• Embed Doc
  • Copy Link
  • Readcast
  • Collections
  • CommentGo Back
Download
 
UNCLASSIFIED
COMMISSION
SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE
RECORD
Event:
Jeff Griffith,
Former
FAA
Assistant Director
of Air
Traffic
ControlType: InterviewDate: March 31,2004Special
Access
Issues: NonePrepared
By:
Lisa Sullivan
Team: 8
Participants
(non-Commission): None
Participants
(Commission): Lisa Sullivan, Miles Kara, John Farmer, Dana Hyde, and
John
AzzarelloLocation: GSA Conference Room
Background
Griffith
spent 36 years in the FAA. He retired from the FAA in November
2002,
Currently,he is
consulting
on air
traffic
management
in
foreign countries including China
and
Columbia.
He
enlisted
in the
U.S.
Air
Force
in
1966
and was
trained
as air
traffic
controller.
He
spent
a
year
in
Vietnam.
In
January
of
1970
he was
discharged
and
went
to the FAA as
controller.
He as
stationed
in
Georgia; then
in
1976
he
went
intomanagement;
in1990,he
became
the
manager
at
Indianapolis
Center;
he
managedChicago
O'Hare
for several years; he went to Great Lakes Region; in
1999
or 2000, hewasselected
as
deputy director
of air
traffic
(AT-2)
-
that
was his
position
on
9-11.
The
operations budget
was 3.5
billion
dollars
to
operate
all the ATC
facilities
on day to
day basis (500 plus). The director of Air
Traffic
(his
boss)
was
Bill
Peacock. Peter
Challen
was the associate; then Steve Brown; then Monte Belger; then JaneGarvey.
15
people reported directly
to
Griffith
including
nine regional division managers
and acoupleof
staff people.
On a day to day
basis,
he
reviewed
the
previous day's operations. They experienced
onaverage ten
break downs
and
problems
in the
system.
He
also received
daily
briefingsfrom
the
Command Center on delays and congestion, runway
incursions-anything
that
affected safety.
He had
meetings
to go to on
budget/modernization
of the air
traffic
system
-
strategy
meetings
-
meetings
with
the
NTSB
on
closing
out
certain recommendations
-
they
wereUNCLASSIFIED
1
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 
UNCLASSIFIEDCOMMISSION SENSITIVEconstantly looking
at
more
efficient
use of
money,
and
they were always answering
to the
Congress
on
this. There
was a lot of
IG
activity.
Primary radar capabilities
The FAA had issued a paper a decision document to decommission them. However
many
there were they are very expensive to maintain. Some
were
30 to 40 years old ASR1 and 2 radar systems. The quality wasn't that great.On
top of the
radar dish
is a
secondary
radar.
It is
getting similar information
as the
primary radar. Secondary radar does not pick up "skin
paint;"
it takes all thedata/electronicallytransmitted information
on the
aircrafts.
The
secondary radar
is
muchcheaper for this
reason.
The decision was made the primary radar was no longer needed
in
some environments.Primary
was
needed
in the
terminal environment
- a
range
of 60
miles
from the
airport
-
there are about 200 of them. The
likelihood
of a collision below
20,000
feet
was greater
that
vicinity.
Griffith
thought eliminating primary radar outside
of the
terminal environment would
not
compromise safety.The actual decommissioning of ASR 1 and 2 models was to be enacted by turning off the
hi-voltage
at selected sites. The decommissioning of the models meant that the supply
parts and
personnel required
to
maintain
the
systems could
be
sent elsewhere.
It
wasn't
a
phase
out -
secondary radar would
still
be at the
sites.
The
date
of
decommission
had not
been set as of September
11.
NTSB had issues with the
FAA's
plan. "The NTSB was obsessed with notion
that
an
aircraft
without transponder would collide
with
a
plane
full
of
people."
A
plane
as a
weapon, or a purposeful turning off of the transponder, was not thought of; it was only a
mechanical
malfunction
they were concerned about.
In
the
last
15
years,
Griffith
doesn't recall
an
aircraft
losing transponder capability above
15,000
feet.
Ifradar capabilityislost,thecontroller's
response
is toprotecttheroute
from
point
to
point
and the
altitude.
It was
very typical
to
lose radio
for a
period
of
time.
The
loss
of
transponder
was
"unusual,
but it
happened". When
it
occurred,
it was
never
for
an
extended period
of
time.
If an
aircraft
lost
a
transponder
for the
duration
of a
transcontinental
flight,
that
would
be
very
unusual and it would be reported up to
HDQTs.
Each facility
keeps
a log daily that
is
reported
up to
Command Center.
Relationship
with
the
Military
UNCLASSIFIEDCOMMISSION SENSITIVE
 
UNCLASSIFIEDCOMMISSION SENSITIVE
A
Joint Military
and
Civilian Group looked
at the
uses
of the
common operating
facility
and was led by
GeneralEberhardt
from the
military side
and Jim
Washington
from FAA
side (Director
of
Requirements). There were
a lot of
people working
on
that.Themilitary wanteda 3-Ddisplayand aone-second update rateon thenewest radar theyinvested in. Griffith's opinion is that the FAA didn't need that level of
definition
toseparate airplanes. "You don't want to put this in operational environment because of theservicing
issues."
He wasn't on the team that was discussing these issues with the
military
(through
the
Joint
Military
and
Civilian
Group).
Lack
of Radar
Coverage
We had
coverage
charts
we
know
all the
gaps. Mountainous terrain
causes
loss
of
primaryandsecondary radar.In theeasternUSthere were
some
gaps, includingPA.
Griffith
thought that gaps in radar coverage were commonly known information, and he
felt
certain thatthecontrollerin thegeographic region would have received trainingat thecenteron any
gaps
incoverage that existed.
Regional
offices maintain the coverage charts. The idea was to provide the
information
to the
facility
in
non-technical
format.
We
didn't want them interpreting
the
informationat
thecenters themselves.
AAL77
The controller was trained to separate everything in front of
that
aircraft. The
aircraft
hasalwayscontinuedto adestinationor aplanned routeof flight.Thatwas thescenario they
trained
for.
If the
controller knew
a
lost target
was in the
system,
the
controller would
look
ahead. Meanwhile,theplane turned aroundandwenttheother way.The
AAL
77 controller did not see anything to the front or to the right of the track
after
the hijacker turned the transponder off. There was no primary radar coverage, so he wasunable to see it.
Griffith
doesn't know thatto betrue.Every gapshouldbememorializedandmade clearto thecontroller.Herecallsageneralknowledge that some
of
these planes were
not
seen
on
primary radar,
but he
cannot
verify.
Controllers were
not
trained
-
there
was no
training
for
radar environment with both
primary
and secondary radars in use.Thecontrollersareabletotrackit atbothZBW(Boston Center)and
ZNY
(New York
Center).
The controllers inIndyworking AAL 77 had the same equipment as ZBW and ZNY. Heknowshow the system works.UNCLASSIFIEDCOMMISSION
SENSITIVE
of 00

Leave a Comment

You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...
You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...