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TABLE OF CONTENTS

About Communities United for Quality Education & Chicago Students Organizing to Save our Schools. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Open Letter from Parents and Students: Investing in our Neighborhood Schools. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Key Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

ABOUT CUQE AND CSOSOS


About Communities United for Quality Education Communities United for Quality Education (CUQE) is a group of concerned parents, students, and community members from across Chicago, committed to improving the quality of public education. In the wake of massive school closings and record budget cuts to neighborhood schools, members of CUQE are committed to increasing investment in neighborhood schools, promoting common-sense solutions to improve the quality of education, and demanding accountable, transparent leadership from our elected officials. CUQE has over 250 members from over 20 CPS schools. Contact CUQE at cuqeinchicago@gmail.com About Chicago Students Organizing to Save our Schools Chicago Students Organizing to Save our Schools (CSOSOS) is a student-led organization that is working to end CPS school closings, put an end to high-stakes testing, and ensure our neighborhood schools are supported to succeed. We believe that every student has the fundamental right to a high quality public education, and that our neighborhood schools are not being given the resources they need. We believe it is our duty as students to hold our elected officials and district leaders accountable to promoting equity in education. Contact CSOSOS at csosos.chicago@gmail.com

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
CUQE and CSOSOS would like to thank Jim Freeman, a civil rights attorney committed to education justice, for assisting us in the data analysis in this report.

OPEN LETTER FROM PARENT AND STUDENTS:


Investing in our Neighborhood Schools
In August 2013, the Chicago Board of Education voted to cut classroom spending from neighborhood schools by $168 million for the 2013-14 school year.i This decision has had a devastating impact on our schools, and came just 16 days after Chicago Public Schools (CPS) quietly released a new Request for Proposals for charter expansion to supposedly relieve overcrowding in priority communities. To give you a sense of what impact the budget cuts have had on the ground we wanted to highlight an example from one of our neighborhood schools. Due to teacher layoffs, classrooms are packed, sometimes so much that students have to stand because there arent enough desks. The school has so few resources now, that it had to take toilet paper out of its school budget. In some classes, students cant even bring their books home because they have to share with everyone in the school who takes the same class. These cuts have not only hurt the learning environments of our schools, but also directly impact the quality of education that students receive. This is a story that is repeated countless times throughout the city, impacting thousands of CPS students, and led us to a key question: Why is CPS promoting charter school expansion while at the very same time cutting basic educational resources from our neighborhood schools? Investing millions of dollars of taxpayer money into new charter schools while our neighborhood schools suffer is not a common sense solution. We hope that through this report, and the ongoing efforts of parents and students to highlight the real facts, Mayor Emanuel and CPS leaders will think twice about their plan, implement more targeted and sensible solutions to the overcrowding that does exist, and re-invest in our neighborhood schools. Parent and student leaders of Communities United for Quality Education and Chicago Students Organizing to Save our Schools

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On August 12, 2013 Chicago Public Schools (CPS) quietly released a Request For Proposals (RFP) for charter school expansion. Through the RFP, CPS revealed that it aims to open new charter elementary and high schools across 10 priority areas between the 2014-2015 and 20152016 school years, with its stated goal to relieve school overcrowding. CPS identified the priority areas of Albany Park, Asburn, Belmont Cragin, Chicago Lawn, Little Village, McKinley Park, Midway, Ravenswood Ridge, Reed-Dunning, and Sauganash as overcrowded and has identified charter expansion as the solution to overcrowding in these areas.ii This is the first time Chicago, and possibly any major school district has taken this approach. Sixteen days after the RFP for charter expansion was released, the Chicago Board of Education, handpicked by Mayor Rahm Emanuel, voted to cut classroom spending from neighborhood schools by $168 million dollars for the 2013-2014 school year, while raising the property tax levy in the city by $86 million.iii This represented devastating cuts to basic educational resources for neighborhood schools. As a result of this latest charter expansion plan at the time of record cuts to neighborhood schools, concerned parents and students that are part of Communities United for Quality Education (CUQE) and Chicago Students Organizing to Save our Schools (CSOSOS) took it upon themselves to take a closer look at CPS rationale for charter expansion, and conduct an independent analysis of the impact of this plan on Chicago taxpayers and neighborhood schools. As a result of this analysis, CUQE and CSOSOS have concluded that CPS rationale for opening new charter schools to relieve overcrowding is deeply flawed, and one with major ramifications for Chicago students, parents, and taxpayers. The research that led to this conclusion revealed the following: 1. The plan is based on misleading information that CPS is promoting. CPS uses inaccurate and misleading data in order to justify charter expansion, such as using inaccurate boundaries for community areas to overstate the overcrowding crisis, and excluding additional classroom space such as mobile classrooms and leased classroom space when calculating community area utilization rates. When adjusting for these factors, the utilization rates within the RFPs priority areas are on average 13% lower than CPS reports. In six out of nine elementary areas, the adjusted community area utilization rates are below 100%. Finally, CPS enrollment projections conflict with U.S. Census Data projections, which show that student-aged populations are projected to decrease in all but one of the priority community areas. 2. The plan does not acknowledge that Chicagos charter schools do not produce better outcomes than traditional CPS schools. New analysis comparing CPS key performance metrics reveals that Chicagos charter schools do not produce better outcomes than traditional CPS schools. In fact, traditional CPS schools are more than twice as likely to receive

a top performance level rating than a charter school in Chicago. Even charter schools that have been praised for high graduation rates and college enrollment rates show a very different picture when examined more closely. For example, the Noble Street Charter Network reports a 100% college acceptance rate. What it doesnt report is the fact that it serves 13% fewer special education students and 19% fewer English Language Learners than traditional CPS high schools, or that it has a high attrition rate of students over the four years of high school. 3. The plan continues CPS trend of making huge increases to charter spending at the same time as it has made record cuts to neighborhood schools. CPS has aggressively increased tax dollar investments into charter schools while neighborhood schools continue to face deep cuts every year. In the last two years alone, traditional CPS school budgets were cut by a total of $351 million, while charter school spending increased by more than $143 million to $570 million.iv 4. The plan is a bad deal for Chicagos taxpayers, adding millions of dollars of long-term and avoidable costs while neighborhood schools continue to suffer. At a time of record budget cuts to neighborhood schools, the new charter schools would receive up-front tax dollars to cover start-up costs, administrator salaries, facility costs, and other expenses. According to CPS funding formula, a single new charter school would cost taxpayers up to $2.9 in upfront revenue that CPS automatically provides and could cost up to $2 million in additional expenses every subsequent year.v The 12 schools that CPS is considering through the RFP process could collectively cost taxpayers anywhere between $13.8 to 34.8 million in a single year alone.vi These are not dollars attached to students; rather these are new expenditures that taxpayers would have to pay for. Additionally, because of CPS new Student Based Budgeting formula, as new charters pull students away from neighborhood schools, financial resources for neighborhood schools would be further depleted over time. 5. More targeted, cost-effective alternatives to relieve overcrowding exist. While there are some schools that experience overcrowding, CPS has failed to provide targeted solutions for this targeted problem. More sensible and less costly solutions exist that CPS has embraced in the past. Some examples include redrawing attendance boundaries and making targeted investments to increase a schools capacity such as building mobile classroom units on site. These solutions could save taxpayers millions of dollars, while investing in existing neighborhood schools. Communities United for Quality Education and Chicago Students Organizing to Save Our Schools believe that this is more than just another irresponsible decision by Mayor Emanuel and Chicago Public Schools. According to a new analysis by Moodys, a small but growing number of school districts face financial stress due to the movement of students to charters.vii Given the population declines in priority areas projected by the U.S. Census that are outlined in this report, combined with the already devastating cuts to neighborhood schools, parents and students have good reason to believe that this latest round of charter expansion will lead to even greater cuts to neighborhood schools, and greater financial distress for our city. This is something that none of us can afford

INTRODUCTION
As Chicago Public Schools (CPS) has been dramatically expanding its investment in charter schools, it has made drastic budget cuts to neighborhood schools, as will be shown in this report. CPS has rationalized its charter expansion strategies in different ways over the years. The latest rationale for opening new charter schools is to provide overcrowding relief. As this report reveals, this rationale is deeply flawed, and has major ramifications for Chicago students and taxpayers. The Washington Post has reported that CPS intends to open 52 new charter schools through 2017.viii If these projections are correct, charter school presence in Chicago will have increased by 1850% since charters first opened in Chicago in 1997. See Figure A:

Charter School Growth in Chicago


Number Of New Charter Schools in Operation

140 120 100 80


Projected New Charters

60
Number of Charter Schools

40 20

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

YEAR

Sources: FY2001-2004 Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports, and 2005-2017 data obtained from CPS and Washington Post analysis

The following section of this report provides an analysis of the rationale and impact of this latest round of charter expansion. Key findings were uncovered through an analysis of: (1) the facts being used by CPS to justify charter expansion as an overcrowding relief strategy in the Request for Proposals released in August 2013; (2) the overall performance of Chicagos charter schools in relation to neighborhood schools; (3) CPS investments in charter expansion vs. neighborhood schools; (4) the projected cost of the proposed charter expansion through this RFP; and (5)the cost and feasibility of other overcrowding relief strategies as a potential alternative to charter expansion. The analysis was conducted primarily using CPS documents including the Request for Proposals itself, the Draft Educational Facilities Master Plan released in May 2013 from which the RFP bases its numbers, the approved plan knows as the Educational Facilities Master Plan released in September 2013 which reports CPSs 10th-day enrollment numbers, CPS budget analysis from multiple years, and other public data CPS has made available. The findings are followed by a set of key recommendations to CPS officials, other elected officials, parents, students and community members.

KEY FINDINGS
Finding #1: CPS is misleading the public to justify charter expansion
The Request for Proposals (RFP) for charter expansion, which was released in August 2013, rationalizes the need for new charter schools based on overcrowding data reported by Chicago Public Schools (CPS) in the Draft Educational Facilities Master Plan released in May 2013.ix According to the analysis done by CUQE and CSOSOS, CPS has used multiple tactics to overstate community area overcrowding to justify the Mayors charter expansion plan. These tactics include using inaccurate boundary lines, including schools that control their own enrollment numbers such as selective enrollment and lottery-based charters in community area calculations, and excluding mobile classrooms and leased classroom space that increases school capacity. 1. CPS uses inaccurate boundary lines for community areas in the RFP to overstate the overcrowding crisis as a justification for charter expansion. CPS has taken an inconsistent and inaccurate approach in defining boundaries of the priority community areas outlined in the RFP to overstate the overcrowding crisis and justify the need for continued charter expansion. According to CUQEs and CSOSOSs analysis, CPS manipulates the boundaries in 7 of the 10 elementary and high school priority areas in order to justify the rationale for charter expansion in these areas. In some cases, CPS defines community areas very broadly, including an expansive list of neighboring communities to inflate the overcrowding crisis. For example, the RFP defines the McKinley Park area across six traditional Chicago community areas spanning an area of over 15 square miles. This allows CPS to identify huge portions of the southwest sides of the city as overcrowded including the communities of McKinley Park, Brighton Park, Gage Park, New City, Archer Heights, and others. There are a number of overcrowded schools in these areas; however there are also schools in these areas that are well within the range of efficiency. The overcrowding issue in McKinley Park is concentrated in certain schools, not across the entire area. Nevertheless, CPS identified the entire area as overcrowded to open up large parts of the city for charter expansion, even where overcrowding is not an issue. This tactic was also used in the areas of Albany/Irving, and Sauganash.x In other cases, CPS shrunk the boundaries of community areas, excluding many schools operating below efficiency. For example, in the Belmont Cragin neighborhood CPS excludes three elementary schools south of Grand Avenue. At the time of the RFPs release, CPS reported the average utilization rates of these schools to be 75%. CPS Belmont Cragin analysis is misleading because CPS has removed these three schools from the Belmont Cragin boundaries.xi CPS also did this in the Chicago Lawn community by excluding five neighborhood

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schools from the boundaries with an average utilization rate of 82%. Midways boundaries excluded a single neighborhood school with a utilization rate of 47%, while 10 elementary schools with an average utilization rate of 76% were excluded from the Pilsen-Little Village area.xii CPS identified two priority communities for new charter high schools: the southwest side and the northwest side. Within these two communities, there are 18 reported neighborhood high schools spread across 10 community areas; however, only two of them were classified as overcrowded by CPS at the time the RFP was released. The remaining 16 neighborhood high schools reported an average utilization rate of 92%.xiii Since CPS has updated its numbers, three high schools are considered overcrowded. Therefore the high school overcrowding issue could be best addressed with targeted overcrowding relief strategies at these three neighborhood high schools. 2. In the RFP, CPS includes selective enrollment, lottery-based charters, and special education-focused schools to calculate utilization rates by community area, which produces misleading numbers. Within CPSs calculation, neighborhood schools are included with schools that serve students outside of a specific boundary and control their own enrollment numbers such as selective enrollment, lottery based, and special education schools. This further overstates the overcrowding numbers. For example, at the time the RFP was released, three of the most overcrowded schools in the Albany/Irving area were Northside Learning Center (233% utilization), Vaughn High School (187% utilization) and Von Steuben High School (150% utilization). These three schools were included when calculating the utilization rate of the Albany/Irving area at 113% as reported in the RFP.xiv However, Von Steuben High School is a selective enrollment school that controls its own enrollment and draws students from across the city. Northside Learning Center and Vaughn High School both specialize in educating students with cognitive disabilities, and thus any overcrowding issue would require a unique solution to serve this specific student population that a charter school would likely not address. 3. Since the RFPs release, CPS continues to overstate overcrowding numbers by excluding existing classroom additions and leased classroom space when calculating its most recent utilization rates. In September 2013, CPS approved its Education Master Facilities Plan with updated numbers. In this most recent reporting of school utilization rates, CPS reports the 10th day 2013-14 School Enrollment numbers to calculate each schools utilization rate. The updated plan reflects an enrollment decrease of 3,000 students citywide.xv Despite the updated numbers, CPS has chosen not to update the overcrowding data reported in the RFP to justify charter expansion. Doing so would weaken CPS overcrowding rationale. Additionally, in the most recently released facilities plan, CPS reports the increased capacity schools receive through mobile classroom units and leased classroom space. However CPS does not consider this permanent capacity and therefore it is excluded from calculated utilization rates. Doing so is greatly misleading.

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For example, Chavez Elementary leases space for 21 classrooms, which increases its capacity by 510 students. Chavezs real utilization rate is 96%. However CPS overstates Chavezs utilization rate by 101%, reporting it as 197% because this leased space is not counted. Foreman High School has 10 mobile classrooms, increasing its capacity by 240 students. Foremans utilization rate is actually 94% because of these mobile classroom units. However CPS reports Foremans utilization rate at 110%.xvi Though these mobile classrooms and leased space increase the capacity of schools considerably in some cases, CPS chose not to include them when calculating utilization rates. CPS has essentially ignored millions of tax dollars previously invested in overcrowding relief strategies in order to make the case for future investment of tax dollars into charter expansion--all at the same time as neighborhood schools continue to receive massive budget cuts. 4. When adjusting for these considerations, as well as using CPS most recent enrollment numbers, community area utilization rates drop across the board. As the analysis reveals, CPS is manipulating data, creating a flawed rationale for charter expansion to relieve overcrowding. By analyzing the most recent CPS data, accounting for correct community area boundaries, excluding schools that accept students from across the city and control their enrollment numbers, and including mobile classrooms and leased space, the utilization rates within the RFP priority areas drop by an average of 13%. Some areas show significant decreases in utilization rates such as McKinley Park (20% decrease), Midway (19% decrease), and Sauganash (18% decrease). In six out of the nine elementary school areas, real community area utilization rates are below 100%, with one areas (Pilsen-Little Village) utilization rate as low as 87%. Using this calculation, 53 fewer schools meet CPS definition of overcrowding than is projected by CPS in the RFP.xvii The average utilization rate of the 19 neighborhood high schools within CPS 10 high school priority areas drops by an average of 2%, from 92% to 90%, using this calculation. 5. CPS projections conflict with U.S. Census Data, which shows that student-aged populations are projected to decrease in all but one of the priority community areas. CPS itself project population declines in three community areas yet still advocates for charter expansion to relieve overcrowding.

Within the Draft Educational Facilities Master Plan, CPS projects the average student enrollment in the ten priority areas to increase by 1.54% within the next ten years. This small population shift is being used as part of the rationale for charter expansion. CPS even projects student enrollment to decrease in the priority areas of Albany / Irving, Pilsen-Little Village, and McKinley Park by an average of 1.8%.xviii Despite this decrease CPS has still chosen to target these communities for charter expansion to relieve overcrowding in the RFP. Furthermore, CPS enrollment projections contradict U.S. Census data showing that student-aged populations in all but one of the priority community areas are projected to decrease by 2016. 12

(McKinley Parks 0-19 year old population is staying stable with a projected increase of a meager 0.1%). For instance, in the Sauganash area, census data projects populations to decrease for 0-19 year olds by nearly 4%, and 15-19 year olds by nearly 9%. Yet CPS projected 10-year enrollment to increase in Sauganash by 4.5%. The average projected population shift through 2016 within CPSs priority areas is -1.96% for students between the age of 0-19, and -6.86% for students between the ages of 15-19, yet CPS projects enrollment to increase by 1.5% in these areas.xix CPS provides no rationale for this conflicting analysis, but rather promotes these enrollment projections throughout the RFP. See Figures B, C, and D:
Projected Population Shift / Projected Enrollment
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8

Albany/Irving

Ashburn

Belmont Cragin

Chicago Lawn

Little Village

Mckinley Park

Midway

Ravenswood Ridge (HS)

Reed-Dunning

Sauganash

2016 Projected Population Shift U.S. Census Data (age 15-19) 2016 Projected Population Shift U.S. Census Data (age 0-18) CPS 10-Year Enrollment Projections

Since the release of the RFP, CPS has updated and approved the Educational Master Facilities Plan. In the final version, it has removed the projected enrollment numbers and 2016 census projections originally reported in the previous plan. The newest version projects a slight population increase in 2017 through a CPS-generated forecast that is not explained. If the slight increase in population were validated despite 2016 census trends, it still comes nowhere close to justifying massive charter expansion as a reasonable solution. 13

Finding #2:

Chicagos charter schools do not produce better outcomes than traditional CPS schools.

CPS latest tactic to promote charter expansion to address overcrowding relief is the newest chapter in CPS aggressive charter expansion illustrated in the introduction (Figure A) of this report. With CPS continued promotion of charter expansion, one might assume that CPS has found the silver bullet solution for improving urban education. Charter schools should be greatly outperforming CPS schools, producing astonishing results worthy of replication. CPS promotes charter schools as an option based on the belief that independently managed charter schools provide parents and students with high quality education options. However, an analysis of CPS key performance metrics shows that charter schools do not in fact outperform their CPS counterparts. This finding is extremely troubling given CPS latest effort to promote charter expansion as an overcrowding relief strategy. Even the seemingly higher performing charters promoted by the Emanuel Administration reveal a different story when examined more closely. Comparing all CPS schools to all charter schools Chicago Public Schools utilizes a Performance Policy to evaluate the performance of every school in the district. Up until the current school year, all schools in the system with sufficient data received a Performance Level rating of 1-3, with one being the highest rating, three being the lowest. The ratings for elementary schools are calculated through a combination of several testing data trends in all content areas along with attendance rates. Additionally, dropout and on-track rates are also considered for CPS High Schools Performance Level ratings.xx CPS recently released citywide Performance Level Data for the 2012-2013 school year including charter schools. Though test data is not an effective metric to comprehensively evaluate a schools performance, this is the metric CPS uses to make school-level probationary decisions. It is also a baseline metric that looks at a combination of measures as opposed to a single test. Several conclusions can be drawn from comparing the performance level distribution of all CPS schools with all charters: SEE FIGURE E
2012-2013 Performance Level Distribution
40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0
Level 1 Level 2
Public Schools

Level 3
Charter Schools

No Data

Source: http://schoolreports.cps.edu/cpsedu/schooldata/PerformancePolicy_Results.xlsx

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First, nearly a third of all charter schools do not have sufficient data to receive a performance rating because they are new. Nevertheless, a CPS school is more than twice as likely to receive a Level 1 rating (the top rating) than a charter school in Chicago. Level 2 classifications were virtually equal. 32% of all CPS schools were classified as Level 3 as compared to 21% of charters.

In the above comparison, the All CPS Schools category includes selective enrollment and magnet schools. However, because charters are unable to have selective enrollment criteria, and CPS magnet schools generally serve fewer low-income students than charters, an analysis was also performed to compare just CPS neighborhood elementary schools to charter elementary schools.xxi This provides a conservative comparison since neighborhood schools must accept all students within an attendance boundary, whereas charter schools are able to accept students by lottery and via complex application processes. (High schools were not compared because 41% of charter high schools did not have enough data to receive a performance level rating, so no conclusion could be drawn.) Several conclusions can be drawn from comparing the level rating distribution of all CPS elementary schools with all charter elementary schools: SEE FIGURE F
2012-2013 Performance Level Distribution
All CPS Neighborhood Elementary & Charter Elementary Shools
60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0
Level 1 Level 2
Public Schools

Level 3
Charter Schools

No Data

Source: http://schoolreports.cps.edu/cpsedu/schooldata/PerformancePolicy_Results.xlsx

13% of charter elementary schools have insufficient data to receive a Performance Level Rating because they are new. 32% of neighborhood schools received a Level 1 rating as compared to 22% of charters. 78% of charter schools fall in the lower two ratings as compared to 68% of CPS schools.

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A Closer Look at Charter Schools High Performance Claims: A Case Study of Noble Charter Network The Noble Street Charter Network is lauded by Mayor Emanuel for its high college enrollment rates and praised as an effective model for urban education that should be replicated and expanded. Mayor Rahm Emanuel has lavished praise on the network, claiming it has a 90% graduation rate.xxii The Noble Network itself advertises a 100% college acceptance rate.xxiii While there are certainly students who have had positive experiences at Noble schools, the Noble Networks reported success has been both overblown and highly misleading. The Truth Behind Nobles Numbers Noble has waged a major marketing campaign centered on its graduation and college acceptance rates. What goes unmentioned, however, is the following: - Noble serves 13% fewer special education students and 19% fewer English language learners than CPSs traditional high schools.xxiv - Nobles publicly stated college attendance rates are misleading and do not take into account the large number of students that Noble loses over the course of the four years. For example, 150 students began 9th grade at Noble Street-Rauner in 200708.xxv Four years later, 102 students graduated and 72 attended college.xxvi This is far short of Nobles misleading claims. - Noble has a set of disciplinary policies that push low-income students out for minor infractions. For example, in 2011-12, Noble collected over $188,000 in disciplinary fines from its students, often for minor infractions such as chewing gum or having a shirt unbuttoned. Almost 90% of these students qualify for free or reduced price lunch. Students who cannot afford to pay the fines are withheld from advancing to the next grade level, and often are not provided with transcripts if they choose to transfer out until all fines have been paid. Fee waivers are not readily available for low-income students.xxvii It is believed that these disciplinary policies are amongst the most egregious in the country. - Noble expels students at over twelve times the rate of CPS.xxviii

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Finding #3:

CPS has a selective budget crisis, making huge increases to charter spending at the same time as it has made record cuts to neighborhood schools.

Year-after-year, Chicago parents, students, and taxpayers read headlines about CPS ongoing budget crisis. In May of 2013, the Chicago Board of Education, handpicked by Mayor Rahm Emanuel, voted to close 50 schools, predominately in the South and West sides of the City, supposedly as a cost-cutting measure due to school underutilization. In August 2013, CPS released this RFP for new charter schools across the northwest and southwest sides of the city, to supposedly relieve overcrowding (a claim which is disputed in this report). Sixteen days after the RFP for charter expansion was released, the Board of Education voted to cut classroom spending from neighborhood schools by $168 million dollars for the 2013-2014 school year, while raising the property tax levy in the city to the highest level possible.xxix According to CPS, these cuts amount to 3,226 fewer teachers and school-based staff-serving students in Chicago Public Schools.xxx A stark contrast surfaces when looking at CPS increasing financial investments in charter schools throughout these difficult financial times. CPS financial coffers appear to be abundant, allowing central office and the Board of Education to make aggressive and risky investments to grow and expand charter resources throughout the city. Charter spending grows as new campuses are opened and additional grades are added. Charter spending increased by 625% between 2004 and 2013. In the last two years alone, traditional CPS school budgets were cut by a total of $351 million, while charter school budgets were increased by more than $143 million to $570 million. This year, charter schools received an $85 million increase which was almost the exact same amount as the districts property tax increase this year.xxxi Thirteen new charter schools opened for the current school year, eleven of which were district approved. SEE FIGURES G, H, and I Figure G

Percentage of Charter Spending - 2004


2%

Total Operating Funds $3.76 Billion 98% Charter Shool Spending $66.6 Million

Source: CPS budget analysis FY2004

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Figure H

Percentage of Charter Spending - 2013


9%

Total Operating Funds $5.16 Billion 91% Charter Shool Spending $483 Million

Source: CPS budget analysis FY2013

Figure I
CPS Charter School Spending 2004-2013
600

500

Dollars (millions)

400

300

200

100

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Source: CPS budget analysis FY2004-14

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FINDING #4:

The continued charter expansion proposed through this RFP is a bad deal for Chicagos taxpayers, adding millions of dollars of long-term and avoidable costs while neighborhood schools continue to suffer.

A new charter school creates duplicated costs for taxpayers because CPS gives new charters tax dollars to cover the cost of administration, operations, and facilities for schools not housed in CPS buildings, start-up funds for their first year, and more. CPS has created a per-pupil formula to allocate funds to charter schools to cover these costs. Charters receive these dollars every year in addition to the Student Based Budgeting dollars that all schools receive.xxxii When a new charter opens, new expenditures are created that taxpayers have to pay for. Assuming a charter elementary school would open with all grades available to fully relieve overcrowding, a new averaged-sized charter elementary school would cost taxpayers $2.4 million dollars to open in the first year. Chicago taxpayers would pay $1.7 million dollars for that school every year for the remainder of its existence. The costs for high schools are even higher. A new averaged-sized charter high school would cost tax payers $2.9 million dollars to open in the first year, and Chicago taxpayers would pay $2.1 million dollars every subsequent year. These numbers are not adjusted for inflation, so the actual costs would be even higher. The 12 schools that CPS is considering through the RFP process could collectively cost taxpayers anywhere between $13.8 to 34.8 million in a single year alone. Assuming that new charter schools continue to open in non-CPS facilities, the 52 new charters that are projected to open by 2017 will cost taxpayers between $125 to $151 million over the next four years.xxxiii These are not dollars attached to students or school construction costs that charters may cover on their own-- rather these are new investments funded by taxpayer dollars through CPS. If CPS is indeed interested in making new investments, resources should be allocated to under-resourced neighborhood schools instead of paying for the salaries of 52 charter principals, the heating, maintenance, and other facilities costs of 52 charter buildings, or other avoidable expenses. These new costs are added to the 116 charter schools currently in operation. These schools collectively receive $570 million from CPS per the FY2014 budget. Assuming costs increased slowly over time, these 116 charter schools would receive $600 million per year.xxxiv CPS is willing to spend more that $34 million dollars to relieve overcrowding in targeted areas through charter expansion in a single year; however the Board of Education claims financial crisis every budget season when it comes to neighborhood schools, continually administering deeper budget cuts and teacher layoffs every school year. As the Mayor pushes for property tax increases, neighborhood school budgets continue to decline while CPS continues to advance its aggressive and expensive charter expansion agenda despite CPS financial issues. Charter expansion is hardly a proper use of tax dollars. In fact, CPS admits to the media that charter expansion is costly: [T]he proportion of the districts students being educated in privately run charter or contract schools continues to grow, though budget officials say that does not have any cost savings benefits.xxxv Nevertheless, during a financial crisis, CPS promotes this flawed and expensive approach as an overcrowding relief strategy despite the more sensible and costefficient solutions to overcrowding that exist, and that CPS has implemented in the past. 19

Finding #5:

More targeted cost-effective alternatives exist that could save Chicago taxpayers millions of dollars per year, such as attendance boundary shifts and the targeted addition of mobile classroom units.

CPS considers a school with utilization rate ranging from 80-120% as efficient.xxxvi Despite CPS misleading claims about the overcrowding crisis, CUQE and CSOSOS recognize that CPSs definition of efficient may still be considered overcrowded in reality. Schools with utilization rates between 101-120% could still be experiencing overcrowding challenges that need to be addressed CUQE and CSOSOS are not making school-by-school or neighborhood-by-neighborhood recommendations. To earnestly address the overcrowding issue in these schools, CPS must make decisions through a thoughtful analysis and a case-by-case approach that addresses the real needs and solutions for the schools that need overcrowding relief. However, new charter schools are not the solution and more targeted, costeffective alternatives exist that could save Chicago taxpayers millions of dollars per year. An analysis of CPS data reveals that the expansion of charter schools is an inefficient solution to an overstated problem. Nearly all of the overcrowding in neighborhood schools that CPS cites could be relieved through the simple redrawing of attendance boundaries, and the remaining challenges could be addressed far more economically by increasing capacity of a targeted number of CPS schools through the construction of mobile classrooms on school grounds. Furthermore, if CPS is willing to invest dollars to specifically relieve overcrowding by bringing in new charter schools, CPS has financial resources to invest in increasing the enrollment capacity of overcrowded schools throughout the city. Attendance Boundary Shifts According to Mary Filardo, Executive Director of the 21st Century Schools Fund, and national expert on school facilities, the most common and cost efficient way to address overcrowding is school attendance boundary changes.xxxvii Shifting attendance boundaries for neighborhood schools adequately distributes the student population across a neighborhood. The cost of doing so is minimal, while being highly effective because strategic attendance adjustments are made based on block-by-block populations. Attendance boundaries would have to be shifted in a way that places every student within 1.5 miles of the school to avoid busing costs. This approach allows schools to balance their utilization rates across a neighborhood while reducing class size at no cost because enrollment and staffing are more properly distributed across neighborhood schools. CPS identifies 10 priority communities for new charter elementary and high schools: Albany Irving; Ashburn; McKinley Park; Ravenswood-Ridge, Reed-Dunning; Sauganash; and portions

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of Belmont Cragin, Chicago Lawn, Midway, and Pilsen-Little Village. Within those target areas, there are 113 neighborhood elementary schools including the schools that CPS excluded in sections of Belmont Cragin, Chicago Lawn, and other priority areas. Thirteen neighborhood elementary schools are defined by CPS as overcrowded within the priority communities, according to most recent CPS data. All but one could be brought within the range of efficiency by CPS definition through the simple redrawing of attendance boundaries with neighboring schools.xxxviii For example,Smyser Elementary in the Portage Park neighborhood is the most overcrowded school in the area with autilization rate of 129%.Smyser would need to reduce its enrollment by 67 students to be considered efficient by CPS. However, it is bordered by Portage Park and Garvy schools which couldcollectively absorbthose 67 students and still be considered efficient. Prieto Elementary in the Belmont Cragin neighborhood has a utilization rate of 138% and exceeds its capacity by 87 students. Theattendance lines for contiguous schools Burbank, Lovett, and others could be redrawn to easily absorb 87 students while still remaining efficient.xxxix CPS identified two priority communities for new charter high schools: the southwest side and the northwest side. Within these two communities, there are 19 neighborhood high schools spread across 10 community areas; however, only three of them are classified as overcrowded by CPS. The attendance boundaries of those three schools each border a number of high school attendance boundaries that have extra capacity and could easily absorb enough students to relieve any overcrowding.xl This report is not specifically advocating for attendance boundary shifts for specific schools. Rather, attendance boundary shifts are recommended as one cost-effective and feasible strategy that would need to be thoughtfully considered on a case-by-case basis. Attendance boundary shifts is an approach CPS has embraced in the past. In fact, CPS has shifted attendance boundaries at schools 106 times between 2003-2012.xli Mobile Classroom Construction The second most cost-efficient solution is to build new mobile classroom units on the school grounds to increase a school capacity without changing a schools attendance boundaries. A mobile unit increases a schools capacity by four classrooms, or roughly 120 students.xlii According to CPS stated capital project budgets, the average construction cost of a new mobile unit is $866,000.xliii It is estimated that a mobile unit adds $78,000 in operating costs, so the total cost for constructing and operating a mobile unit the first year is $945,000. Thereafter the cost drops to an estimated $78,000 per year.xliv Some severely overcrowded schools may need two mobile units if attendance boundaries are not adjusted, increasing the upfront construction costs; however the long-term savings after the first year are still significant when compared to charter expansion.

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It should be noted that while mobile units increase capacity at a school by four classrooms, they do not reduce class sizes. Since the enrollment numbers stay the same, staffing numbers do not change based on the Student Based Budgeting formula, because it is not designed to provide adequate funding to reduce class sizes. If CPS invested in class size reduction by providing more teachers to overcrowd ed schools, each mobile unit would theoretically add an additional $288,000 in expenses to cover the salaries of four additional teachers.xlv CPS has also embraced this approach in the past. CPS has built mobile classrooms 107 times for schools between 1996-2012.xlvi Charter school expansion is one of the most costly overcrowding relief strategies that CPS can employ, and its the only approach that directly takes financial resources away from already under-resourced CPS schools. Given available capacity within the priority community areas, and considering population trends, opening new charter schools will more than likely create excess capacity within the community areas. This would likely result in future underutilization of neighborhood schools, while new charters would continue to market toward students from across the city. Therefore charter expansion is a costly, harmful, and inefficient investment to relieve overcrowding, costing taxpayers millions of dollars that could be invested more wisely or avoided all together. See Chart J: Once again, the vast majority of CPSs overcrowding problem is a result of poor planning, not insufficient capacity. Investing in the expansion of school capacity at targeted schools, coupled with a sensible redrawing of attendance boundaries, would both address the problem CPS has identified and be substantially less costly than the one-size-fits-all solution CPS proposes for all 132 neighborhood elementary and high schools within priority communities.

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Chart J

CHARTER EXPANSION COSTS

$2,358,890.07
K-8 Elementary School
(Assuming all grades open to relieve Overcrowding)

$1,654,054.78
Cost Every Year Following
(Assuming stable enrollment)

Avg. 1 Year Cost

$2,913,231.70
K-8 High School
(Assuming all grades open to relieve Overcrowding)

$2,053,154.90
Cost Every Year Following
(Assuming stable enrollment)

Avg. 1 Year Cost

Alternative Overcrowding Relief Strategies

$0
Attendance Boundary Shifts with no bussing required
(Elementary & High School)

$0
Cost Every Year Following
(Assuming stable enrollment)

Avg. Cost for Year 1 & Estimated Operating Costs

$943,849.31
New Temporary Units & Mobile Classrooms Construction
(Elementary & High School)

$78,000.00
Cost Every Year Following
(Assuming stable enrollment)

Avg. Cost for Year 1 & Estimated Operating Costs

Sources: Data obtained from CPS Capital Plan and the Chicago Educational Facilities Task Force. Charter funding formulas obtained from CPS Budget and Charter Funding Overview. October 7, 2013 PowerPoint Presentation to the Task Force on Charter School Funding.

23

RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations to Mayor Emanuel and Chicago Pubic Schools
Reconsider this plan for charter expansion! Invest in cost-effective, common-sense solutions to relieve the overcrowding that does exist, such as sensible attendance boundary shifts and mobile classroom units where needed. Re-allocate new funding reserved for charter expansion back to neighborhood schools to support quality neighborhood-based education and well-resourced learning environments. Approve a budget designed to fund existing neighborhood schools at the highest rate possible.

Recommendations to Aldermen and State Representatives

Where overcrowding does exist in neighborhood schools, promote sensible solutions such as attendance boundary shifts and mobile classroom units. We need common-sense solutions to the problems impacting neighborhood schools! Advocate for funding to be reallocated from charter expansion back into neighborhood schools. Advocate for a CPS budgeting formula designed to fund existing neighborhood schools at the highest rate possible.

Recommendations to Parents, Students, and Community Members


Join our efforts to support neighborhood schools! Contact CUQE or CSOSOS to get involved, and contact your elected officials and CPS to tell them to promote common-sense solutions to relieve overcrowding, and strong investment in neighborhood school.

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CONCLUSION
As this report shows, Mayor Emanuels continued plans to expand charter schools, in this case justified as an overcrowding relief strategy, is based on misleading facts and could cost taxpayers millions of dollars in short- and long-term costs. This represents dollars that could be re-invested in neighborhood schools and go towards more sensible, cost-effective solutions for targeted overcrowding relief. Communities United for Quality Education and Chicago Students Organizing to Save Our Schools believe that this is more than just an irresponsible decision, but one that will lead to greater cuts to neighborhood schools, and greater financial distress for our school district. We hope our elected officials will reverse course and join our efforts to promote investment in neighborhood schools.

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End Notes
Chicago Public Schools. Approved Budget2013-2014 Budget Book. Pg 27. http://www.cps.edu/finance/FY14Budget/Documents/FY2014ApprovedBudgetBook.pdf Chicago Public Schools. Approved Budget 2012-2013 Budget Book. Pg. 32 http://www.cps.edu/finance/FY14Budget/Documents/FY2014ApprovedBudgetBook.pdf
i

Chicago Public Schools. Request for Proposals for New Schools. Pg. 7. http://www.cps.edu/NewSchools/Documents/RFP_ForNewSchools.pdf
ii

The Ravenswood Ridge community area was only identified within the high school portion of the RFP. All other community areas were identified in both the elementary school and high school priority areas. Chicago Public Schools. Approved Budget2013-2014 Budget Book. http://www.cps.edu/finance/FY14Budget/Documents/FY2014ApprovedBudgetBook.pdf
iii

CPS Budget Book FY2014 Pg 27. http://www.cps.edu/finance/FY14Budget/Documents/FY2014ApprovedBudgetBook.pdf CPS Budget Book FY2013. Pg. 32 http://www.cps.edu/finance/FY14Budget/Documents/FY2014ApprovedBudgetBook.pdf
iv

Chicago Public Schools. CPS Budget and Charter Budget Overview. Presentation to the Task Force on Charter School Funding. Powerpoint presentation. October 7, 2013. Chicago Public Schools. 2012-2013 20th Day Membership. http://www.cps.edu/Schooldata/Pages/Schooldata.aspx
v

Funding formula adopted from CPS Powerpoint Present. CPS allocates funding on a per-pupil basis to charters for administration base pay, teacher salary adjustments, operations costs, facilities supplemental costs, and first year start-up funds. CUQE and CSOSOS calculated the average size of a Chicago charter elementary and high from the 2012-2013 20th Day Membership CPS. CPS Budget and Charter Budget Overview. Presentation to the Task Force on Charter School Funding. Powerpoint presentation. October 7, 2013. CPS. 2012-2013 20th Day Membership. http://www.cps.edu/Schooldata/Pages/Schooldata.aspx
vi

Moodys Investor Services. Announcement: Moodys: Charter schools pose greatest credit challenge to school districts in economically weak urban areas. October 15, 2013. https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Charter-schools-pose-greatest-credit-challenge-to-school-districts--PR_284505
vii

Valerie Strauss, How big can Teach for America get? Washington Post. September 10, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ answer-sheet/wp/2013/09/10/how-big-can-teach-for-america-get/
viii

Chicago Public Schools. Draft Educational Facilities Master Plan. May 3, 2013 Pgs. 80, 88, 110, 147, 222, 231, 259, 278, 284. http://www.cps.edu/NewSchools/Documents/CPSDraftEducationalFacilitiesMasterPlan.pdf Chicago Public Schools. Request for Proposals for New Schools. Appendix I. Pgs. 43-52. http://www.cps.edu/NewSchools/Documents/RFP_ForNewSchools.pdf
ix

The RFP for New Schools provides a summary of each priority areas utilization rates in Appendix 1 of the document. The utilization rates identified in each area are the same as the Enrollment and Utilization trends section for each area in the Draft Educational Facilities Master Plan released in May of 2013. CPS. Request for Proposals for New Schools. Pgs. 44-52. http://www.cps.edu/NewSchools/Documents/RFP_ForNewSchools.pdf
x

Four or more traditional Chicago communities were identified within the boundaries of the McKinley Park, Albany/Irving, and Sagaunash community areas respectively. CPS. Request for Proposals for New Schools. Pg. 46 http://www.cps.edu/NewSchools/Documents/RFP_ForNewSchools.pdf
xi

CPS. Request for Proposals for New Schools. Pgs. 46, 47, 49, and 50 http://www.cps.edu/NewSchools/Documents/RFP_ForNewSchools.pdf
xii

In the RFP, the priority areas of Belmont Cragin, Pilsen-Little Village, Midway, and Chicago Lawn are sectioned off, excluding significant portions of the community with schools with schools that have excess capacity Pgs. 46, 47, 49, and 50

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CPS. Draft Educational Facilities Master Plan. May 2013 http://www.cps.edu/NewSchools/Documents/CPSDraftEducationalFacilitiesMasterPlan.pdf


xiii

Data compiled from reported utilization rates of the 16 neighborhood high schools within the RFPs high school priority areas. CPS. Draft Educational Facilities Master Plan. May 2013 http://www.cps.edu/NewSchools/Documents/CPSDraftEducationalFacilitiesMasterPlan.pdf CPS/ Request for Proposals for New Schools. http://www.cps.edu/NewSchools/Documents/RFP_ForNewSchools.pdf
xiv

Cassandra West. In the News: CPS reports an enrollment drop of 3,000 Catalyst Chicago. September 25, 2013 http://www.catalyst-chicago.org/notebook/2013/09/25/62793/in-news-cps-reports-enrollment-drop-3000
xv

Chicago Public Schools. Educational Facilities Master Plan. September 2013 http://cps.edu/About_CPS/Policies_and_guidelines/Documents/CPSEducationalFacilitiesMasterPlan.pdf
xvi

CPS. Educational Facilities Master Plan. September 2013 http://cps.edu/About_CPS/Policies_and_guidelines/Documents/CPSEducationalFacilitiesMasterPlan.pdf


xvii

CPS. Draft Educational Facilities Master Plan. May 2013. Pg. 28 http://www.cps.edu/NewSchools/Documents/CPSDraftEducationalFacilitiesMasterPlan.pdf
xlviii

CPS. Draft Educational Facilities Master Plan. May 2013. Pg. 28 http://www.cps.edu/NewSchools/Documents/CPSDraftEducationalFacilitiesMasterPlan.pdf
xix xx

Chicago Public Schools. 2013-2014 CPS Performance Policy. Overview http://www.cps.edu/Performance/Documents/OverviewofPerformancePolicy.pdf

Chicago Public Schools. 2012-2013 Performance Policy Results and Probation Status http://schoolreports.cps.edu/cpsedu/schooldata/PerformancePolicy_Results.xlsx
xxi xxii

Fran Spielman, Rahm Emanuel: Noble Charter Schools Results Speak for Themselves, Chicago Sun-Times February, 14, 2013. http://www.noblenetwork.org/students-families/enroll-at-noble Analysis by Voices of Youth in Chicago Education

xxiii

xxiv

Chicago Public Schools. 2012-2013 Performance Policy Results and Probation Status http://www.cps.edu/SchoolData/Pages/SchoolData. aspx.
xxv

Chicago Public Schools. 2012-2013 Performance Policy Results and Probation Status http://www.cps.edu/SchoolData/Pages/SchoolData. aspx.
xxvi

Chicago Public Schools. 2012-2013 Performance Policy Results and Probation Status http://www.cps.edu/SchoolData/Pages/SchoolData. aspx.
xxvii xxviii

Data provided in response to public records requests.

Chicago Public Schools FY14 Budget Interactive Reports https://supplier.csc.cps.k12.il.us/analytics/saw.dll?Dashboard&PortalPath=/shared/CPS%20FY14%20Budget/_portal/Chicago%20Public%20 Schools%20FY14%20Budget%20Interactive%20Reports&page=Home&NQUser=cpsbiguest&NQPassword=hell0cpsb1


xxix xxx

CPS budget analysis of FY2004 ,FY 2013, and FY2014 CPS. FY14 Budget Book. Pg. 7

xxxi

Chicago Public Schools. CPS Budget and Charter Budget Overview. Presentation to the Task Force on Charter School Funding. Powerpoint presentation. October 7, 2013.
xxxii

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Chicago Public Schools. CPS Budget and Charter Budget Overview. Presentation to the Task Force on Charter School Funding. Powerpoint presentation. October 7, 2013. Chicago Public Schools. 2012-2013 20th Day Membership. http://www.cps.edu/Schooldata/Pages/Schooldata.aspx
xxxiii

Funding formula adopted from CPS Powerpoint Present. CPS allocates funding on a per-pupil basis to charters for administration base pay, teacher salary adjustments, operations costs, facilities supplemental costs, and first year start-up funds. CUQE and CSOSOS calculated the average size of a Chicago charter elementary and high from the 2012-2013 20th Day Membership
xxxiv

CPS. FY2014 Budget Book. Pg. 29

CPS reports 116 charter/contract schools budgets total $570 million. This averages out to the average is $4.9 million per school. Linda Lutton. Chicago schools budget avoids staggering cuts by draining reserves,WBEZ. July 6, 2013 http://www.wbez.org/news/education/chicago-schools-budget-avoids-staggering-cuts-draining-reserves-100680
xxxv

CPS. Draft Educational Facilities Master Plan. May 2013 http://www.cps.edu/NewSchools/Documents/CPSDraftEducationalFacilitiesMasterPlan.pdf


xxxvi xxxvii

Sarah Hainds, email to Mary Filardo. September 26, 2013

Educational Facilities Master Plan. September 2013 http://cps.edu/About_CPS/Policies_and_guidelines/Documents/CPSEducationalFacilitiesMasterPlan.pdf


xxxviii

Analysis performed from CPS Educational Facilities Master Plan Utilization Rates Educational Facilities Master Plan. September 2013 http://cps.edu/About_CPS/Policies_and_guidelines/Documents/CPSEducationalFacilitiesMasterPlan.pdf
xxxix

CPS. Educational Facilities Master Plan. September 2013 http://cps.edu/About_CPS/Policies_and_guidelines/Documents/CPSEducationalFacilitiesMasterPlan.pdf


xl

CPS. Educational Facilities Master Plan. September 2013 Pg. 30 http://cps.edu/About_CPS/Policies_and_guidelines/Documents/CPSEducationalFacilitiesMasterPlan.pdf


xli

CPS. Educational Facilities Master Plan. September 2013 Pg. 30 http://cps.edu/About_CPS/Policies_and_guidelines/Documents/CPSEducationalFacilitiesMasterPlan.pdf


xlii

Chicago Public Schools. Capital Project Locations http://www.cps.edu/Pages/Capital_Plan_Data.aspx. Chicago Educational Facilities Task Force
xliii

Average cost was calculated from average cost of every CPS mobile unit built from 1996-2013. 1996-2010 data obtained from the Chicago Educational Facilities Task Force.2010-2013 Obtained from Capital Project Locations Website. CPS. Draft Educational Facilities Master Plan. May 2013 Pg. 38 http://www.cps.edu/NewSchools/Documents/CPSDraftEducationalFacilitiesMasterPlan.pdf
xliv

CPS projected savings of $78,000,000 in operating costs by closing 50 schools. That amounts to $1,560,000 per school. Assuming a mobile unit takes on 5% of the operating cost of an entire school, that amounts to $78,000 per school, or 5% of $1,560,000. Chicago Public Schools. Stats and Facts. (http://www.cps.edu/about_cps/at-a-glance/pages/stats_and_facts.aspx).
xlv

CPS reports that the average teacher salary is $75,000. (http://www.cps.edu/about_cps/at-a-glance/pages/stats_and_facts.aspx). One mobile classroom unit adds four additional classrooms. By multiplying the average teacher salary (75,000) by four, the total amounts to $288,000. Chicago Public Schools. Capital Project Locations http://www.cps.edu/Pages/Capital_Plan_Data.aspx. Chicago Educational Facilities Task Force
xlvi

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