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Bonnie D. Jenkins
Bush
at War
One
question that would always linger was whether they had moved
fast
enough on athreat that had been identified by the CIA as one of the top three
facing
the country,whether September
11
was as much a
failure
of policy as it was of intelligence.
P.
5Re: Afghanistan. One option that had been considered was a clandestine helicopter-borne
night
assault on bin Laden with a small, elite US military Special Forces unit of roughly40 men. It would require aerial refueling, as the helicopters would have to fly some 900miles. But they were spooked by the
1980
Desert One operation President Carter hadordered to
rescue
the American hostages held in Iran when several
aircraft
had crashed in
the
desert, and the downing of two Blackhawk helicopters in Somalia during a 1993mission, whichhad led to
18
American deaths.Themilitary saidaraidon binLaden
might
fail
and could involve substantial US casualties. Intelligence reports also showedthat bin Laden had his key lieutenants keep their
families
with the entourage, and Clintonwas opposed to any operation that might kill women and children.
A US
Special
Forces unit
and US
submarines capable
of firing
cruise
missiles
were put on alert, but they required six to ten hours advance warning about bin
Laden's
future
location.
p. 20
Re:
use of the military.
Rumsfeld
told Bush that during the eight years of Clinton, the
natural
pattern when challenged or attacked had been a "reflexive
pullback"-
caution,
safe
plays, even
squeamishness.
The Clinton weapon of choice was the
standoff
cruise missile.
Rumsfeld
left
no
doubt
in
Bush's mind that when that moment came,
as it
surely would,
that
the United States was threatened, he, as secretary of
defense,
would be coming to thepresident to unleash the military. The president could expect a
forward
leaning plan.
p.
25Re: Afghanistan. The military, which seemed to have contingency plans for the mostinconceivable scenarios,had noplansforAfghanistan,thesanctuaryof binLadenand hisnetwork.
There
was nothing on the
shelf
that could be pulled down to provide at least anoutline. This was not a surprise for the secretary of defense. Now he turned to Myers with
a
message: When I've asked
to see
various plans, I've
not
been
happy with what I'veseen. They are neither imaginative nor creative. Clearly the plans are old and have been
on
the shelf for too long. I've just not been happy.
We've
got a long way to go. You need
to
know
that."
P. 32
Since the military had no plan and no
forces
in the immediate area, he wanted to keepexpectations low. He dropped a bomb, telling them that some
major
strikes could take up
to
60daysto puttogether.
 
p. 39
Though Rice and the others were developing a plan to eliminate
al
Qaeda, no
formal
recommendations had ever been presented to the president.
p. 43
Re: Afghanistan. Bush pressed
Rumsfeld
on what the military could do immediately."Very little, effectively," the secretary replied. Though
Rumsfeld
did not get into all the
details, he was
having
a
difficult
time
getting
some military plans
on his
desk.
GeneralTommyFranks, the commander in chief or
CINC
of the US Central Command(CENTCOM), which was responsible for South Asia and the Middle East, had told him itwould take months
to get
forces
in the
area
and
plans drawn
up for a
major militaryassaultin
Afghanistan..
.Franks
wanted basesandthisandthat. Afghanistanwas
halfway
around the world. Al Qaeda was a guerilla organization whose members lived in caves,rode mules
and
drove large sport-utility vehicles.
p.
44Re:Afghanistan. Bush believed the Pentagon needed to be pushed. "They had yet to be
challenged
to think on how to
fight
a guerilla war using conventional means..
.They
hadcome
out
from
a era of
strike
from
afar
- you
know, cruise missiles into
the thing."
p.
50Re:Afghanistan. "The military strategy was going to take a while to
unfold..
.1
becamefrustrated."
p. 53
Re: Afghanistan and the CIA. "I was impressed by their [the CIA's] knowledge of thearea.
We've
had assets there for a long period of time. They had worked, had beenthinking through
things."
p. 62
Re: Afghanistan. Shelton
offered
a pessimistic assessment of the immediate militaryoptions. The contingency plans on the shelf were only cruise missiles against trainingcamps. "It's just digging
holes."
Rumsfeld
said they needed new tasks for the military if
they
wantedto go
after
states harboringbinLaden.
"We've
never done that before."
Bush
was concerned that the war cabinet had not had
sufficient
time to really debate andevaluatetheir course of action, consider the options and plans.
p. 62
Re: Afghanistan. Bush:
"This
is a new
world.. .General
Shelton should go back to thegenerals
for new
targets. Start
the
clock. This
is an
opportunity.
I
want
a
plan
-
costs,time. I need options on the table. I want
Afghan
options by Camp David. I want decisions
quick."
Rumsfeld
was
trying
to
push
the
Pentagon.
 
p. 63
Re:
Afghanistan. Bush: "Everything
is on the
table..
.Look
at the
options."
He
also saidthat
the
British really wanted
to participate.
"Give
them
a
role.
Time
is of the
essence."
p. 64
Re: Afghanistan. Rumsfeld was under
pressure.
He had no military plans and thepresident was going to war.
p. 79
Re:
Afghanistan. Bush had ordered the Pentagon to come to the meeting with plenty of
options, and
Shelton
was
prepared
to
talk about military action against both Afghanistan
and, if
pressed, Iraq.
He had
three general options
for
Afghanistan.
One
- a
strike with cruise missiles,
a
plan
the
military could execute quickly
if
speed
was
the
president's
overriding priority. The targets included all
al
Qaeda's
training camps.
Problems:
the camps were empty. It also might have well been labeled the Clinton option.
Two
-
combined cruise missiles with manned bomber attacks.
The
targets included
al
Qaeda
training camps and some Taliban targets.Three
-
most robust. Cruise missiles, bombers
and
"boots
on the
ground." Would take
minimum
of
10
- 12
days just
to get
initial
forces
on the
ground
be/
bases
and
overflight
rights
would
be
needed
in the
region
for
search
and
rescue teams
to
bring
out any
downed
pilots.p. 80Re:
Afghanistan.
In
Desert Storm, presented
a
detailed,
off-the-shelf
proposal
for
militaryaction. It was called Operation Plan
90-1002,
and it was the basic military plan that wouldbeexecuted overthenext seven monthstoousttheIraqi army
from
Kuwait.
Now
there
was no
off-the-shelf
military plan.
One
would have
to be
devised
fast
and from
scratch, once
the
president
had
decided
the
shape
of the
war,
the
initial focus
of the
campaign
and the
relationship between
the CIA and the
Pentagon.
p. 83
The
United
State's
rapid victory
in the
1991
Gulf War,
and the
immediacy
of
watching
it
unfold
live
on
CNN,
had
redefined
people's expectation about warfare, which
the
Clintonadministration's
occasional
cruise
missile
attacks
had
done nothing
to alter.
p.
88
Re: Intell. Rooting out bin Laden would take very
different
intelligence
than they had.
The
doctrine of "hit, talk, hit," in which the United States would strike, pause to see the
reaction, and
then
hit
again, sounded much like Vietnam.
Rumsfeld:
"The military options look like
five or ten
years ago. Rumsfeld said there
was
a
need
for
unconventional approaches, especially
the
Special Forces operations,
ingathring
intelligence
on the
ground. "Get
a
group
functioning
fast.
Lift
out ofconventional
mind-set."
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