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Matt
BiunlGovemot
James
F.
Keathley
Colonel, MSHPVan
GodseyDircctot. MIAC
Mark
S.
James
Dhectot.
DPS
MIACA!-ERT
National
SocialistMovement,
JefTerson
City, MissouriRallyCounter-demonstrator
trssues
November8,
2Oo8
As discussedin an earliet alertregarding
the
upcomingNational Socialjst
N,4ovement
rally
lor
Jefferson
City,
Missouri, November
8,
2008, one
of
theprimary
reasons
to
conduct sucha
rallyis
to elicit
a
violent
response
from the
communiiy.
Such
a
violentresponse accomplishesmanythings:
It
serves
to
prcvethe
NSM3 contentionthat members
of
the
minoritycommunity
are
animalistic.
tt
validates
that
notion
in
the
minds otmoderatemembers of
the
community
who wouldotherwise not subscilbe
to that
beliel.
It
has
the
ettectof
pittingneighbotagainst neighborand lostering divisivenessin
a
com-munity,
It
revealsticed,
flaws
in
a Police Department'ssecurity
plan
that wouldotherwise
go
unno-ttprovides
NSM
with the opportunityto
initiate
legal actionagainsl
both
the localgov-ernment andpolicedepartment
fot
perceiveddisregatd
of the
NSM
tight
toPeaceably
assemble, and
a
host
ol other
"equal
prctection"
issues.
It
provides
NSM
with an excuseand
iustification
forfurthet rcllies in
the
community'
While
it is theresponsibility
of
local
governmentto
allow
and
protecl
theexercise
of
free speech'there exists a corollary responsibility
to
insure
that
public
orderand salety
1s
malntained.
Theaccompiishment
of this
duty canplace
a
tremendousfinancialstrain on
a
locaigovernment
en-
tityalthoughdereliction of this dutyhas aneven steeperpricetag,
not only
fiscally,
but also
in
an erosion
oJpublic
confldence-This erosion
of
publjcconfidence eventuallyhas
an
adverseimpact on
pollce
department operationsand alsoplays
into
the
NSM strategv.
ln an analysis
ol
recent NSltl rallies
that
havebeen marked byviolent episodesand near riotconditions, nearlyevery case has beendue totlawedpollcedepartmenlsecurityplansand
in-
complete operationabriefjng ol
individual
offjcers.
Somerecent examples;lna
northern
lllinoisrallyin
which
NSM
memberswere
literally
caged
on an
athleticfieldforthelr
own
protectlon,
anumber
oi
memberswere assaulted
on
the stleetssimplyattempting toreachthe rally
point.
These memberswere turned-awayat the'officlal"staging
area
bypolicewhowere not satisfied
with
their
identifications.it
became theirresponsibilily
to
reach
the
rally
by
parklngcars
in a racially
diverseneighborhoodand
runninga
gauntletoienraged
minorities
Ofcoursemostof theresponsibilityremainswith
the
NS[,4
members,who chose
to
emergetromtheir cars
in full Storm
trooperuniform.
Had
these
assaults
turned
into
a
full-blownriot however,
the
policedepartment's
decisrons
would have undoubtediybeencalled
into
questionand aper-centage
of
responsjbiliiy been
assumed.
Simple operationalbrieiingregarding
the staius ol
persons
with
questionable
ldentificationswouldhave
avertedthis situation
ln
a
rally
in
EasternKansas, anarchistsand
other
members
of ananiJascist
groupwereal-
lowed
to infiltrate
anNSM
supporter's sectionandother memberswere aliowedto subtly drive
a
wedgebetween
police
protectivelines andNSM supporters.This tactlc
was
noticedbyplain-clothes
offlcers
too
late
topreventdisintegration
of
thelines.
A
SWATunit had to
be
called
in
torestore order
and
the extremistqroupmembershad to
be
evacuated
Onceagain, operationalbriefing on
anarchist
tacticswould
have
preventedthis
near riot.
ln an eastern Nebraskarally, anarchists,racists
of
color, and oiher
antilascists
were allowedintoan
NSN4
supporter area,whjchresultedin near
riot
conditions
Other operational
Jiaws in-
cluded the dispersalolpoliceoffjcersbefore
the
rallywasactuallysecured,
andthe
failure
of
departmental
officialsto
adequatelyaddressthe security
of
personsmoving back
to
theil
cars
at
the
rally
end.
ln thiscase,
severainnocentbystanders
were
caught-up
in
theflow
01
NSIM
sup-portersand
suryounded
by anarchistsand
anti-fascists
Operationalbriefing,taclicsdiscussion,eniorcement
responsibilities, and
posleveni
surveillancewouldhavepreventedthissituaiion
While
thereis
noperfect
securityplan,
it
shouldbe
noted
that themost llawedplansarethe
re-sult
oipoor
operational
pianning,briefing, andparingof
resources
lo
reducesecurity
costs.Any
sound
operational
planmust includePre-event,
Event,
andPost-eventconsiderations
Conclusion:
While most
ol
the
issues discussedin
thls
alertareforwarded
to
assist
in
preservingpublicsaiety
by
allowing supervisorypersonnel someinslghl lntoeventplanning,no operatlonalsecu-ritypianis completewithoul detailed,thorougholficer
briefing
The
most
successfulmiiigation
ol
exlremist eventshas been broughtaboutthrough
a
combination
oJ
sound
pre-eventplan-njng/allocation
of
resources andline-officersituational
awareness
Thatsituationalawareness
begins
with the officer briefing
in
whichsecuritypersonnelaremade aware
of
thenature of theextiemistgroups
involved,
the
potentialforvioJence,its
impact
on
the communityand
future
po-liceoperaiions,tactics
oi the
subjectgroupsandthe legal/ethicalproceduresrequiled
to
pre-
serve
officer/publicsaleiy
and
enhancean intelligencegatheringeflort
Patches
emblems
and
stickerscommonlyfound
in
the"Black-Biock" community:
Ahtt!-RAG[gT
@
TT:C}hT
.sh
anflfas
*"dT"t
ury-"I-"
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