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He subprime crisis peaked in September 2008 following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Many forecast that 2009-10 would be the year of reckoning for the Indian economy and for Indian banking, both of which had successfully weathered the crisis until then. I disagreed. I said that banking would be a bright spot in the economy given the strengths inherent in the sector. The pessimists have been proved wrong about the Indian economy the economy is projected to grow at more than 7% in 2009-10 . They are going to be proved even more wrong about the banking sector. The Bankex has outperformed the Sensex during April-December 2009. It rose by 123% while the Sensex rose by 73%. In 2008-09 , the Bankex had declined by 40%, a little more than the decline of 37% in the Sensex. We have to await the details of financial performance for 2009-10 but the RBIs Report on Trend and Progress in Banking (2008-09 ) tells us what happened last year and gives us clues to what we might expect this year. It is indeed a revelation. In the midst of the worst financial crisis of the century and when banks in the industrial world were falling apart, the Indian banking sector fared as well as in the boom years. Banks managed a return on assets of 1% in both 2007-08 and 2008-09 , slightly higher than the 0.9% return of 2006-07 . This should place the Indian banking sector amongst the most profitable in the world today . Banks elsewhere saw their capital eroded and required infusions of capital from governments. In India, capital adequacy actually improved in 2008-09 . What better indicators of banking soundness do you need than world-class profitability and improved capital in the midst of devastation in the banking sector worldwide? After the Lehman collapse, pundits forecast that the moment of reckoning for Indian banks had arrived following years of commercial credit growth of around 30%. They said banks would face a mountain of nonperforming assets (NPAs) as Indian companies and the housing sector felt the impact of the global crisis. There are models that predict that a sustained credit boom leads to bank failures and even a banking crisis. This did not happen in 2008-09 and is unlikely to happen in 2009-10 either. Bad times for the economy spell lower credit growth. In 2007-08 , commercial credit growth slowed to 22%. It slowed further to 18% in 2008-09 . But banks maintained their return on assets in 2008-09 at the same level as in the preceding boom years of 2004-08 . This is truly astonishing . It suggests that no matter what the ups and downs of the economy, the Indian banking sector can deliver a return of 1% on assets, a benchmark of good performance in banking. India today seems to have a crisis-proof banking sector. What explains this phenomenon? One, banks ability to sustain spreads return on advances minus cost of funds at all times. Volume growth slowed down in the last two years. But the spread on loans actually increased in 2008-09 . A key factor driving large spreads in Indian banking is the high proportion of current and savings account (Casa) deposits. These account for a more a third of all deposits in Indian banking. Banks pay zero interest on current accounts and 3.5% on savings accounts. Secondly, banks have woken up to the potential for fee income. Apart from conventional products that generate fees such as letters of credit, guarantees and mortgage products, banks now generate fee income from sale of mutual fund and insurance products. Thirdly, falling interest rates in a slowdown lead to a surge in treasury profits on banks investment in government securities. By the same token, rising interest rates in boom periods
should cause these profits to decline. They do, but there have been other offsetting factors: gains on equities and foreign exchange products. Fourthly, the slowdown that we have seen in the past two years has not caused any increase in provisions on account of rising NPAs. That is because a deceleration from 9% to 7% may mean lower growth in earnings but it hardly spells disaster for companies. Besides, companies entered the crisis with sound balance-sheets after five boom years. There was a large increase in housing prices before the slowdown but this does not appear to be a bubble. It is based on genuine demand and increased affordability. Experts told us that Indias antiquated banking sector was constraining growth. Reforms in the financial sector would deliver another two percentage points of growth. We have since found that the banking sector can support economic growth of 9%. Banks, of course, need to do more. We need more sophisticated products. There is the challenge of financial inclusion. But those who urge banking sector reforms need to tell us what exactly needs fixing in a system that aint broke.
25000 lives annually(as on 31st day of March) from social sector. Most companies have complied with these requirements. The number of life policies sold in the last two years in rural areas were 12.6 million in 2007-08 and 15.6 million in 2008-09.Similarly 25,000 lives from the social sector have been covered. To achieve this life insurance companies had to open more than two-thirds of 11,700 branches in rural and semi-urban areas without any statutory intervention. In the case of general insurance companies 5 per cent policies are required to be underwritten in rural areas. Compliance is strictly monitored by IRDA and in case of noncompliance companies have been fined. Sebi has not prescribed any minimum stipulation for mutual funds to distribute products in rural areas or cover people in the social sector. There is also no stipulation like in case of banks that certain minimum branches will be opened in non city and non metro areas. This has lead to concentration of mutual fund branches in urban areas with 75 % of the turnover arising from 16 major towns. One can only guess the reasons for this. One argument can be that equity investments are speculative in nature and it will not be desirable to expose investors in non metro centres to these risks. But if one looks at the responses to some of the large IPOs and the data about number of sub brokers being added in the stock exchanges and the number of demat accounts being opened in non-metro areas, the argument for not making mutual fund industry participate in inclusive growth can hardly be convincing. Notwithstanding the above the bulk of funds with the industry are debt funds. Certainly people in rural and semi urban areas need to be encouraged to save under these secure schemes rather than allow them fall to the temptation of entrusting their savings to informal sector and lose their hard earned money. This business may not be as profitable as in the major cities but is in tandem with the road map for growth envisaged by our Government. The regulatory indulgence is quite surprising. The new NPS is of recent origin. It is too early for any mandated rural foray. But it will be advisable to lay a long term inclusive growth pattern and to make it mandatory at some future point of time. Merely hoping that various POPs in the rural or semi urban areas will get some business may lead the beneficiaries under the scheme to be confined to cities and urban areas as in case of mutual funds. While some major initiatives have been taken in ensuring that financial sector touches all sections in the country there is inconsistency in approach. It is high time that a composite policy is put in place to ensure that all participants in the financial sector contribute to the inclusive growth of the economy.