3developments mean that the State's capacity to capture, store and useprivate communications is greater than ever before.2.
Kennedy v United Kingdom
(2011) 52 EHRR 4 at , this Court recognisedthat the evident risk of arbitrariness in a secret power to interceptcommunications rendered it
to have clear, detailed rules oninterception, especially as the technology available for doing so is becomingcontinually more sophisticated. It observed at  that it would be contraryto the rule of law for the legal discretion granted for interception to beexpressed in terms of an unfettered power. It also observed (at ) that"
indiscriminate capturing of vast amounts of communications is not permittedunder the internal communications provisions of the Regulation of InvestigatoryPowers Act 2000
"). The Court has also held that Article 8 jurisprudence must adapt to technological developments in
(2008) 46 EHRR SE5 at , and observed that in the context ofrapidly developing telecommunications technology, legislative frameworksgoverning the safeguarding of private information and electroniccorrespondence must be
Uzun v Germany
(2012) 54EHRR 121 at ).3.
This Application is made because recent reporting in the news mediaaround the world indicates that technologies have now been developed,and have for some time been in use, which
permit the indiscriminatecapture of vast quantities of communication data, which can then be passedbetween States, and which is not subject to any sufficiently precise orascertainable legal framework and is beyond effective legal scrutiny.4.
The two programmes which are challenged by this Application are:4.1.
The soliciting or receipt and use by the UK intelligence services
, of data obtained from foreign intelligence partners, inparticular
the US National Security Agency’s “PRISM” and“UPSTREAM
receipt of foreign interceptdata