Welcome to Scribd, the world's digital library. Read, publish, and share books and documents. See more
Download
Standard view
Full view
of .
Look up keyword
Like this
8Activity
0 of .
Results for:
No results containing your search query
P. 1
58

58

Ratings: (0)|Views: 446 |Likes:
Published by olaydyosa
digested cases

dont just download, at least hit like or leave a comment :D
digested cases

dont just download, at least hit like or leave a comment :D

More info:

Published by: olaydyosa on Jul 24, 2009
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

Availability:

Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less

02/01/2013

pdf

text

original

58. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA
GRN 108763 Feb 13, 1997
268 SCRA 198
Doctrine: In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological

incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by(a)

gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
FACTS: PANGANIBAN, J.
Private respondent, Roridel Molina, in her verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina
alleged the following circumstances:
- that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money;
-that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances,
resulting in frequent quarrels between them;
-that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole

breadwinner of the family;
-that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged;
-that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City;
-that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them;

-that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and
was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served;
-and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what
appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

In his Answer, Reynaldo admitted that he and private respondent could no longer live together as husband and wife, but argued that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to private responden\u2019ts behavior and refusal to perform her marital obligations, ie., cooking meals, running the household and handling their finances.

The couple had been separated-in-fact for more than 3 years.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center.

The RTC rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. (In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and

incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture"). The respondent court relied heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because

of their opposing and conflicting personalities."
Hence, the present recourse.

The petitioner, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply theneglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but adefect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."

ISSUE: W/N Reynaldo is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to private respondent, thus a valid ground
to render the marriage void.
HELD: NO. In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological

incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by(a)

gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere

showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to beincapable of doing so, due to some psychological (or physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

(From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,

(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent orincurable.

(5) Such illness must begrave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.)
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, the Court have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even
more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
-Olay M. Omar
76. SUSAN NICDAO CARI\u00d1Ovs. SUSAN YEE CARI\u00d1O.
351 SCRA 131
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
Doctrine: Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage

on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit

not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.In such

instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.

FACTS: YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.

During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cari\u00f1o, he contracted two marriages, the first with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cari\u00f1o (Susan Nicdao) in 1969, with whom he had two offsprings; and the second was with respondent Susan Yee Cari\u00f1o (Susan Yee) in 1992, with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.

In 1988, SPO4 Cari\u00f1o became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis, and eventually he passed away, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from \u201cMBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,\u201d while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from \u201cGSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).\u201d

Respondent filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner praying, inter alia, that petitioner be
ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as
\u201cdeath benefits\u201d which she (petitioner) received from \u201cMBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.\u201d Despite service
of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license as evidenced by a certificate

issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila. She further claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased.

The trial court ruled in favour of respondent ordering petitioner to pay the former, P73,000.00 which is one-half of the subject
death benefits. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the case at bar.
ISSUES: (1)W/N the court has the authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages (despite being invoked by respondent NOT
for purposes of remarriage).
(2) Who has a better claim to the death benefits?
HELD: (1) YES.

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit

not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.In such

instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.

It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject \u201cdeath benefits\u201d of the deceased.

Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.

Activity (8)

You've already reviewed this. Edit your review.
1 hundred reads
1 thousand reads
Claire Culminas liked this
Supot Nabata liked this
nuvelco liked this
Joel Longos liked this
Ryan de Luna liked this
chinitokoko liked this

You're Reading a Free Preview

Download
scribd
/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->