2The Defendant asserts his concerns about receiving a fair trial. The intense mediacoverage led the Defendant to express concerns about the ability to seat a venire that has notbeen tainted by the coverage, and argues that audio and video taping of the trial would turn thiscase from one of appropriate public interest to a cause celebre.DMG seeks expanded media coverage in this case for the trial of the Defendantscheduled to commence on August 7, 2009, after four days of jury selection. DMG asserts thatthere is strong public interest in this case and that only through video and audio taping the trialcan the public be educated about our system of justice and the inner workings of a trial. DMGasserts that video and audio taping the trial is the only mechanism for assuring a complete andaccurate portrayal of the trial. Finally, DMG assures the Court that the mechanisms in place inCanon 3A(8)(e), limiting the ways in which the trial is covered, ensure that the trial could notturn into a media production.Canon 3A(8)(b) of the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct provides the standard forauthorizing extended media coverage. In determining whether expanded media coverage shouldbe permitted, a judge shall consider the following factors:1.
Whether there is a reasonable likelihood that expanded media coverage would interferewith the rights of the parties to a fair trial.2.
Whether there is a reasonable likelihood that expanded media coverage would undulydetract from the solemnity, decorum, and dignity of the Court: and3.
Whether expanded media coverage would create adverse effects that would be greaterthan those caused by traditional media coverage.It is axiomatic that the rights of the defendant to a fair trial are the highest priority of theCou
rt: “No right ranks higher than the right of the accused to a fair trial.”
Press-Enterprise Co.V. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984). The mere presence of a camera in a courtroom,however, does not
per se
violate a defendant’s Due Process rights.
Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S.560 (1981). Existing authority makes it clear that, while the Court must take great care to grant
public access to criminal proceedings, the issue of “public access” is not identical to EMC.
Simply put, there is no constitutional right to use of cameras or audio-transmitting devices. The
First Amendment provides for a right to attend trial, “rather than a license allowing cameras or
tape-
recorders into the courthouse….”
United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1280 (11
th
Cir.1985).
The rights of the press to access a criminal proceeding are “no greater than those of anyother member of the public.”
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 609 (1978).While the Court has been given discretionary authority to allow EMC, there is nopresumption in favor of EMC. People v. Weighard, 727 P.2d 383 (Colo.App. 1986). Instead,this Court must balance the impact of such coverage not only against those important rights heldby a criminal defendant, but also against the rights of the victims in this case. Only after all of these respective rights and concerns have been addressed does this Court ultimately consider its
own interests in the case, which involve the decorum and dignity of the Court’s proceedings.
While media coverage in courtroom has become nearly commonplace, there are unique facts andcircumstances in this case which require careful scrutiny.
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