CAYAT V. COMELEC G.R. No. 163776 April 24, 2007 FACTS: Fr.

Nardo Cayat and Thomas Palileng are the only mayoralty candidates for the May 2004 elections in Buguias Benguet. Palileng filed a petition for cancellation of the COC of Cayat on the ground of misrepresentation. Palileng argues that Cayat misrepresents himself when he declared in his COC that he is eligible to run as mayor when in fact he is not because he is serving probation after being convicted for the offense of acts of lasciviousness. Comelec, granted the petition of Palileng and Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration. Such, MR was denied because Cayat failed to pay the filing fee and hence, it was declared final and executory. Despite this decision, Cayat was still proclaimed as the winner and Palileng filed a petition for annulment of proclamation. Comelec declared Palileng as the duly elected mayor and Feliseo Bayacsan as the duly elected vice mayor. Bayacsan argues that he should be declared as mayor because of the doctrine of rejection of second placer. ISSUE: WON the rejection of second placer doctrine is applicable. HELD: The doctrine cannot be applied in this case because the disqualification of Cayat became final and executory before the elections and hence, there is only one candidate to speak of. The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. As such, Palileng is the only candidate and the duly elected mayor. The doctrine will apply in Bayacsans favor, regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the decision on Cayats disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayats disqualification became final only after the elections.

RIVERA III V. COMELEC G.R. No. 167591 May 9, 2007 FACTS: A petition for cancelation of the Certificate of Candidacy of Marino Morales as mayoralty candidate in Mabalacat, Pampanga for the May 2004 mayoralty was filed on the ground the he already served three consecutive terms in the office he seeks to run. Morales argues that this is not so because although he really served in 1995-1998 (1st term) and 2004-2007 (3rd term), he was merely a caretaker or de facto mayor in 1998-2001(2nd term) because his election was declared void by the RTC due to an election protest. Comelec ruled that Morales already served his third term and after an MR was filed, declared it final and executory on May 14, 2004. ISSUE: WON Morales had already served his 3 consecutive terms and if so, who should take his position. HELD: For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms. Here, Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. Such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term. Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him "to stay on indefinitely". With regard to the person who will replace Morales, it is a rule that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. Since his disqualification became final and executory after the elections, the candidate having the second highest number of votes cannot assume the position. Hence, it is the petitioner, the elected Vice Mayor Anthony Dee who should be declared as the mayor.

DELA TORRE V. COMELEC G.R. No. 121592 July 5, 1996 FACTS: Petitioner Rolando dela Torre was disqualified from running as mayor of Cavinti Laguna on the ground that he was convicted of violation the Anti-Fencing Law. He argues that he should not be disqualified because he is serving probation of his sentence and hence, the execution of his judgment was suspended together with all its legal consequences. ISSUE: WON Dela Torre is disqualified to run for public office. HELD: Sec.40 of LGC provides: Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence; Moral turopitude is considered as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. In this case of fencing, actual knowledge by the "fence" of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one's rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. Hence Dela Torre is disqualified from seeking public office. With regard to his argument that he is under probation, the court ruled that the legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. Dela Torre's conviction subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation.

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MERCADO V. MANZANO G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999 FACTS: Respondent Edu Manzano won as vice mayor of Makati City in the May 1998 elections. However, upon petition of a certain Ernesto Mamaril, the COC of Manzano was cancelled by Comelec on the ground that he is a dual citizen. ISSUE: WON Manzano is eligible to be Makati VP even if he is a dual citizen. HELD: Sec.40 of the LGC provides that persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running any elective position. However, the court ruled that dual citizenship under Sec.40 must be understood as dual allegiance. The former arises when different laws of citizenship of different countries are applied to a person without any voluntary act (jus soli, jus sanguinis) while the latter arises out of a positive act of a person who simultaneously owes loyalty to different countries. To terminate the status of dual allegiance, it must conform with the strict processes of law while in dual citizenship, the mere election of Philippine Citizenship upon filing of the COC is sufficient to terminate the previous status. By declaring in his COC that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

VALLES V. COMELEC G.R. No. 137000. August 9, 2000 FACTS: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez who was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother, ran for governor of Davao Oriental. Petitioner Cirilo Valles filed a petition for disqualification against Lopez on the ground that she is an Australian Citizen. ISSUE: WON Lopez is eligible to run as governor. HELD: Under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, the laws effective at the time of birth of Lopez before the 1935 Constitution, her father is considered as Spanish subject and a Filipino citizen. As such, she is also a Filipino Citizen. The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. (2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands. (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. (5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. The principle of jus sangguinis has been adopted also by the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. Hence, Lopez is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship. Also, the mere fact that Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express.

COQUILLA V. COMELEC G.R. No. 151914 July 31, 2002 FACTS: Petitioner Teodulo Coquilla is a Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American Citizen after joining the US Navy. He then applied for repatriation and on Nov.2000, his application was approved and he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. On Feb.2001, he filed his COC to run as a mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar where he stated that he has been residing in the place for two years. Another candidate Neil Alvarez filed a petition for cancellation of the COC of Coquilla but the Comelec failed to resolve the issue so the petitioner later on was declared the winner. Alvarez argues that Coquilla has not complied with the residency requirement for the position of mayor. ISSUE: WON Coquilla complied with the residency requirement. HELD: Although Coquilla was born and grew-up in Oras, Eastern Samar, he is deemed to have lost his residence together with his citizenship when he was naturalized as American citizen. He is only deemed to have acquired his citizenship and residence until his reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship when he took oath on Nov.2000. As such, when he filed his COC, he is considered as resident of the place for a few months and not two years as he stated therein. Hence, his disqualification is valid on the ground of misrepresentation. Coquilla cannot invoke the ruling in Bengzon v. HRET that upon repatriation, he is deemed to have reacquired his original status. This is because the issue here is his false statement in his COC.

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JUSTIMBASTE V. BALDERIAN G.R. No. 179413 November 28, 2008 FACTS: Petitioner Pricila Justimbaste filed a disqualification case against Rustico Balderian, a mayoralty candidate in Tabobtabob Leyte on the ground of material misrepresentation in his COC and that he is not a Filipino citizen. Petitioner argues that Balderians real name is CHU TECK SIAO but it was not the name reflected in his COC. Comelec denied the disqualification case and Balderian won the election. Hence, this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: WON Balderian committed misrepresentation in his COC. HELD: The petition is without merit because SEC. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that cancellation of COC is allowed only if any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false Although the birth name of the respondent is CHU TECK SIAO, there is already a decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) granting his change of name to Rustico Balderian. The use of a name other than that stated in the certificate of birth is not a material misrepresentation, as "material misrepresentation" under Sec.78 refers to "qualifications for elective office." There was also no intent to deceive the electorate as to private respondents identity, nor that by using his Filipino name the voting public was thereby deceived. SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation assumed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

KARE V. COMELEC G.R. No. 157526 April 28, 2004 FACTS: Salvador Moll and Avelino Ceriola are candidates for mayor in Malinao, Albay. Ceriola filed a petition for disqualification against Moll on the ground that he was previouslt sentenced by final judgment to suffer the penalty of 6 months to 1 year and 9 months for the crime of usurpation of authority or official functions. Moll won the May 2001 election but on March 2003, Comelec issued a resolution disqualifying him from office and declared Ceriola to be the mayor. The vice-mayor Emiliana Kare filed a petition to against the resolution on the part of the proclamation of Cariola. She argues that she is the rightful successor the the position of mayor. ISSUE: WON the proclaimation of Ceriola is valid. HELD: Moll argues that his judgment is not yet final but since he was not able to seasonably file his MR, it did not stay the implementation of the judgment. On the issue of who should be the mayor, the court ruled that Comelec was wrong in proclaiming Ceriola because the resolution disqualifying Moll took effect after the election, that is on March 2003. Comelec argued that under the OEC Sec.24, any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been disqualified by final judgment shall be considered as stray and shall not be counted but it shall not invalidate the ballot." Moll, according to Comelec, was disqualified when he was convicted by final judgment long before the election and so Ceriola is the lone candidate in the election. The court however disagrees. The court said that it is clear that it was only on March 19, 2003, that the Comelec en banc issued Resolution to disqualify Moll from running as a mayoral candidate. Thus, on May 14, 2001, when the electorate voted for him as mayor, they were under the belief that he was qualified. There is no presumption that they agreed to the subsequent invalidation of their votes as stray votes, in case of his disqualification. To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise them through no fault on their part, and to undermine the importance and the meaning of democracy and the right of the people to elect officials of their choice. As such, in case of permanent vacancy, the elected vice mayor should be proclaimed as the mayor.

BORJA V. COMELEC G.R. No. 133495 September 3, 1998 FACTS: Respondent Jose Carpo is the vice-mayor of Pateros for a term ending June 1992. When the mayor Cesar Borja died, Carpo became the mayor by operation of law. In 1992, Carpo ran and elected as mayor and in 1998 he again filed his COC for reelection but petitioner Benjamin Borja Jr. contested it on the ground that he had already served the three-consecutive term allowed by law. ISSUE: WON Carpo has already served three consecutive terms. HELD: The contention of Borja is unmeritorious. The three term limit of local officials must be taken to the right to be elected and the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms but he must also be elected in the to the same position in the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. In this case, the first term of Carpo cannot be included in the computation because he was not elected in that instance but rather only served the remaining term of the deceased mayor by virtue of operation of law.

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LOZANIDA V. COMELEC G.R. No. 135150 July 28, 1999 FACTS: Romeo Lonzanida was the mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for two consecutive terms. In 1995, he ran again for his third term and won. However, after an election protest has been filed by his opponent Juan Alves, the Comelec declared a failure of election and the position vacant but Lonzanida still continued to function as such. After the recounting of votes, Comelec declared Aves as the winner of the election and issued a resolution for such in February 1998, a few months after the next election. Lonzanida acceded to the resolution and Aves took over the position. In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his COC to run as mayor of the place but his opponent this time, Eufemio Muli filed a disqualification case on the ground that he has already served his three-term limit. Muli contends that even though Aves has been declared as the winner in the 1995 polls, Lonzanida still functioned as the mayor for almost the entire term. ISSUE: WON Lonzanida has already served his three-term limit. HELD: The argument of Muli is without merit. The three-term limitation provided by the Constitution and the LCG provides that The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. In the present case the assumption in office of Lonzanida in 1995 cannot be considered as part of the three-term limit because of the absence of two requisites. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

ADORMEO V. COMELEC G.R. No. 147927 February 4, 2002 FACTS: Raymundo Adormeo filed a petition for disqualification against the incumbent mayor of Lucena City, Ramon Talaga Jr., from his re-election bid for the 2001 polls on the ground that he has already served three consecutive terms. Talaga was the mayor of the place in 19921995 and again on 1995-1998. In his reelection bid in 1998, however, he lost to Bernard Tagarao. In a recall election in 2000, Talaga run against Tagarao and won and he served the unexpired term of the latter. The Comelec first denied the petition of Adormeo but granted it after a motion for reconsideration has been filed. ISSUE: WON Tagala already served for three consecutive terms. HELD: Talaga served two consecutive term at most and then lost. After two years as a private citizen, he ran again in the recall election and won. As such, his term cannot be considered as consecutive although he merely served the unexpired term of Tagarao after the recall polls. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. The comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a Constitutional Commission member, stating that in interpreting said provision that if one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed is only applicable to members of Congress where there is no recall election provided.

LATASA V. COMELEC G.R. No. 154829 December 10, 2003 FACTS: Arsenio Latasa was the mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in 1992, 1995 and 1998. In September 2000, a plebiscite was conducted to convert the municipality to City of Digos. This marked the end of the term of Latasa as mayor of the municipality. However, the charter of the new city provides that Latasa will stay in position in a hold-over capacity until the next election. In 2001 elections, Latasa again filed a COC to run as mayor. He argues that although he has already served three consecutive term in municipal mayor, this is his first bid as a city mayor. His opponent in the election Romeo Sunga filed a disqualification case against Latasa in the Comelec on the ground of violation of the three-term rule. Comelec granted the petition. Latasa filed a MR that was not acted upon until the day of election and hence, he won and proclaimed as the mayor. ISSUE: WON Latasa can still run as mayor of Digos City after serving three terms as mayor of municipality of Digos. HELD: The new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years. The Court believes that Latasa did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor unlike in Lonzanida case, where petitioner for even just a short period of time, stepped down from office. In this case, there was no interruption in the holding of office and hence, the three consecutive term is completed. Since Latasa was proclaimed but later on disqualified, the second placer Sunga, cannot assume the position but the vice mayor. chrism Page 4

PANIS V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. No. 102948 February 2, 1994 FACTS: Jaime Panis was employed as Administrative Officer of the Cebu City Medical Center (CCMC) formerly, Cebu City Hospita, while private respondent Bella Veloso was Administrative Officer of the City Health Department detailed at the said hospital. Panis and Veloso are both candidate for the position of Assistant Chief of Hospital for Administration of CCMC but the city mayor appointed the latter. Panis questioned the appointment of Veloso on the grounds that the position was not legally created, there was no screening process made and that the next in rank rule was not applied. ISSUE: WON Veloso has the right to be appointed to the disputed position. HELD: On the issue of the legality of the position, it was created under Ordinance 1216 when the hospital changed its name. It is the equivalent of Office of the hospital administrator. With regard to the screening process, Panis did not attend the screening process scheduled by the Personnel Selection Board even after due notice. On the issue of the next-in-rank, the court ruled that the "next in rank" rule specifically applies only in cases of promotion. The instant controversy, however, involves a new office and a position created in the course of a valid reorganization. Under the law, a vacancy not filled by promotion may be filled by transfer of present employees in the government service, by reinstatement, by reemployment of those separated from the service, and appointment of outsiders who have appropriate civil service eligibility, but not necessarily in this order. Assuming nonetheless that a vacancy actually occurred that can be filled up only by promotion, the concept of "next in rank" does not impose any mandatory or peremptory requirement to appoint the person occupying the next lower position in the occupational group of the office. What the Civil Service Law and the Administrative Code of 1987 provide is that if a vacancy is filled up by the promotion, the person holding the position next in rank thereto "shall be considered for promotion. In other words, one who is "next in rank" to a vacancy is given preferential consideration for promotion to the vacant position, but it does nor necessarily follow that he alone and no one else can be appointed. There is no vested right granted the next in rank nor a ministerial duty imposed on the appointing authority to promote the holder to the vacant position.

MENZON V. PETILLA G.R. No. 90762 May 20, 1991 FACTS: On Feb.1988, DILG Sec. Luis Santos designated Vice-Gov. Leopoldo Petilla as active governor of Leyte because no governor has yet been proclaimed in the province. The most senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Aurelio Menzon was also designated by Santos to be acting Vice-Governor. The SP issued a resolution declaring the appointment of Menzon invalid on the ground the law does not provide in cases of succession in the Office of the ViceGovernor in case of a temporary vacancy and the appointment is not necessary since the Vice-Governor who is temporarily performing the functions of the Governor, could concurrently assume the functions of both offices. Menzon questioned the said resolution but it was dismissed by the court and in the meantime the issue on the governorship of Leyte was settled and Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed the Governor. The provincial treasurer allowed the payment of the salary and emoluments for Menzon as active vice-governor but Larrazabal later asked to pay it back. ISSUE: WON there was vacancy and WON Menzon is entitled to the emoluments. HELD: The issues should be resolved in the affirmative. The law on Public Officers is clear on the matter. There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu contrario, there is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office. In this case, the office of the Vice-Governor was left vacant when the duly elected ViceGovernor Petilla was appointed Acting Governor. In the eyes of the law, the office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor. The LCG is silent on the mode of succession in the event of a temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor. However, under the circumstances, the Court rules that, in order to obviate the dilemma resulting from an interregnum created by the vacancy, the President, acting through her alter ego, the Secretary of DILG, may remedy the situation. In view of the foregoing, the petitioner's right to be paid the salary attached to the Office of the Vice Governor is indubitable.

SB of San Andres Catanduanes v. CA G.R. No. 118883 January 16, 1998 FACTS: Augusto T. Antonio was elected bgy captain of Sapang Palay, San Andres. In that capacity, he was appointed by the President as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Andres and was later elected president of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC). Meanwhile, the election for the president of Federation of the Association of Barangay Councils (FABC) was declared void by the DILG for lack of quorum and the reorganization in the provincial council became necessary. Being president of ABC, the DILG Sec. appointed Antonio as temporary member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Catanduanes. As such, Antonio tendered his resignation as member of SB. The VP of ABC, Nenito Aquino was appointed as member of SB in replacement of Antonio. Later SC, invalidate the decision of the DILG with regard to the election of the FABC president and also the appointment of Antonio as member of SP. Antonio wrote a letter to SB to reassume his position but it was denied on the ground that he has already resigned. ISSUE: WON there is an effective resignation of abandonment of office. HELD: Antonio cannot assume his previous position because although there was no effective resignation, there was an abandonment of office. To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority. In this case, there is no effective resignation because there is no evidence that the resignation was accepted by any government functionary or office. However, Antonio has effectively relinquished his membership in the Sangguniang Bayan due to his voluntary abandonment of said post. This is clear when he did not simultaneously discharge the duties and obligations of both positions. Neither did he, at that time, express an intention to resume his office as member of the SB. His overt acts, silence, inaction and acquiescence, when Aquino succeeded him to his original position, show that Antonio had abandoned the contested office. Antonios failure to promptly assert his alleged right implies his loss of interest in the position. His overt acts plainly show that he really meant his resignation and understood its effects. chrism Page 5

Republic Act No. 8295

June 6, 1997

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE PROCLAMATION OF A LONE CANDIDATE FOR ANY ELECTIVE OFFICE IN A SPECIAL ELECTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 4. Disqualification. In addition to the disqualifications mentioned in Sec.s 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec. 40 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, whenever the evidence of guilt is strong, the following persons are disqualified to run in a special election called to fill the vacancy in an elective office, to wit: a) Any elective official who has resigned from his office by accepting an appointive office or for whatever reason which he previously occupied but has caused to become vacant due to his resignation; and b) Any person who, directly or indirectly, coerces, bribes, threatens, harasses, intimidates or actually causes, inflicts or produces any violence, injury, punishment, torture, damage, loss or disadvantage to any person or persons aspiring to become a candidate or that of the immediate member of his family, his honor or property that is meant to eliminate all other potential candidate. Section 5. Prohibited acts, election offenses and penalties. Any act of coercion, bribery, threat, harassment, intimidation, terrorism, or actually causing, inflicting or producing violence, injury, punishment, torture, damage, loss or disadvantage to discourage any other person or persons from filing a certificate of candidacy in order to eliminate all other potential candidate from running in a special election shall constitute as an election offense. Violations of this provision shall be prosecuted and penalized in accordance with the provision of Sec. 264 of the Omnibus Election Code.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165

June 7, 2002

AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Section 27. Criminal Liability of a Public Officer or Employee for Misappropriation, Misapplication or Failure to Account for the Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment Including the Proceeds or Properties Obtained from the Unlawful Act Committed. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00), in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office, shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who misappropriates, misapplies or fails to account for confiscated, seized or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment including the proceeds or properties obtained from the unlawful acts as provided for in this Act. Any elective local or national official found to have benefited from the proceeds of the trafficking of dangerous drugs as prescribed in this Act, or have received any financial or material contributions or donations from natural or juridical persons found guilty of trafficking dangerous drugs as prescribed in this Act, shall be removed from office and perpetually disqualified from holding any elective or appointive positions in the government, its divisions, subdivisions, and intermediaries, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Section 28. Criminal Liability of Government Officials and Employees. The maximum penalties of the unlawful acts provided for in this Act shall be imposed, in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office, if those found guilty of such unlawful acts are government officials and employees.

Republic Act No. 9225

August 29, 2003

AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT. AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled : Section 1. Short Title this act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003." Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: "I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion." Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizenship of the Philippines. Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: (1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must Meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws; (2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath; (3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath; (4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and (5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who: (a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or (b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens. Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective. Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Section 8. Effectivity Clause This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general circulation.

1987 CONSTITUTION (ART. X SEC.8)

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.