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All God Has to DoAuthor(s): Tim CraneSource:
Analysis,
Vol. 51, No. 4 (Oct., 1991), pp. 235-244Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis CommitteeStable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3328767
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COHERENCEANDTHE CAUSATION OF BELIEFSOHERENCEANDTHE CAUSATION OF BELIEFS
SoifCBisinCS,it mustalso be in thehigherlevelsystemCS*,whichCCTis in.CCTand CBcannot,therefore,bekept apartinthewayrequiredto block the inference from(1)to(3);inCS*,CCTandCBareinconsistent.Inshort,internal realism doesn'tgetCCT offthehook.Thesimplefactis thatCBandCCT can'tbothbetrueunlessatleastoneof(a)-(e)isfalse.Sounless someone can show us that oneis,wehavea choice to make:whichshouldn't be toodistressing,sincethe choiceiseasy.8CorpusChristiCollege,CambridgeB2IRH
REFERENCES[1]SimonBlackburn,SpreadingheWordOxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1984).[2]DonaldDavidson,'Causalrelations',in hisEssaysonActionsandEvents(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1989).[3]BrianEllis,Truth ndObjectivityOxford:Blackwell,1990).[4]HartryField,'Realism andrelativism',JournalofPhilosophy9(1982)553-75.[5]N.Jardine,TheFortunesofInquiryOxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1986).[6]D. H.Mellor,'Thesingularlyaffectingfacts ofcausation',inMetaphysicsndMorality,ditedbyP.Pettitetal.(Oxford:Blackwell,1987).[7]HilaryPutnam,Reason,TruthandHistory (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,1981).SIamgratefultoNickJardine,IliseLombardo,MikeMartin,GregMcCulloch,HughMellorand DavidPapineauforhelpfulremarks.
ALLGOD HAS TO DO
ByTIMCRANE
INTHEBEGINNINGGodcreatedtheelementaryparticles.Bosons,electrons,protons,quarksandtheresthecreatedthem. Andtheywerewithout form andvoid,so Godcreated thefundamentallaws ofphysics-the lawsofmechanics,electro-magnetism,thermodynamicsand the rest-andassignedvaluestothefundamentalphysicalconstants:thegravitationalconstant,thespeedoflight,Planck'sconstant and therest. God thenset theUniverse inmotion.AndGodlooked at what he haddone,andsaw thatitwasphysicalisticallyacceptable.Whatmorewould Godhave to do togivesomeone athought?Somephilosopherswillsay: nothing.Theybelievethatsince thephysicalfacts 'fix'or'determine' all otherfacts,allmental facts willSoifCBisinCS,it mustalso be in thehigherlevelsystemCS*,whichCCTis in.CCTand CBcannot,therefore,bekept apartinthewayrequiredto block the inference from(1)to(3);inCS*,CCTandCBareinconsistent.Inshort,internal realism doesn'tgetCCT offthehook.Thesimplefactis thatCBandCCT can'tbothbetrueunlessatleastoneof(a)-(e)isfalse.Sounless someone can show us that oneis,wehavea choice to make:whichshouldn't be toodistressing,sincethe choiceiseasy.8CorpusChristiCollege,CambridgeB2IRH
REFERENCES[1]SimonBlackburn,SpreadingheWordOxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1984).[2]DonaldDavidson,'Causalrelations',in hisEssaysonActionsandEvents(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1989).[3]BrianEllis,Truth ndObjectivityOxford:Blackwell,1990).[4]HartryField,'Realism andrelativism',JournalofPhilosophy9(1982)553-75.[5]N.Jardine,TheFortunesofInquiryOxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1986).[6]D. H.Mellor,'Thesingularlyaffectingfacts ofcausation',inMetaphysicsndMorality,ditedbyP.Pettitetal.(Oxford:Blackwell,1987).[7]HilaryPutnam,Reason,TruthandHistory (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,1981).SIamgratefultoNickJardine,IliseLombardo,MikeMartin,GregMcCulloch,HughMellorand DavidPapineauforhelpfulremarks.
ALLGOD HAS TO DO
ByTIMCRANE
INTHEBEGINNINGGodcreatedtheelementaryparticles.Bosons,electrons,protons,quarksandtheresthecreatedthem. Andtheywerewithout form andvoid,so Godcreated thefundamentallaws ofphysics-the lawsofmechanics,electro-magnetism,thermodynamicsand the rest-andassignedvaluestothefundamentalphysicalconstants:thegravitationalconstant,thespeedoflight,Planck'sconstant and therest. God thenset theUniverse inmotion.AndGodlooked at what he haddone,andsaw thatitwasphysicalisticallyacceptable.Whatmorewould Godhave to do togivesomeone athought?Somephilosopherswillsay: nothing.Theybelievethatsince thephysicalfacts 'fix'or'determine' all otherfacts,allmental facts will
23535
 
be fixedjustwhen the relevantphysicalfactsare fixed.JaegwonKim,forexample,arguesthatthereis an
importantsensein which thephysicaldetermines themental:once thephysicalside ofourbeingiscompletelyfixed,ourpsychologicallifeisalsocompletelyfixed.([8],p.52)
AndJohn Haugelandclaimsthattheterminologyinwhichthelawsofphysicsareexpressedis'descriptivelysufficientto"fixtheworld" ata time'([4],p.98).If KimandHaugelandareright,thenall Godhas todotocreatementalfacts-thoughts,experiences,desires etc.-istocreate theunderlying physicalfacts. These factsalone will determine the mentalfacts.1If thephysicaldetermines themental,itfollowsthatanymentaldifferenceinasystem,S,willrequiresomephysicaldifference inS.Forifthereissome mentaldifferencein Swithoutaphysicaldifference,thenthis mentaldifference(andhence themental factsaboutS)willbedeterminedbysomethingotherthanthephysicalfactsaboutS.The claimthat thereisno difference withoutaphysicaldiffer-ence isoftenexpressedbysayingthat the mentalsupervenesponthephysical(see,e.g.[6],p.321;[15],p.67).Ishall therefore callthe claim thatthephysicalfixeseverything 'superveniencephysicalism',andIshallarguehere thatdespitethe inituitiveappealithasformanypeople,it is false.IITo seewhythis isso,wefirst need to ask:whydo somanypeoplebelieveinsuperveniencephysicalism?Iconjecturethat,inbroadestoutline,thereasoningbehindit isasfollows(cf.[7],pp.150ff.).Supposeweacceptaroughlyphysicalistor naturalist viewof the world-weacceptthattheuniverseis'basicallyphysical'([4],p.96),whateverthispreciselymeans.Andsupposethat weareable to ruleout Eliminativismandotherkindsof Anti-Realismabout the mental.How then canweaccountnaturalisticallyfor themind'splacein thephysicalworld?Thetemptinganswer that mentalpropertiesaretype-identicalwithpropertiesof the brainturnsoutto involve animplausibleempirical speculation.For itseemsnomologicallypossiblethatmanyphysicallyverydifferententitiescould allbein the sametypeofmental state.The linkbetweenmental andphysicalproperty-typesmustbe 'looser'thantype-identitytheory says.Butthe retreatto the more modest ideathattokens fmentalproperties
For thetheologicalmetaphor,see[16].Forotherexplicitstatements of thiswidespreadview, see,forexample,[5]pp.552and558,[6]p.310,[7]p.151,[11]p.364.
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