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T7 B7 Narrative and Final Report Fdr- 2 Drafts 203

T7 B7 Narrative and Final Report Fdr- 2 Drafts 203

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02/05/2013

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I. C.
DESTRUCTION
OF PAN AM103
(1988)
AND RESPONSE
On
December 21, 1988 a terrorist bomb, concealed in a checked bag unaccompanied bythe Libyan agent who planted it, exploded in the cargo hold of Pan Am Flight
103
overLockerbie, Scotland killing
270 people.'
Shortly
after
the
incident,
the
administration's
top
anti-terrorism
official
testified
that
the
Pan Am
103
disaster
reflected
a new trend in aviation terrorism toward sabotage andaway
from
the
customary hijacking
threat.
"
In response, the administration announced a
battery of initiatives to strengthen anti-explosives procedures at
facilities
consideredhigh-risk,
located
mostly
overseas.The
procedures included mandatory x-ray
screening
ofallbaggageand a100 percent
passenger/bag
match requirement
"'
Four months
after
the downing of Pan Am 103, Secretary of Transportation Sam Skinnerannounced
the
department's plan
to
spend over
$100
million
to
purchase equipment
specifically
designed to detect explosives, unlike the x-ray machines in use at the time.(STILLWORKING ON:List numberofSecurity directives,andrules implementedin
1989-199;
and the
general flavor
of
changes
in the
ACSSP's
to
prove explosivesdetection
was the new
emphasis).On August 4,
1989
President George Bush signed Executive Order 12686 creating the
President's
Commission
on
Aviation
Security and
Terrorism.
The panel examined the
Pan Am
103
disaster and on May
15,
1990 issued a comprehensive report, including 64recommendations
to
improve aviation security.
1V
In
Novemberof
1990,
Congress passedtheAviation Security ImprovementAct (PL
104-
604) to
implement
a number of the Commission's key recommendations. These included
the
creation of several new aviation security and intelligence billets; mandatory agencyreports on aviation threats and system vulnerability; and, new FAA authorities to impose
security
measures at airports, including flight cancellation. (Of the 64, x number wereimplemented)
v
Notably
the
legislation also implemented
a key
commission recommendation with regardto performance problems with the TNA units sought by the Department of
Transportation,
requiring
that Explosive Detection
Systems
not be
deployed
until
the
Secretary could
certify
their reliability or otherwise assure they contributed to
security.
V1
II a. CIVIL
AVIATION
SECURITYON
9/11;
CONGRESS
Prior to September
11,2001,
the
107
th
Congress held 25 hearings on aviation issues.None of the hearings
focused
on the status of aviation security. The primaryCongressional spotlight on aviation was cast on the status of
efforts
to improve aircarriers' customer serviceand theeconomic healthandcommercial healthofcivil
aviation/
11
 
TheCommission couldfindonly three occasionsonwhich SenatorsorMembersofCongress cited the topic of aviation security in
floor
statements during the 107
th
Congressprior to September
11,
2001. Only one
bill
was introduced on the topic in the same timeperiod. Two of the three
floor
references to aviation security and the sole
bill
introducedpertained
to
renaming
an FAA
facility
after
a
former member
of the
Senate.
V1U
The General Accounting
Office,
the investigative arm of Congress, issued a singleaviation report in 2001 prior to
9/11.
A
major
GAO report on Terrorism (NAME OFREPORT) issued
on
(INSERT), included
a
small section
on
transportation security.
The
GAO received (Number) of requests for investigations by Member of Congress on the
topic."
1
(GAO IS COLLECTING THE INFORMATION)Thecommission notes that whiletheaviation
funding
billfor FY2002had notbeenpassedbyCongress priortoSeptember
11,
2001, Congressional
funding
forcivil aviation
security
had substantially increased over the preceding five years
from
$72 million in FY
1997
to $139 million in FY
2001,
(though the amounts appropriated in 2000 and 2001
were
each approximately
$1
million below the president's request).
x
Thereport accompanyingtheTransportation Appropriations billfor FY2001, approved
in
the
fall
of 2000, did express
Congress'
ongoing frustration with the FAA on securitymatters."The Committee
is
extremely disappointed over managementissues which continue
to
plague
the
civil aviation securityprogram. Many of these issues have been unresolved forsometime...the Committee has provided substantial bud-
getary
increasesforcivil aviation security programs over
the
past
few
years,
and isunsure whether
these
additional
resources
are
paying
off in
significantly improved security."
Xl
III.
ELEMENTS OF THE AVIATION
SECURITYSYSTEM
ON
9-11
Seven main elements comprised the
nation's
aviation security system in
effect
onSeptember
11,
200l.
xii
1.
Intelligence Collection, Threat assessment and Response: The U.S. intelligence
community
was responsible for collecting and analyzing intelligence data androutingpertinent informationtoFAA's
Office
ofCivil Aviation SecurityIntelligence which was tasked with assessing the data, analyzing threats and
determining
follow-up actionbyFAA.2. Passenger Pre-Screening:
Air
Carriers' were required
to
analyze passengers
via a
computer program
that
alerted
the
airline
to
those prohibited
by the
government
from flying
as
well
as
"selectees"--
those
who may
pose
a
security
threat-
and a
randomsampling of other passengers. The air carrier was responsible for
 
screening
the
checked baggage
of
"selectees"
for
explosives
in
accordance with
an FAA
approved
Air
Carrier Standard Security Plan.3. Secure Area Designation
and
Enforcement: Airports
and Air
carriers, with
FAA
guidance
and
approval, were responsible
for
designating secure
areas
and
restricting access
to
authorized personnel only,
in
accordance with
FAA
approvedAirport
and Air
Carrier Standard Security
Plans.
4.
Checkpoint Screening
for
Weapons:
Air
Carriers (and their contractors) wereresponsible for screening passengers and carry-on luggage for weapons usingmetal
detectors
and
x-ray machinery calibrated, operated
and
maintained underFAA minimum guidelines
and in
accordance with
the Air
Carrier StandardSecurity Plan.5. Checked Baggage Screening for Explosives: Air Carriers were responsible for
screening
the
checkedbaggage
of
"selectees"
using
ExplosivesDetection
System
(EDS) equipment
or a
"suitable"
alternative,
in
accordance with
an FAA
approvedAir Carrier Standard Security Plan.
6.
Cargo
and
Mail Screening:
Air
Carriers were responsible
for
categorizing cargobetween known
and
unknown shippers,
and
subjected
the
cargo
to
various tiers
of
inspection
in
accordance with
an FAA
approved
Air
Carrier Standard SecurityProgram.7.
Aircraft
Security: Air Carriers were responsible for guarding and inspecting their
aircraft;
and fortraining aircrewonsecurity procedures,inaccordance withanFAA approved
Air
Carrier Standard Security Program.
The FAA was
responsible
for
operating a Federal Air Marshal program placing armed and trained security
officers
on
certain high-risk
flights.
V.b. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
AND
RESPONSE(INFORMATION ABOUT
THE
EXISTING ALERT LEVEL
AND
WHAT THATMEANS)As of September
11,
2001 eight FAA security directives, requiring air carriers andairports to take
specificsafety
precautions, were in
effect
(seven were issued during thecourse
of
2001
and one
dated back
to
2000).None
specifically
referenced
the
Al
Qaeda organization,
the
9-11
hijackers,
or a
threat
to
hijack
a
plane
and use it as a
guided missile.
A
Security Directive issued April
24
th
2000
did
issue
an
alert regarding
Al
Qaeda operatives including
Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed,(who
the FBI
identifies
as the
main planner
of the 9/11
attack)
and five
other individualsassociated with Ramzi Ahmed Yousef
and the 1995
Bojinka plot. (CHECK
TO SEE IF
LIST INCLUDED
Al
QAEDA MEMBERS)(
SEE
WHAT
WAS
BEHIND
THE
MARCH
22
SD).
FAA
issued another
SD on
August
28,
2001 Security Directivewarning airports and air carriers about nine individuals who should receive extra securityscreening,including physical search.
At
least
six of the
nine carried Pakistani passports.(SEE WHAT
WAS
BEHIND THIS
SD AND IF THE
PEOPLE
ARE
KNOWN
AL
QAEDA).
xiil

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