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Commission
Sensitive
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Event:
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) HeadquartersType
of
event:
Interview
with
Tony
Ferrante
Date: April
19,
2004
Special
Access Issues: NonePrepared
by:
Geoffrey
BrownTeam Number:8
Location:
FAA Headquarters Building, Washington, D.C.Participants - Non-Commission: Brook Avery, Chief Consul
Office,
FAA
Participants
- Commission: Team 8: John Azzarello, Miles Kara,
Geoffrey
Brown
Note:
Please
refer
to the
recorded interview
for
further
details.
Background:
Ferrante beganhiscareer withthe FAA in 1982
after
tenmonthsas amilitarycontroller. He was a controller at
Pittsburg
Tower, in Miami, and in 1988 took a
Staff
position.
In
1989
was a
Supervisor
for
Miami Tower,
and in
1991
was an
AssistantManager. In1993he became a Specialist in Civil Operations at FAA Headquarters. In1994 he was promoted to Assistant Division Manager of Civil Ops. In 1995 he became
Manager
Terminal Flight Service Operations and Procedures (ATO-120). In 1997 hebecame Assistant Manager of Air
Traffic
Investigations(AAT-201).In 1998 he became
the
Manager of Air
Traffic
Investigations (AAT-200). He has had various details since.
In
the
fall
of 2001 Ferrante reported to David
Cannoles
(AAT-20). AAT-20 isresponsible
for
Evaluations
and
Investigations. Ferrante headed
the
Investigationsdivision. Cannoles reported
to
Jeff Griffith
and
Bill Peacock.
September 11,2001 (9/11):
On
9/11 Ferrante was in Chicago. When he returned to the FAA Headquarters
building
on September 12,
2001,
he immediately began to oversee what
information
hadbeen gathered.
The
forerunner
of the DEN
line
had
been established,
and he
checked thatline
periodically.
He met
with
the FBI and
began
turning
over
information
and
datarecords. Cannoles
and
Doug Gould were present
as
well. They reviewed
air
traffic
controller (ATC) tapes, controller statements, facilities logs and Ferrante reviewed
SATORI
radar data. Ferrante believes the Doug Gould reviewed the SATORI with theFBI.
Traffic
Situational Displays (TSDs) were located
in the
offices
of
Monte Belger,
Mike
Sorello (sixth
floor), Jeff Griffith,
the Air
Crisis Center (ACC),
and
"perhaps"
BillPeacock's room. Ferrante believes snapshots
of the air
traffic
system shut down
from
the
Commission Sensitive
 
Commission
Sensitive
TSD were provided to the FBI. Some TSD data was used in the
FAA's
Summary
of
Air
Hijacking
Events.
On Thursday
13
September 2001
Ferrante
and his colleagues beganreconstructing events of the attacks for the aforementioned FAA book. TheAdministrator, Jane
Garvey,
wanted more information and materials on what hade takenplace.
Cannoles
specified that he wanted the exact data that recorded the events. Theparameters weretostart
from
thetaxi instructions givento the
aircraft,
throughthepointwherethe flightswere receivedby air
traffic
control,andthenup to thepointatwhichthe
hijack
was confirmed. Their primary resources were
facility
logs, personnel statements,radar
data, and
voice
data.
In the
normal
investigative
progress,
the
record
is
five
minutes
before
theinitial contact withthe air
traffic
systemto fiveminutes
after
thelast contactwith
the air
traffic
system.Ferrante specifically noted that for every entry in their log book there is anunderlyingdocument.Ferrante believes Col. Atkins,
as the
military
liaison,
may
have been exposed
to
any
NEADS
logsin
possession
of the FAAduring their timeline
efforts.
Ferrante knows
of
no classified documents that contributed to the FAA timetable. Ferrante had hisassistant gather the chronology information and gave the reports
from
Dave Cannoles at
"somepoint"
on the
afternoon
of
September
16, 2001.
During
his
normal course
of
work,
if
aninvestigation indicates that there were
traffic
violations, thentheinvestigator will
seek
toreviewall thematerials
from
all thefacilities.Ferrante knows that John Whitewasmonitoringthe FAATacticalNet
from
Herndon Command Center. He also understood that the
Herndon
Command Center mighthave been running two or three separate lines at the time with the facilities.Ferrante stated thatthe
Summary
of
Air
Hijacking
Events
wasdesigned
specifically
to explain how the air
traffic
system performed; not how FAA Headquartersoperated. The item was created
specifically
to formally brief the FAA senior executives.Ferrante
further
explained that Washington Operations Center (WOC) notificationof aneventis not included in such an item. The item would contain the technical issues that arepertinent to what was done in the air
traffic
system to address an event.Ferrante understands that the military notification times on
9/11
become an issue,
but
that
notification
to the WOC was never addressed.
Ferrantee
explained that thetasking to uncover notification issues was
focused
on how the facilities communicatedregarding the aircraft. They also addressed when the air
traffic
system partook in
notifying
themilitary.Ferrante did not personally look at the communications that originated
from
FAAHeadquarters on
9/11,
and is not aware that this
effort
was made by any of his colleagues.
Commission Sensitive
of 00

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