Contents
Preface v1 What G¨odel’s First Theorem Says 11.1 Incompleteness and basic arithmetic 11.2 Why it matters 41.3 What’s next? 52 The Idea of an Axiomatized Formal Theory 72.1 Formalization as an ideal 72.2 Axiomatized formal theories 92.3 Decidability 122.4 Enumerable and effectively enumerable sets 162.5 More definitions 182.6 Three simple results 202.7 Negation complete theories are decidable 213 Capturing Numerical Properties 233.1 Remarks on notation 233.2
L
A
and other languages 243.3 Expressing numerical properties and relations 263.4 Case-by-case capturing 283.5 A note on our jargon 304 Sufficiently Strong Arithmetics 314.1 The idea of a ‘sufficiently strong’ theory 314.2 An undecidability theorem 324.3 An incompleteness theorem 334.4 The truths of arithmetic can’t be axiomatized 344.5 But what have we really shown? 355 Three Formalized Arithmetics 375.1
BA
– Baby Arithmetic 375.2
Q
– Robinson Arithmetic 405.3 Capturing properties and relations in
Q
425.4 Introducing ‘
<
’ and ‘
≤
’ into
Q
445.5 Induction and the Induction Schema 445.6
PA
– First-order Peano Arithmetic 465.7 Is
PA
consistent? 48
i
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