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COMMISSION
SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM
June
8,
2004
To:
CommissionersFrom: Philip Zelikow
Subj:
Draft
Outline
of
Policy Recommendations
and Our
Meeting TomorrowAttached is a
draft
outline of policy recommendations, prepared at Tom and
Lee's
request
for
your benefit.
We
have
not
made
it a
classified document.
It is
more sensitive thanthat.Tom and Lee have reviewed the outline repeatedly and directed various changes to get it
into
a
condition
they
felt
was
ready
for
your review. While they asked
us to say
they
are
not
wedded
to
every word,
it
captures
the
recommendations they propose
for
yourconsideration.
The
agenda
for the
meeting tomorrow, with notional times,
is:
1.
Initial
Discussion
of
Policy Recommendations
(9-1230)
2.
Discussion
of
Report
-
Draft
Chapters
One
-
Four (1230-3)
3.
Next
Week's
Agenda
~
Special Concerns about NORAD-FAA Prior Statements(3-330)
(a
memo
on
this
subject
will
be
distributed
to you
later today
from
me and
from
John
Farmer)4. Other Business (330-4)Tomorrow
we
also plan
to
give you,
in
person:
(1) Staff
Statement
15
(al
Qaeda);
(2)
Staff
Statement
16
(the plot);
(3)
Staff
Statement
17
(improvising
a
homeland defense);
(4)
Draft
Report Chapter Five;
and (5)
Draft
Report Chapter
SixCOMMISSION
SENSITIVE
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
Summary of
Possible Policy Recommendations
Draft
of 8
June
OVERALL STRATEGY
1. Articulate a clear, comprehensive national strategy.
The
strategy shouldinclude:
A
strategy to prevent Islamist terrorism by addressing crises in the Muslimworld.A strategy to stop terrorists; and
A
strategy to protect against and prepare for terrorist attacksThat strategy needs to encompass all the elements of national power, includingmilitary power,
diplomacy,economic
policy, financial
assistance, intelligence,
covert action, and public diplomacy. It
therefore
must be integrated andcoordinated
by the
White House.Recast
the
problem
as:
a generational challenge, as the Muslim world adapts to modernity; andachallengeforgovernance,as thenational security institutions builtforWorld War II and the Cold War are transformed for a
different
kind ofworld.
2. The
strategy should define
the
enemy,
and the
nature
of the
conflict.
"Terrorism"
is a
tactic.
It is not the
enemy.
The
enemy
is violent Islamist
extremism that
offers
revolution and mass murder as an answer, or outlet, fortroubled,
frustrated
societies.Islam is not the enemy. The United States and its allies are not engaged in a clashof civilizations. We are instead caught up in a clash within a civilization, a civil
and
religious conflict across a Muslim world struggling with modernity andchange.
We
must take
sides
in
that struggle, supporting
those
who are
trying
to
build a better, peaceful
future.
Violent Islamist extremists, organized
by
groups like
al
Qaeda,
use
religiousideas, language and imagery. But their agenda is essentially political. They
feed
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
r
/
COMMISSIONSENSITIVEuponsocial, economic and cultural dislocation. The
forces
of order can round upterrorists and seize their
funds.
But to
defeat
the extremists they must alsostrengthen
the
forces
of
hope.Our strategy has to
reflect
our goals as a nation. The United States and its
allies
should stand for encourage personal
freedom,
political participation, economicopportunity, educational opportunity,
and
religious tolerance.
We
cannot achievethese goals in the near
future,
but those in the Arab and Muslim world who sharethese goals need to know that we are on their side.
3.
The
strategy should
set
realistic, accountable objectives
to
measure success,
such
as:
No
sanctuaries;Joint management of counterterrorism
efforts
across the foreign-domesticdivide with clear accountability about who is in charge; andNationalsecurity agencies networked to join the
information
revolution
and
guided on how to protect both privacy and security.Terrorism everywhere should
be
condemned,
but not
every terrorist
act
threatensthe United States. A realistic, vital objective is to stop a repetition of 9/11 orworse
—
attacks that
can
cause mass casualties
and
catastrophic harm
to the
United States.COMMISSION SENSITIVE
of 00
SK B3 Policy Recommendations Fdr- Entire Contents- 6-8-04 Memo-Summary-Outline and 6-1-04 Musharraf OpEd (Fair Use)
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