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CommissionSensitive
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Event:Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) HeadquartersType of event: Interview with James SlateDate: April 19, 2004Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by:
Geoffrey
BrownTeam Number:
8
Location: FAA Headquarters Building, Washington, D.C.
Participants
-
Non-Commission: Brook
Avery,
Chief
Consul
Office,
FAA
Participants - Commission: Team 8: John
Azzarello,
Miles Kara,
Geoffrey
BrownNote: Please
refer
to the
recorded interview
for
further
details.
Background:
Slate joined the FAA in 1983 as an Air
Traffic
Controller (ATC) in Raleigh,North Carolina.Heworkedfor ayearat FAAHeadquarters, returnedtoRaleigh,andthen
in
1996
returned to Headquarters. In 1998 he was assigned to National Tower as theAssistant Facility Manager.
September
11,
2001
(9/11):
Slate arrived at National Tower shortly
after
10:OOAM.
When he arrived at theTRACON (Terminal Radar Control) his OMIC, Bob Laser,
informed
him of a
fourth
aircraft
en route to Washington, DC.
Post
9/11:
As the Acting Facility Manager, Slate stayed on duty for "the next several
days".
He had a Specialist secure the data
from
the
day's
logs, recordings, and statements, andprovide that information to the Quality Assurance Branch at Eastern Region. The originaldata remainedat the
facility.
Questions
from
the Region prompted Slate to listen to tapes
from
National. PerthedirectionofBill PeacockandDarlene Freeman, Slatewasresponsibleforputting
"some"
briefing papers together for the Administrator to
refer
to in her appearance
before
Congress. Also involved in Darlene Freeman's group, to his recollection, was JamesAerosmith. There were
functional focus
groups under various lines of business forFreeman. Slate workedon Air
Traffic,
and was theleadfor the
briefing
papers.Oneissuepaper
was on
coordination
and
communication,
and
Slate
"believes"
he
received
the
information
for
this
effort
from
David
Cannoles,
Doug Gould, Tony
Ferrente,
Scott Bing,
and
Jack Keis (at the Herndon Command Center). Slate brought
from
a NORAD entity
Commission Sensitive
 
Commission
Sensitive
data
from
the FAA side of communication with the military. He did not speak to the
military
to receive these logs. The information was given to him by New England Region
(Bill
Ellis), Great Lakes (Nancy Shelton) and Eastern Region (Air
Traffic
DivisionManagers,
either
Frank Hatfield
or
Rick
DuCharme).
Slatedoes not recall exactly when he completed this work, but it was certainly
before
the
Administrator's
meeting. Slate believesheworkedtheweekend
after
9/11,
butdoes not recall the timing of his tasking. He believes that part of his
effort
was to look fortimes
for
military notification.Slate's
end
products were "one
or two
page talking point
papers".
The
issues were
on
military notification, transponders,
the
timing
of
traffic
management instructions
- he
handed his work to Darlene Freeman. The Director of Air
Traffic,
Bill Peacock, oversaw
all
this work. The "one paper I did on military notifications" was addressed operations
notifications.
He gave the notes to Mary Ellen Kraus (Special Assistant or Chief of
Staff).
Hereceivednofeedbackor
follow-on
questions.As Slate recalls, the point paper on notifications was referred to as "Air
Traffic
Coordination with
Military".
He believes that his paper was one page. He recalls that hewas told to use only the FAA timeline, but decided to contact the military regardingmilitary
information.
He approached this through Col Atkins.Slatedoes recall
at
some point during this
effort
NORAD published
its own
timeline, but does not know if the FAA was involved in any way. Slate did not
specifically
know about a disagreement with the military, but his job was solely to deal
with
the FAA
side
of a
chronology.
He
"just heard
on the
macro-scale"
that there
was
contentionover the correct chronology between the military and the FAA.Slateexplained that therewas oneentry pointat the FAA for thedata thatwasused for thechronology,andthenthevarious groups took
from
that data whateverwaspertinent to their own assignments.
The
military liaison could have been informed
by one of the
ATCs
for an
aircraft
of
interest, and, according to Slate, this could be interpreted that there was a notification
to
the military. [Note: Commission
staff
is clear that neither the FAA Center positionMOS(Military Operations Supervisor)or theMilitary Liaison positionat FAAHeadquarters (Col. Cheryl Atkins)
fills
theresponsibilityofbeingachannelto the
military
for
hijack
and/or
fighter
escortprotocols.
For
further
information,
please
consultthe MFRs for Col Cheryl Atkins and ZBQ MOS Collin Scoggins.]Slate believes the ATCs (air
traffic
controllers) at Cleveland Center (ZOB)believedthatAA 77 hadcrashed,and
notified
theNational GuardsandState Police.Hebelieves Cleveland Center attempted to
find
UAL 93 through the use of a military
aircraft.
Commission
Sensitive

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