COMMISSION
SENSITIVETHETHREAT: DEFININGTHEPROBLEMTerrorism
is not the
enemy,
terrorism
is a
tactic.
1
Lorry
M.
Fenner
The
US government and military have not yet fully transitioned from Cold War andIndustrial Age thinking and postures to face Information Age, transnational threatseffectively. Catastrophic terrorist attacks
are not the
only significant challenges
we
face,
but
the
attacks
of
September
11,
2001 have shown
us in
dramatic terms that
we can no
longer adjust gradually to globalization and the new era. We must move much morerapidly to posture and equip our people, our government and the
intelligence
community
to
combat this challenge
as
well
as
other transnational challenges (those known
and
thosenot yetanticipated).
Hypothesis:
The
Intelligence
Community
(1C)
and
policy makers
did not
understandthe threat to US national security in the late
1990s.
We focused too narrowly on UsamaBin Laden (UBL), and then incrementally enlarged that focus to
al
Qa'ida seniorleadership (AQSL).
The
narrow focus
and ad hoc
changes made creating
a
comprehensive and appropriate US Government (USG) strategy difficult. This, in turn,made the development of an effective intelligence strategy nearly impossible. Since
9/11
our
focus
has
changed.
Now it is too
broad
- a
global
war on
terrorism (GWOT).
2
Our
strategy must
be
grander than
one
that only addresses
a
tactic; terrorism.Although others reject this notion, we posit that the threat is ideological
-violent
Islamicextremism.
We do not
posit
a
"clash
of
civilizations", however
whether our
adversary
is
one
group,
al
Qa'ida,
or a
network
of
groups,
we
must address this ideology,
and we
must analyze
the
adversary's
goals
andstrategy.
3
Only then
can we
truly understand
why
the US is a
target. Only then
can we
design
a
strategy
or set of
strategies witheffective
campaign plans
andtacticsto
defeat
our adversaries.
4
First, this paper posits our adversary's strategy including notional "ends, ways,
and
means." Next,
is a
review
of the
security environment
and
terrorism
and the
intelligence attempts to assess and respond to these. While we had a general National
Intelligence
Estimate(NIE)
and an
update,
in the
absence
of a
comprehensiveassessment specifically of al Qa'ida, the
Counterterrorism
Center worked from a
narrow,
DCI
approved "plan".
The
paper ends with
a
call
for an
appropriate assessment
of
the threat and proposes possibilities that would bring us closer to being able todesignaneffective strategy.
Many
books have been written about the threat, terrorism, and strategy. This is not meant to be
a
comprehensive review
or
overview,
but a
thumbnail sketch
of our
framework
for
analysis.
2
Jeffrey
Record, "Bounding
the
Global
War on
Terrorism,"
Strategic
Studies Institute, December
2003.
3
Bard
O'Neill,
Insurgency &
Terrorism:
Inside
Modern Revolutionary
Warfare,
Brassey's
Inc.,Washington, 1990.
O'Neill
providesaframeworkforanalysis.
4
Combating
Terrorism
in a
Globalized
World,
National
War College, May
2002
is one example of
an analysis of a "pansurgency" and
designing ends,
ways
and
means
to
respond.
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
1
2/25/2004
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