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insights
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Bob Lowry
November 07
38
afer e 2006 cr:
aurl ere  tmor‑Lee
Introduction
After the collapse of state authorityin Timor‑Leste in mid‑2006, Australia,along with other countries and the UN,committed itself to assist the governmentof Timor‑Leste re‑establish law and order,support presidential and parliamentaryelections, and revive the institutions of state. With the election of a new president,José Ramos Horta, on 9 May 2007 and anew parliament on 30 June, followed by theformation of a new coalition governmentunder Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao, theformer president, on 6 August 2007, it istime to review how these developmentsmight affect Australia’s long‑term interestsin Timor‑Leste.
Australian interests
Australia has six broad security interests inTimor‑Leste. First; that no foreign militarybases be established in Timor‑Leste. Second;that Timor‑Leste maintains mutuallybenecial relations with Indonesia. Third;that the treaties and agreements regulatingexploitation of the shared Timor Sea
East Timorese President Jose Ramos‑Horta, center, anked by newly sworn in Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao, left, and Secretary General of theopposition Fretilin Party Mari Alkatiri, right, 8 August 2007 in Dili, the capital of East Timor. AP via AAP/Binsar Bakkara © 2007 the Associated Press
 
After the 006 crisis: Australian interests in Timor‑Leste
resources be honoured. Fourth; that adequateprovision be made for the security of theoff‑shore resources in the Timor Sea. Fifth;that Timor‑Leste become an effective partnerin maintaining regional security, includingthe ght against transnational crime andterrorism. And nally; that Timor‑Lesteimplements the full range of bio‑securitycontrol measures relating to humans, animalsand plant life.How signicant are these interests andwhat effect and priority should they have onAustralian policy?
Foreign military bases
The 2000 Defence White Paper statedAustralia has an ‘overriding strategic interestin being able to protect our direct maritimeapproaches from intrusion by hostile forces’.Timor‑Leste is one of the closest parts of the archipelago to Australia’s north, butits conventional security threat potentialis limited: it will never challenge Australiain its own right and there are no current orprojected plans to establish foreign militarybases there. It is also unlikely that anyTimor‑Leste government would pursue thisoption, as it would be contrary to the letterand spirit of ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity andCooperation, which Timor‑Leste signed beforebecoming the 25th member of the ASEANRegional Forum (ARF) on 26 July 2005.
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China has a large embassy in Timor‑Lesteand is a major aid contributor, although themotivations for its interest are not altogetherclear apart from the obvious reasons of givingit leverage in relation to Taiwan, access togovernment infrastructure projects and theenergy industry, and as part of a broaderpolicy to lift its regional status vis‑a‑vis theUnited States. Establishing a military basethere might seem a rational response to theprospect of strengthening defence relationsbetween Japan, Australia, India and the US.However, Indonesia is one of the key countriesin China’s strategic calculations: it straddlesthe choke points for oil and gas shipmentsfrom the Middle East and Africa, exportsenergy to China, and can assist in neutralising,if only indirectly, Indian and Americanambitions in the region. China is, therefore,most unlikely to offend Indonesia’s long heldsensibilities by seeking to insert a militarybase into the archipelago.It is also unlikely that Timor‑Leste wouldinvite Indonesia to establish military bases inTimor‑Leste. If it did so, however, it would notnecessarily be contrary to Australian interestsand under foreseeable circumstances theinvasion of Timor‑Leste by Indonesia isequally unlikely. Indonesia has no historicalclaim to Timor‑Leste, the justication thatit was invited to intercede in 1975–76 is nolonger valid—if it ever was, the anti‑colonialand ideological justications are no longerrelevant, and any likely rewards would befar outweighed by the likely political andeconomic repercussions.Likewise, neither the US nor Australia needs amilitary base in Timor‑Leste and they wouldbe most unlikely to antagonise Indonesia andthe broader ASEAN community by buildingbases there in the absence of overridingstrategic considerations.
… the establishment of foreign military bases in Timor‑Leste, by invitation or invasion, remains highly unlikely.
Consequently, although it would be contraryto Australia’s interests, the establishmentof foreign military bases in Timor‑Leste,by invitation or invasion, remains highlyunlikely. Being such a remote possibility, thethreat does not present Timor‑Leste with abargaining chip and should not inuence ordetermine Australia’s engagement in the areaunder present and foreseeable circumstances.
 
Strategic Insights
 Although Indonesia and Australiahave different perspectives onTimor‑Leste’s relevance, they haveto incorporate Timor‑Leste intotheir respective relationships simply because of its geographic location.
Timor‑Leste, Indonesia and Australia
The 2000 Defence White Paper noted that:‘Our biggest and most important neighbouris Indonesia. … Australia’s fundamentalinterests and objectives in having a gooddefence relationship with Indonesia remainas important as ever’. The independenceof Timor‑Leste does not change thisfundamental pillar of Australian securitypolicy. Although Indonesia and Australiahave different perspectives on Timor‑Leste’srelevance, they have to incorporateTimor‑Leste into their respective relationshipssimply because of its geographic location.With Indonesia’s centre of gravity inpopulation, economic activity, and externalsecurity centred on Java and the South ChinaSea, Timor‑Leste is (literally) of peripheralinterest. Indonesia’s primary concern isto secure its land border and, to a lesserdegree, its maritime border with Timor‑Leste.Historical border crossing, heightened by theinux of 20,000 East Timorese who choseto stay in West Timor after the 1999 ballot,means that the greatest challenge is tostop the border area becoming a haven forcriminals involved in violent crime or theft oneither side of the border.
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Smuggling is a daily occurrence, but becauseTimor‑Leste is the major beneciary, dueto Indonesian subsidies, and the quantitiesinvolved are not signicant for Indonesia,there is little incentive to stop it. However,small‑scale illegal shing by Indonesians inTimor‑Leste waters could become a sourceof irritation if the industry in Timor‑Lesteexpands. Conversely, the granting of shing
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