Plaintiffs also assert that PlaintiffKerchner should beable to assert the rights of other members of the military. Pl.s’Br. at 16. However, prudential standing requirements dictate thata party cannot assert the legal rights of third parties. SeeValley Forge Christian Coll. v. American United for Separation ofChurch & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982).-3-Plaintiffs as “parts” of that “whole” have also suffered an injury(i.e., a violation of their constitutionally protected libertyinterests), Pl.s’ Br. at 8-9; (4) the Plaintiffs, as parties to acontract (the Constitution), have standing to enforce it in court,Pl.s’ Br. at 10; and (5) Plaintiff Kerchner, as a retired member ofthe military subject to recall to active duty, has alleged aparticularized injury-in-fact, Pl.s’ Br. at 13-16.
Points 1, 2,and 4 above do not merit discussion because they do not rebutDefendants’ arguments in its moving brief. Defendants will brieflyaddress points 3 and 5 below.A.Plaintiffs’ Injuries Are Widely-Shared with Others.Plaintiffs allege that even though their claims of injury maybe widely-shared with others, that does not mean that they lackstanding. Pl.s’ Br. at 8-9. Plaintiffs proffer that just becausethe general public shares their injuries does not mean that they donot have injuries particular to them. Id. However, to acceptPlaintiffs’ interpretation of the injury-in-fact component ofArticle III standing would render it meaningless. Moreover, theUnited States Supreme Court has rejected that very argument.In Ex Parte Levitt, plaintiff, a citizen and a member of the
Case 1:09-cv-00253-JBS-JS Document 37 Filed 07/27/2009 Page 3 of 10