence and lethality of terrorist attacks, as well as decreases in particularly
intimidating and deadly terrorist tactics, including suicide and improvisedexplosive devices (IED) attacks. These results lend credence to the argument
that drone strikes, while unpopular, have bolstered U.S. counterterrorism effortsin Pakistan and cast doubt on claims that drone strikes are militarily ineffective.
Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2011 Annual Meetings of the AmericanPolitical Science Association, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard
University’s Kennedy School of Government, and the New America Foundation. For helpful feedbackon earlier versions, we thank Peter Bergen, James Dobbins, C. Christine Fair, Melissa Willard-Foster,
Seth G. Jones, Jennifer Keister, Akbar Khan, Peter Krause, Sean Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller,
Jacob N. Shapiro, Arthur Stein, Katherine Tiedemann and Jeremy Weinstein. Johnston acknowledge
financial support from AFOSR Award #FA9550-09-1-0314.
 
1 Introduction
Do drone strikes against terrorists reduce the threat posed by terrorist organizations, ordo they unintentionally increase support for anti-U.S. militants and thus fuel terrorism?
1
.Empirical studies of targeted killings and civilian casualties in counterinsurgencyand counterterrorism show that both outcomes are possible.
2
Strikes conducted byremotely piloted aircraft may undermine counterterrorism efforts or enhance themdepending on the nature of the violence, the intentionality attributed to it, or the
precision with which it is applied.
3
Existing research has studied the effects of coercive
airpower,
4
targeted killings,
5
and civilian victimization,
6
but social scientists have
1
Examples of arguments that drone strikes are ineffective or counterproductive include
Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians From US Drone Practices in Pakistan 
,Stanford Law School and NYU School of Law, September 2012; and Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Why
Drones Fail,”
Foreign Affairs 
, July 1, 2013. Examples of arguments that drone strikes are effective
include C. Christine Fair, “Drone Wars,”
Foreign Policy 
, May 28, 2010; Fair, “For Now, Drones Arethe Best Option,”
New York Times 
, September 26, 2012; and Daniel Byman, “Why Drones Work,”
Foreign Affairs 
, July 1, 2013.
2
Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay, “‘Draining the Sea:’ Mass Killing andGuerrilla Warfare,”
International Organization 
, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring 2004): 375407; Alexander B.
Downes, “Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate
Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy,”
Civil Wars 
, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2007): 420444;
Jessica Stanton,
Strategies of Restraint in Civil War 
(New York: Columbia University, 2009); Jenna
Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,
Security 
Studies 
, Vol. 18, No. 4 (December 2009), pp. 719-755.
3
Stathis N. Kalyvas,
The Logic of Violence in Civil War 
(New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2006); Downes, “Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectivenessof Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy”; Matthew Adam Kocher, Thomas B.Pepinsky, and Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War,”
American Journal of Political Science 
, Vol. 55, No. 2 (April 2011), pp. 201-218.
4
Robert A. Pape,
Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War 
(Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1996); Michael Horowitz and Dan Reiter, “When Does Aerial Bombing Work?Quantitative Empirical Tests, 1917-1999,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 
, Vol. 45, No. 2 (April
2001), pp. 147173.
5
David A. Jaeger, “The Shape of Things to Come? On the Dynamics of Suicide Attacks andTargeted Killings,”
Quarterly Journal of Political Science 
, Vol. 4, No. 4 (December 2009), pp.
315342; Jordan, “When Heads Roll;“ Patrick B. Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work? Assessing theEffectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns,”
International Security 
, Vol.
36, No. 4 (Spring 2012), pp. 47-79; and Bryan Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership
Decapitation Contributes To Counterterrorism,“
International Security 
, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Spring 2012),
pp. 9-46.
6
Kalyvas,
The Logic of Violence in Civil War 
; Jason Lyall, “Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite
Insurgent Attacks?: Evidence from Chechnya,
Journal of Conflict Resolution 
, Vol. 53, No. 3(February 2009), pp. 331362; and Luke Condra and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Who Takes the Blame?
The Strategic Effects of Collateral Damage,”
American Journal of Political Science 
, Vol. 56, No. 1
(January 2012), 167187.
1
 
conducted little empirical analysis of the effects of drone strikes.
7
This lack of attention
is unfortunate: unmanned aerial vehicles, and their lethal targeting capabilities, are
likely to represent a critical aspect of current and future counterterrorism efforts.
The consequences of drone strikes are a critical policy concern. The United Stateshas frequently been called upon to cease drone strikes in Pakistan in order to protect
noncombatants, but instead it has expanded its use of drones to other countriesin which al Qa’ida-affiliated militants are believed to operate, such as Somalia and
Yemen.
8
The laws governing international armed conflict codify and strengthen norms
against targeted killings, yet other interpretations of the laws of war leave civilian
officials and military commanders with substantial latitude to target enemy combatantsbelieved to be affiliated with terrorist organizations against which the U.S. has declared
war.
9
Liberal democratic states face substantial pressures to protect civilians in war,
but at the same time are often confronted with substantial uncertainty as to what
abiding by legal principles such as “discrimination” – the obligation of military forces
to select means of attack that minimize the prospect of civilian casualties – actually
entails.
Drone strikes are not the only instrument the U.S. can use to fight al Qa’ida terror-ists; states have used other methods to fight terrorism for centuries. The effectivenessof drone strikes at countering terrorism lies at the core of U.S. policymakers’ argumentsfor their continued use. Yet because of the drone program’s secretive nature and wide
7
Exceptions include David A. Jaeger and Zahra Siddique, “Are Drone Strikes Effective inAfghanistan and Pakistan? On the Dynamics of Violence between the United States and the
Taliban,
IZA Discussion Paper No. 6262 
, November 2011; and Megan Smith and James Igoe Walsh,“Do Drone Strikes Degrade Al Qaeda? Evidence From Propaganda Output,”
Terrorism and Political 
Violence 
, Vol. 25, No. 2 (February 2013), pp. 311-327.
8
For excellent descriptions of the drone war’s expansion, see Mark Mazzetti,
The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth 
(New York: Penguin Press,
2013); and Jeremy Scahill,
Dirty Wars: The World Is a Battlefield 
(New York: Nation Books, 2013).
9
Christine D. Gray,
International Law and the Use of Force 
(New York: Oxford University Press,
2000).
10
Neta C. Crawford, “Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War,”
Perspectives on Politics 
,Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 2003), pp. 5-25; and Michael Walzer,
Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument 
with Historical Illustrations 
(New York: Basic Books, 2006).
2

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