The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple

or impede the power of legislation. 4 It should be given Tio v Videogram Regulatory Board G.R. No. L-75697 June 18, 1987 Facts: 1. Petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators adversely affected assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The Decree promulgated on October 5, 1985, took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days after completion of its publication in the Official Gazette. The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the 2. On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the decree, PD 1994 amended the NIRC. Petitioner's contended that the tax provision of the decree is a rider. ISSUE: Whether or not the PD 1987 is unconstitutional PD 1987 constitutional. The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object." 2. The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the decree, which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with nor foreign to the general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the
1

practical rather than technical construction. Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the tax provision of the DECREE is a rider is without merit. That section reads, inter alia: Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. xxx xxx xxx

accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation, it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the DECREE. The express purpose of the DECREE to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5, supra. Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. The title of the DECREE, which is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the DECREE. 7 1. The title of the decree, which calls for the creation of the VRB is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covered all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the decree.

regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the decree.3. The express purpose of PD 1987 to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videos is evident from Preambles 2 and 5. Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure.

G.R. No. L-28089

October 25, 1967

Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject

BARA LIDASAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. Facts: 1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a

thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House where the bill, being of local application, originated. 2. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and

qualified voter for the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces. 2. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation." 3. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title YES. RA 4790 is null and void 1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power.

the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators. 3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad. 4. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del

First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects.

Sur" projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive.
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For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur. 5. Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.

Dela Cruz v Paras G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983

NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. 1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be

Facts: 1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. 2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.' The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction: On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938. 3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid
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expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs. 2. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. 3. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.

G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994 ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners, vs. HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents. FACTS: Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong , Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. A plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they approved of the said conversion. The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said conversion. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted yes whereas 7, 911 voted no. Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject." The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit: Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an

Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been complied with. ISSUE: Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI 26(1) HELD/RULING:

enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied).

Requirements as to certain laws - Appropriation laws G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987 DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, M.P., ORLANDO S. MERCADO, M.P., HONORATO Y. AQUINO, M.P., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, M.P., DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, M.P., OSCAR F. SANTOS, M.P., ALBERTO G. ROMULO, M.P., CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, M.P., ISIDORO E. REAL, M.P., EMIGDIO L. LINGAD, M.P., ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, M.P., PEDRO M. MARCELLANA, M.P., VICTOR S. ZIGA, M.P., and ROGELIO V. GARCIA. M.P., petitioners, vs. HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF THE BUDGET and VICTOR MACALINGCAG in his capacity as the TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. FACTS 1.) Petitioners filed as concerned citizens of the country, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with general interest common to all the people of the Philippines , and as taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs 2.) Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the Budget Reform Decree of 1977 on the ff. grounds: - It infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing the illegal transfer of public moneys - It is repugnant to the constitution as it fails to specify the objectives and purposes for which the proposed transfer of funds are to be made

- it amounts to undue delegation of legislative powers on the transfer of funds by the President and the implementation thereof by the Budget Minister and the Treasurer are without or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction - The threatened and continuing transfer of funds by the president and the implementation thereof by the budget minister and the treasurer of the Philippines are without or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON the Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is unconstitutional. 2. YES. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, being repugnant to Section 16(5) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is null and void. - Paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides: The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. - Section 16(5) Article VIII reads as follows: No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. - Prohibition to transfer was explicit and categorical. For flexibility in the use of public funds,

- It allows the President to override the safeguards, form and procedure prescribed by the Constitution in approving appropriations

the Constitution provided a leeway in which the purpose and condition for which funds may be transferred were specified.

- The constitution allows the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body concerned - Paragraph 1 of Section 44 unduly over-extends the privilege granted under Section 16(5), and empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard to whether or not the funds to be transferred are savings, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which the transfer is to be made. - It completely disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, amounting to an undue delegation of legislative power

G.R. No. 94571 April 22, 1991 TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary, Budget & Management, HON. ROZALINA S. CAJUCOM in her capacity as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents. This is a case of first impression whereby petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget. Facts: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831 , otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by P.D. No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose. The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees. Issue: Is the appropriation of P86 billion in the P233 billion 1990 budget violative of Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution?

Held: No. There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be made by law, such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present. The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all their essential terms and conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein. The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable the government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the country. Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other evidences of
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indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury.

** While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to "assign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from the previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.

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G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA and A. GONZALES, petitioners, vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and Management; HON. VICENTE T. TAN, as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents. FACTS: RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Philippines from January 1 to December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes was approved by the President and vetoed some of the provisions. Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the Constitution.

1. Special Provision on Debt Ceiling Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are germane to & have direct relation w/ debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire item/appropriation. VETO VOID. 2. Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCUs said provision allows for the use of income & creation of revolving fund for SCUs. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCUs enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID. 3. Special Provision on Road Maintenance Congress specified 30% ratio for works for maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subj. of road maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID. 4. Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. AFP modernization, prior approval of

PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994. 16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management and the National Treasurer and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt services. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and valid? HELD:

Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must be subject of a separate law. VETO VALID. 5. Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions allows Chief of Staff to augment pension funds through the use of savings. According to the Constitution, only the President may exercise such power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID. 6. Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGUs use of special fund for the compensation of the said CAFGUs. Vetoed, President requires his prior approval. It is a lso an amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID. Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions

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inserted by it must be treated as "item", which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. It is readily apparent that the Special Provision applicable to the appropriation for debt service insofar as it refers to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in the bill, is an "inappropriate" provision referring to funds other than the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriated in the General Appropriations Act of 1991. The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). That is why it is found in Article VI on the Legislative Department rather than in Article VII on the Executive Department in the Constitution. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution. Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts thereof (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the general veto power is the power given to the President to veto any particular item or items in a general appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[2]). In so doing, the President must veto the entire item. A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and "be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates," it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in the category of "inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no place in an appropriations bill.

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TAX LAWS G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995 ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation

Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds. One contention is that There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 of the Constitution Held: Article VI Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate proposed an amendment to a House revenue bill by enacting its own version of a revenue bill. On the other hand, amendment by substitution a mere matter of form. Petitioner has not shown what substantial difference it would make if, as the Senate actually did in this case, a separate bill like S. No. 1630 is instead enacted as a substitute measure, " taking into Consideration . . . H.B. 11197." Nor is there merit in petitioners' contention that, with regard to revenue bills, the Philippine Senate Art. I, 7, cl. 1 of the U.S. Constitution reads: All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of

The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments.
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Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills. Art. VI, 24 of our Constitution reads: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate

exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

III. The President's certification. As to what Presidential certification can accomplish, we have already explained in the main

The power of the Senate to propose amendments must be understood to be full, plenary and complete "as on other Bills." Thus, because revenue bills are required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the Senate cannot enact revenue measures of its own without such bills. After a revenue bill is passed and sent over to it by the House, however, the Senate certainly can pass its own version on the same subject matter. This follows from the coequality of the two chambers of Congress. The power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments is apparently without restriction. It would seem that by virtue of this power, the Senate can practically re-write a bill required to come from the House and leave only a trace of the original bill.

decision that the phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, 26 (2) qualifies not only the requirement that "printed copies [of a bill] in its final form [must be] distributed to the members three days before its passage" but also the requirement that before a bill can become a law it must have passed "three readings on separate days." There is not only textual support for such construction but historical basis as well. This provision of the 1973 document, with slight modification, was adopted in Art. VI, 26 (2) of the present Constitution, thus: (2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on

In sum, while Art. VI, 24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills must "originate exclusively in the House of Representatives," it also adds, " but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." In the exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure. As petitioner Tolentino states in a high school text, a committee to which a bill is referred may do any of the following:

separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. The exception is based on the prudential consideration that if in all cases three readings on

(1) to endorse the bill without changes (2) to make changes in the bill omitting or adding sections or altering its language;

separate days are required and a bill has to be printed in final form before it can be passed, the need for a law may be rendered academic by the occurrence of the very emergency or public calamity which it is meant to address. Apparently, the members of the Senate (including some of the petitioners in these cases)

(3) to make and endorse an entirely new bill as a substitute, in which case it will be known as a committee bill; or (4) to make no report at all.

believed that there was an urgent need for consideration of S. No. 1630, because they responded to the call of the President by voting on the bill on second and third readings on the same day. The purpose for which three readings on separate days is required is said to be two-fold:

*** (1) to inform the members of Congress of what they must vote on and
14

(2) to give them notice that a measure is progressing through the enacting process, thus enabling them and others interested in the measure to prepare their positions with reference to it. (1 J. G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 10.04, p. 282 (1972)). These purposes were substantially achieved in the case of R.A. No. 7716.

15

Held: The Lung Center of the Philippines is a charitable institution. To determine whether an enterprise is a charitable institution or not, the elements which should be considered G.R. No. 144104 June 29, 2004 include the statute creating the enterprise, its corporate purposes, its constitution and bylaws, the methods of administration, the nature of the actual work performed, that character LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. QUEZON CITY and CONSTANTINO P. ROSAS, in his capacity as City Assessor of Quezon City, respondents. Facts: Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit entity established by virtue of PD No. 1823. It is the registered owner of the land on which the Lung Center of the Philippines Hospital is erected. A big space in the ground floor of the hospital is being leased to private parties, for canteen and small store spaces, and to medical or professional practitioners who use the same as their private clinics. Also, a big portion on the right side of the hospital is being leased for commercial purposes to a private enterprise known as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center. When the City Assessor of Quezon City assessed both its land and hospital building for real property taxes, the Lung Center of the Philippines filed a claim for exemption on its averment that it is a charitable institution with a minimum of 60% of its hospital beds exclusively used for charity patients and that the major thrust of its hospital operation is to serve charity patients. The claim for exemption was denied. On appeal, the Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City affirmed the local boards decision, finding that Lung Center of the Philippines is not a charitable institution and that its properties were not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. Issue: Is the Lung Center of the Philippines a charitable institution within the context of the Constitution, and therefore, exempt from real property tax? IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The respondent Quezon City Assessor is hereby DIRECTED to determine, after due hearing, the precise portions of the land and the area thereof which are leased to private persons, and to compute the real property taxes due thereon as provided for by law. Exclusive is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others, debarred from participation or enjoyment. If real property is used for one or more commercial purposes, it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation. However, under the Constitution, in order to be entitled to exemption from real property tax, there must be clear and unequivocal proof that (1) it is a charitable institution and (2)its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes. While portions of the hospital are used for treatment of patients and the dispensation of medical services to them, whether paying or non-paying, other portions thereof are being leased to private individuals and enterprises. of the services rendered, the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries and the use and occupation of the properties.

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G.R. No. 109289 October 3, 1994 RUFINO R. TAN, petitioner, vs. RAMON R. DEL ROSARIO, JR., as SECRETARY OF FINANCE & JOSE U. ONG, as COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents. Facts: 1. Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), which amended certain provisions of the NIRC, as well as the Rules and Regulations promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said law. 2. Petitioners posit that RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it allegedly violates the following provisions of the Constitution: -Article VI, Section 26(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. - Article VI, Section 28(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. - Article III, Section 1 No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners contended that public respondents exceeded their rule-making authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships. Petitioner contends that the title of HB 34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is deficient for being merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession" (Petition in G.R. No. 109289) when the full text of the title actually reads, 'An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of

the National Internal Revenue Code,' as amended. Petitioners also contend it violated due process. ISSUE: Whether RA 7496 in unconstitutional HELD: Article VI, Section 26(1), of the Constitution has been envisioned so as (a) to prevent logrolling legislation intended to unite the members of the legislature who favor any one of unrelated subjects in support of the whole act, (b) to avoid surprises or even fraud upon the legislature, and (c) to fairly apprise the people, through such publications of its proceedings as are usually made, of the subjects of legislation. 1 The above objectives of the fundamental law appear to us to have been sufficiently met. Anything else would be to require a virtual compendium of the law which could not have been the intendment of the constitutional mandate. Petitioner intimates that Republic Act No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional requirement that taxation "shall be uniform and equitable" in that the law would now attempt to tax single proprietorships and professionals differently from the manner it imposes the tax on corporations and partnerships. The contention clearly forgets, however, that such a system of income taxation has long been the prevailing rule even prior to Republic Act No. 7496. Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities (Juan Luna Subdivision vs. Sarmiento, 91 Phil. 371). Uniformity does not forfend classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class. What may instead be perceived to be apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present global
17

treatment on taxable corporations. We certainly do not view this classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate.

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G.R. No. 101273 July 3, 1992 CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA (Second District of Bataan), petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, THE TARIFF COMMISSION, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, and THE ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, respondents. Facts: On 27 November 1990, Cory issued EO 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines . In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Sec 24 of Art 6 of the Constitution which provides: " All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power of issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures. Issue: whether or not EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional HELD:

Art VI Sec. 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. (Emphasis supplied) There is thus explicit constitutional permission from Congress to authorize the President "subject to such limitations and restrictions is [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . ."

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[G. R. No. 119775. October 24, 2003] JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION, MATEO CARIO FOUNDATION INC., CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS FOUNDATION INC., REGINA VICTORIA A. BENAFIN REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHER MRS. ELISA BENAFIN, IZABEL M. LUYK REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHER MRS. REBECCA MOLINA LUYK, KATHERINE PE REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHER ROSEMARIE G. PE, SOLEDAD S. CAMILO, ALICIA C. PACALSO ALIAS KEVAB, BETTY I. STRASSER, RUBY C. GIRON, URSULA C. PEREZ ALIAS BA-YAY, EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, CARMEN CAROMINA, LILIA G. YARANON, DIANE MONDOC, petitioners, vs. VICTOR LIM, PRESIDENT, BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY; JOHN HAY PORO POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, CITY OF BAGUIO, TUNTEX (B.V.I.) CO. LTD., ASIAWORLD INTERNATIONALE GROUP, INC., DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, respondents. FACTS: Petitioners assail, in the main, the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 420, Series of 1994, CREATING AND DESIGNATING a portion of the area covered by the former Camp John [Hay] as THE JOHN HAY Special Economic Zone pursuant to Republic Act No. 7227. and creating a regime of tax exemption within the John Hay Special Economic Zone. Petitioners argue that nowhere in R. A. No. 7227 is there a grant of tax exemption to SEZs yet to be established in base areas, unlike the grant under Section 12 thereof of tax exemption and investment incentives to the therein established Subic SEZ. The grant of tax exemption to the John Hay SEZ, petitioners conclude, thus contravenes Article VI, Section 28 (4) of the Constitution which provides that No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress. ISSUE: Whether or not the president may grant tax exemption within John Hay SEZ HELD: It is clear that under Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 it is only the Subic SEZ which was granted by Congress with tax exemption, investment incentives and the like. There is no express extension of the aforesaid benefits to other SEZs still to be created at the time via presidential proclamation.
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While the grant of economic incentives may be essential to the creation and success of SEZs, free trade zones and the like, the grant thereof to the John Hay SEZ cannot be sustained. The incentives under R.A. No. 7227 are exclusive only to the Subic SEZ, hence, the extension of the same to the John Hay SEZ finds no support therein. More importantly, the nature of most of the assailed privileges is one of tax exemption. It is the legislature, unless limited by a provision of the state constitution, that has full power to exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax.[42] Other than Congress, the Constitution may itself provide for specific tax exemptions,[43] or local governments may pass ordinances on exemption only from local taxes.[44] The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the Constitutions imposition that a law granting any tax exemption must have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress.[45] In the same vein, the other kinds of privileges extended to the John Hay SEZ are by tradition and usage for Congress to legislate upon. Contrary to public respondents suggestions, the claimed statutory exemption of the John Hay SEZ from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based; it must be expressly granted in a statute stated in a language too clear to be mistaken.[46] Tax exemption cannot be implied as it must be categorically and unmistakably expressed.[47] If it were the intent of the legislature to grant to the John Hay SEZ the same tax exemption and incentives given to the Subic SEZ, it would have so expressly provided in the R.A. No. 7227. However, the entire assailed proclamation cannot be declared unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not being repugnant to the law or the Constitution. The delineation and declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ was well within the powers of the President to do so by means of a proclamation. Where part of a statute is void as contrary to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, as in the case at bar, may stand and be enforced.

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PROCEDURE FOR THE PASSAGE OF BILLS Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. 1990

provisions must be struck down because they contravene the constitution because it limits the power of the executive to augment appropriations (ART VI SEC 25 PAR 5.) The provisions are inappropriate because

GR No. 87636 o They do not relate to particular or distinctive appropriations Facts: o Disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face of the bill Congress passed House Bill No. 19186 (GAB of Fiscal Year 1989) which eliminated or o It is more of an expression of policy than an appropriation Court also said that to make the GAB veto-proof would be logrolling on the part of the decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by the president President signed bill into law (RA 6688) but vetoed 7 special provisions and Sec 55, a general provision. complete legislation but because they are aware that it would be NOT passed in that February 2, 1989 Senate passed Res. No. 381 Senate as an institution decided to contest the constitutionality of the veto of the president of SEC 55 only. If the legislature really believes that the exercise of veto is really invalid then congress SEC. 55 disallows the president and heads of several department to augment any item in the GAB thereby violation CONSTITUTION ART VI SEC 25 (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto by the President of SEC 55 of GAB for FY 1989 and SEC 16 of GAB for FY 1990 is unconstitutional. HELD: The veto is CONSTITUTIONAL. Although the petitioners contend that the veto exceeded the mandate of the line-veto power of the president because SEC 55 and SEC 16 are provisions the court held that inappropriate provisions can be treated as items (Henry v. Edwards) and therefore can be vetoed validly by the president. Furthermore inappropriate SHOULD resort to their constitutionally vested power to override the veto. (ART VI SEC 21 PAR 1) manner they attempt hide it in the GAB

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Issue: whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution or differently put, has the President the power to veto provisions of an Appropriations Bill

Held: No. Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are not provisions in t he budgetary sense of the term. Article VI, Section 25 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 25 (2) No provision or

Held: No. The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution. Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if exercised would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the item-veto power or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As specified, the President may not veto less than all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other words, the power given the executive to disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. Notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution of any reference to the veto of a provision, the extent of the Presidents veto power as previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed. In other words, in the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill. The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) because they nullify the authority of the Chief Executive and heads of different branches of government to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations, as guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution.

enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein. The challenged provisions fall short of this requirement. Firstly, the vetoed provisions do not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation. They apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have to be made to the original recommendations made by the President and to the source indicated by the Legislative Budget Research and Monitoring Office. Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) although labeled as provisions, are actually inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the Presidents veto power.

Issue:

whether the Legislatures inclusion of qualifications, conditions, limitations or Issue: whether Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are provisions, not items, in the appropriation bill restrictions on expenditure of funds in the Appropriation Bill was proper

Held:
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There can be no denying that inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to specify how money shall be spent; and that in addition to distinct items of appropriation, the Legislature may include in Appropriation Bills qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions on expenditure of funds. Settled also is the rule that the Executive is not allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation itself to stand. The veto of a condition in an Appropriations Bill which did not include a veto of the items to which the condition related was deemed invalid and without effect whatsoever. However, for the rule to apply, restrictions should be such in the real sense of the term, not some matters which are more properly dealt with in a separate legislation. Restrictions or conditions in an Appropriations Bill must exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures. Again, the test is appropriateness. It is not enough that a provision be related to the institution or agency to which funds are appropriated. Conditions and limitations properly included in an appropriation bill must exhibit such a connection with money items of appropriation that they logically belong in a schedule of expenditures . . . the ultimate test is one of appropriateness. Tested by these criteria, Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) must also be held to be inappropriate conditions. While they, particularly, Section 16 (FY 90), have been artfully drafted to appear as true conditions or limitations, they are actually general law measures more appropriate for substantive and, therefore, separate legislation. Further, neither of them shows the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures.

A Presidential veto may be overridden by the votes of two-thirds of members of Congress (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 27[1]). But Congress made no attempt to override the Presidential veto. Gonzales et al.s argument that the veto is ineffectual so that there is nothing to override has lost force and effect with the exec utive veto having been herein upheld. There need be no future conflict if the legislative and executive branches of government adhere to the spirit of the Constitution, each exercising its respective powers with due deference to the constitutional responsibilities and functions of the other. Thereby, the delicate equilibrium of governmental powers remains on even keel.

Note: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as item, which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules that even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) were not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term, they are inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the Presidents veto power.

Note: Executive Impoundment Definition: This refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type. Argument against executive impoundment: Those who deny to the President the power to impound argue that once Congress has set aside the fund for a specific purpose in an appropriations act, it becomes mandatory on the part of the President to implement the

Issue: whether the legislature has a remedy when it believes that the veto powers by the executive were unconstitutional Held: Yes. If, indeed, the legislature believed that the exercise of the veto powers by the executive were unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the Constitution is crystal clear .
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project and to spend the money appropriated therefor. The President has no discretion on the matter, for the Constitution imposes on him the duty to faithfully execute the laws.

Argument for executive impoundment: Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three principal sources of the authority of the President. Foremost is the authority to impound given to him either expressly or impliedly by Congress. Second is the executive power drawn from the Presidents role as Commander-in-Chief. Third is the Faithful Execution Clause which ironically is the same provisions invoked by petitioners herein. The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires that the President desist from implementing the law if doing so would prejudice public interest. An example given is when through efficient and prudent management of a project, substantial savings are made. In such a case, it is sheer folly to expect the President to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law.

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G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992 CESAR BENGZON, QUERUBE MAKALINTAL, LINO M. PATAJO, JOSE LEUTERIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Department of Budget and Management, and HON. ROSALINA CAJUCOM, in her capacity as National Treasurer, respondents. Facts: On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower Courts General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted . The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission.

The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly different. An item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts . . . of the bill (Bengzon, supra, at 916.) It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purposeThe United States Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice declared "that an "tem" of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill." (id. at page 465) The general fund adjustment is an item which appropriates P500,000,000.00 to enable the Government to meet certain unavoidable obligations which may have been inadequately funded by the specific items for the different branches, departments, bureaus, agencies, and offices of the government. The President did not veto this item. What were vetoed were methods or systems placed

Issue: whether the President may veto certain provisions of the General Appropriatons Act Held: The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also

by Congress to insure that permanent and continuing obligations to certain officials would be paid when they fell due. An examination of the entire sections and the underlined portions of the law which were vetoed will readily show that portions of the item have been chopped up into vetoed and unvetoed parts. Less than all of an item has been vetoed. Moreover, the vetoed portions are not items. They are provisions. Doctrine: Pocket Veto Power Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-called pocket-veto power, i.e.,

provides limitations to its exercise. The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the item veto power to avoid inexpedient riders from being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure. What was done by the President was the vetoing of a provision and not an item. The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. We distinguish an item from a provision in the following manner:

disapproval of a bill by inaction on his part. The failure of the President to communicate his veto of any bill represented to him within 30 days after the receipt thereof automatically causes the bill to become a law.

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This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935 Constitution of releasing veto messages long after he should have acted on the bill. It also avoids uncertainty as to what new laws are in force.

endangered because the transfer is made within a department (or branch of government) and not from one department (branch) to another. The Constitution, particularly Article VI, Section 25(5) also provides:

When is it allowed? Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of Art 6 of the Constitution which grants the President power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. The veto in such case shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. In the instant case, the vetoed provisions which relate to the use of savings for augmenting 3 ways how a bill becomes a law: 1. 2. When the President signs it When the President vetoes it but the veto is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the members items for the payment of the pension differentials, among others, are clearly in consonance with the abovestated pronouncements of the Court. The veto impairs the power of the Chief Justice to augment other items in the Judiciary's appropriation, in contravention of the constitutional provision on "fiscal autonomy." of each House; and 3. When the president does not act upon the measure within 30 days after it shall have

been presented to him.

In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. There should be no question, therefore, that statutory authority has, in fact, been granted. And once given, the heads of the different branches of the Government and those of the Constitutional Commissions are afforded considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources (Demetria v. Alba, supra). The doctrine of separation of powers is in no way
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G.R. No. L-15138

July 31, 1961

Constitution expressly provides that "the Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.(Sec. 1, Art. VII of the

BILL MILLER, petitioner-appellee, vs. ATANACIO A. MARDO, and MANUEL GONZALES, respondents-appellants.

Constitution). Thus, judicial power rests exclusively in the judiciary. It may be conceded that the legislature may confer on administrative boards or bodies quasi-

ISSUE: validity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, prepared and submitted by the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission under the authority of Republic Act No. 997, as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor created in said Plan to decide claims of laborers for wages, overtime and separation pay, etc. FACTS: Gonzales filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, in Manila, a complaint (IS-1148) against Bill Miller (owner and manager of Miller Motors) claiming to be a driver of Miller from December 1, 1956 to October 31, 1957, on which latter date he was allegedly arbitrarily dismissed, without being paid separation pay.

judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative functions. But in so doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to or in connection with the performance of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts. And so we held in Corominas et al. v. Labor Standards Commission, et al. (G.R. No. L-14837 and companion cases, June 30, 1961); . . . it was not the intention of Congress, in enacting Republic Act No. 997, to authorize the

.Upon receipt of said complaint, Chief Hearing Officer Atanacio Mardo of Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor required Miller to file an answer. Whereupon, Miller filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio a petition (Civil Case No. 759) praying for judgment prohibiting the Hearing Officer from proceeding with the case, for the reason that said Hearing Officer had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the subject matter of the complaint. RESPONDENT argues that pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, regional offices of the Department of labor have exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases affecting money claims arising from violations of labor standards or working conditions. Said motions to dismiss were denied by the court.

transfer of powers and jurisdiction granted to the courts of justice, from these to the officials to be appointed or offices to be created by the Reorganization Plan. Congress is well aware of the provisions of the Constitution that judicial powers are vested 'only in the Supreme Court and in such courts as the law may establish'. The Commission was not authorized to create courts of justice, or to take away from these their jurisdiction and transfer said jurisdiction to the officials appointed or offices created under the Reorganization Plan. The Legislature could not have intended to grant such powers to the Reorganization Commission, an executive body, as the Legislature may not and cannot delegate its power to legislate or create courts of justice any other agency of the Government. But it is urged, in one of the cases, that the defect in the conferment of judicial or quasi-

ISSUE: whether conferment of power to the Department of Labor to take cognizance of cases affecting money claims is valid under our Constitution and applicable statutes. HELD:

judicial functions to the Regional offices, emanating from the lack of authority of the Reorganization Commission has been cured by the non-disapproval of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A by Congress under the provisions of Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 997, as amended.

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It is an established fact that the Reorganization Commission submitted Reorganization Plan No. 20-A to the President who, in turn, transmitted the same to Congress on February 14, 1956. Congress adjourned its sessions without passing a resolution disapproving or adopting the said reorganization plan. It is now contended that, independent of the matter of delegation of legislative authority (discussed earlier in this opinion), said plan, nevertheless became a law by non-action on the part of Congress, pursuant to the above-quoted provision. Such a procedure of enactment of law by legislative in action is not countenanced in this jurisdiction. By specific provision of the Constitution No bill shall be passed or become a law unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its final form furnished the Members at least three calendar clays prior to its passage by the National Assembly (Congress), except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its final passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal. (Sec. 21-[a], Art. VI). Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large on its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members voting for and against shall be entered on its journal. If any bill shall not be returned by the President as herein provided within twenty days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall become a law in like manner as if he has signed it, unless the Congress by adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall become a law unless vetoed by the President within thirty days after adjournment. (Sec. 20[1]. Art. VI of the Constitution).

A comparison between the procedure of enactment provided in section 6 (a) of the Reorganization Act and that prescribed by the Constitution will show that the former is in distinct contrast to the latter. procedure of enactment provided in section 6 (a) of the Reorganization Act - consent or approval is to be manifested by silence or adjournment or by "concurrent resolution." In either case, the contemplated procedure violates the constitutional provisions requiring positive and separate action by each House of Congress. It is contrary to the "settled and well-understood parliamentary law (which requires that the) two houses are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations, and the determination of the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the separate determination of the other," (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 187). Furthermore, Section 6 (a) of the Act would dispense with the "passage" of any measure, as that word is commonly used and understood, and with the requirement presentation to the President. In a sense, the section, if given the effect suggested in counsel's argument, would be a reversal of the democratic processes required by the Constitution, for under it, the President would propose the legislative action by action taken by Congress On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we hold ad declare that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, insofar as confers judicial power to the Regional Offices over cases other than these falling under the Workmen's Compensation on Law, is invalid and of no effect.

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Effectivity of Laws

Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987 PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided . . .;" WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in the Official Gazette will suffice has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme Court in Taada. et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986) when it observed that "[t]here is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic release and limited readership"; WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly"; and

Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the Official Gazette. Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.

LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION G.R. No. L-3820 July 18, 1950

WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil Code should accordingly be amended so the laws to be effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country; NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order: JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner, vs. LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-arms, Philippine Senate, and EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, Director of Prisons, respondents FACTS: The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the government's payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of 1.5 million pesos for his alleged interest in the two parcels or estates that only amounted to 20,000 pesos, which he seemed to have
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forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the government. Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burnt in the subject transactions , was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person whom she gave the amount of 440,000 pesos, which she withdrew from the 1.5 million pesos proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt. Arnualt was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until she answers the questions. She thereafter filed a petition for Habeas Corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of her detention. He contends that the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, because such information is immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended or purported legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process

In other words, the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question. The question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined.

ISSUE: 2. Whether or not the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its legislative period. It is next contended for the petitioner that the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950 . Yes, the Senate has the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person whom she gave the 440,000 pesos.

legislative session. The Court finds no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for

HELD: Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, we think the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry.
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contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. To deny such committee the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved. But theresolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress.

G.R. No. L-6749

July 30, 1955

In a way, therefore, the petitioner's assumption that the imprisonment is punitive is justified by the language of the resolution, wherefore the issue now before Us in whether

JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner-appellee, vs. EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, as Director of Prisons, respondent-appellant. FACTS: This an appeal from judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, Honorable Jose F. Flores presiding, in habeas corpus proceeding, declaring that the continued detention and confinement of Jean L. Arnault in the new Bilibid Prison , in pursuance of Senate Resolution No. 114, dated November 8, 1952, is illegal, for the reason that the Senate of the Philippines committed a clear abuse of discretion in considering his answer naming one Jess D. Santos as the person to whom delivery of the sum of P440,000 was made in the sale of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estate, as a refusal to answer the question directed by the Senate committee to him, and on the further ground that said Jean L. Arnault, by his answer has purged himself of contempt and is consequently entitled to be released and discharged. ISSUE: If the Senate did not believe the statement, is the continued confinement and detention of the petitioner-appellee, as ordered in Senate Resolution of November 8, 1952, valid? In the supposition that such power and authority exist, was such power legitimately exercised after the petitioner had given the name Jess D. Santos HELD: A study of the text of the resolution readily shows that the Senate found that the petitioner-appellee did not disclose, by the mere giving of the name Jess D. Santos, the identity of the person to whom the sum of P440, 000 was delivered, and, in addition thereto that petitioner withheld said identity arrogantly and contumaciously in continued affront of the Senate's authority and dignity. Although the resolution studiously avoids saying that the confinement is a punishment, but merely seeks to coerce the petitioner into telling the truth, the intention is evident that the continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact partly punitive.

the Senate has the power to punish the contempt committed against it under the circumstances of the case. This question is thus squarely presented before Us for determination. American legislative bodies, after which our own is patterned, have the power to punish for contempt if the contempt has had the effect of obstructing the exercise by the legislature of, or deterring or preventing it from exercising, its legitimate functions (Annotation to Jurney vs. MacCraken, 79 L. ed. 814). Here, we are concerned not with an extention of congressional privilege, but with vindication of the established and essential privilege of requiring the production of evidence. The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the legislature in order to enable it to exercise its legislative power or authority must be distinguished from the judicial process by which offenders are brought to the courts of justice for the meting of the punishment which the criminal law imposes upon them. The former falls exclusively within the legislative authority, the latter within the domain of the courts; because the former is a necessary concommitant of the legislative power or process, while the latter has to do with the enforcement and application of the criminal law. We must also and that provided the contempt is related to the exercise of the legislative power and is committed in the course of the legislative process, the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme, and unless there is
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a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations, the exercise of the authority is not subject to judicial interference. (Marshall vs. Gordon, supra). o o The resolution refuses to relate CONFINEMENT as PUNISHMENT

o o

Senate did not believe that Jess D Santos is the real person The Senate, therefore, held that the act of the petitioner continued the original

contempt, or reiterated it Merely seeks to get the identity of the person Kinda intention is to punish accused for being arrogant in not disclosing the truth Senate has the authority to commit a witness if he refuses to answer a question 1 last contention of petitioner remains to be considered. It is the claim that as the

period of imprisonment has lasted for a period which exceeded that provided by law punishment for contempt, i. e., 6 months of arresto mayor, the petitioner is now entitled to be released. o This claim is not justified by the record. Petitioner was originally confined by

pertinent to a legislative inquiry, to compel him to give the information, i.e., by reason of its coercive power, not its punitive power. o Petitioner contends that if he is to be punished for not disclosing the identity, he

Resolution No. 17 on May 15, 1950. On December 13, 1951, he executed his affidavit and thereafter he was called to testify again before the Senate Committee. The latter passed its Resolution No. 114 on November 6, 1952, and he presented the petition for habeas corpus in this case on March 3, 1953, i. e., five months after the last resolution when the Senate found that the petitioner committed another contempt.

needs to go through the judicial process The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish

disobedient witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power.

The next question concerns the claim that the petitioner has purged himself of

contempt, because he says he has already answered the original question which he had previously been required to answer o In order that the petitioner may be considered as having purged himself of the

contempt, it is necessary that he should have testified truthfully, disclosing the real identity of the person subject of the inquiry. o No person guilty of contempt may purge himself by another lie or falsehood; this
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would be repetition of the offense.

G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991 JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE MILLS JR., LEONARDO GAMBOA, KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ, ERNESTO CALUYA, AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN ROXAS, ELVIE CASTILLO, and CYNTHIA SABIDO LIMJAP, petitioners, vs. THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by and through the CHAIRMAN, HON. WIGBERTO TAADA, respondents, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, intervenor. Facts: 1. Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the government with the Sandiganbayan for the alleged anomalous sale of Kokoy Romoaldez of several government corporations to the group of Lopa, a brother-in-law of Pres. Aquino. 2. By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to look into the

ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of legislation HELD: Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Seante alone. As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16 the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the exervcse of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member. Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon commitee was to find

transactions, an investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez." 3. At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may

out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopaa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no

"unduly prejudice" the defendants in civil case before the Sandiganbayan 4. Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the inquiry was beyond

intended legislation involved. Thus, the inquiry under Senate Resolution No. 212 is to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by the three (3) stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution.

the jurisdiction of the Senate. He contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. One of the defendants in the case before the Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention. The Court granted it and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in intervention.
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It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the ralatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.

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G.R. No. 169777

April 20, 2006

of the general power of Congress to obtain information, otherwise known as the power of inquiry, is in order. The power of inquiry The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads: SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is coextensive with the power to legislate. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof. Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or Houses duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights. Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege." Since this term figures prominently in the challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS, Petitioners, vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines, Respondents. FACTS: On September 23, 2005, the committee of the senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the executive department and Military officials for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail Project, and on the issues of Gloriagate, Wire-tapping of the President, Electoral fraud, as was shown in the respective privileged speeches of the Senators. On September 27 & 28 2005, after being invited most of those resource persons were not able to make it due to prior commitments (i.e. military officials), while on 27 September then Senate President Drilon, received a letter from Executive Secretary Ermita requesting a postponement of the hearing (re: Northrail). On September 28, 2005 the president issued E.O 464, and Ermita sent a letter to the Senate President, informing him of the E.O. and that the resource persons from the executive department would not be able to attend without the consent of the president. With regard to the hearing on the wire-tapping of the President, Col. Balutan and Gen. Gudani were relieved from their military posts and faced court martial proceedings for testifying without the presidents approval. Issue: Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress HELD: Constitutionality of E.O. 464 E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive officials before Congress, deprives Congress of the information in the possession of these officials . To resolve the question of whether such withholding of information violates the Constitution, consideration
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preambular clauses,62 and in its very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial for determining the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

Executive privilege "the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress." "the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public." The entry in Blacks Law Dictionary on "executive privilege" is similarly instructive regarding the scope of the doctrine. This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts the executive from disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental operations extends not only to military and diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive domestic decisional and policy making functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in intra-governmental advisory and deliberative communications.

Validity of Section 1 Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. There are significant differences between the two provisions, however, which constrain this Court to discuss the validity of these provisions separately. Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads possession of any information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis--vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.

The leading case on executive privilege in the United States is U.S. v. Nixon, 72 decided in 1974. In issue in that case was the validity of President Nixons claim of executive privilege against a subpoena issued by a district court requiring the production of certain tapes and documents. The Court, nonetheless, rejected the Presidents claim of privilege, ruling that the privilege must be balanced against the public interest in the fair administration of criminal justice. Notably, the Court was careful to clarify that it was not there addressing the issue of claims of privilege in a civil litigation or against congressional demands for information. It also held that information on military and diplomatic secrets and those affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused were exempted from the right to information. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character
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SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session. SEC 21 and SEC 22 pertained to two different functions of the legislature. The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is different from the power to conduct inquiries during the question hour. "question hour" has a definite meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation of the government. There was a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution86 which made the appearance of ministers mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary

system established by that Constitution, where the ministers are also members of the legislature and are directly accountable to it. The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of powers.88 To that extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from the question period of the parliamentary system. That department heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress right to executive information in the performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative. = Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.90 In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.

By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief Justice.

constitutionality of Section 1 of E.O. 464. Section 1 must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render it constitutional. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

Validity of Sections 2 and 3 En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states that executive privilege actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed above, is properly invoked in relation to specific In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged, and that the President has not reversed such determination. Such declaration, however, even without mentioning the term "executive privilege," amounts to an implied claim that the information is being withheld by the executive branch, by authority of the President, on the basis of executive privilege. Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege. The letter dated September 28, 2005 of respondent Executive Secretary Ermita to Senate President Drilon illustrates the implied nature of the claim of privilege authorized by E.O. 464
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The letter does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested. A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly asserted. The privilege belongs to the government and must be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor waived by a private party. It is not to be lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer. The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.92 (Underscoring supplied) Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected. The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated. It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.
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G.R. No. 174340

October 17, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF CAMILO L. SABIO, petitioner, J. ERMIN ERNEST LOUIE R. MIGUEL, petitioner-relator, vs. HONORABLE SENATOR RICHARD GORDON, in his capacity as Chairman, and the HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES and THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES of the Senate, HONORABLE SENATOR JUAN PONCE-ENRILE, in his official capacity as Member, HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, Senate President, SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS, and the SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. The Congress power of inquiry encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed legislation. It even extends to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish. So long as the constitutional rights of witnesses will be respected by the investigating committees, it is the duty of the former to cooperate with the latter in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation. FACTS: Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 ) directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. The Senate invited Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) Chairman Camilo L. Sabio to be the resource person in a public meeting that would deliberate on the issues presented in Senate Res. No.455. Chairman Sabio, however, declined the invitation, invoking Section 4, paragraph (b) of Executive Order No. 1, which provides: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance. Senator Richard J. Gordon issued a subpoena ad testificandum, requiring Chairman Sabio and the four PCGG Commissioners to appear in the public hearing scheduled on August 23, 2006 and testify on what they know relative to the matters specified in Senate Res. No. 455.

Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. Another notice was sent to Chairman Sabio requiring him to appear andtestify on the same subject matter set on September 6, 2006, but Chairman Sabio still did not comply. Eventually, Chairman Sabio and the PCGG Commissioners were arrested for contempt of the Senate and brought to the Senate premises where they were detained. ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution; 2.) Whether or not the investigating committees are vested with contempt power; HELD: The petitions are DISMISSED. Sec. 4(b) of E.O. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on the Congress power of inquiry, the principle of public accountability, the policy of full disclosure, and the right of access to public information. The Congress power of inquiry encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed legislation. It even extends to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish, to which class the PCGG belongs. Sec. 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress power of inquiry . This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in theConstitution is any provision granting such exemption. Sec. 4(b) places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress andother administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability, it only institutionalizes irresponsibility and nonaccountability. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation is not only intended to benefit Congress but also the citizenry. The Constitution seeks to promote transparency in policymaking and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective eimplementation. An informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. Sec. 4(b) limits or obstructs the power of Congress to secure from PCGG members and staff information and other data in aid of its power to legislate. Again, this cannot be countenanced. The investigating committees are vested with contempt power

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The 1987 Constitution, in Section 21 of its Article VI, recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of any of its committees. Significantly, this constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform the investigative function are also available to the committees, like the power of contempt. Otherwise, Sec. 21 of Art. VI would be meaningless.

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G.R. No. 180643

March 25, 2008 ON THE CONTENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION: What reasons were given for the claim of executive privilege? Executive Secretary Ermita said that the context in which executiveprivilege is being invoked is that the information sought to bedisclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relationswith the Peoples Republic of China. Neri further added that his conversations with the President dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to theimpact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. a. Whether the President followed up on the NBN project? b. Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?

ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner, vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, respondents. What is the case of Neri vs. Senate Committee? This case is about the Senate investigation of anomalies concerning the NBN-ZTE project. During the hearings, former NEDA head Romulo Neri refused to answer certain questions involving his conversations with President Arroyo on the ground they are covered by executive privilege. When the Senate cited him in contempt and ordered his arrest, Neri filed a case against the Senate with the Supreme Court. On March 25, 2008, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Neri and upheld the claim of executive privilege.

What is executive privilege? It is the right of the President and high-level executive branch officials to withhold information from Congress, the courts and the public. It is a privilege of confidentiality which applies to certain types of information of a sensitive character that would be against the public interest to disclose. Executive privilege is based on the constitution because it relates to the Presidents effective discharge of executive powers. Its ultimate end is to promote public interest and no other. c. Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe?

ISSUES: a. Are the communications sought to be elicited by the three questions covered by executive privilege? b. Did the Senate Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in citing Neri in contempt and ordering his arrest?

Is executive privilege absolute? No. Any claim of executive privilege must be weighed against other interests recognized by the constitution, like the state policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest, the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, the accountability of public officers, the power of legislative inquiry, and the judicial power to secure evidence in deciding cases.

How did the Supreme Court resolve these issues? The Supreme Court first recognized the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. The Court said that the power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege. On the first question, the Supreme Court said that the communications sought to be elicited by the three questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege, which is one type of executive privilege. Hence, the Senate cannot compel Neri to answer the three questions.

Did the revocation by the President of E.O. 464 on March 6, 2008 diminish the concept of executive privilege? No. Executive privilege may still be invoked despite the Presidents revocation of E.O. 464 because it is based on the constitution.
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On the second question, the Supreme Court said that the Senate Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in citing Neri in contempt. Hence, the Senate order citing Neri in contempt and ordering his arrest was not valid.

The deliberative process privilege applies to decision-making of executive officials. It includes advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre- deliberative ones. Moreover, congressional or judicial negation of the presidential communications privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege.

What are the types of executive privilege? a. state secrets (regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters) b. identity of government informers c. deliberative process d. information related to pending investigations e. presidential communications

What is the type of executive privilege claimed in this case? The type of executive privilege claimed in this case is the presidential communications privilege.

In what cases is the claim of executive privilege highly recognized? The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the constitution to the President, such as the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers of the President. Information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

Is there a presumption in favor of presidential communications? Yes. Presidential communications are presumptively privileged. The presumption is based on the Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality. The privilege is necessary to guarantee the candor of presidential advisors and to provide the President and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. The presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to presidential communications.

What specifically are the executive privileges relating to deliberations or communications of the President and other government officials? These are the presidential communications privilege and the deliberative process privilege.

Who are covered by the presidential communications privilege? How are the presidential communications privilege and the deliberative process privilege distinguished? The presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It pertains to communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential. Aside from the President, the presidential communications privilege covers senior presidential advisors or Malacanang staff who have operational proximity to direct presidential decision-making.

What are the elements of the presidential communications privilege?

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Does the grant of the claim of executive privilege violate the right of the people to information on matters of public concern? a. The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power. b. The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The advisor must be in operational proximity with the President. c. The privilege is a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate or compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and that the information sought is unavailable elsewhere by an appropriate investigating agency. No, for the following reasons: a. Neri appeared before the Senate on Sept. 26, 2007 and was questioned for 11 hours. He also expressed his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, except the three questions. b. The right to information is subject to limitation, such as executive privilege. c. The right of Congress to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the peoples right to information. Congress cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the peoples right to information.

What are examples of quintessential and non-delegable presidential powers which are covered by the presidential communications privilege? Was the claim of executive privilege properly invoked by the President in this case? The privilege covers only those functions which form the core of presidential authority. These are functions which involve quintessential and non-delegable presidential powers such as the powers of the president as commander-in-chief (i.e., to call out the armed forces to suppress violence, to declare martial law, or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus), the power to appoint officials and remove them, the power to grant pardons and reprieves, the power to receive ambassadors, and the power to negotiate treaties and to enter into execute agreements. Yes. For the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim by the President stating the precise and certain reason for preserving confidentiality. The grounds relied upon by Executive Secretary Ermita are specific enough, since what is required is only that an allegation be made whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc. The particular ground must only be specified, and the following statement of grounds by Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement: The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China.

Are the elements of the presidential communications privilege present in this case? Yes. The communications elicited by the three questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege because: a. First, the communications relate to the power of the President to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. b. Second, the communications are received by Neri, who as a Cabinet member can be considered a close advisor of the President. c. Third, the Senate Committees have not adequately shown a compelling need for the answers to the three questions in the enactment of a law and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

What reasons were given by the Supreme Court in holding that it was wrong for the Senate to cite Neri in contempt and order his arrest? a. There was a legitimate claim of executive privilege. b. The Senates invitations to Neri did not include the possible needed statute which prompted the inquiry, the subject of inquiry, and the questions to be asked. c. The contempt order lacked the required number of votes. d. The Senates rules of procedure on inquiries in aid of legislation were not duly published.

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e. The contempt order is arbitrary and precipitate because the Senate did not first rule on the claim of executive privilege and instead dismissed Neris explanation as unsatisfactory.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION: Who has the burden of showing whether or not a claim of executive privilege is valid? Executive privilege is in derogation of the search for truth. However, the decision recognized Presidential communications as presumptively privileged. Hence, the party seeking disclosure of the information has the burden of overcoming the presumption in favor of the confidentiality of Presidential communications. This presumption is inconsistent with the Courts earlier statement in Senate vs. Ermita (April 20, 2006) that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. It is also inconsistent with constitutional provisions on transparency in governance and accountability of public officers, and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.

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Act as board of canvassers for presidential election Pimentel v. Joint Committee, G.R. 163783, June 22, 2004 Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress (Joint Committee) to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June 11, 2004. Petitioner posits that with "the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its last regular session, [its] term ... terminated and expired on the said day and the said Twelfth Congress serving the term 2001 to 2004 passed out of legal existence." Henceforth, petitioner goes on, "all pending matters and proceedings terminate upon the expiration of ... Congress." HELD: this Court finds that the petition has absolutely no basis under the Constitution and must, therefore, be dismissed. Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the Senate, of which he is an incumbent member. This section clearly provides that the Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President not later than thirty days after the day of the elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. As for petitioner's argument that "the existence and proceedings of the Joint Committee of Congress are invalid, [i]llegal and unconstitutional following the adjournment sine die of both Houses of Congress of their regular sessions on June 11, 2004," he cites in support thereof Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution which reads: Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time. Contrary to petitioner's argument, however, the term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire upon the adjournment sine die of the regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004. Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess

before the opening of its next regular session (subject to the power of the President to call a special session at any time). Section 4 of Article VIII also of the Constitution clearly provides that "[t]he term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." Similarly, Section 7 of the same Article provides that "[t]he Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." Consequently, there being no law to the contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present Twelfth Congress to which the present legislators belong cannot be said to have "passed out of legal existence." The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its nonlegislative functions, such as that of being the National Board of Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio. Its membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has accomplished its purposes. (Pelayo v. Commission on Elections, 23 SCRA 1374, 1385 [1968], citing Bautista v. Fugoso, 60 Phil. 383, 389 [1934] and Aquino v. Commission on Elections, L28392, January 29 1968) Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the duly elected President and Vice-President, its existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as well as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the certificates of canvass, has not become functus officio. In sum, despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal impediment to the Joint Committee completing the tasks assigned to it and transmitting its report for the approval of the joint public session of both Houses of Congress, which may reconvene without need of call by the President to a special session.

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