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Commando Raids in the Peloponnesian War Author(s): H. G. Robertson Source: The Classical Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 11 (Jan.

10, 1944), p. 130 Published by: Classical Association of the Atlantic States Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4341856 . Accessed: 15/08/2013 12:51
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130

CLASSICAL

WEEKLY

namely, the 'GoldenMean' or, as the Hellenes have 23. 25-6, 30, 56, 69; 3.7, I6, 91, 94, 105; 4.42-5, IOI). 2 Some of their operationswere merely maraudingdeexpressed it, 'nothingin excess'.' In this present period of world conflict it may be scents upon unprotected lands, but others were apparraidswith limited objectives in which both interesting and instructive to review the pro- ently commando of ancientwriterson types of government they engagedenemy forcesand then withdrewby sea. nouncements existing two and one-half millenniaago, when demo- The seizureof Cythera providedAthens with an adto Pylos. It was used for a numcracy stood embattled, even as today, against what vancedbase superior Thucydides called "the lust for power arising from ber of raidsand arousedgreat alarmat Sparta(Thuc. greedand ambition."The past is largelya determinant 4.53-7). A rising of helots was fearedand, insteadof of the presentas well as a rich body of experience, as havingsomeof them liquidated by the Spartan Gestapo, ProfessorPratt has well observed,3and it is only the governmentsent severalhundredto help Brasidas "through the conjunction of historical analysis and in openinga secondfront in the North (Thuc. 4.80). in the re-examination The strategy of the Sicilianexpeditiondid not call criticalappraisal of the past that it is finally possibleto achievethe perspective and in- for commando raids,althoughthe Syracusans may have sight which are required for realhumanadvancement." fearedthem when they built stockadesat the landing places (Thuc. 6.75). After war was resumed with H. L. RUSSELL UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS Spartaonly one expeditionwas sent aroundthe Peloponneseand it was content to ravagethe country and build a fort, even though Argive hoplites were on board (Tbuc. 6.20, 26). Commando Raids in the Peloponnesian War The Ionian War offers one striking instanceof the One night in the earlywinterof 429 B.C. the Athen- use of commando methodswhen an Atheniansquadron ianshad a narrow escape.The crewsof a Peloponnesian sailed unexpectedlyinto the harborof Mytilene and fleet had marchedoverlandto Nisaea, manned forty captured the enemy vessels; the crews then disemships which were lying there, and put to sea under barked,defeatedthe opposingland forces,and captured cover of darknessto raid the harborof Piraeus. No the city (Thuc. 8.23). Thus an operationwhich may were stationedthere and the entrancewas havebeen plannedas a mereraiddeveloped guardships into a comnot closed. An attack by sea was the last thing the plete victory. It was followedby some minor successes Atheniansexpected. It was a perfectset-upfor a com- in amphibiousoperationsagainst the Chians (Thuc. commander persevered, he 8.24). mandoraid.Had the Spartan himself and made a notable might have immortalized Commando raids were among the most effective As weavonsof the Athenians and might well have been to the history of combinedoperations. contribution it was, he contented himself with a smash-and-grab used much more extensively. That they were not so raidon Salamis(Thucydides2.93-4). used may have been due to the fact that they were inSuch enterpriseswere not suited to the cautious consistentwith the defensivestrategy of Pericleswho The Athenianshoweverwere peculiarly fitted contemplated a "phonywar."l He may have regarded Spartans. and training for commandoraids or them merelyas a meansof satisfyingthose who wished by temperament Even their enemies recog- more action. The failureto make greateruse of such their ancient counterparts. nized theirreckless courage(Thuc. 7.2I). Demosthenes raidswas one of the blunders of Athens. in making rightly claimedthat they were experienced H. G. ROBERTSON lead- UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO descentson hostilecoasts(Thuc. 4.IO). Athenian ers were used to commandingeither militaryor naval of dividedcommandto be forces;therewas no problem overcome. Hence Pericles naturally includedraidson the The Guardians, Socrates, and Board Peloponnesiancoast as a part of Athens' strategy "in Prytaneion" War ThucydidesmentionssevIn the Archidamian eral expeditionsaroundthe Peloponnese(Thuc. 2. 17.
2J. Penrose Harland, From Kingship to Democracy. This is one of several stimulating articles in a book of studies honoring William Kelly Prentice, The Greek Political Experience, Princeton I941. The present comment is indebted for several indirect quotations and for the elan in general that led up to it to those articles in that book by Harland, Harper, Meritt, Coleman-Norton, and MacLaren, as well as that acknowledged in note 3. 3Norman T. Pratt, Jr., The People and the Value of Their Experience, Prentice Studies, see note 2 above.

(Thuc.I I 42-3).

"The guardians will live a happier life than that men count most happy, the life of the victors at Olympia." "How so?" "The things for which these are felicitated are a small part of what is secured for these. Their victory is fairer and their public support more complete."

Modern commentators on this passagel give several


lFor a criticism of Pericles' strategy see Henderson, The Great War between Athens and Sparta, 47-68.
i,

lPlato, Rep. 5.13; p. 465 D; trans. Shorey, Loeb Class. Libr. ed. of 1937.

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