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MRP ProposalThomas Hobbes: Philosophic Virtue and Political Necessity
 Ian McMurtrie April 24, 2009Supervisor: Dr. Stephen NewmanSecond Reader: Dr. Ross RudolphThomas Hobbes is often understood to have crafted a philosophical theory ofpolitics that is mechanistic, materialist, and dominated by the necessity for anoverbearing sovereign power. This view may be premature in its assessment of Hobbes’intentions. Could it be that Hobbes’ prescriptions for successful political organizationare subtler and owe more to the classical imperatives of virtue than is commonlyassumed? This is an argument that Peter Berkowitz has put forth. Berkowitz argues boththat Hobbes’ theory of politics pays greater attention than is recognized to the non-political qualities found in virtue, and that contemporary liberal thought can do well tolearn from Hobbes the proper relation of virtue and politics to rectify currentphilosophical and political problems.Berkowitz’s assessment, however, may be lacking. Hobbes demandsunquestioned authority to a sovereign which projects power and thus creates socialorder in pursuit of the ultimate political end, peace. Because each person surrenderssome of their freedoms found in nature to establish this order, the social circumstance isless than optimal for each party (they suffer a loss), but is however the best possible forall parties subject to the sovereign’s dominance (all members gain the benefit of peacefulcoexistence). The sovereign’s power and discretion are mandated to include religious
 
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doctrine, political opinion, and philosophic discourse (or the repression thereof).
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Thiscircumscription on the limits of thought (or at least discourse) are said to be in theinterests of social harmony. Hobbes’ argues that civil cooperation is paramount to mostintellectual speculation which he argues is primarily idle, ill-founded, or even seditious(if for example priests can discern politically advantageous opinion from biblicalsources). It seems that the solution is for the sovereign to dictate religious doctrine,educational content, and limit the public pursuit of philosophy. This is accomplished byinstituting a certain type of doctrinal material – not least of which is Hobbes’ ownwritings – that ought to take the place of misleading texts then found in the universitiesand seminaries.Virtue, by contrast, is often understood to require freedom of thought and liberty ofdiscourse. The virtuous properties of a person are frequently not coherent with thosequalities that are most politic. If one is to respect and prize virtue as a politicalcomponent for the perpetuation of a civilized regime (as Berkowitz does), then therewould seem to be a need to study and discuss (i.e. philosophize) about the greatestgoods (i.e. virtues) that extend beyond the purview of the political sovereign.Investigations into
human
virtues (as opposed to
democratic
or
monarchic
virtues) mayconflict with the sovereign’s interests and commands and could be seen, by a jealoussovereign, to be ‘contrary to peace’ and thus contrary to Hobbes’ fundamental law of
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“Although the sovereign had no greater access to the truth than any of his citizens, it was vital for theelimination of contention that its judgments were absolute, and no one was tempted to revert to the privatecalculation of self-interest. This was the point of the power of the sword, the capacity the sovereignpossessed to force citizens into alignment with one another.” Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen, (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. xxviii.
 
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nature and therefore worthy of repression. Hobbes can address some of these points inhis derivation of the political community from ‘right reason,’ the ‘laws of nature’ and soforth, but can he accommodate a notion of virtue that is not politically or materiallyderived while maintaining the power-oriented political order necessary to maintain civilpeace? Berkowitz seems to be suggesting that Hobbes can (or at least he can makeinstructive contributions to the understanding of virtue in relation to our own politicalclimate). In other words, can Hobbes’ preferred political strictures allow forphilosophical investigation into the nature and number of virtues for persons that mayextend beyond political considerations? Although Hobbes believes and endorsesfreedom of thought, this is most often freedom of private opinion (the freedom to adopta personal religion while maintaining public performance of the established religiousdoctrine). But these points appear to go against much of the force of Berkowitzargument, therefore, the central question is can Hobbes maintain a notion of virtue at all,or is it simply the dominance of philosophy by politics. Is this wise? Is it necessary? Andcan our current vicious
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political climate be served by coming to understand the role ofvirtue in the face of political necessity and power as Hobbes understood it.
 * * *
For further background I have included a heavily edited excerpt from the articlethat sparked the inception of this project, “Leviathan Then And Now:
 
The latter-dayimportance of Hobbes’s masterpiece” by Peter Berkowitz. (
Hoover Institution Policy
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Vicious
derives from the root
vice
(i.e. that which lacks virtue) and is used here in that sense, rather than theconnotation invoking violence or mercilessness.
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