• Embed Doc
  • Copy Link
  • Readcast
  • Collections
  • CommentGo Back
Download
 
Commission Sensitive
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Event:
Federal Aviation Administration HeadquartersType
of
event: Interview with
May
AvreyDate: Thursday, March25,2004Special Access
Issues:
NonePrepared
by:
Geoffrey
BrownTeam Number:
8
Location:
FAA HQ,
Washington, D.C.Participants - Non-Commission: David Weeguard, FAA Legal CounselParticipants
-
Commission: John
Azzarello,
Miles Kara, Dana Hyde,
Geoffrey
Brown
Note:
Please
refer
to the
recorded interview
for
further
details.
Background:
Avrey started
her
career
in the
Telecommunications
Center of the FAA in
1978.
She
became the Manager of the Washington Operations Center (WOC) in 1991. Avrey is
now
under the Director of Security Operations.
The
WOC, prior
to
September
11,
2001
(9/11),
was
responsible
for
collecting data
on
aircraft
accidents, incidents,
and
operational statistics
from
its
country wide reportingstructure (the FAA Regions). They reported this data to department executives, which attimes included reporting responsibilities to the White House, FBI and military. It was a
twenty
four
hour operation, always
staffed
by two
personnel.
Hijacking
role:
Prior
to
9/11
the WOC
provided information
to the
"office
of
primary
interest";
soin
the case of a hijacking the WOC was required to pass information to the FAA AviationSecurity division
- who
have
the
primary responsibility, working
in
concert with
the
other
offices
of the
FAA,
of
bringing
the
hijacking
crisis
to a
safe
resolution.There
was a set
list
of
individuals
to be
notified
in the
case
of a
crisis.
The
individuals
notified
include
the
Administrator through
to the
Secretary
of
Transportation.
The
manager
of the WOC is
responsible
for
notification,
but
ultimately
the
Administrator
and
the
Deputy Administrator have
final
say as to who is
notified.
Other areas around the WOC: 1) The Aviation Command (or crisis) Center (ACC)
-
where security responds, this area includes communication capabilities with largely
the
operations center personnel in control of those communications. Each position has multi-
line
phones
and
Secure Telephone Units (STUs);
and 2) A
SCIF
office
for
secure
intelligence.
Commission Sensitive
 
Commission Sensitive
Communications capabilities:
In
order
to
pass
notifications
in the
case
of a
hijack
they
used speed
dial
programs
on
from
the phone. There were phones and television
feeds
from
the WOC into theadministrative
office
conference room,
from
which they
can
monitor ongoing activities
of
their operations
staff.
The network had a conference bridge with a 240 dynamic portcapability. This conference capability handles multiple phone conferences.In thecaseof ahijackingthe WOC
staff
isresponsiblefor
notifying
theappropriate agencies separately
before
FAA Civil Aviation Security (ACS) makes thedecision to establish a Primary Net teleconference.
Avrey's reporting structure:
Avrey reportedto DanNoel,theManagerofEmergency Operations. Noelreported directly to the Deputy Administrator's (Monte Belger)
staff.
Since 9/11, Belgercreated the Director of Emergency Operations position, which bypasses
staff
and reportsdirectlyto theDeputy Administrator.
Pre-9/11
hijacking protocol:
In
theeventof a
hijacking,
the WOCwould look towardsthe FAARegional
Office
for
information.
If it was
decided that
it was an
actual event,
the WOC
wouldspeak with the ACS and ACS would make the decision to set up a Primary or Tactical
net.
ACI, theintelligence divisionofaviation security (intelligence watch),atwenty-fourhouroperation that had overlapping
shifts,
would also be involved. Avrey noted that areport of a hijack could come through the intelligence watch, one of the air
traffic
centers
or
through
a
media report.Tactical
net -
establishing
the
tactical
net is
dependent
on
ACS'
decision
on who
and
what entities need to be informed of an event. The person running the AviationCommand Center (ACC) makesthedecisionof who is on theTactical net.ThePrimary
net
has an established list of agencies. These organizations have operations centers, andthat is where any calls are
filtered.
The Secret Service is one such organization, and on
9/11
their
twenty-four
hour operation center was notified.
Live
hijack exercise:
Avrey
was a participant in the management of a live hijacking exercise referred to
as
Polar Star. [Commission
staff
believes thismay be the
NORAD/FAA
Twin Starexercise that occurred in the
1990s]
She was only an observer, and did not have anyresponsibilities for operational decisions. The
exercise
proceeded
based
on thedocumentation on hijacking procedures. They tested their conference bridge and use of
the
ACC, as well as tested the communication capability with the FAA Facilities andRegions. Avrey
informed
Commission
staff
that there was a
"hotwash"
of the exercise.
Commission Sensitive
 
Commission Sensitive
She
could not recall details of this document, but does recall it discussed the various"injects"from theagency.
This
was thelargestof theexercises, sinceitinvolvedtheCanadians,
an air
carrier,
and the
FBI.She believes there have been
a
number
of
exercises
of
this type.
She
believesCommission
staff
could speak
to
security
staff
personnel
for
more information
onhijacking
exercise. The Deputy Administrator
staff
was responsible for developing theseexercises.
Lufthansa:
Avrey experienced the
Lufthansa
event and its coordination, and recalls it being a
"protracted event"
that
involved considerable
amount
of
coordination
between
NORAD,
the FAA and the Canadians.9/11:Avrey reported
to
work
at
7:OOAM
for a
staff
change. There were
two
people
onduty,
and she and Sharon Battle were contacted by Jessie McGee. McGee
informed
her ofa call from New England Region regarding a possible hijack. McGee
briefed
her on thecalland theactionshetook.His
first
actionwas tocall ACI (FAA Civil AviationIntelligence), and establish a conference between ACI, the New England Region andWOC. She does not know who at the ACI was on duty at that time. She knew how tooperate the bridge and the equipment so she was able to answer calls, but Battle andMcGee made most
of the
telephone notifications.
The WOC
received
a
"flood"
of
"extra"
volunteer
staffing.
She tried to manage the executives and the
information
they received.Belger arrived "relatively early
in
this
process",
as
well
as a
security executive,
and a
public
affairs
executive.Avrey doesnotrecallif aTacticalnet wasestablished,but shebelieves thataPrimary net was
(staffed)
by the ACC.The list of notifications was split between Sharon Battle and Jessie McGee, andtheyhaddiscretionon how thenotifications were started dependent uponthecredibility
of
the
information.
The first report was of one hijacking
"with
an
open..
.witha keyedmicrophone". She did not know if the information was passed that it was the pilot or the
hijacker
that keyed the microphone, nor does she know quickly
thereafter
the
information
arrived that there were more
hijacks.
Avrey was not involved in building the Primary net conference, and believes thedirection to set up this net came from the intelligence watch supervisor. Avrey does notknow if Boston Center (ZBW) was entered into the net initially, and commented that
typically
the WOC has a facilities log that would record which entities became netparticipants.
Commission Sensitive
of 00

Leave a Comment

You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...
You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...