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Taxation and Tax Defined
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
vs.
ALGUE, INC., and CTA (1988)
 
Collector of Internal Revenue disallowed the P75K deductionclaimed by private respondent Algue as legitimate businessexpenses in its income tax returns. CTA agreed with Algue,allowing the deduction of P75K as legit business expenses.Collector of IR appealed CTA’s decision.Commissioner argues: deduction was not allowed bec it was notan ordinary reasonable or necessary business expense.CTA & Algue: the said amount had been legitimately paid by theAlgue for actual services rendered. The payment was in the formof 
promotional fees
. These were collected by the Payees for their work in the creation of the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation of the Phils (VOICP) and its subsequent purchase of the propertiesof the Philippine Sugar Estate Devt Company (PSEDC).
ISSUE
: Is the tax deduction proper? YES!
HELD
: In favor of CTA& Algue!Theamount was earned through the joint efforts of the personsamong whom it was distributed.It has been established that thePSEDC had earlier appointed Algue as its agent, authorizing it tosell its land, factories and oil manufacturing process. Pursuant tosuch authority, 5 others worked for the formation of the VOICP,inducing other persons to invest in it. Ultimately, after itsincorporation largely through the promotion of said 5persons, thisnew corporation purchased the PSEDC properties.
 
For this sale,Algue received as agent a commission of P126k, and it was fromthis commission that the P75k promotional fees were paid to the5persons.
 
There is no dispute that the payees duly reported their respectiveshares of the fees in their ITRs and paid the corresponding taxesthereon.
 
CTA also found that no distribution of dividends wasinvolved.
18
 
Commissioner accuses Algue of 
tax dodging 
(attempt to evade alegitimate assessment by involving an imaginary deduction). Heclaimed that these payments are fictitious bec most of the payeesare members of the same family in control of Algue. In fact, noindication was made as to how such payments were made,whether by check or in cash, and there is not enoughsubstantiation of such payments.However, these suspicions were adequately met by Algue Incwhen its President, Guevara, and the accountant, de Jesus,testified that the payments were not made in 1 lump sum butperiodically and in different amounts as each payee's need arose.It should be remembered that Algue Inc was a family corporationwhere strict business procedures were not applied and immediateissuance of receipts was not required. Even so, at the end of theyear, when the books were to be closed, each payee made anaccounting of all of the fees received by him or her, to make up thetotal of P75,000.00. Admittedly, everything seemed to be informal.This arrangement was understandable, however, in view of theclose relationship among the persons in the family corporation.
The CTA was correct
that the amount of the
promotional feeswas not excessive.
The total commission paid by the PSEDC. toAlgue Inc was P125K. After deducting the said fees, Algue still hada balance of P50K as clear profit from the transaction. The amountof P75K was 60% of the total commission. This was a reasonableproportion, considering that it was the payees who did practicallyeverything, from the formation of the VOICP to the actual purchaseby it of the PSEDC properties. This finding of the respondent courtis in accord with Sec 30 of the Tax Code:
SEC. 30.
 Deductions from gross income
.--In computing net income thereshall be allowed as deductions — (a) Expenses: (1)
 In general 
.--All the ordinary and necessary expenses paidor incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business,including a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for  personal services actually rendered; ...
22
 
and Revenue Regulations No. 2, Section 70 (1):
SEC. 70.
Compensation for personal services
.--Among the ordinary andnecessary expenses paid or incurred in carrying on any trade or business may be included a
reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation forpersonal services actually rendered
. The
test of deductibility in the caseof compensation payments is whether they are reasonable and are, infact, payments purely for service.
This test and deductibility in the case of compensation payments is whether they are reasonable and are, in fact, payments purely for service. This test and its practical application may befurther stated and illustrated as follows:
Any amount paid in the form of compensation, but not in fact as the purchase price of services, is notdeductible. (a) An ostensible salary paid by a corporation may be adistribution of a dividend on stock. This is likely to occur in the case of acorporation having few stockholders, Practically all of whom drawsalaries. If in such a case the salaries are in excess of those ordinarilypaid for similar services, and the excessive payment correspond or beara close relationship to the stockholdings of the officers of employees, itwould seem likely that the salaries are not paid wholly for servicesrendered, but the excessive payments are a distribution of earnings uponthe stock 
. . . .
It is worth noting at this point that most of the payees were not inthe regular employ of Algue nor were they its controllingstockholders.
23
 
SolGen’s correct that the
burden is on the taxpayer to provethe validity of the claimed deduction
. In the present case,however, we find that the onus has been discharged satisfactorily.The private respondent has proved that the payment of the feeswas necessary and reasonable in the light of the efforts exerted bythe payees in inducing investors and prominent businessmen toventure in an experimental enterprise and involve themselves in anew business requiring millions of pesos. This was no mean featand should be, as it was, sufficiently recompensed.
 
Taxes are what we pay for civilization society. Without taxes,the government would be paralyzed for lack of the motivepower to activate and operate it. Hence, despite the naturalreluctance to surrender part of one's hard earned income tothe taxing authorities, every person who is able to mustcontribute his share in the running of the government. Thegovernment for its part, is expected to respond in the form of tangible and intangible benefits intended to improve the livesof the people and enhance their moral and material values.This symbiotic relationship is the rationale of taxation andshould dispel the erroneous notion that it is an arbitrarymethod of exaction by those in the seat of power.
But even as the inevitability and indispensability of taxation isconceded, it is a requirement in all democratic regimes that it beexercised reasonably and in accordance with the prescribedprocedure. If it is not, then the taxpayer has a right to complainand the courts will then come to his succor. For all the awesomepower of the tax collector, he may still be stopped in his tracks if the taxpayer can demonstrate, as it has here, that the law has notbeen observed.
 
PROGRESSIVE DEVT CORP
vs.
QUEZON CITY
 
1989
 City Council of QC adopted Ordinance No. 7997, Series of 1969,the Market Code of Quezon City, Section 3 of which provided:
Sec. 3.
Supervision Fee.- Privately owned and operated public markets
shall submit monthly to the Treasurer's Office, a certified
listof stallholders showing the amount of stall fees or rentals paid daily by eachstallholder, ... and
 shall pay 10% of the gross receipts from stall rentals
tothe City, ... ,
as supervision fee
 
The Market Code was thereafter amended by Ordinance No.9236, Series of 1972, which reads:
SECTION 1.
There is hereby imposed (5 %) tax on gross receipts onrentals or lease of space in privately-owned public markets in QuezonCity.
xxx xxx xxxSECTION 3. For the effective implementation of this Ordinance,owners of privately owned public markets shall submit ... a monthlycertified list of stallholders of lessees of space in their markets xxx
Petitioner Progressive Devt Corp, owner and operator of a publicmarket known as the "Farmers Market & Shopping Center" filed aPetition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction againstrespondent bec the supervision fee or license tax imposed by theordinances is in reality a tax on income which QC may not impose,the same being expressly prohibited by RA 2264
QC answered
: it had authority to enact the ordinances,maintaining that the tax on gross receipts imposed therein is not atax on income. SolGen added that the tax on gross receipts wasnot a tax on income but one imposed for the enjoyment of theprivilege to engage in a particular trade or business which waswithin the power of QC to impose.
LC
:dismissed the petition: the questioned imposition is not a taxon income, but rather a privilege tax or license fee which localgovernments, like QC, are empowered to impose and collect.
ISSUE
: Whether the tax imposed on gross receipts of stall rentalsis properly characterized as partaking of the nature of an incometax or, alternatively, of a license fee.
HELD
: LICENSE FEE, in favor of QC!
Section 12, Article III RA 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City
,authorizes the City Council:xxx xxx xxx(b) To provide for the levy and collection of taxes and other city revenues and apply the same to the payment of cityexpenses in accordance with appropriations.(c)
To tax, fix the license fee, and regulate the business of 
 the following:...
preparation and sale of meat, poultry, fish, game, butter,cheese, lard vegetables, bread and other provisions
.
 
The scope of legislative authority conferred upon the QC Councilin respect of businesses like that of the petitioner, iscomprehensive: the grant of authority is not only" [to] regulate" and"fix the license fee," but also " to tax"Also, RA 2264, the
Local Autonomy Act
, provides that:Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
all chartered cities,
municipalities and municipal districts
 shall haveauthority to impose municipal license taxes or fees upon personsengaged in any occupation or business, or exercising privileges
inchartered cities
, municipalities or municipal districts byrequiring them to secure licenses at rates fixed by themunicipal board or city council of the city, the municipalcouncil of the municipality, or the municipal district councilof the municipal district; to collect fees and charges for service rendered by the city, municipality or municipaldistrict; to regulate and impose reasonable fees for servicesrendered in connection with any business, profession or occupation being conducted within the city, municipality or municipal district and otherwise to levy for public purposes just and uniform taxes licenses or fees: ...Thus, RA 2264 confers upon local governments broad taxingauthority extending to almost "everything, excepting those whichare mentioned therein," provided that the tax levied is "for publicpurposes, just and uniform," does not transgress any constitutionalprovision and is not repugnant to a controlling statute.Both the Local Autonomy Act and the Charter of QC clearly showthat respondent is authorized to fix the license fee collectible fromand regulate the business of petitioner as operator of a privately-owned public market.Petitioner, insists: "supervision fee" collected from rentals, being areturn from capital invested in the construction of the FarmersMarket, practically operates as a tax on income, 1 of thoseexpressly excepted from respondent's taxing authority, and thusbeyond the latter's competence. Petitioner cites the same Section2 of the Local Autonomy Act :... Provided, however,
That no city,
municipality or municipaldistrict
may levy 
or impose any of the following:xxx xxx xxx(g) Taxes on income of any kind whatsoever;
SC HELD
: The term "
tax 
" frequently applies to all kinds of exactions of monies which become public funds. It is often loosely
 
used to include levies for revenue as well as levies for regulatorypurposes such that license fees are frequently called taxesalthough
license fee
is a legal concept distinguishable from
tax:
 the former is imposed in the exercise of police power primarily for 
 
purposes of regulation, while the latter is imposed under the taxingpower primarily for purposes of raising revenues. Thus, if thegenerating of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation ismerely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is theprimary purpose, the fact that incidentally revenue is also obtaineddoes not make the imposition a tax.To be considered a license fee, the imposition questioned mustrelate to an occupation or activity that so engages the publicinterest in health, morals, safety and development as to require
 
regulation for the protection and promotion of such public interest;the imposition must also bear a reasonable relation to the probableexpenses of regulation, taking into account not only the costs of 
 
direct regulation but also its incidental consequences as well.Accordingly, a charge of a fixed sum which bears no relation at all
 
to the cost of inspection and regulation may be held to be a tax
 
rather than an exercise of the police power.ITCAB, the "Farmers Market & Shopping Center" was built byvirtue of Resolution No. 7350.The same resolution imposed uponpetitioner, as a condition for continuous operation, the obligation to"abide by and comply with the ordinances, rules and regulationsprescribed for the establishment, operation and maintenance of markets in Quezon City."The "Farmers' Market and Shopping Center" being a public marketin the' sense of a market open to and inviting the patronage of thegeneral public, even though privately owned, petitioner's operationthereof required a license issued by the respondent City, theissuance of which, applying the standards set forth above, wasdone principally in the exercise of the respondent's police power.The operation of a privately owned market is, as correctly noted bythe Solicitor General, equivalent to or quite the same as theoperation of a government-owned market; both are established for the rendition of service to the general public, which warrants closesupervision and control by the respondent City, for the protectionof the health of the public.Thus, the (5%) tax imposed in Ordinance No. 9236 constitutes, nota
tax on income,
not a
city 
income tax but rather a
license tax or fee for the regulation
of the business in which the petitioner isengaged. While it is true that the amount imposed by thequestioned ordinances may be considered in determining whether the exaction is really one for revenue or prohibition, instead of oneof regulation under the police power, it nevertheless will bepresumed to be reasonable. Local' governments are allowed widediscretion in determining the rates of imposable license fees evenin cases of purely police power measures, in the absence of proof as to particular municipal conditions and the nature of the businessbeing taxed as well as other detailed factors relevant to the issueof arbitrariness or unreasonableness of the questioned rates.Petitioner has neither shown that the rate of the gross receipts taxis so unreasonably large and excessive and so grosslydisproportionate to the costs of the regulatory service beingperformed by the respondent as to compel the Court tocharacterize the imposition as a revenue measure exclusively. Thelower court correctly held that the gross receipts from stall rentalshave been used only as a basis for computing the fees or taxesdue respondent to cover the latter's administrative expensesTheuse of the gross amount of stall rentals as basis for determiningthe collectible amount of license tax, does not by itself, upon theone hand, convert or render the license tax into a prohibited citytax on income. Upon the other hand, it has not been suggestedthat such basis has no reasonable relationship to the probablecosts of regulation and supervision of the petitioner's kind of business. For, ordinarily, the higher the amount of stall rentals, thehigher the aggregate volume of foodstuffs and related items sold inpetitioner's privately owned market; and the higher the volume of goods sold in such private market, the greater the extent andfrequency of inspection and supervision that may be reasonablyrequired in the interest of the buying public. Moreover, what westarted with should be recalled here: the authority conferred uponthe respondent's City Council is
not 
merely "to regulate" but alsoembraces the power "to tax" the petitioner's business.
Petitioner argues
: respondent is without power to impose a grossreceipts tax for revenue purposes absent an express grant fromthe national government. As a general rule, there must be astatutory grant for a local government unit to impose lawfully agross receipts tax, that unit not having the inherent power of taxation. The rule, however, finds no application in the instant casewhere what is involved is an exercise of, principally, the regulatorypower of the respondent City and where that regulatory power isexpressly accompanied by the taxing power.
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