Politikon September 2013

Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. Nr.20, June 2013
important to participate in the building of new ideas, to criticize the established order and
Volume 21: September 2013 Academic year 2013-2014

Editor in Chief Rodrigo Vaz Catholic University of Portugal Portugal Editorial Board Caitlin Bagby, USA
Kings College, London, United Kingdom
Pter Kirly, Hungary

Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
Andrijana Nikic, Montenegro

University of Montenegro, Montenegro
Reint-Jan Groot Nuelend, The Netherlands

University of Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Vit Simral, Czech Republic

IMT, Lucca, Italy / Charles University, Prague / Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic
Advisory Board Manuel Garreton, Chile, Joo Carlos Espada, Portugal, Carole Pateman, England, Leonardo Morlino, Italy, Phillippe Schmitter, USA
Content
Editorial Message....4 Rodrigo Vaz When nationalism meets electoral schemes: the intricate situation of the Aromanian minority from Romania5 Sergiu Delcea American policy on the Balkans: Sucessful story or a diplomatic failure?.......12 Frosina Doninovska

Rentier state as an obstacle to development in the Middle East.20 Andrzej Guzowski From Yeltsin to Putin: Moscows Perception of the Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula..30 Wonhee Lee
Politikon:IAPSS Political Science Journal
Vol. 21, September 2013
Editorial Message
Dear Reader, Let me start by welcoming you to yet another issue of POLITIKON. In this issue we publish the papers selected from the submissions we received to our call for papers. Very soon, in November, we will celebrate the first anniversary of the re-publishing of POLITIKON, which undoubtedly fills all IAPSS members with joy, particularly the ones directly contributing to the success of the journal. November also promises to be a celebrating moment to IAPSS as in this month our organization turns 15 years old. This marking moment will be integrant part of the program of our upcoming Academic Conference and General Assembly in Bucharest, Romania, from the 19th to the 24th of November. More information on the Conference Website. Feel very much invited to join us! I am also very happy to inform you that observing the challenges that Political Science students and young scholars may face while submitting an article, the Editorial Board is currently working in the preparation of some guidelines on how and what to submit and how and what not. Those guidelines will be published soon in the POLITIKON page of IAPSS website. Together with, the call for papers for the next issue will also be issued. For now, I will leave you with the selected articles. Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact me directly at academic@iapss.org. Enjoy!
Best wishes,
Rodrigo Vaz POLITIKON, Editor in Chief Head of Academic Department International Association for Political Science Students
When nationalism meets electoral schemes: the intricate situation of the Aromanian minority from Romania

Sergiu DELCEA1, Central European University, Budapest Abstract
he resurgence of ethno-centered, exclusionary types of nationalisms in Eastern Europe after the fall of the communist regimes in 1989 represents a multi-layered phenomenon with complex ramifications. The aim of this paper is to delve into an extremely complicated case surrounding a very peculiar minority - the Aromanians living in Romania. This analysis aims to show that although Romania's approach to minority representation is a non-essentialist one on paper, the reserved seat system is sometimes still laced with nationalistic overtones. As a minority with a highly debated historical legacy, the Aromanians lack legal recognition and are subjected to an assimilation process that is not always as soft as it might seem. If Romania is to continue its already protracted democratic transition solving the puzzle surrounding the Aromanians seems to be a key stepping stone.
Sergiu Delcea is a second year MA student in the Nationalism Studies Programme, Central European University, Budapest, with a previous background in Political Science (graduated BA studies in 2012) from the University of Bucharest. He is currently a member of the editorial board for the IAPSS blog A Different View, where he is exploring his current research interests that revolve around linking nation-building processes and welfare-regime construction (with a focus on Eastern Europe). 45
Sergiu DELCEA
When nationalism meets electoral schemes secure any kind of legal recognition for the Aromanians. The contentious stake here is that vocal Aromanian grass-roots organizations are striving for recognition as a "national minority" (Kymlicka&Opalski,2001:13-107) arguing that under the blurry Romanian legislation only this legal status will ensure cultural and linguistic protection (which is the aim of Romania's minority legislation projects5). Romania's monolithic approach is grounded in a historicist discourse claiming that the Aromanians are an integral part of an organically defined nation hence making their claim illegitimate for a number of reasons: Parliamentary representation is done through the regular channels (since they are equated to the bulk of the nation), language rights are not necessary since Aromanian is a dialect of Romanian and for the groups of Aromanians that are claiming descent from other nations representation is done indirectly via minority representations of those respective states. In addition, the Romanian politicians' second core argument is that since mass migration towards Romania in the interwar era was voluntary, the second/third/fourth generation Aromanians today cannot claim national minority status. My main argument is that the Aromanian minority stands at a very dangerous crossroads between a circular legislation that aims to preserve the status quo of reserved seats system and the political value of nationalist rhetoric. Despite creating an over-representation of minorities (with the exception of the Roma, see Protsyk&Matichescu, 2010), the Romanian electoral system disenfranchises minorities from pursuing own agendas. On the other side of the spectrum, although Romania's stance towards minorities is in not an
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espite a rather tumultuous start in the early 90s Romania has been slowly improving its institutional approach to minority protection (Bernd Rechel(ed), 2009: Ch. 13 M. Ram), owing in no small part to its growing international commitments. However, there are still rather blurry lines when it comes to defining who gets to be declared a minority and gain political representation. Furthermore, language rights packages represent a very contentious issue that are generally transcribed into public debate as threats to national integrity (as they are generally show-cased around the Hungarian minority). What seems to emerge is a rather fuzzy picture, that leaves room for potentially problematic case around minorities with very intricate backgrounds. This paper will provide a case-study of a rather small minority that stands at a crossroads between multiple discourses and competing claims: the Aromanians2 living in Romania. There is an interesting paradox at play surrounding the recognition of this minority3: recognized as a cultural minority by the Council of Europe in 1997 (which Romania has ratified in 2007), the Aromanians are subject to a soft assimilation process via an indigenization discourse, without being recognized as a minority of any sort by the Romanian state. Despite having sued the Romanian state as early as 2005, grass-roots organizations (mostly uniting around CAR - Council of Aromanians from Romania4) have failed to
Methodologically, throughout this paper I have used "Aromanians" as an umbrella term. However, it must be clearly stated that a wide body of literature shows a very high degree of cultural and linguistic fragmentation within this community 3 According to Romanian sources about 26.000 individuals in 2006 4 Throughout this paper I will mostly use CAR as a reference point as it is not only the most vocal grass-roots organization, but also well-connected in an international network of Aromanian bodies.
http://www.dri.gov.ro/documents/lege_mi noritati_forma_finala_guvern.pdf Last Accessed: 3rd April 2013 - Art 3-5 enshrined that any individual has the right to selfidentification, and the state-mandated protection of identity 46
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal essentializing one, there is a very blurry legislation as to which groups gets to be a minority and enter into either direct electoral competition or the reserved seats system. Although in post-socialist Romania, nationalist rhetoric is not an outward force in electoral competitions, it still seems to be at least a latent hot potato: the 1999 history textbook scandal that lead ultimately to the fall of the Government on grounds of "AntiRomanian feelings" (TRENCSENYI& PETRESCU& KANTOR IORDACHI&Petrescu,2001:Part 1, Ch. Razvan Paraianu) seems to point to an extremely complicated picture. In this equation the Aromanians seem to be torn between multiple stances: accepting assimilation and identifying with the Romanian nation, or pushing forward an agenda of recognition as a minority of some sort. Competing stances - Are Aromanians in Romania nationals or minority? More importantly, whose nationals and/or minority? Broadly speaking, there are two individual threads to be pursued here: the direct consequences of the electoral system itself and the impact of the nationalistoriented rhetoric on an already circular legislation6. What stands out is that in the case of the Aromanians both seem interwoven in a very distinct fashion: essentialization not directly via statedefinition of minorities, but by excluding Aromanians as a separate ethnic category in the census, and putting them under the over-arching category of "Romanians"(Tircomnicoiu,2011). This creates a very blurry classification that the Aromanians are a kind of a minority of the "homeland itself" due to particular historical contexts, a narrative that could adequately be labeled as a paradox between free choice of
As of 2008, minorities that have a reserved seat are those represented in the National Council for Minorities. However, the minorities that are represented in this body are those who get Parliamentary representation in the elections!
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Vol. 21, September 2013 identity and the objective requirements for considering the group as completely distinctive (K. Henrard (ed),2013forthcoming: ch. by Andras Pap). To begin with, I will first present the historicist arguments claiming that Aromanians are part and parcel of the Romanian nation. For the sake of space I will not present here this entire narrative, but focus on a few key issues that come up in the debates surrounding this minority: Latin ancestry, voluntary migration in the interwar (quasi-democratic meeting of representatives at Varia, Greece in 1923), ethnic identification. Even the most nationalistic Romanian researchers ultimately conclude that this minority is of clear Latin descent, though not part of the North-Danubian core that constituted the perceived background of the Romanian nation, but rather of a South-Danubian origin - latinized Greeks, Illyrians and Balkan Thracians. In a political sense, this historical reality has always been exploited as a kind of blood-tie specific for kin-minorities, a discourse which entered main-stream Romanian political debates in the late 19thearly 20th century. There is one important element to be noted here: in the interwar, despite no legal recognition, the Aromanians were granted language rights and offered state-financed minority language education (Iosif, 2011:136-137). Although such rights were clearly absent during communism, this legacy, coupled with a the known endogamous character of most Aromanian communities(Djuvara (ed.), 2012:165-170 ch. M. Demeter-Peyfuss), ensured that, in no small part, the Romanian groups maintained some of their linguistic and cultural individuality. On the other side of the spectrum, this has given rise to a very intricate backlash effect: scholars are claiming that beyond the Latin origin of the dialect, its systematization as a language was done under the influence and standards of Romanian (Djuvara(ed.), 2012:207-214, ch. M. Caragiu-Marioteanu) thus enhancing the essentializing view that Aromanians are part of an organically defined nation. 47
Sergiu DELCEA The state's secondary core argument revolves around the fact that voluntary migration makes it illegitimate to request minority status. Although not framed as a nationalistic type of argument, this narrative points to a clear direction: while first/second generation immigrants might be acceptable as non-integrated, third/fourth generation ones, particularly those with a loose common descent, are forcefully assimilated. There are two important issues though at play within this secondary argument: firstly, the very nationalistic argument that common Latin descent, which implies a perceived facilitation towards assimilation, is taken to mean automatic desire for assimilation; secondly, in the case of the Hungarian minority non-integration is tolerated because this particular group has concrete political value as a show-case example for Romanian towards fulfilling its policy goals towards the EU and other international bodies. This type of argument, backed up by the historicist discourse of the Romanian Academy, seems to have gotten some firm ground with grassroots Aromanian organizations that espouse the following view: if the Aromanians are a minority in their Romanian "home-land", hence non-assimilated, they would become "wanderers", which is normatively inconceivable!7 This line of thought clearly reveals the nationalistic rhetoric: nationhood and national affiliation taken as salient is the only normatively desirable legal existence. The striking paradox at play here is that this indigenization discourse revolves around the Aromanians as part of the ancestral core of the nation, which would, at least a theoretical level, make them somewhat suitable for indigenous people status! However, as they were not settled on the territory of Romania that line of thinking seems to be completely futile and not at all pursued not even by the most radical grassroots organizations. Moving on, I will now briefly outline some of the legal and political consequences
Declaration of Aromanian NGO, http://www.scribd.com/doc/49694825/Problemaaromanilor, Last Accessed: 23rd April 2013
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When nationalism meets electoral schemes of this approach to the Aromanian minority, in the context of Romanian electoral legislation. Although the Romanian electoral system was not enshrined as an essentialist one with regards to minorities (King&Marian, 2012), the Aromanians were simply taken as an integral part of the Romanian Kulturnation, a view that was not challenged by any competing organizations. This approach seemed to have some sort of popular legitimacy within the Aromanian community itself, as one of the few existing large-scale surveys point towards a strong majority that self-identified with the Romanian nation (Kahl, 2006). However, some consideration must be given to the broader issue of self-identification in the particular case of the Aromanians. Although the legislation enshrines a purely individualistic approach to ethnic affiliation, Aromanian organizations that could provide sufficient data in order to register a minority party are faced with a daunting challenge: legally, they can only be ethnic-Romanian minorities. If an individual declares himself to be Aromanian, the census counts him/her automatically as a Romanian, making it impossible to claim AromanianMacedonian or Aromanian-Greek descent. This legal reality translates not as an essentialist approach to minority definition, but creates a salience of Romanian nationhood: by the proxy of common Latin descent, Aromanian identification cannot exist in the framework of any other national identity (taken also as salient), than the Romanian one. The paradox at play is the following: although Romanian legislation enables selfidentification, it creates clear delineations between the minority and the organizations (King&Marian, 2012:567). Consequently, even if grass-roots organizations, such as CAR, bring to the Central Electoral Bureau sufficient data to back up their registration as an NGO or party with representative claims, they are not allowed into intraminority electoral competition for reserved seats, since an alternative (i.e. outside the umbrella of "Romanian minority") legal category does not exist. What follows 48
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal logically is that such a grass-roots organization is stuck between Scylla and Charybdis: registration as an Aromanian representative body means going into mainstream electoral competition, registration as a minority unit within existing recognized ethnic groups is technically impossible, or would imply the fragmentation of the NGO/Party itself into small factions molded on some intra-minority ethnic boundaries. There is one more contentious point to be noted here about the Romanian electoral system: it seems to rest on the assumption that minorities are homogeneous and will always be represented by one political group (King&Marian, 2012:568). This mechanism transfers electoral thresholds on a proportional basis within minority groups creating the perverse effect that in the case of sharp intra-minority competition representation might be completely lost (King&Marian, 2012:565570). Consequently, the aforementioned fragmentation of a hypothetical Aromanian NGO/Party in small-scale ethnic units would not gain much ground with minority constituencies that would fear losing representation at all. To further complicate the problem, national minorities such as the Greek one might not even recognize the existence of an internal Aromanian community, as this identity does not legally exist at all in Greece! This legal reality greatly hinders the Aromanian cause as the state has the straight-forward argument of indirect representation. What CAR and other organizations are striving for is recognition of the Aromanians as a "minority of a Balkan regional people"8, by arguing that migration towards Romania was done more on economic grounds, rather than some nationalist ethos. It is exactly here that the Romanian arguments blend become very blurry: although acknowledging that the Aromanians are clearly distinct from the Balkan nationalities, they are not granted any special status, but rather forcefully assimilated into Romanian main-stream
http://www.scribd.com/doc/49694825/Problemaaromanilor, Last Accessed: 23rd April 2013
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Vol. 21, September 2013 electoral legislation. One interesting parallel can be drawn that shows the very specific nature of the Aromanian case: when the Tartar minority representatives separated from the Turkish ones in the early 90s, they were granted reserved seats. Outwardly, the Tartars seem to be in a comparable position: a regional identity without a kin-state, but a clearly delineated language, inhabiting a plurality of states with existing minority representation in Romania (such as Russia and Ukraine). However, this group was acknowledged as being different from the Russian minority and granted its own channels of representation. This points clearly towards the direction that in the case of the Aromanians there are more important factors outside the voting system itself (for in-depth analysis Reynolds, 2006) - i.e. some sort of assimilation. Last but not least, some attention must be given to the issue of political entrepreneurship. King and Marian argue that one of the key perverse effects of the Romanian minority representation legislation is that it allows great maneuvering room for crafty, well-connected politicians aiming to secure a comfortable seat in Parliament (King&Marian, 575). Although acknowledging the validity of this argument, in the case of the Aromanians I argue that it holds no bearing: the singular case of the PD-L member Costica Canacheu (which has proven Aromanian descent!) does not make CAR's case an instance of political entrepreneurship. For instance, the documented case of George Becali who did indeed pursue minority-politics (King&Marian, 2012:581), but via the Italian minority rather than the Aromanian minority (which he proudly claims descent from) inside which he would probably have enjoyed even more popularity and gained more support, clearly indicates that CAR is not pursuing some entrepreneurial agenda. Furthermore, since the Romanian law permits any citizen to cast a vote for any political organization, if CAR were indeed just an instance of minorityentrepreneurship it could just go into mainstream politics and by using some prominent 49
Sergiu DELCEA personalities gain representation through the main-stream national channels. However, such a project seems to be completely absent from the agenda of Aromanian grass-roots organizations. Conclusions The situation of the Aromanian minority in Romania seems to be at a crossroads between a plethora of issues: internal division of the community itself, nationalist rhetoric pervading Romanian politics, unclear scientific conclusions on the history of the minority and unclear places within other minorities. Competing stances towards this minority seem to be the common denominator, prompting various legal statuses throughout the plethora of states the Aromanians inhabit: forceful assimilation in Greece hence barred identity, soft assimilation in Romania, partial recognition in Albania, national minority status in FYROM and so on. Despite the fact that the Council of Europe recognized the Aromanians as a cultural and linguistic minority, the vagueness of this document with regards to defining "national minorities" put this particular group in a problematic position. In the case of Romania there seem to be two intertwining arguments: a nationalistic argument, grounded in a historicist discourse, claiming assimilation into the Romanian nation, which has been legally enshrined in the census by denying the possibility of self-affiliation to alternative groups such as Macedonian-Aromanian, Albanian-Aromanian etc. Although boundaries of the minority are not directly drawn by the abusers themselves in the case of Romania, the Aromanians seem to have less of a freedom of choice when it comes to self-ascribed identity (K. Henrard (ed), 2013forthcoming: ch. by Andras Pap). This case seems to be less a direct consequence of the electoral system, as is the case of some small-scale Hungarian organizations, but more linked with a soft assimilation process made by a particular way of conceptualizing the census. When it comes to an in-between
When nationalism meets electoral schemes recognition such as cultural-linguistic minority, the Romanian state's argument seems even more fraught with nationalism the Aromanian dialects are purportedly systematized under the templates used for the Romanian language hence cannot be granted distinct rights. The common Latin descent seems to be a catch-phrase used to legitimized almost every kind of discrimination. All things considered, breaking out of this intricate equation seems a daunting challenge for Aromanian grass-roots organizations. Political lobby seems to be insufficient, and needs to be joined with a growing body of scholarly studies in order to stand any chance of success. Short personal description Sergiu Delcea is a second year MA student in the Nationalism Studies Programme, Central European University, Budapest, with a previous background in Political Science (graduated BA studies in 2012) from the University of Bucharest. He is currently a member of the editorial board for the IAPSS blog A Different View, where he is exploring his current research interests that revolve around linking nationbuilding processes and welfare-regime construction (with a focus on Eastern Europe). Bibliography Djuvara, N. (ed.) (2012), Aromanii. Istorie. Limba. Destin [The Aromanians. History. Language. Destiny. own translation], Humanitas: Bucharest o M. Caragiu-Marioteanu, Un dodecalog al aromanilor [A 12-point Decalogue of the Aromanians own translation], o Max Demeter Peyfuss, Aromanii in era nationalismelor balcanice [The Aromanians in the age of Balkan nationalisms own translation] Iosif, C. (2011) The Aromanians between nationality and ethnicity: the 50
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal history of an identity building, published in Transylvanian Review, Vol. 20 Kahl, T. (2006) Istoria Aromanilor [History of the Aromanians - own translation], Edit. Tritonic: Bucharest King, R., Marian, C. (2012) Minority Representation and Reserved Legislative Seats in Romania, published in East European Politics, Vol. 36, No. 3, Kymlicka, W., Opalski, M (eds) (2001), Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Oxford University Press: Oxford K. Henrard (ed.), (2013, forthcoming, Brill), in use the chapter by Pap, A., Murphy's Law on free choice of identity? Legal and Political difficulties in defining minority communities and membership boundaries TRENCSENYI, B., PETRESCU, D. , PETRESCU, C., IORDACHI, C. , KANTOR, Z. (2001) Nation-Building and Contested Identities: Romanian and Hungarian Case Studies, Regio Books, Budapest), in use the chapter by Paraianu, R. , National Prejudices, Mass Media and History Textbooks: The Mitu Controversy Protsyk, O., Matichescu, M. L. (2010) Electoral rules and minority representation in Romania, published in Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 43, Issue 1, Rechel, B. (2009) Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe. Routledge:London, chapter in use Ram, M. Romania. From laggard to leader? Reynolds, A. (2006) Electoral systems and the protection and participation of minorities, Minority Rights Group International available online
Vol. 21, September 2013 http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid =1075, Last Accessed 25th July 2013 Tircomnicoiu, E. (2011), The Aromanians in Contemporary Romania, published in Romanian Sociology Review, Issue 1
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American policy on the Balkans: Successful story or a diplomatic failure?

Frosina DONINOVSKA1, National Democratic Institute, Skopje Abstract
he United States of America is a country which left a significant mark and still has a strong influence on the world political scene and the changes in the international relations especially in building the strategy of worldwide foreign policy. The paper will try to give an overview of the events that marked the 1990s of the last century, with an accent on the breakup of Yugoslavia and the role of U.S. foreign policy in this period. The paper will especially focus on the process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia as well as the role of the United States in the Dayton Agreement and the ways of implementing the peace through the assets of diplomacy. Dayton differed from the traditional methods of negotiation in a way that included the U.S. leadership and its implementation depended on the will of the international community, especially the United States who led the efforts.
Frosina Doninovska, 25 is a graduate who received her Bachelor degree in Political Science at the University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in 2010. In 2013 she obtained her MA degree in Diplomacy and International Relations at the faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus at the department od International relations. At the moment she works at the office of the National Democratic Institute office in Skopje, Republic of Macedonia as a program assistant in the field of elections. Her interests include rule of law, integrity of the electoral and political process, democratic governance, citizen participation, etc. 45
Frosina DONINOVSKA
American policy on the Balkans superpower, to describe the American status without precedent (Safire 2003). Within a short period in the early 90 - es, peace and world order seemed achievable. The end of the Cold War and the sudden defeat of the Soviet Union eliminated the major reasons for national tensions and reduce the threat of nuclear disaster. President George Bush proclaimed a new world order led by the United States. Fukuyama welcomed the "end of history", the absolute triumph of capitalism and democracy over fascism and communism ( Fukuyama 1992). Despite all these event, from today's perspective, it is important to note that the end of the Cold War caused an explosion of ethnic regional conflicts in the South Eastern Europe. At the end of World War II, Yugoslavia emerged as it was conceived in Jajce. By 1948 Yugoslavia was the best student of the Soviet Union (Dokmanovic 2005). However, during the time the relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR were deteriorated as a result of the desire of the USSR to dominate with the communist countries by underestimating them economically (Dedier 1953). It is important to note that Stalin systematically and cold prepared the subordination of Yugoslavia, as the central point in South Eastern Europe. He profusely used the fact that Yugoslavia was under threat from the other great powers in the early years of the war and USSR were trying to complicate those relations in order Yugoslavia to become their prey (Dedier 1953). These were the immediate causes of conflict between these two countries.
he end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a new chapter in the world politics that the previous stable and predictable system of international relations replaced by a insecure international framework which was characterized by fragmentation in the international relations and the emergence of strong nationalist tendencies within the states. The end of the Cold War was manifested through certain events that prevailed on the international political scene at that time. The defeat of Communism, manifested by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union imposed the need for redefining the relations on a global level. The United States from the Second World War emerged as one of the strongest countries. Characteristic of the United States in the period after the Second World War was the opposition of the relations with the Soviet Union, a period known as the Cold War. In the years that followed the Second World War, the US foreign policy relied on the power of the nuclear weapon. The nuclear weapon was a helpful way to ensure that the Western Europe will rely on the United States as a guarantee of their own security rather than looking for external adjustment with the the Soviet Union (Office of the Historian. US Department of State). The beginning of the Cold War was an expression of the failure to implement the principles agreed on the conferences in Yalta and Potsdam (Scott 2007). Soon, The United States started again to confront with the Soviet Union militarily, economically and politically. After the Cold War, the United States enjoyed a degree of world hegemony. The French often critically disposed towards the United States, invented a new word -
The interests of the United States in the Balkans
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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal During the Cold War, the American Yugoslav relations were defined within the broader context of relations East - West. The United States supported Yugoslavia in its independent course since decided to go to the way of self-governing socialism, separated from the USSR with the Resolution from the Inform bureau in 1948. Relations between Yugoslavia and the United States basically remained good over the years due to the fact that the United States respected Tito in order to prevent any association of Yugoslavia to the Soviet Union. In other words, the United States needed an ally in the region in order to prevent penetration of the USSR to the heart of Europe. Nationalism as a destiny of the Yugoslav Peoples Besides the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States faced new problems in the region of South Eastern Europe, especially in the Balkans (Cox; Stokes 2008). With the end of the Cold War, the ethnic hatreds reached the boiling point and the state began to fall apart. Among the other factors, the disintegration of Yugoslavia was caused primarily by nationalist tensions among the two biggest nations, Serbian and Croatian. Serbian nationalism was embodied through Milosevic's efforts to create a Greater Serbia, and the thesis of supporters of Milosevic that they were the last line of defense and rescue of Yugoslavia as an equal union of all Yugoslav nations in which the Serbian people should get an equal position. The Croatian nationalism unlike Serbian was dedicated to the creation of a new independent state that was largely distinct from those of the other Yugoslav peoples. The supporters of Tudjman developed discourse in which Croatian nationalism constituted contrary to the others, especially
Vol. 21, September 2013 against the Serbs / Yugoslavs, which hampered the real development of the Croatian people. The Croats communist system interpreted as something that is imposed from the outside - by Serbia in this particular case, not by the Soviet Union. The Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the administration of the President George Bush George Bush was the 41th President of the United States. The function President he performed from 1989 to 1993, when inherited Ronald Reagan. The period in which the president George Bush led the United States signifies quite turbulent chapter in the world history. Precisely in his time, major changes have occurred on the international political arena. In these years, the world was facing with the collapse of the Soviet Union, which in some way signified the end of the policy of balance between the two superpowers the United States and the Soviet Union. George Bush took the office in a time when the Soviet Union was disintegrating and when Moscow was looking for a new framework of understanding with the West. The question is: "What was the position of the United States in the new world order?" Given the fact that the future of the Soviet Union was clear, even clearer was the role of the United States in the new world order. After the Cold War the United States were the most powerful country on the worlds political scene militarily as well as economically and politically. In the period between 1989 - 1990, the focus of the Bush's policies were aimed at finding a way to deal with the collapse of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and consequently, how to deal with the effects that were caused by the collapse (Smith 1994). Along 47
Frosina DONINOVSKA to this, the Bush administration was engaged in war with Iraq known as the Gulf War. The administration of the President George Bush supported the promotion of democratic - liberal values around the world, especially in the countries that emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and the new states in Eastern and Central Europe. Perhaps the greatest triumph of the Bush administration aimed at spreading democracy worldwide, was the moment of spreading democracy in Latin America, especially with the election of Violeta Chamorro as president of Nicaragua, which marked the end of the eleven years of governance of the regime of Sandinista. The winter 1990 -1991, the Bush administration was concerned about the resistance to changes in the Soviet Union. The situation became especially alarming when Eduard Shevardnadze resigned from the position of Foreign Affairs Minister, accusing Gorbachev that he was moving too much to the right and its approach to the right could result in reforming the Communist Party, or worse with preparing a military coup. In such a situation, Washington had to recognize that its impact on Moscow was limited, given the fact that certain events on the domestic political scene in the USSR, might have a negative outcome for U.S. policy in the region. Perhaps the biggest failure of the Bush administration was the failure to comply with the European Union on the issue of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, since they were engaged with the events in the Middle East, or the development of the situation that culminated with the attack of United States on Iraq as a result of the Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Where the American interests were threatened, the ultimate asset of diplomacy was used. Thus, the United States used force to deal with the problems that emerged in
American policy on the Balkans the Middle East. Through the launch of "Operation Desert Storm", U.S. foreign policy was focused on events related to the Gulf War ( (Office of the Historian. US Department of State).
The Relations Between the United States and Yugoslavia during the dissolution This section will cover the views of U.S. diplomats and officials about the question of dissolution of Yugoslavia. During the whole period since the start of the crisis until the final outcome, the position of the United States regarding the question of dissolution was unchanging. The United States advocated for united Yugoslavia. Since the start of fueling the crisis, the United States condemned the use of force as a tool for achieving political goals and undermining the democratic process of peaceful dialogue. The events that marked the crisis in the Yugoslav presidency with the non election of Stipe Mesic for president of the Federal Presidency in June 1991, caused reactions by American side. The United States called for unimpeded transfer of the constitutional power. The United States expressed support for progress towards a democratic and unified Yugoslavia. According to them, the unhindered constitutional transfer of power in accordance with the accepted practice was a very important step in that direction. For the United States the dissolution of Yugoslavia was unacceptable but also unacceptable was the violent preservation of the unity of Yugoslavia because in this way democracy would be stifled, considered the U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman. He also mention that the script for the peaceful dissolution could not be 48
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal imagined. Zimmerman said that democracy and unity were inseparable principles upon which the American foreign policy toward Yugoslavia was based (Zimmerman 1999). One of the most important events in this period was the visit to Yugoslavia of the Secretary of State James Baker. James Baker visited Belgrade on 21 June 1991. The visit was aimed to confirm the position of the United States in order to support the united and democratic Yugoslavia. According to him, this should be achieved through dialogue, without violence and bloodshed. Baker believed that opportunities for dialogue aimed at resolving the crisis have not been exhausted yet. In other words the republics still could agree on a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Dissolution of Yugoslavia In 1991, Yugoslavia amid fierce ethnic fighting faced with the collapse of the longstanding common state. The conditions for collapse of the political regime of "selfgoverning socialism" and the conditions for failure of his model "real socialism", among other factors, should be sought in the immanent weakness of this regime, which among other things also belonged: institutionalized political monopoly of the Communist Party (SKJ), permanent inferiority of the "self-governing social economy" compared to the market economy in terms of meeting the material needs of members of society, the growing deficit, as well as the legitimacy of the regime ( Goati 1996). The dissolution of Yugoslavia was the final outcome of the open hostilities between the member states of the Yugoslav federation. What all feared, yet there was to happen. In less than four years the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed as a result of the three year exhaustive war on the territory of
Vol. 21, September 2013 Bosnia and Herzegovina with which two entities were established: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. Several years after the Dayton agreement, Kosovo was the flash point of a new conflict. The situation once again required a long standing political, financial and even military assistance from the Western countries. The reason for such set of circumstances, inevitably leads to the question about the quality of the policy of the Western countries in this region (Meier 1999). Dayton In the period between 1991-1995, Bosnia represented the chaos that many feared after the Cold War. After the breakup of Yugoslavia in Bosnia as ethnic composed state the violence reached a shocking degree of brutality. Thousands of people, mainly Muslims were kidnapped from their homes to be subjected to violence and terror. Influential at that time was the comment of Robert Kaplan who noted that: "Such bloodshed can only be explained as the release of old ethnic hatreds between Serbs, Muslims and Croats that Cold War pushed in the shadow (Kaplan 1993). In May 1993, President Clinton sent the Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher to Bosnia in order to find a solution for the conflict. Europe hoped that finally will find out how America plans to intervene, but Christopher was sent to Bosnia as an observer. The European Allies were not so happy about this because they expected a strong leadership from the President Clinton regarding this issue. The war in Bosnia had taken a larger scale. This situation stressed the American foreign policy. Some of the officials such as Madeleine Albright, Lake and Holbrooke advocated for stronger 49
Frosina DONINOVSKA intervention. Others, including Christopher, wondered whether it is worth their effort and believed that the United States only retained the problems rather than solving them. In the summer 1995, the number of victims in Bosnia reached 300,000 and more than a million people have fled. As the conflict took a larger scale, Islamic extremists from the Middle East arrived in Bosnia in order to help the endangered Muslim population (Chollet 2005). In July 1995, Serb forces flooded the small town of Srebrenica and thousands of Muslim men and boys were massacred. This genocide was one of the greatest horrors in the history since the Second World War. This situation has strengthened the position of America towards intervention. Clinton's new policy was aimed at implementing the strategy of NATO airstrike over Bosnian Serbs if they continue to attack the Croatian and Muslim population. In this way, the UN officials had first to identify the targets before any air attack. The bombing by NATO coincided with sending new diplomatic support in order to conclude a peace treaty. A key figure in this diplomatic support was Richard Holbrooke, tireless negotiator who understood the connection between military force and diplomacy. In November 1995, a delegation of Holbrooke managed to bring the warring parties to negotiate in Dayton, Ohio. Twenty-one day the representatives of the international community and the representatives of the warring sides in Bosnia, negotiated to reach an agreement in order to stop the war. At the end of 1995, sixty thousands NATO troops, including twenty thousands Americans were present on the territory of Bosnia in order to begin the process of implementation of the agreement (Warren 1998).
American policy on the Balkans
Dayton and the future of the Balkans The Dayton Agreement introduced a different way of resolving violent conflicts. In the past, the success or failure of peace negotiations depended on whether a conflict was ready for resolving. The maturity of the negotiation process depended on a number of factors including the common perception of the parties that an agreement through bargaining is desirable. (Haass 1990). Dayton differed from the traditional methods of negotiation in a way that included the U.S. leadership as well as pushing the opposing sides to negotiate. This approach not only had a profound impact on the stability of the agreement that was reached, but the implementation depended on the will of the international community, especially the United States who led the efforts (Daalder 2000). Conclusion The fact that in Yugoslavia there was an opportunity for a different political outcome is an indisputable. Only if the political elites took a different position in terms of the common good, not in order to satisfy their own appetites and desires the chaos could be prevented. Until the outbreak of the civil war in Slovenia in June 1991, the position of the international community was to preserve Yugoslavia. After the outbreak of the war, the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia became inevitable, and the international community played a less important role than internal factors. The secondary role of international community and the untimely response from the same lead to a major disaster in the Balkans, which undoubtedly could have been avoided. 50
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Unfortunately, the administration of the President George Bush did not deal with the problem. Moreover, this condition was inherited by the next President of the United States Wiliam Jefferson Clinton. The fact that the administration of the President Clinton used force aimed at ending the war in former Yugoslavia, raises the question of the quality of the American foreign policy in the Balkans and the fact that if they reacted on time, the disaster might be prevented. Transferring the responsibility from one to another, the European Union and the United States failed to deal with the problem in the former Yugoslavia respectively. This entails another question: If we make a comparison between the approach of the Bush administration and that of Bill Clinton, we can not say which of them was successful. We can not claim that the approach of the Bush administration was wrong, nor to claim that Clinton was successful only because he put an end to the war in Yugoslavia. The approach of the administration of the President Clinton aimed at using force to deal with the situation caused by the civil war, is marked as a failure of this administration, and thus for the President himself. The fact that the United States used military force to achieve results is a clear indication of the inconsistency of the foreign policy of the United States in the region, if you take into account the commitments of the United States for a peaceful resolving of the Yugoslav crisis. The success of the U.S. administration in Dayton had a great influence on the American foreign policy. Three areas were particularly emphasized: First, the way in which the Dayton Agreement was reached retreated primary responsibility of United States for the future of Bosnia. As a result of this the United States were engaged in
Vol. 21, September 2013 Bosnia and in the next few years that followed the Dayton Agreement, American soldiers were present on a Bosnian soil. The only question was: Why would United States accept engagement for such period of time? The answer would be: to ensure that violence will not be repeated, and in order to build a multiethnic, democratic and prosperous Bosnia. Second, the U.S. policy toward Bosnia in 1995 had a major impact on how the Clinton administration and others saw the connection between the diplomacy and the power. Finally, the war in Bosnia has proved essential for the return of the United States foreign policy towards Europe on the right track. Within a few years after Dayton, the vision of Clinton for Europe is that of a undivided, peaceful, democratic was on the right direction to become a reality. The crisis in Bosnia was of great importance for the United States because they helped to continue the process of integration into NATO, a policy that continued into the next administration. Providing security, NATO has given support through the necessary reforms that have been allowed to enter the Warsaw Pact countries into NATO. The policy of expanding NATO, promoted by Clinton, was a significant factor in creating a peaceful, undivided and democratic world. The end of the war in Bosnia represented a turning point for the American foreign policy. The experience with the war in Bosnia had an impact long after the finishing of the war. This experience has shown that America used military force to achieve results. References Office of the Historian. Atomic Diplomacy. Office of the Historian Milestones 1945 1952. November 5, 2006. 51
Frosina DONINOVSKA http://history.state.gov/milestones/19451952/Atomic (accessed December 8, 2012). Scott, Leon. International History 1945 1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Safire, William. On Language. New York Times Magazine, 2003. Fukuyama, Francis. The end of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 1992. Dokmanovic, Miso. Independence of the Republic of Macedonia. Skopje: Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus, 2005. Dedier, Vladimir. Josip Broz Tito. Skopje: Misla, 1953. Cox, Michael and Stokes, Douglas. US Foreign Policy in the Post- Cold War Era Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Smith, Tony. Americas Mission: The United States and the World Wide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Office of the Historian. 1990 2000: The Post Cold War Era. Office of the Historian Milestones. May 21, 2002. http://history.state.gov/milestones/19902000. (Accessed: December 24, 2012) Goati, Vladimir. Politicke Elite, Gradjanski Rat I Raspad SFRJ. Republika, 1996: 2-5. Meier, Victor. Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise. London: Routledge, 1999. Robert, Kaplan D. Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Trough History. New York: Vintage Books, 1993.
American policy on the Balkans
Chollet, Derek. The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2005. Warren, Christopher. In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era. Bringing Peace to Bosnia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. Haass, Richard N. Conflicts unending: The United States and Regional Disputes. New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1990. Daalder, Ivo H. Getting Dayton: The Making of Americas Bosnia Policy. Washington DC: Brookings institution press, 2000.
52
Rentier state as an obstacle to development in the Middle East

Andrzej GUZOWSKI, University of Warsaw Abstract
any Middle Eastern countries, especially the ones in Arabian Peninsula, are well-known for being rich with oil and gas. While it could be considered a blessing by many, it is becoming more and more apparent that the abundance of natural resources in the region is a double-edged sword and a form of a natural resource trap. Many countries have become so-called rentier states, funding their operations and their very structures by renting their resources to external actors. While it may seem like a profitable political move at first, said overreliance conserved the structure of economies in the Middle Eastern, never forcing the countries to develop effectively, thus making most of the produced goods, other than oil and gas, uncompetitive on the international market. Long term, it may prove disastrous for the Middle East as eventually the resources are going to get exhausted and said countries will be left with nothing but an economic structure unadjusted to the 21st century.
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Andrzej GUZOWSKI
Rentier state as an obstacle to development in the Middle East contribution, the governments could embark on large-scale public expenditure programmes without the need to tax their own people; they also would not suffer from imbalance of payments or high inflation2. The rentier state theory was later expanded upon by many other analysts and scholars, including Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani3. It must be noted that former created a definition of a rentier state that is more precise than Mahdavy`s and as such it will be applied to this paper. Beblawi argues that 4 characteristics are required for a country to be called a rentier state: rent situations predominate the economy; the economy relies on substantial external rent; only a small percentage of the population is involved in the generation of the rent; the government is the principal recipient of the external rent4. Although many points of the rentier state theory are still being debated to this day, most of the theorists seem to agree that the rentier state (or rentier economy as some prefer) poses several risks. Firstly, the citizens of such countries are virtually dependant on the government and the public structures as they hold all the keys to prosperity. This in turn creates proper conditions for the rise and preservation of authoritarianism. Secondly, the reliance on external rents does not force the countries to undergo significant economic changes and industrialization. This lack of innovation and initiative may cause trouble for future generations. Oil, gas and state in contemporary Middle East Over 40 years after the rentier state theory was first presented, it still holds a great significance for the Middle East and its people. The region remains home to some
Ibidem, p. 431-432. See: The Rentier State: Nation, State and the Integration of the Arab World, H. Beblawi, G. Luciani (eds), Croom Holm, London 1987. 4 H. Beblawi, The Rentier State in the Arab World, [in:] The Arab State, G. Luciani (ed.), University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1990, p. 87-88.
2 3
il has long been called the black gold. Along with natural gas it has been one of the most important energy sources in the world in the last decades and has served as a necessary tool to economic growth in many countries. With the oil prices having long been on the rise, it might seem like the abundance of oil (and, to a lesser extent, gas) should be considered a blessing. Countries rich with these natural resources have the opportunity to sell them to external actors and fund their own development from the profits. While this might seem like a perfect scenario without any downsides, the reality proves that this is not always the case. This paper aims to present how natural resources in some Middle Eastern countries might actually be a trap and how in long term they might actually pose a serious threat to their economic growth and stability. What is a rentier state? The theory of the rentier state was first presented by Hossein Mahdavy, an economist, in a 1970 article The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: the Case of Iran. Therein, taking Iran as a model, he identifies rentier states as those countries that receive on regular basis substantial mounts of external rent [which can be defined as] rentals paid by foreign individuals, concerns or governments to individuals, concerns and governments of a given country1. It is obvious that in the case of Middle Eastern countries most rents come from oil sales. Later in the article the economist argues that the period 1950-1956 constitutes a turning point in the economic history of the Middle East during that period the political changes enabled the governments of many countries in the region to capture a larger share of the rents which previously accrued to the oil companies. With such
H. Mahdavy, The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: the Case of Iran, [in:] Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, M. A. Cook (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford 1970, p. 428.
1
46
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal of the world`s biggest oil (and natural gas) producers, as presented in the tables below. Co un try Pro ven oil rese rves (tho usa nd mill ion barr els) 157. 0 150. 0 101. 5 5.5 23.9 265. 9 Perc enta ge of glob al oil rese rves Dail y pro duct ion tho usa nd barr els (201 2) 3680 Perc enta ge of glob al oil dail y pro duct ion Da ily ex po rts (2 01 2) Perc enta ge of glob al oil exp orts as a wh ole
[source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013, http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf /statisticalreview/statistical_review_of_world_energy_ 2013.pdf] Co un try Pr ov en ga s res erv es (tri llio n cu bic me tre s) 0.2 33. 6 3.6 1.8 0.9 25. 1 8.2 Perc enta ge of glob al gas rese rves Pro duct ion billi on cubi c met res (201 2) Perc enta ge of glob al gas pro duct ion Ex po rts bill ion cu bic me tre s (20 12) Perc enta ge of glob al gas exp orts
Ira n Ira q Ku wai t O ma n Qa tar Sau di Ar abi a Syr ia U. A. E Ye me n Ot her s Th e Mi ddl e Ea st
9.4 % 9.0 % 6.1 % 0.3 % 1.4 % 15.9 %
4.2 % 3115 3.7 % 3127 3.7 % 922 1.1 %
1966 2.0 % 1153 13.3 0 %
2.5 97.8 3.0 0.6 807. 7
0.1 % 5.9 % 0.2 %
164
0.2 % 3380 3.7 % 180 0.2 % 0.2 %
19 69 9
35.6 %
<0.1 206 % 48.4 %
2827 32.5 0 %
Ba hra in Ira n Ira q Ku wai t O ma n Qa tar Sau di Ar abi a Syr
0.1 % 18.0 % 1.9 % 1.0 % 0.5 % 13.4 % 4.4 %
14.2 160. 5 0.8 14.5 29.0 157. 0 102. 8
0.4 % 4.8 % <0.1 % 0.4 % 0.9 % 4.7 % 3.0 %
12 4.6 -
12.1 % -
0.3
0.2
7.6
0.2
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Andrzej GUZOWSKI
Rentier state as an obstacle to development in the Middle East economic situation of those countries as well as their attachment to the production of oil and gas, one must also take into consideration the prices of these resources. The graphs below present the fluctuation of both of those values in the last 20 years.
Oil prices (Brent crude, $/barrel) Oil prices (Brent crude, $/ barrel), 2008, 97,26
ia % % U. 6.1 3.3 51.7 1.5 A. % % E Ye 0.5 0.3 7.6 0.2 me % % n Ot 0.2 0.1 2.7 0.1 her % % s Th 80. 43.0 548. 16.3 15 15.4 e 5 % 4 % 8.9 % Mi ddl e Ea st as a wh ole [source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013, http://www.bp.com/content/dambbp/pdf /statisticalreview/statistical_review_of_world_energy_ 2013.pdf] As one can clearly notice, countries located in the Persian Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, U.A.E., Qatar and Oman) benefit greatly, at least in financial terms, from the abundance of oil (together they produce as much as 31.7% of all the oil in the world). One must remember however, that even though the ratio of production-toconsumption of oil in the Middle Eastern countries is 3.56:1, in the case of natural gas it is only 1.42:1. This means that most of the oil produced in the Middle East is exported to other regions, while most of the gas is consumed by the countries themselves. The only notable exception to this rule is Qatar, who is one of the biggest exporters of gas in the world5. To fully understand the
Oil prices (Brent crude, $/ barrel), 1993, 16,97
Oil prices (Brent crude, $/ barrel), 2009, 61,67
[source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013, http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/stati sticalreview/statistical_review_of_world_energy_2013 .pdf]
Natural gas Natural gas prices (average German import prices price, $/million Btu) (average German import price, $/ million
[source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013, http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf /statistical-
In 2012 Qatar produced 157 billion cubic metres of gas. Only 26.2 billion (less than 17%) were consumed by Qataris themselves, while 130.8 billion were exported to other countries,
5
including Japan (21.3 billion), India (16.1 billion) and South Korea (14.2 billion).
48
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal review/statistical_review_of_world_energy_ 2013.pdf] While in the 1990s, both prices were mostly steady, since the beginning of the new millennium, they have been on a sharp rise, with a small exception in 2009 (and 2010 in case of natural gas), which was one of the effects of the global economic crisis. The opportunity to sell natural resources at very high prices has been of great benefit to the countries in the Persian Gulf and has been the biggest contributing factor to their prosperity. In fact, most of them have a high GDP per capita, especially when compared to the poorest countries in the region, like Afghanistan or Syria. GDP per capita (US$) [Middle East] Country Arab World (average) Afghanistan Bahrain Egypt Iran Iraq Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Syrian Arab Republic United Arab Emirates Yemen 2008 6105,42 376,98 19625,58 2156,76 4899,31 4472,06 27591,62 3797,41 54548,62 7185,61 23353,17 84628,50 18064,87 2584,38 46309,98 1238,00 2009 5162,56 450,66 16213,34 2461,53 4931,28 3701,86 26032,16 4027,05 37160,54 8159,02 17597,49 62390,28 14057,62 2564,46 35025,10 1105,82
Vol. 21, September 2013 surface, it may seem like oil- and gasexporting countries in the Middle East do not have anything to worry about, as far as economic indicators are concerned, the real picture is far from perfect, due to the nature of the rentirer state itself.
The problems The biggest problem for the rentier states in the Middle East (which we could now narrow down to the countries located Rank (in the world, either 2010, 2011 or 2012) 172. 43. 123. 80. 89. 30. 100. 9. 68. 34. 5. 40. 122.
2010 5867,56 561,20 18334,17 2803,53 5674,92 4375,91 28522,41 4370,72 41566,10 8551,85 20640,01 72773,31 16537,74 2746,85
2011 7017,67 619,59 2972,58 6815,57 5686,61 31281,47 4665,94 56514,16 9148,13 23731,21 90523,53 20777,67 -
2012 3187,31 6454,62 4945,13 9705,39 3289,06
[source: World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.G DP.PCAP.CD] It should be noted that out of 7 Arab states that are above the Arab World average only Lebanon is not a major oil/natural gas exporter. Moreover, in case of GDP per capita, Qatar and Kuwait are among the top 10 countries in the world. While on the
35259,99 40363,16 25. 1400,67 1361,33 1494,43 144. in the Persian Gulf), as mentioned before, is their utter dependence on oil exports as their major source of revenue. Let us look at some examples. In Saudi Arabia, oil and oilbased products constitute approximately 94% of all exported goods (or 85% of all exports, including services), 92.5% of government revenue6 and 50% of the GDP7.
48. Annual Report. The Latest Economic Developments, Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, p.
6
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Andrzej GUZOWSKI
Rentier state as an obstacle to development in the Middle East constitutes only 2.2% of the GDP and in Kuwait barely 0.7% of the GDP (to put these numbers in context, in the US it is 10.1%, in France 21.3% and in the UK 27.4%)13. As Terry Lynn Karl rightly points out, this means that the governments have no need to build the institutional capacities that have historically been required in resource-scarce countries due to harsher conditions. Moreover, dependence on high oil revenues allows the states to enter and maintain control over many areas of civil life while at the same weakening opportunities to strengthen administrative capacities, merit-based civil services and the rule of law all of which are indispensable in building efficient state structures and prosperous economy14. While authoritarianism in itself is not necessarily harmful to a country`s economic performance (which has been proved by many historic examples, such as China or South Korea), it has to be supported by adequate, stable and reliable administrative structures. These are seldom developed in rentier states. Secondly, oil dependence has a great impact on the citizens. Although the aforementioned welfare and state-controlled distribution of wealth in the Middle Eastern rentier states do sound promising, it must be remembered that major inequalities do persist. Unfortunately, due to lack of sufficient data it is not possible to come up with the Gini coefficient, which demonstrates how the income distribution among the citizens deviates from perfect equality (results above 0.35 should be considered a significant inequality), for all of these countries. It can be measured, however, for at least some of them: Iraq 30.9 (2007), Iran 38.3 (2005) and Qatar
In Iran oil exports make up about 80% of the country`s total export earnings, 60% of its government revenue8 and 25% of its GDP9. Lastly, in Qatar, the export of oil and gas constitutes 85% of all its export earnings, 60% of its GDP and 50% of government revenue10. This has several important consequences. Firstly, the elites and rulers in the Middle Eastern rentier states have grown accustomed to the fact that they can rely on the external demand for oil (and gas) and that the money gained from the export of these resources is enough to ensure their endurance and control over the country. To this end, many of them have provided welfare and wealth to their citizens, demanding little to nothing in return, other than that they agree to a non-explicit social contract, which stipulates that they give up their political ambitions and rights11. The notion of no taxation, hence no representation12 is not an exaggeration. In fact, in Oman the revenue from taxes
24, http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/samaen/Reports Statistics/ReportsStatisticsLib/5600_R_Annual_ En_48_2013_02_19.pdf. 7 Saudi Arabia National Accounts Indicators 2012, http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/pdf/GDP2012report.p df. 8 Sanctions reduced Iran`s oil exports and revenues in 2012, http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?i d=11011. 9 Iran Investment Monthly, April and May 2012, p. 8, http://www.turquoisepartners.com/iraninvestm ent/IIM-AprMay12.pdf. 10 Qatar facts and figures, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/ 168.htm. 11 One needs to remember that the situation in Iraq is slightly different - since the 2003 war the country has been trying to become more democratic, with results leaving much to be desired. 12 R. Schwarz, The political economy of state-formation in the Arab Middle East: Rentier states, economic reform, and democratization, Review of International Political Economy 15, No. 4, October 2008, p. 607.
Tax revenue (% of GDP), World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX. TOTL.GD.ZS. 14 T. L. Karl, Oil-Led Development: Social, Political, and Economic Consequences, [in:] Encyclopedia of Energy, Volume 4, C. J. Cleveland, R. U. Ayres (eds), Elsevier Academic Press 2004, p. 666.
13
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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal 41.1 (2007)15. While it should be noted that these results are not up-to-date and cannot be treated as definitive, it is nonetheless safe to assume that they are representative of the Persian Gulf region. It is especially noteworthy that the country with the highest GDP per capita (Qatar) also has the highest level of inequality and the one with the lowest GDP per capita (Iraq) has got the lowest level of inequality. While these results pale in comparison with the results in countries like Rwanda (Gini coefficient of 50.8 in 2011) or Zambia (57.5 in 2010), they do prove that a Middle Eastern rentier state is not an economically equal state. This should come as no surprise, considering that one sector predominates its entire economy. Moreover, oil-dependence harms the structure of the economy. As more and more people from rural areas move to the cities in hopes of becoming a part of the oil business (not unlike the Dutch disease), the agricultural sector becomes underdeveloped. In fact, the states located in the Persian Gulf are not self-dependent when it comes to food and must import most of it from abroad16. It should also be noted that these hopes also attract a lot of foreign workers, who upon arrival not only do not get their dream jobs, but are often mistreated and underpaid. This creates a very bizarre social structure. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, the foreigners constitute about 80% of its total workforce17, while in Qatar an astonishing 94%18! With the government being the prime recipient of external rents, it can afford to artificially broaden the public sector and administration and employ most
15 Gini Index, World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.G INI?page=1. 16 Z. Babar, Food Security and Food Sovereignty in the Middle East, http://cirs.georgetown.edu/research/grants/11 6115.html. 17 Saudi Arabia Economy, http://www.saudiarabia.com/Page/Economy/5 9. 18 J. O. Dennie, Modern Slavery: The Plight of Foreign Workers in Qatar, http://digitaljournal.com/article/303006#ixzz2 djrWV9jl.
Vol. 21, September 2013 of its nationals, while a huge majority of the foreigners find jobs in the private sector, usually in services. This causes severe social tensions and problems. It must also be noted that due to the state-provided employment and welfare, the nationals often lack incentive to develop skills necessary for less lucrative jobs. Thirdly, dependence on oil and gas exports makes the rentier states even more vulnerable to drastic changes in the global economy. When the oil price dropped from 97.26 USD/barrel in 2008 to 61.67 USD/barrel in 2009, the countries in the Persian Gulf were severely affected. In just one year the Omani GDP per capita fell by 25%, the Qatari GDP per capita went down by 26% and the Kuwaiti GDP per capita suffered a decrease of 32%. Even though the prices soared again soon afterwards, it was a drastic and sudden shift. Moreover, even though oil is well known to be a political weapon (as was first proven by OPEC in 1973), it is sometimes forgotten that it can be used by both sides of a dispute. In 2012 the European Union put an embargo on Iranian oil because of the country`s nuclear program. This resulted in diminished exports and a steep drop in Iranian oil revenue it fell from 95 billion USD (in 2011) to 69 billion USD (in 2012)19 which caused a series of problems for the country`s economy. As one can clearly see, even though oil and gas are usually dependable sources of revenue, over-reliance on these resources can be extremely harmful and dangerous. This lack of what one could call self-dependence and the economic issues it may generate, should be regarded with caution by the ruling elites of oilexporting countries, especially considering the events of the so-called Arab Spring. While its effects for the states located in the Persian Gulf were not as serious as for some other countries in the region, it did lead to protests, some governmental changes in Oman and Kuwait and a military intervention of the Gulf Cooperation Council in Bahrain. Even though the
19
Sanctions, op.cit.
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Andrzej GUZOWSKI
Rentier state as an obstacle to development in the Middle East oil and gas are definitely not going to last forever and even if we remain optimistic, it is safe to assume that these resources will get exhausted either by the end of this century or by the beginning of the next one23. Considering that non-oil (non-gas) sectors of the economies of the Middle Eastern rentier states are hugely underdeveloped and that the majority of their products and services are rather uncompetitive on the global market, the economic future of these countries could be bleak. Towards a post-rentier state in the Middle East? It is obvious by now that economic growth should not be regarded in purely financial terms, just as a measurement of GDP or GDP per capita rise. The real progress demands serious changes in the structure of the economy itself, selfreliability and the development of human capital. Instead, the rentier state promotes economic immobility and lack of innovation. Dependence on oil and gas sales may be convenient for the ruling elites and many citizens in these countries, but it is becoming more and more apparent that the rentier state practices are a serious obstacle to real development. Fortunately, the decision-makers in the Middle Eastern rentier states have not been oblivious to these problems and have been trying to modify their economic policies for some time. The results of these actions vary from country to country. Matthew Gray argues that the model currently represented by the Arab states of the Gulf should be referred to as late rentier. In said model, the state is more entrepreneurial, supportive of development,
protests in these countries were mostly motivated by politics and less so by economy (unlike in some other Middle Eastern countries), they proved that the people are unsatisfied with the current situation and way of living. The unrests may be slowly dying off, but possible economic problems, caused by over-dependence on oil exports and the instability of world economy, could bring them back to life in the future. Fourthly, as Hazem Beblawi points out, the politics of the rentier state has affected not only the oil/gas-exporting countries themselves, but other countries in the region as well, turning them into semirentiers without oil. As much of their own GDP is comprised of external rent-like revenues (royalties, workers` remittances, foreign aid etc.), they also adopted some of the rentier state`s behavior and elements, such as overblown bureaucracy (a new rentier class), which serves to guarantee that the people employed by the state do not turn against their own employer and remain loyal20. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, one has to wonder about the long-term future of Middle Eastern rentier states. While for now they can rely on oil and gas as their primary source of revenue, these resources are eventually going to run out. The only question remains, when? Some scientists believe that at present rates of consumption, the current reserves will be sufficient for the next 40 years in case of oil and 60 years in case of natural gas21. These claims are of course purely estimative and do not take into consideration the emergence of new technologies or the discovery of new reservoirs. One must also remember that many of past predictions regarding that subject have been proven wrong22. However,
Beblawi, op. cit., p. 95-98. Are We Running Out of Oil and Gas?, http://www.petrostrategies.org/Learning_Cente r/are_we_running_out_of_oil_and_gas.htm. 22 For example, in 1950 geologists estimated the worlds total oil endowment at around 600 billion barrels. Current estimates put that number at almost 1.7 trillion barrels. See: Are we
20 21
running out of oil? Policy Backgrounder No. 159, http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/bg159.pdf. 23 It is interesting to note that the Middle East as a region has the second highest oil-reserves-toproduction ratio in the world (behind South and Central America) and the highest gas-reservesto-production ratio.
52
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal and responsive than it was previously24. Saudi Arabia, for instance, has been trying to develop its private sector and has invested in infrastructure and education25. It is estimated that the growing private sector is now generating over 40% of the country`s GDP. Other examples can be given. Qatar tries to diversify its economy into a more sustainable model, including global financial investments, the creation of tourism and sporting event destinations, a world-class carrier in Qatar Airways, and the creation of a global financial hub26. These new positive changes are less visible in Iran and Iraq, two Middle Eastern rentier states who have been dealing with serious international problems for quite some time. But even these developments are still insufficient and too slow the very nature of rentierism in said countries persists. Strengthening the private sector and diversifying the economy may also lead to consequences that could be considered unwanted by the ruling autocratic elites namely, the development of a civil society that is fully aware of the political rights it is entitled to. The growing calls for democratization could pose a threat to the current rulers` grip over their countries. That, in turn, may discourage them from entirely abandoning the rentier state practices.
Vol. 21, September 2013 The abundance of oil and gas in the countries located in the Persian Gulf is both a blessing and a curse. While the export of these resources plays a substantial role in their nominal economic growth, it also paves the way for negative practices of a rentier state, which include over-reliance on said resources, static economy, inflated bureaucracy and preservation of authoritarianism. Since excessive attachment to this model might prove disastrous in the future, many states have initiated new policies aiming to diversify their economic structures, strengthen the private sector and attract foreign non-oil/gas related investments. These reforms, though necessary, are still far too conservative. If the policy-makers in the countries located in the Persian Gulf really wish to secure their states` future, they will have to take bolder and more radical actions. References 48. Annual Report. The Latest Economic Developments, Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/samaen/Rep ortsStatistics/ReportsStatisticsLib/5600_R_ Annual_En_48_2013_02_19.pdf. Are we running out of oil? Policy Backgrounder No. 159, http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/bg159.pdf. Are We Running Out of Oil and Gas?, http://www.petrostrategies.org/Learning_C enter/are_we_running_out_of_oil_and_gas. htm. Babar Z., Food Security and Food Sovereignty in the Middle East, http://cirs.georgetown.edu/research/grants /116115.html. Beblawi H., The Rentier State in the Arab World, [in:] The Arab State, Luciani G. (ed.), University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1990, p. 85-98. June BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2013, 53
Conclusion
M. Gray, A Theory of Late Rentierism in the Arab States of the Gulf, Occasional Paper No. 7, Center for International and Regional Studies, Doha 2011, p. 23. 25 IMF: Private sector may not keep pace with Saudi youth bulge, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/319 059/economy/business/imf-private-sector-maynot-keep-pace-with-saudi-youth-bulge. 26 Qatar looks to diversify its economy away from hydrocarbon export reliance, http://www.ameinfo.com/qatar-looks-diversifyeconomy-hydrocarbon-export-318995.
24
Andrzej GUZOWSKI
Rentier state as an obstacle to development in the Middle East http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cf m?id=11011. Saudi Arabia Economy, http://www.saudiarabia.com/Page/Econo my/59. Saudi Arabia National Accounts Indicators 2012, http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/pdf/GDP2012repo rt.pdf. Schwarz R., The political economy of state-formation in the Arab Middle East: Rentier states, economic reform, and democratization, Review of International Political Economy 15, No. 4, October 2008, p. 599621. World http://data.worldbank.org. Bank,
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf /statisticalreview/statistical_review_of_world_energy_ 2013.pdf Dennie J. O., Modern Slavery: The Plight of Foreign Workers in Qatar, http://digitaljournal.com/article/303006#ix zz2djrWV9jl. Gray M., A Theory of Late Rentierism in the Arab States of the Gulf, Occasional Paper No. 7, Center for International and Regional Studies, Doha 2011. IMF: Private sector may not keep pace with Saudi youth bulge, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/ 319059/economy/business/imf-privatesector-may-not-keep-pace-with-saudi-youthbulge. Iran Investment Monthly, April and May 2012, http://www.turquoisepartners.com/iraninve stment/IIM-AprMay12.pdf. Karl T. L., Oil-Led Development: Social, Political, and Economic Consequences, [in:] Encyclopedia of Energy, Volume 4, Cleveland C. J., Ayres R. U. (eds), Elsevier Academic Press 2004, p. 661-672. Mahdavy H., The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: the Case of Iran, [in:] Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, Cook M. A. (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford 1970, p. 428-467. Qatar facts and figures, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about _us/168.htm. Qatar looks to diversify its economy away from hydrocarbon export reliance, http://www.ameinfo.com/qatar-looksdiversify-economy-hydrocarbon-export318995. Sanctions reduced Iran`s oil exports and revenues in 2012,
54
From Yeltsin to Putin: Moscows Perception of the Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula

Wonhee LEE1, John Hopkins University, Washington D.C. Abstract
ussia has developed multipolar paradigm in its effort to reobtain the position of the Great Power since it realized that it could not exert influence strong enough to stake its claim in the world politics. The advocacy of a multipolar world order, referred to as the Primakov Doctrine, shifted Moscows attitude toward the two Koreas as well. In its pursuit of multipolarity in East Asia, Russia has designed its strategy toward Koreas nuclear crisis and unification to best suit its national interest. Considering the competition among the Great Powers in East Asia, Russias Korea policy can better be understood under such a multilateral framework.
Wonhee Lee, 29, born and raised in Seoul, is a candidate for M.A. in International Relations with concentration in China Studies, Korea Studies and International Economics at The Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Studies (SAIS). He is currently working as a research assistant at the U.S.Korea Institute at SAIS (USKI). His academic interests lie in diplomatic history of East Asia, Sino-Taiwanese relations and inter-Korean relations. Wonhee Lee co-authored The Uneasiness of Big Brother-Little Brother Relationships-Chinas Relations with Neighboring Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Mongolia, and Myanmar, a chapter in Chinas Domestic Politics and Foreign Policies and Major Countries Strategies toward China, edited by Jung-Ho Bae and Jae H. Ku, published by Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), with Jae H. Ku. He is also a recipient of Starr Excellence in China Studies Fellowship conferred by SAIS China Studies. He obtained B.A. in Chinese and B.B.A. in International Economics and Law at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS) in 2011. 45
Wonhee LEE
From Yeltsin to Putin and why Moscow made such a fundamental shift in 1996 deserves attention. In terms of global geopolitics, soured Russo-American relations in the mid 1990s reaffirmed that the time was not yet ripe for a new democratic condominium between Washington and Moscow. Former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski points out that Moscows hope for enhanced scope and power through mature strategic partnership was devoid of either international or domestic realism.2 Simply put, post-Soviet Russia was too weak to become Americas coequal partner in a new global order. In addition, Washington and Moscow took different approaches on some of the critical geostrategic issues in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East.3 The most instructive example would be the mounting tension between the two over the expansion of NATO to Central Europe where Moscow was willing to maintain its influence. Additionally, the erosion of the political base of these reformists was accelerated as the Russian economy was in distress due to the adverse consequences of a rapid economic transition. Now let us take a close look at the chessmen in the East Asian segment. Moscow was worried if it might be internationally marginalized in this region. After the 1993-1994 nuclear crisis, Russia proposed a multilateral conference on security and nuclear-weapon-free status of the Korean Peninsula based on a 2+6 mechanismwith the participation of North Korea, South Korea, Russia, the U.S., China, Japan, the United Nations, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, against their expectations, Moscow was not perceived either as a key partner or an Americas equal partner, while the importance of Washingtons role dramatically increased. As a result, a 2+2 formulathe negotiation among North Korea, South Korea, the U.S.
2
ecognizing and accepting limitations can be an importance step to move forward to the future. To Russia, that moment came in 1996 just five years after the Soviet Union collapsed. After its transition to a democratic nation, Russia anticipated that the West in the global community would regard it as an equal partner. In 1996, facing domestic instability and international marginalization, PostSoviet Russia opted to promote a concept of multipolarity to regain its position as a Great Power. Therefore, 1996 marked a turning point of Moscows diplomacy, which eliminated reminiscence of the Cold War bilateral framework or mere hope for the strategic partnership with the United States. This paper aims to document how and why Moscow made such a dramatic shift and what impacts it has produced on the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. The second section covers the emergence of the Primakov Doctrine and Moscows effort to create a multipolar global order in 1996. The following section briefly describes Moscows foreign policy from the Yeltsin era to Putins presidency. How Russia views the nuclear crisis involving North Korea and the Korean unification from the perspective of multilateralism is examined in the forth section. Finally, this paper suggests that Russias Korea policy should not be assessed in exclusively peninsular terms, but also in a wider context of Russias relations with the worlds centers of power. . Moscows Dramatic Foreign Policy Shift in 1996 ( ) Americas Coequal Partner? 1996 marked a turning point of Moscows diplomacy. Since the Primakov doctrine was adopted, the Kremlin has shown consistency in its main diplomatic strategy regardless of leadership changes from Yeltsin to Putin, from Putin to Medvedev, and again, Medvedev to Putin. This key concept of a multipolar world order has remained a pillar of Moscows diplomacy. In this regard, examining how
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1997. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. New York: Basic Books. 3 Ibid. 46
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal and China) was adopted, leaving Moscows position as an observer. Moscow changed the polarity of its approach and joined the anti-North Korean coalition in de-facto terms in the early 1990s, but Russia lost its influence in the North without any gains in the South.4 ( ) Pursuit of the Multipolar Word Order Russias cornered position in the international community led to post-Soviet advocacy of multipolarity. The unfavorable condition of Russias relationship with and strategy toward two Koreas did not satisfy the pragmatic wing of the Kremlin and resulted in efforts to change its approach.5 In the latter half of the Yeltsin administration, Yevgeni Primakov, who replaced Andrei Kozyrev as Russias foreign minister, presented three principles: (1) integrating Russia into the world economy; (2) establishing a multipolar world; and (3) counteracting key United Statesled initiatives including North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement, the Iraqi economic embargo, and military intervention in Kosovo.6 Thus, the advocacy of a multipolar world order, referred to as the Primakov Doctrine, can be construed as Moscows effort to counterbalance a growing U.S. influence in world politics. Indeed, Primakovian multipolarity reflected the view that Moscow intended to remain one of the Great Powers but at the same time it could not wield its influence as strongly as the U.S. in the international community. A multipolar world was thus considered as the best international structure for restraining Washingtons influence while
Vol. 21, September 2013 enhancing Moscows.7 One year later, in 1997, Russias growing need for creating a multipolar order was codified in the RussoChinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order signed by Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin, President of the People's Republic of China. Though the U.S. was not obviously mentioned in the declaration, the two parties agreed that any country should not aspire to hegemony, pursue a policy from a position of force and monopolize the international affairs.8 This event signaled a remarkable transformation of Moscows foreign policy, which had titled toward the US-led Western community during the first half of the Yeltsin years. In dealing with the Korean problem, the Yeltsin administration began to take a more balanced, pragmatic approach from the balance-of-power perspective. When Andrei Kozyrev proposed a multilaternal framework with the 2+6 formula to solve the first nuclear crisis, Russia still remained in the pro-Western, or anti-North Korean coalition. However, Yeltsin and Russian diplomats realized that the bilateral relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang had to be improved in order to achieve a balanced position on the Korean Peninsula.9 Actually, without the influence over Pyongyang, Moscow was an unattractive option to Seoul. Russia was surprised to hear later from the South Korean representatives that Russias lack of leverage over North Korea had caused Seouls interest in cooperation with Moscow to decrease correspondingly.10 By maintaining the influence over both Koreas,
7
Toloraya, Georgy. 2009 Russian policy in Korea in a time of change. The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 21: 73. 5 Vorontsov. 6 Primakov Doctrine. Historical Dictionary of the Russian Federation. Accessed April 7, 2013. http://russian_federation.enacademic.com/ 458/Primakov_Doctrine.
Rangsimaporn, Paradon. 2009. Russian perceptions and policies in a multipolar East Asia under Yeltsin and Putin. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 9: 213. 8 The Russo-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order. http://thebooks.biz/policy-peace-foreign/the-russianchinese-joint-declaration-the-60993.html. 9 Vorontsov. 10 Ibid. 47
Wonhee LEE Russia sought to obtain its status as one of the poles in the multipolar order of East Asia. . Overview of Moscows Foreign Policy since the 1990s ( ) Democratic Romanticism (The First Half the Yeltsin Years) In 1992-1995, Russias foreign policy was pro-Western. In consideration that it could maximize political and economic benefits, Boris Yeltsin and his foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev advocated Westcentric policy. This period has recently been labeled democratic romanticism.11 Upgrading partnership with South Korea was one of these West-centric policy agendas. Accordingly, Russia actively reached out to South Korea, anticipating tremendous potential for cooperation with Seoul in the political and economic arena. Yeltsins three-day official visit to South Korea from November 18 to 20, 1992 would be an illustrative example that shows their improved bilateral relations. Issuing a joint statement, South Korean President Roh Tae-woo pledged more vigorous participation in Russias economic 12 development to Yeltsin. The rapid pace of diplomatic and political cooperation laid the groundwork for South Koreas brisk investment in Russia. In particular, the invested amount increased more than 13fold, continuously going up from 1992 to 1996 until the Asia Economic Crisis hit both of them (See Table 1). From the perspective of Moscow, such a developed relationship with Seoul seemed beneficial to drawing political and economic support for its reform drive. Table 1: South Korea's Investment in Russia Vorontsov. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea. Korean-Russian Joint Statement. http://www.mofa.go.kr/webmodule/htsboa rd/template/read/korboardread.jsp?typeID =12&boardid=660&seqno=304702
12 11
From Yeltsin to Putin Unit: Registered Registered Investment Number Capital Amount 7,386,432 5,550,228 3,247,004 3,647,722
USD Year
1992 21 1993 30 1994 42 1995 31 1996 49 1997 26
54,321,981 13,871,446 52,713,605 31,901,980 74,814,068 44,132,794 33,641,538 8,422,992
Source: The Export-Import Bank of Korea At the same time, Moscows policy put its relations with Pyongyang into the freezer. The ruling elite in Pyongyang, who openly supported the anti-Gorbachev coup, now had to deal with Moscows proWesterners.13 Above all things, Moscows declaration to cut off military aid was a serious blow to Pyongyangs nuclear aspirations. Speaking at a news conference during his visit to Seoul in November 1992, Yeltsin mentioned that Russia had already stopped providing nuclear technology and materials to North Korea.14 Earlier in spring 1992, then Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev announced plans to suspend all military cooperation with North Korea in order to pressure it into giving up its nuclear weapons development plan.15 When the global community was at loggerheads over the Clinton administrations proposal to impose sanctions against North Korea in
13
Wishnick, Elizabeth. 2002. Russian North Korean Relations: A New Era? in North Korea and Northeast Asia. ed. Samuel S. Kim and Tai Hwan Lee. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 14 Pollack, Andrew. Yeltsin Vows Curb on North Koreans. The New York Times, Nov. 21, 1992. 15 Koh, Jae-nam. 1999. The Rising Role of Russia in Settling a Peace on the Korean Peninsula. East Asian Review 11. 48
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal 1994, Kozyrev expressed its readiness to accept them as a last resort.16 ( ) Primakov Doctrine (The Latter Half the Yeltsin Years) As Brzezinski pointed out in the previous section, Russia suffered several internal and external problems in the middle of the 1990s. In terms of economic growth, Russias GDP fell for five years in a row from 1991 to 1996, which was directly opposed to its hope (see Table 2). With regard to the problems on the Korean Peninsula, a series of major events took place and weakened the position of proWesterners in 1996. Russia was excluded from the 2+2 mechanism (North Korea, South Korea, the U.S. and China) to deal with the nuclear crisis in North Korea, which broke out in early 1990s. Furthermore, it was also excluded from the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Moscows marginalization reflects a grim situation where Russia was losing leverage over North Korea at the expense of economic gains from improved relations with South Korea. Frustrated with the limited benefits from the West-centric foreign policy, in July 1996, Yeltsin appointed Yevgeni Primakov as a new foreign minister and began to pursue more balanced and pragmatic diplomatic strategies. Table 2: GDP of the Russian Federation (1991-2000) Unit: Billion USD Yea 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 19 199 200 r 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 98 9 0 509 406 435 395 395 391 404 27 195 259 GD .4 .2 .1 .1 .5 .7 .9 1 .9 .7 Los Angeles Times. Cooling Off a Hot Head : Administration's phased-in approach toward North Korea gains backing. Jun. 16, 1994. http://articles.latimes.com/1994-0616/local/me-4585_1_north-korea.
16
Vol. 21, September 2013 P Source: Tradingeconomic.com & World Bank http://www.tradingeconomics.com/russia/ gdp
The key principle that shifted Moscows approach in the latter half the Yeltsin years was the Primakov Doctine. Yeltsin and Primakov aimed to establish a multipolar world order, moving away not only from the bipolar framework during the Cold War era but also from its mere hope to be treated as an equal partner by the U.S. Russian foreign policy had to be balanced in order to ensure the necessary environment for domestic development and avoid the international marginalization. Under this framework, Russia sought to maintain a balanced attitude between North Korea and South Korea, avoiding unnecessary confrontation with the West. Accordingly, Moscow implemented separate strategies toward Pyongyang and Seoul: Russia tried to secure its interests regarding both South and North Korea, but did not connect them with each other.17 This logic behind the Kremlins calculation explains why Russia accelerated its effort to improve the bilateral relationship with North Korea in the latter half of Yeltsins presidency. ( ) Pragmatism (The Putin and Medvedev Administrations) Primakov Doctine has been inherited to the current Putins diplomatic principles in the form of the Putin Doctrine, but Putins view on multipolarity is different from that of Primakovs. This difference originates from Putins realization that Russia can only encourage the establishment of a multipolar world when Russia itself is politically stable and economically vibrant. Therefore, the Russian governments Korean strategy evolved toward a concept asserting national interest
17
Ibid.
49
Wonhee LEE in the Putin administration. The essence of Putins foreign policy concept is to promote the construction of a fair democratic order in the world, to broaden the range of friends and partners of Russia, andmost importantlyto firmly and consistently protect the national interest of Russia.18 This is why Putin vigorously cultivated ties with Pyongyang to gain the leverage on the Korean Peninsula while at the same time trying to maintain cooperative relations with the Great Powers, especially the U.S. Like his predecessor, Medvedev succeeded Primakovian mulipolairty as described in the Concept of Foreign Policy adopted in July 2008. The second principle of Medvedevs doctrine says that The world must be multipolar Russia cannot accept a world order with only one decision maker, even one as serious as the U.S.A.19 Furthermore, Medvedev also put the effort to protect Russias national interest based on pragmatism. In his doctrine, Medvedev pleaded for a modernization strategy that would use technological know-how and innovation to boost efficiency in consideration that Russia could join the ranks of the most advanced economies through modernization.20 Putin has maintained his consistent approach toward the two Koreas since he took office again after the end of Dmitri Medvedev's term in 2012. His stress on multilateral frameworks, friendly relations with its neighboring powers and favorable market conditions is a
From Yeltsin to Putin symbolic sign that shows Putins orientation to pragmatic thinking.21 . Moscows View on the Peace on the Korean Peninsula ( ) Nuclear Crisis There are three main points that Moscow stresses to deal with North Koreas nuclear ambitions, all of which are in line with the key principles mentioned above. First, Moscow prefers to solve the nuclear impasse under a multilateral framework. Resuming six-party talks remains Moscows highest priority among its policy agendas regarding Pyongyangs denuclearization. This stance is affirmed by a recent official comment made by Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Lukashevich about two months after North Koreas third nuclear test. On April 19, 2013, he said, Russia hopes that the six-party talks on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will remain the priority one and help resume negotiations to resolve all issues.22 Then, how does Moscow perceive the threats from Pyongyangs nuclear potential? Georgy Tolorayas analysis provides a clue to interpreting Mocows strategy toward the current nuclear impasse. According to his assessment, Pyongyangs use of nuclear weapons is highly improbable, but turmoil, resulting from loss of nuclear materials control or technical accidents, does constitute possible dangers.23 All in all, one can conclude that Russia holds firm to the six-party talks while not taking the actual threats seriously. Second, Russia is keenly interested in playing a balancing role rather than a leading role in resolving the nuclear crisis involving North Korea. In other words, Moscow seeks to balance tensions, especially between Washington and Pyongyang, in
21
Afanasiev, Evgeny. 2000. Vladimir Putins New Foreign Policy and Russian Views of the Situation on the Korean Peninsula. The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 12: 8. 19 Chugrov, Sergei 2010. Russias Foreign and Security Strategy in the 21st Century. In Russian National Strategy and ROK-Russian Strategic Partnership in the 21st Century. ed. Jung-Ho Bae and Alexander N. Fedorovskiy. Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification.
20
18
Ibid.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Russia. Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. 22 Russia hopes 6-party format on Korea remains priority. Itar-Tass, April 19, 2013. 23 Toloraya, Georgy. Russia and the North Korean knot. Asia Times Online, Apr. 23, 2010.
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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal maintaining the six-party talks. Russia often criticized the Bush administrations gettough policy toward North Korea and urged the U.S. to solve North Korean conflicts through peaceful means.24 For example, when the six-party process reached a deadlock in 2007 as North Koreas funds in the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) was frozen for two years, Russias Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov accused the U.S. of hindering progress of the multinational nuclear talks.25 Simultaneously, Moscow continues to make sincere efforts to resume the negotiation process when Pyongyang withdraws from the talks. Most recently, as the six-party talks had been suspended since 2009, a Russian delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin paid a visit to Pyongyang in March, 2011, urging North Korea to return to the 6-party talks. North Korea responded by saying that it was willing to accept Russias proposal without preconditions.26 All in all, within the six-party talks, Russias main role has been to voice for the need for peaceful solutions and to prevent too much pressure on North Korea.27 Finally, Russia takes a stand against North Koreas nuclear weapons program based on the concept of the peaceful coexistence of the South and the North. Political instability driven by nuclear issues on the Far East border is likely to harm Russias interest, hampering its plan of developing the Far East and producing a massive inflow of refugees. Moscows stance toward a non-nuclear status of the Korean peninsula was confirmed by Losyukov when he was quoted by Chinas Xinhua news
Joo. Chapter 8. Russia and the Korean Peace Process. 25 Xinhua News Agency. Russia criticizes U.S. for delay in solving financial dispute with DPRK. Mar. 16, 2007. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007- 04/16/content_5985102.htm. 26 Kim, Hyung-jin. North Korea 'not opposed' to discussing uranium enrichment if 6-nation nuclear talks resume. The Washington Post, Mar. 15, 2011. 27 Blank, Stephen and Younkyoo, Kim.
24
Vol. 21, September 2013 agency on his arrival in Beijing in 2003 to join a preliminary meeting for the six-party talks. We consider that the presence of a nuclear weapon on the peninsula is of a destabilizing nature that does not meet the interests of all the states that are located in the region, he was quoted as saying.28 On March 7, 2012, the UN Security Council unanimously approved a resolution to impose the fourth set of sanctions on North Korea. Speaking after the vote, Russias Permanent Representative to the U.N. Vitaly Churkin, who is also the current president of the council, described the resolution as an "appropriate measure".29 ( ) Unification Before examining the Russian attitude toward Koreas unification, it should be noted that while various political forces in Russia have varying points of view on the two Koreas. Alexander Lukin, a professor at the Department of Political Science of Moscow State Institute of International Relations, introduces these different approaches. According to Lukin, the political elite and specialists are divided into three groups.30 First, pro-Western politicians and specialists, called rightists in Russia, argue that Russia should stimulate the collapse of the communist dictatorship, or at least should not prevent it from collapsing. Then, there is a leftist group with a more traditional Soviet-style policy, which sympathizes with North Korea, considering it as an ally in the ongoing struggle against the U.S.-led world politics. However, Lukin points out that these two groups do not have a decisive influence on Moscows foreign policy. Indeed, Moscows diplomatic circles have been occupied with a pragmatist or
28
Xinhua News Agency. BBC News. UN adopts tough new North Korea sanctions after nuclear test. Mar. 7, 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia- 21704862.
29
30
Lukin, Alexander. 2009. Russias Korea Policy in the 21st Century. International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 18: 43-4. 51
Wonhee LEE centrist group during the Putin and Medvedev years. They promote the pragmatic approach toward the two Koreas, which treads a middle path between the two more radical views.31 In this regard, it would be fair to consider this centrist approach Russians mainstream view on the unification of the Korean Peninsula. Thus, this section covers the main points presented by this centrist view. Also, it is interesting to see that Russias view on Koreas unification reflects the concept of multipolarity. First of all, Moscow supports the idea of a democratic, gradual and peaceful unification of Korea. Vasily Mikheev, Director of the China-Japan Centre at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Moscow, argues that the best variant of the possible scenarios will be co-existence of two Korean states on the Korean Peninsula in the form of diplomatic relations while North Korea learns how to live on market-democracy principles before full unification with the South.32 He further claims that the Permanent Five need to establish a special fund to support North Korean market transformation in order to make the process smoother.33 To sum up, it is clear that Moscow is opposed to the abrupt collapse of North Korea but prefers the gradual process assisted by neighboring powers. Second, Moscow is willing to secure its economic and geostrategic interest on the Korean peninsula. Moscows aspiration can be construed as the attempt to pursue its national interest in an East Asian multipolar world. In economic cooperation, Russia expects a unified Korea to be a larger and more active partner and investor provided that it would more closely resemble the current South Korean model than the North
31
From Yeltsin to Putin Korean system.34 In particular, considering that the development of its Far Eastern region is one of the key agendas, a unified Korea would certainly be an attractive economic partner. Also, Russia anticipates geopolitical shifts after the unification. A decrease in the U.S. role in Korea may bring about a relocation of the line of Chinas deterrence eastwards to Japan.35 In addition, a unified Korea friendly to Russia would serve as counterbalance against Japan and China. While Russian leaders often say that only Russia supports Korean unification, one should note that Russia would support a unified Korea only if it would be willing to accommodate Russias interest.36 Last, Moscow is convinced that it can perform a unique role in the process of Koreas unification. Russian experts believe that its traditional ties with Pyongyang and its experience of democratic transition will be beneficial to the reform in North Korea. For example, Lukin claims that it is in Russians interest to demonstrate to the North Korean regime the advantages of the market economy, and to encourage reformist tendencies within it.37 As mentioned above, it should also be noted that it is hard to accept this claim as it is. Considering Russias pursuit of pragmatism, it is probable that Russia would assist the unification process in a way that it is favorable to Russias interest. . Conclusion After a dramatic shift in its foreign policy in 1996, the Kremlin has taken a balanced and pragmatic approach based on mulipolarity in a bid to regain its status of a super power of the world. When the scope of this study is confined to the Korean Peninsula, it is observed that Moscows
34
Mikheev, Vasily. The Korean Problem: The Vision and Philosophy. Presentation at the 1st JPI-FNF-KF Joint Workshop, Jeju, South Korea, October 15-16, 2010.
33
32
Ibid.
35
Lukin. 57.
Toloraya, Georgy. 2008. Russias East Asian Strategy: The Korean Challenge. Russian in Global Affairs 6: 181-2.
36 37
Ibid.
Joo. Lukin. 45.
52
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal strategy in this region can also be explained through its pursuit of multipolarity and diplomatic pragmatism. In this case, the poles consist of the multipolar world in East Asia would be Russia, the U.S., China and Japan. It is also discovered that Moscows strategy toward Koreas peace process is designed in a way that Russia could maintain its influence and secure its national interest in a multipolar order of East Asia. As for the nuclear issues, Moscow prefers multilateral mechanism, plays a balancing role and strongly opposed Pyongyangs nuclear weapons program. With regard to the unification, it emphasizes a gradual process assisted by neighboring powers, its expected economic and geostrategic interest, and its unique role that could contribute to the unification process. This paper suggests that Russias Korea policy is a byproduct of its effort to create a multipolar order in East Asia. In fact, the Korean Peninsula is one of the venues where the Great Powers vie for the hegemony in Asia-Pacific. As Georgy Toloraya suggests, Russias Korea policy should not be evaluated in exclusively peninsular terms, but also in a wider context of Russias relations with the worlds centers of power.38 Therefore, in examining Russias view on the peace process on the Korean Peninsula, competition among the Great Powers deserves equal importance as Russo-Korean relations.

Bazhanov, Eugene and Bazhanov, Natasha. 1994. The Evolution of Russian-Korean Relations: External and Internal Factors. Asian Survey 34: 789-98. BBC News. UN adopts tough new North Korea sanctions after nuclear test. Mar. 7, 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia21704862. Bazhanov, Evgeny. 2005. The Russian Responses to the North Korean Nuclear Crisis. (Washington, D.C. : National Council for Eurasian and East European Research) Blank, Stephen and Younkyoo, Kim. 2012: Restarting the Six-Party Talks: Russias Dilemmas and Current Perspectives. Korea Observer 43: 253-77. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1997. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. New York: Basic Books. Buszynski, Leszek. 2009. Russia and North Korea: Dilemmas and Interests. Asian Survey 49: 809-30. Carpenter, Ted Galen. Why China and Russia Balk at Sanctions against North Korea and Iran. Cato Institue. March, 2010. http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/ pdf/npu_march2010.pdf. Chugrov, Sergei. 2010. Russias Foreign and Security Strategy in the 21st Century. In Russian National Strategy and ROK-Russian Strategic Partnership in the 21st Century. ed. Jung-Ho Bae and Alexander N. Fedorovskiy. Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification. Ellison, Herbert J. 2006. Boris Yeltsin and Russias Democratic Transformation. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Joo, Seoung-ho. 2003. Chapter 8. Russia and the Korean Peace Process. in The Korean Peace Process and the Four Powers. ed. Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo . Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. Kim, Hyung-jin. North Korea 'not opposed' to discussing uranium enrichment if 6-nation nuclear talks resume. The Washington Post, Mar. 15, 2011.
Bibliography
Afanasiev, Evgeny. 2000. Vladimir Putins New Foreign Policy and Russian Views of the Situation on the Korean Peninsula. The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 12: 7-17.
Toloraya, Georgy. 2009. Russian policy in Korea in a time of change. The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 21: 69.
38
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Koh, Jae-nam. 1999. The Rising Role of Russia in Settling a Peace on the Korean Peninsula. East Asian Review 11. Mikheev, Vasily V. 1977. Russian Policy Towards Korean Peninsula After Yeltsins Reelection as President. The Journal of East Asian Affairs 11 no. 2. Mikheev, Vasily. The Korean Problem: The Vision and Philosophy. Presentation at the 1st JPI-FNFKF Joint Workshop, Jeju, South Korea, October 15-16, 2010. Lukin, Artyom. 2012. Russia and the Balance of Power in Northeast Asia. Pacific Focus 27: 15583. Lukin, Alexander. 2009. Russias Korea Policy in the 21st Century. International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 18: 30-63. Nanto, K. Dick and Chanlett-Avery, Emma, North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Anaysis. Congressional Research Service, Jan. 22, 2010. Pollack, Andrew. Yeltsin Vows Curb on North Koreans. The New York Times, Nov. 21, 1992. Rangsimaporn, Paradon. 2009. Russian perceptions and policies in a multipolar East Asia under Yeltsin and Putin. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 9: 207-44. Toloraya, Georgy. 2008. Russias East Asian Strategy: The Korean Challenge. Russian in Global Affairs 6: 170-83. Toloraya, Georgy. 2009. Russian policy in Korea in a time of change. The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 21: 67-84. Panov, Alexander. Russias Vision for East Asia in the 21st Century and the Korean Peninsula. Presentation at the Conference sponsored by the Korea Institute for National Unification and the Ministry of Unification, Seoul, September 9, 2008. Vorontsov, Alexander. Current Russia-North Korea Relations: Challenges and Achievements. CNAPS Visiting Fellow Working Paper, The Brookings Institution, 2007.
From Yeltsin to Putin

Xinhua News Agency. Russia criticizes U.S. for delay in solving financial dispute with DPRK. Mar. 16, 2007. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/200704/16/content_5985102.htm. Yang, Seung Ham., Kim, Woosang and Kim, Yongho. 2004. Russo-North Korean Relations in the 2000s: Moscows Continuing Search for Regional Influence. Asian Survey 44: 794-814.
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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal

Vol. Nr.20, June 2013

Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal

Vol. Nr.20, June 2013

Volume 21: September 2013 Academic year 2013-2014

Pter Kirly, Hungary

Andrijana Nikic, Montenegro

Reint-Jan Groot Nuelend, The Netherlands

Vit Simral, Czech Republic

Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal

Vol. Nr.20, June 2013

Politikon:IAPSS Political Science Journal

Vol. 21, September 2013

Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal

Vol. 21, September 2013

Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal

Vol. 21, September 2013

American policy on the Balkans: Successful story or a diplomatic failure?

The interests of the United States in the Balkans

American policy on the Balkans

American policy on the Balkans

Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal

Vol. 21, September 2013

Rentier state as an obstacle to development in the Middle East

Vol. 21, September 2013

Ira n Ira q Ku wai t O ma n Qa tar Sau di Ar abi a Syr ia U. A. E Ye me n Ot her s Th e Mi ddl e Ea st

9.4 % 9.0 % 6.1 % 0.3 % 1.4 % 15.9 %

4.2 % 3115 3.7 % 3127 3.7 % 922 1.1 %

1966 2.0 % 1153 13.3 0 %

2.5 97.8 3.0 0.6 807. 7

0.1 % 5.9 % 0.2 %

0.2 % 3380 3.7 % 180 0.2 % 0.2 %

<0.1 206 % 48.4 %

Ba hra in Ira n Ira q Ku wai t O ma n Qa tar Sau di Ar abi a Syr

0.1 % 18.0 % 1.9 % 1.0 % 0.5 % 13.4 % 4.4 %

14.2 160. 5 0.8 14.5 29.0 157. 0 102. 8

0.4 % 4.8 % <0.1 % 0.4 % 0.9 % 4.7 % 3.0 %

Oil prices (Brent crude, $/ barrel), 1993, 16,97

Oil prices (Brent crude, $/ barrel), 2009, 61,67

[source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013, http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf /statistical-

2012 3187,31 6454,62 4945,13 9705,39 3289,06

Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal

Vol. 21, September 2013

1992 21 1993 30 1994 42 1995 31 1996 49 1997 26

54,321,981 13,871,446 52,713,605 31,901,980 74,814,068 44,132,794 33,641,538 8,422,992

Joo. Lukin. 45.

Vol. 21, September 2013

From Yeltsin to Putin

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