Professional Documents
Culture Documents
FROM THE P roviding universal access to basic utilities is justified on human rights
grounds and also because of the positive externalities involved. Adequate
provision of water, sanitation and electricity contributes to the achievement of the
EDITORS other Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Access to these services, however,
is still unequal in the developing world. Services do not adequately reach the poor.
Poverty in Focus is a regular publication of the This Poverty in Focus brings together a mix of policy issues and some country experiences.
International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
(IPC-IG). Its purpose is to present the results
of research on poverty and inequality in the Degol Hailu and Raquel Tsukada provide an overview of the broad challenges involved
developing world. Support is provided by in making access to basic services equitable and universal.
the Swedish International Development
Cooperation Agency (Sida).
Hulya Dagdeviren and Simon A. Robertson point out the difficulties of expanding utility
Editors networks in slum areas, which include technical barriers and a lack of land and housing
Degol Hailu and Raquel Tsukada tenure. They make a case for stronger public interventions.
International Advisory Board
Oscar Altimir , CEPAL, Santiago de Chile Kate Bayliss argues that the allocation of demand and investment risks during
Giovanni A. Cornia, Università di Firenze privatisation in Sub-Sahara Africa is distorted. This is because the risks are borne
Nora Lustig , Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico
Gita Sen, Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore
by governments and end users instead of the private contractors.
Anna Tibaijuka, UN Habitat, Nairobi
Philippe van Parijs , Université de Louvain David Hall and Emanuele Lobina provide a critique of both the investment potential
* We express our sincere condolences on the recent passing of the private sector and cost recovery schemes in the provision of sanitation services.
of Professor Peter Townsend, who was a member of the
Advisory Board.
Ashley C. Brown discusses the externalities involved in supplying basic infrastructure to
Desktop Publisher
Roberto Astorino those who can least afford it. He argues that, contrary to established views, cross-subsidy
schemes actually benefit all users and not only the targeted population.
Copy Editor
Andrew Crawley
Alison Post emphasises the benefits of water metering but highlights problems
Front page: Photomontage by Rosa Maria
Banuth. It includes photos by Christian Lehmann,
of implementation and poor design in Argentina.
Raquel Tsukada, Steve Ford Elliott, Erik Araujo and
Bruno Spada from the Ministry of Social Degol Hailu, Rafael Osorio and Raquel Tsukada examine the reasons for the privatisation
Development and the Fight Against Hunger, Brazil.
IPC-IG and the Editors thank all for granting and then renationalisation of the water supply in urban Bolivia.
permission of use.
Editors’ note: IPC-IG and the editors are grateful Andre Rossi de Oliveira explores water privatisation in Brazil. He argues that the expansion
for the generous contributions, without any of coverage has stemmed mainly from high levels of investment by private operators.
monetary or material remuneration, by all the
authors of this issue. We also would like to
acknowledge the support of the Brazil Office of Suani Teixeira Coelho, Patricia Guardabassi, Beatriz A. Lora and José Goldemberg note that
DRCLAS at Harvard University; special thanks go geographically isolated communities without access to electricity grids, such as those
to Jason Dyett and Lorena Barberia.
in the Amazon, can be served by renewable energy sources.
IPC-IG is a joint project between the United Luc Savard, Dorothée Boccanfuso and Antonio Estache present the findings of a general
Nations Development Programme and Brazil to
promote South-South Cooperation on applied equilibrium model that assesses the impact of electricity price changes on the
poverty research. It specialises in analysing poor in Mali and Senegal.
poverty and inequality and offering research-
based policy recommendations on how to reduce
them. IPC-IG is directly linked to the Poverty Joana Costa, Degol Hailu, Elydia Silva and Raquel Tsukada empirically show that water
Group of the Bureau for Development Policy, provision reduces the total work burden on women in rural Ghana.
UNDP and the Government of Brazil.
IPC-IG Director (a.i.) Nitish Jha conducts a sociological analysis of access to water and sanitation in India,
Degol Hailu emphasising the challenges encountered in community-based schemes.
International Policy Centre for Inclusive
Growth (IPC-IG), Poverty Practice, Julia Kercher explains why and how a human rights framework must guide
Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP
the design and implementation of private utility provision.
Esplanada dos Ministérios, Bloco O, 7º andar
70052-900 Brasilia, DF Brazil
We hope that this collection of articles will contribute to the discussion
ipc@ipc-undp.org of how to provide vital infrastructure services more equitably.
www.ipc-undp.org
The views expressed in IPC-IG publications are the This Poverty in Focus is the result of an International Workshop on Equitable Access
authors’ and not necessarily those of the UNDP or
to Basic Services held on 5 December 2008 in São Paulo, Brazil. IPC-IG and the
the Government of Brazil.
David Rockefeller Centre for Latin American Studies at Harvard University (DRCLAS)
Rights and Permissions – All rights reserved. jointly organised the workshop. We gratefully acknowledge DRCLAS’ contribution.
The text and data in this publication may be
reproduced as long as written permission is obtained
from IPC-IG and the source is cited. Reproductions for
commercial purposes are forbidden. The Editors
Poverty in Focus August 2009 3
Basic Utilities:
An Overview
The Millennium Development cases, market-oriented policies are not
Goal (MDG) for water is to halve appropriate means of providing access More than 1 billion people
the proportion of people without to water in the slums of the developing globally are living in
access to safe drinking water by 2015. world. They note that “there are serious extreme water deprivation.
The urgency of meeting this target doubts about the potential gains Over 40 per cent of the
is reflected in the UNDP’s Human of both privatised network utilities world’s population also
Development Report 2006, which warns (where planning and development lack access to safe and
that more than 1 billion people globally challenges persist) and small-scale service clean sanitation services.
are living in extreme water deprivation. providers (because of pricing and quality
Over 40 per cent of the world’s issues). Ultimately, these concerns can be About 1.6 billion people
population also lack access to safe and resolved by investing in the expansion of worldwide do not have
clean sanitation services. The report also the public water and sanitation network.” access to electricity. Of these,
notes that “not having access to water 706 million are in South Asia
and sanitation is a polite euphemism for While access to basic services should and 554 million in Africa.
a form of deprivation that threatens life, be a human right, it is also a public
destroys opportunity and undermines good with numerous positive While access to basic
human dignity” (UNDP, 2006, p. 5). externalities. The impact on the other services should be a human
MDGs, for instance, is clear. Making right, it is also a public
Similarly, about 1.6 billion people water, sanitation and electricity good with numerous
worldwide do not have access to electricity. available empowers women by freeing
positive externalities.
Of these, 706 million are in South Asia them from the burden and dangers of
and 554 million in Africa, despite large carrying water, often over long distances,
The policy challenge
mining and industrial conglomerates and allows them more time to attend
that developing countries
enjoying cheap access to an enormous school. As Joana Costa et al. show, the
face is to increase the
supply of electricity (see McDonald, 2009). provision of utilities in rural Ghana
poor’s access to utilities
The figures indicate how inequitable reduces the burden of unpaid work.
while simultaneously
is access to basic utilities, both across In addition, for women already engaged in
reaping the benefits of
and within countries. remunerated activities, work time seems
the positive externalities.
to have increased, which in turn has
Communities with the least access to a gender-empowering impact. They
utility infrastructure often live in slum stress that “additional public policies
dwellings and remote areas. Rapid are needed to achieve that goal
urbanisation and informal settlements [reducing work burden], especially
pose particular problems for water policies related to educational training
provision. As Hulya Dagdeviren and and childcare facilities”.
Simon Robertson report, the number
of residential water connections The policy challenge that developing
has fallen in most unplanned urban countries face is to increase the poor’s
settlements in the past decade. access to utilities while simultaneously
The authors also highlight the reaping the benefits of the positive
obstacles that large-scale private externalities. For the past two decades,
providers cannot resolve without policy has focused mainly on private
imposing exorbitant tariffs to cover costs. investment and foreign capital. Just as the
Those obstacles are two-fold in origin. “market failure” argument gave rise to
First, technical difficulties such as the public ownership of certain enterprises,
topographical location of informal so the “government failure” reasoning
settlements pose physical challenges. paved the way for privatisation. The
Second, lack of tenure for land and latter was supported by developments
housing creates uncertainties. In these in economics, which emphasised public
4 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
choice, property rights and principal- This is mainly related to a lack of coverage in El Alto by 2001. The poor’s
agent theories as justifications for competing firms and scarce capital. access to water connections increased,
private ownership. Such outcomes are confirmed by private but the private company could not meet
investors’ interest in sectors with less the targets. Inevitably, the limits of
A fiscal case was also made: gains competition, such as utilities. cost recovery and profitability had been
from the sale of enterprises, savings from reached. The tariff increases needed to
subsidising unprofitable companies and The debate on private versus public connect the additional poor consumers
new tax revenues from the privatised provision of utilities is complex, but were so high that they sparked
firms would improve government the guiding principle for the kind of public outrage.
budgets. Additionally, privatisation provision preferred must be the initial
was seen as a permanent shift to a market level of access to water, sanitation and Similarly, as Alison Post reveals,
economy—what the World Bank called electricity. Where access is already high in private concessionaires in Argentina
“lock-in” in the 1990s. Unlike, say, changes developed and middle-income countries, entered into a contract with the
in interest rates or exchange rates, which privatisation may yield productive and government to increase water metering
can be reversed overnight, privatisation dynamic efficiencies. up to 100 per cent. Fees were imposed
was seen as a commitment to reform, one for the installation of the meters and
that sent the right signals to investors. Private providers have incentives to tariffs were increased. The result was
improve overall performance through intense public protest. In Mali and
The above arguments are well captured new techniques and novel management Senegal the poor have not benefited
in a World Bank (2004) research report, processes. Where access to utilities is from privatisation, simply because
which stated that: low and the focus is on increasing they were not connected to the grid
coverage of the poor in low-income in the first place. The tariff hikes after
“In a globalised economy, poorly countries and neighbourhoods, public privatisation affected them indirectly
performing state-owned infrastructure provision makes sense. This is because as a result of economy-wide effects,
providers were increasingly seen of problems associated with a point stressed by Luc Savard et al.
as constraining economic growth affordability, how much cost recovery The concessions in Argentina,
and undermining international can be pushed, and regulatory capacity. Bolivia, Mali and Senegal have
competitiveness. Developing countries The persistent challenge, however, is all been terminated.
simply could not continue to absorb financing investment outlays. The
the fiscal burden of these enterprises. options are reducing system losses Contract cancellations and
Around the world, it became evident such as water leakages; improved renationalisation are often the result of a
to policymakers that the problems of billing; domestic resource mobilisation; policy that transfers risk to governments
public enterprises could be solved and external financing (both donor and and end users. As Kate Bayliss argues,
only by implementing radical structural private bond/equity financing). the focus in Sub-Saharan Africa has
changes and realigning the roles been to transfer investment, demand and
of the government and the private Historical experiences are particularly currency risks in order to attract private
sector” (p. 35). enlightening. Privatisation had been investors. She argues that “in industrialised
relatively successful in the United economies, the transfer of risk to the
Under utility privatisation and Kingdom and the United States, because private sector is considered essential if
commercialisation schemes, governments these countries embarked on private efficiency gains from privatisation of
usually retain ownership of assets while utility provision after achieving 100 the delivery of basic services are to reach
inviting private contractors to run the per cent access to water and electricity end users. In SSA [Sub-Saharan Africa],
operations and provide management by the 1980s. As David Hall and Emanuele however, the emphasis is on reducing
services. While there are plenty of cases Lobina observe, “the sewerage systems in the risks faced by the private sector in
in which publicly managed utilities are Europe, the United States and Japan order to encourage private investment.”
marked by poor maintenance, wastage were not developed through full cost The upshot is always exorbitant tariffs
and uncollected bills, social welfare goals recovery from users; they were paid and neglected infrastructure. This
such as increasing the poor’s access to for by distributing the costs among the contrasts with the standard practice in
basic services can be organised public, using taxation and cross-subsidy.” developed countries, where risk is usually
successfully by public initiatives. transferred to private providers at the
The overall evidence is that privatisation time of privatisation.
As Vickers and Yarrow (1991, pp. 113–114) of utilities is not a solution where initial
note: “public ownership may have the access is low and the objective is the One reason why private participation in the
advantage if externalities are larger coverage of the poor. This point is made in water sector has been successful in Brazil
and the pursuit of personal agendas the article on Bolivia by Degol Hailu et al. seems to be the transfer of investment
is more constrained, for example by a risk. Contracts with the various
well-functioning political system.” The private concessionaire and the government entities at the state and
For instance, large private enterprises government agreed on coverage municipal levels clearly outlined the
can be highly inefficient, leading to targets to provide universal access investment obligations of the private
a concentration of market structures. in the city of La Paz and 82 per cent operators, particularly in low-income areas.
Poverty in Focus August 2009 5
As Andre Rossi de Oliveira points out, the and around the Amazon, have benefited
private operators had invested about from locally managed electricity
While there are plenty
U$500 million by 2004. He underscores generating facilities. The difficulty has of cases in which
that “the positive outcomes in Brazil been expanding the traditional grid publicly managed
are related to contract design... Most system in the densely forested areas.
contracts stressed investment obligations, As Suani Teixeira et al. report, following
utilities are marked
something relatively easy to monitor.” the ambitious Light for Everyone by poor maintenance,
programme in Brazil, local renewable wastage and uncollected
The limitations of public and private energy-generating services using
provision to increase the poor’s access photovoltaic, small-scale hydropower bills, social welfare goals
to utilities have enhanced the role of and biomass sources have become such as increasing
community and small-scale water viable solutions. the poor’s access to
providers. The absence of economies
of scale, however, means that water Third, where initial access to utilities basic services can be
prices are typically high. Maintenance is high and privatisation is considered, organised successfully
facilities are inadequate and there better contract design is needed
by public initiatives.
is no proper accountability for to take account of political and social
service interruption. considerations. Risk must be transferred
to private providers, not to governments
The quality of small-scale providers’ and consumers. As Julia Kercher explains
supply is not always assured. Moreover, a human rights framework must guide
it is not easy to regulate community and the design and implementation of
small-scale providers, and neither is it private provision based on the principles
possible to engage in cross-subsidy. of availability, accessibility, acceptability
In India, as Nitish Jha argues, community- and its quality.
based water provision schemes are often
poorly designed and implemented. Finally, utility provision can only
Because of a lack of social cohesion, succeed if effective regulatory and
vulnerable groups are often excluded intuitional capacities are put in place
from decision-making processes. to enforce contracts and ensure the
efficiency of cross-subsidy mechanisms.
What are the lessons? The debate Regulation is most effective when laws
should move away from a narrow and institutions are stronger and are
focus on public versus private to free of political influence (see Estache
analysis of the constraints on public et al., 2003). Regulation is also country-
intervention, possible improvements, specific, while technical skills, legal
and the potential for alternative frameworks and dissemination of
provision under a poverty reduction information to the wider public
framework. Three issues seem to matter. are essential.
First, where initial utility coverage is Estache, A., J. L. Guasch and L. Trujillo
(2003). “Price Caps, Efficiency Payoffs,
low, subsidy and cross-subsidy schemes
and Infrastructure Contract Renegotiation
are the best alternative. As Ashley Brown in Latin America”, Policy Research
reminds us, another externality comes Working Paper 3129. World Bank
from connecting the poor to infrastructure (Washington, D.C.).
networks though cross-subsidies. McDonald, D. (ed.) (2009). Electric
Capitalism: Recolonising Africa on the
All consumers benefit if the cross-subsidy Power Grid. London, Earthscan and Human
Sciences Research Council.
is designed in such a way that the poor
cover the variable cost and make some UNDP (2006). Beyond Scarcity: Power,
contribution to fixed costs. Income-based Poverty and the Global Water Crisis.
Human Development Report. New York,
targeting schemes, for instance, with a Palgrave Macmillan.
mix of some consumption-, age-
and geography-based targeting Vickers, J. and G. Yarrow (1991).
“Economic Perspectives on Privatization”,
of beneficiaries, can be sustainable. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 (2),
pp. 111–132.
Second, decentralised and locally based
World Bank (2004). Reforming
utility provision has been promising
Infrastructure: Privatization, Regulation,
in the electricity sector. Geographically and Competition, World Bank (Washington,
isolated communities, such as those in D.C.) and Oxford University Press.
6 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
by Hulya Dagdeviren
and Simon A. Robertson,
University of Hertfordshire
Access to Water in
the Slums of the
Developing World
The problem of inadequate access Public policies towards slums are highly
The increase in urbanisation to safe water is nowhere more pressing politicised. They are influenced by factors
and its disproportionate than in the slums of the developing such as the strength of non-governmental
concentration in informal world. Most countries in which a large organisations (NGOs) and other social
settlements pose problems proportion of the urban population groups, as well as by the politics of slum
for the expansion of water live in squatter settlements are unlikely management. So far, governments have
and sanitation services. to meet the water-related Millennium dealt with squatter settlements and
Development Goals (MDGs). This article the associated problems in three ways:
Forced evictions are still argues that market-oriented policies
used extensively, especially make little, if any, difference in (i) clearing slums through forced
in Africa and Asia, where those circumstances. or legal evictions;
over 14 million people (ii) applying public policies that range
were evicted between Trends in Slum Development from benign neglect to occasional
1998 and 2006. About a third of the world’s urban interventions; and
population lived in slums in 1990, and (iii) regularising settlement conditions.
the total number of slum dwellers might
rise to 1.5 billion by 2020. Slum growth Forced evictions are still used extensively,
has been particularly marked in Africa especially in Africa and Asia, where over
where, on average, more than 70 per cent 14 million people were evicted between
of the urban population live in informal 1998 and 2006 (UN-Habitat, 2007).
settlement areas.
Access to Water in the Slums of
the Developing World
The increase in urbanisation and
Table 1
its disproportionate concentration in
Access to Safe Water in Countries with the Largest Slum Population (%)
informal settlements pose problems for
the expansion of water and sanitation
Slum population Urban population Urban households
services. Table 1 provides data on access
to urban without access to without residential
population ratio safe drinking water piped water supply to safe water in the countries with the
largest slum populations in Asia and
Asian countries 1990 2001 1990 2004 1990 2004 sub-Saharan Africa, where conditions
Afghanistan 99 99 90 37 94 85 are particularly drastic.
Nepal 97 92 5 4 59 48
Bangladesh 87 85 17 18 72 76 UN-Habitat’s original database, which
Pakistan 79 74 5 4 40 51 includes a larger number of countries,
India 61 56 11 5 47 53 shows that urban access to improved
Sub-Saharan African countries water facilities declined in more than
Ethiopia 99 99 19 19 98 68 a third of African countries during the
Chad 99 99 59 59 90 90 period 1990–2004. In many cities,
Tanzania 99 92 15 15 67 57 there is a notably low rate of access
Niger 96 96 38 20 81 65 to water through private household
Mozambique 95 94 17 28 67 82 connections from network infrastructure.
Malawi 95 91 10 2 56 71 More than two-thirds of the urban
Mali 94 93 50 22 92 71 population in Africa depend on water
Uganda 94 93 20 13 76 93 from non-residential connections.
Madagascar 91 93 20 23 72 84 In half of the African countries, the share
Sudan 86 86 15 22 25 54 of residential water connections either
Source: UN-Habitat (2007). declined or was static.
Poverty in Focus August 2009 7
Lack of access to safe water in general, plots and squat elsewhere. The policy are not problem-free. Water charges are
and lack of residential supply in particular, may benefit the non-poor, especially higher and cross-subsidisation is not
is positively correlated to the proportion property merchants. Opposition to feasible because the projects do not
of the population living in unplanned redistributive policies, involving benefit from economies of scale. Their
settlement areas. An important trend in relocation and/or the formalisation of long-term maintenance can be difficult
Africa, and to some extent in Asia, is that slums, can be testing for governments. because of a lack of social cohesion,
improvements in access to safe drinking financial resources, and technical and
water were frequently accompanied Can Privatisation of Utilities management capacity.
by a decline in residential connections Provide an Answer?
during the period 1990–2004. In other Thus far, policies geared to improving Small-scale private water suppliers: Some
words, more people now rely on public access to water have emphasised the 50 per cent of the urban population in
standpipes, boreholes, “protected” wells importance of market-oriented solutions Africa obtain water from small suppliers.
and springs. (World Bank, 2004). The shift towards These include water tankers, street
private or commercialised services has vendors and other water re-sellers
Challenges for Public Utilities in Improving meant that direct public investment in (that is, households with a piped supply
Access to Safe Water in the Slums the water sector has declined. But the or wells in their yards selling water to
1. Technical difficulties of infrastructure resulting gap has not been offset by those without access). Their services are
extension: The supply problems facing private sector investments (Estache, 2006). problematic for three reasons. First, their
public utilities are exacerbated by Where public utilities have been privatised prices are much higher, partly because
a number of barriers that make it there have been numerous problems they lack economies of scale. Second, the
impractical to build the network in related to cost recovery, affordability quality of the water is highly dependent
some slum areas. The most important are: and regulation of services. Private service on the quality of sanitation services in
providers have not performed better than the locale. Finally, where regulation
The topographical location of public operators. Nonetheless, though is absent (which is often typical), prices
settlements in previously unused the outcomes have been disappointing, may be subject to collusion. While
land such as hills, ravines, flood the drive for privatisation continues with it is desirable to regulate small, private
plains and desert land. renewed emphasis following a short suppliers, it is intrinsically difficult and
period of critical reflection. costly to do so because of their size,
The physical conditions of the
variety and number.
settlements, which are marked by a
The potential for privatisation is even
random and haphazard development
more limited in countries where a Policy Recommendations
pattern and overcrowding.
significant proportion of the urban There are three fundamental reasons
The quality of the materials used population live in squatter settlements. why governments should play a more
to build housing units, such as In these settlements, the multifaceted active role in the provision of water and
thickened mud, plant leaves and nature of the problems (such as tenure, sanitation. First, universal access to safe
stems, tin and plaster boards, which technical difficulties in building water drinking water has positive externalities
are unsuitable for permanent water infrastructure, widespread poverty, high in the form of lower rates of illness and
pipes and taps. population turnover) seriously constrain mortality, an associated increase in
the capacity of privatised utilities. productivity, and reduced medical
2. Lack of tenure for land or housing: the costs. The returns from universal water
result of the invasion of public or private Types of Informal Water Services in the coverage can be significant, varying from
land, can pose a significant obstacle to Slums and Their Limitations US$4 for each dollar invested in sub-
the provision of water services. This is In the middle- and upper middle-income Saharan Africa to US$17 in Latin America
because provision by utilities and the countries, slums are often supplied from (Table 2). Second, privatisation is not an
extension of water services by local the public network. In low-income option in poor and low-income areas
authorities often depend on the economies, however, the provision of where services are not profitable.
existence of legal tenure for property. water in informal settlements is dominated
by community-managed water schemes
These two issues are challenging for and small-scale private suppliers. Table 2
Cost-Benefit Ratio of Achieving
public policy. Overcoming the difficulties
Universal Water Coverage
associated with the settlement conditions Community managed water schemes:
outlined in (1) requires relocation of Typically, these are facilitated by NGOs Sub-Saharan Africa 3.9
slum dwellers to more suitable areas that help the community to build a
Arab States 5.9
and enforcement of housing standards. shared water point such as water kiosk,
Granting full tenure in order to tackle the which is then managed and run by East Asia and Pacific 6.6
problems associated with the insecurity of people employed by the community’s South Asia 3.9
tenure outlined in (2) may raise property members. These small-scale projects are
Latin America 17.2
prices and encourage the development crucial to the provision of water in the
of new slum areas. Dwellers may sell their absence of other alternatives, but they Source: Hutton et al. (2006).
8 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
Finally, as outlined above, there are That requires thinking outside the Estache, A. (2006). ‘PPI Partnerships vs.
PPI divorces in LDCs’, Review of Industrial
specific failures associated with non-state, “water and sanitation box” (IIED, 2003). Organization 29, 3–26.
small-scale supply systems.
The expansion of public network Hutton, G., L. Haller and J. Bartram (2006).
“Economic and Health Effects of Increasing
In short, solutions to the lack of utility: Long-term policy should be
Coverage of Low Cost Water and Sanitation
safe water services in the slums devised in light of the costs and Interventions”, HDR Office Occasional Paper.
of the developing world lie in benefits of alternative systems of New York, UNDP.
the following approaches: provision. There are serious doubts
IIED (2003) Water and Sanitation: Water
about the potential gains of both Will Deliver the Improvements Required
Coordinated public sector privatised network utilities (where for Urban Areas. International Institute for
interventions: Improving water planning and development Environment and Development. London.
services depends heavily on challenges persist) and small-scale
UN-Habitat (2007). Enhancing Urban Safety
upgrading slum conditions service providers (because of pricing and Security: Global Report on Human
more generally. Urban planning and quality issues). Ultimately, these Settlements 2007. Un-Habitat. Nairobi.
and tenure issues require concerns can be resolved by investing
World Bank (2004). Reforming Infrastructure:
multifaceted interventions in the expansion of the public Privatization, Regulation, and Competition.
within the remit of governments. water and sanitation network. Oxford University Press. Oxford.
by Kate Bayliss,
School of Oriental and
African Studies, University of London
Private Investment in
African Infrastructure:
Who Bears the Risk?
Rates of access to water and was for telecommunications. Less than 1
In industrialised economies, electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) per cent was for water and sewerage.
the transfer of risk to the remain below those of other developing
private sector is considered regions. More than 42 per cent of all Donors and country governments have
essential if efficiency gains Africans—some 300 million people— increased their efforts to attract private
from privatisation of the lack access to an improved water supply investment into infrastructure in
delivery of basic services and 64 per cent—477 million people— SSA. Central to these policies and
are to reach end users. do not have adequate sanitation. programmes is the reduction of risk
In SSA, however, the Only one in four Africans has access to for the private sector.
emphasis is on reducing electricity, and in some countries access
the risks faced by the private rates are as low as 7 per cent. The generally accepted principle of risk
sector in order to encourage allocation is that risk should lie with the
Infrastructure financing requirements party best able to manage it. While this is
private investment.
for water and energy in SSA exceed the fairly straightforward at the two ends
amounts that donors and governments of the spectrum—construction risk lies
In the energy sector,
can provide. Policy-makers are looking with the private investor, and political
the contractual terms of the
to the private sector to reduce the risk with the government—there are
PPA mean that demand risk
“financing gap” and to bring efficiency numerous grey areas in between, such as
rests with the government.
to ailing utilities (Bayliss, 2009). demand risk, investment risk and the risk
All the power produced is
of fluctuations in the prices of key inputs,
sold to the state-owned
Private sector participation (PSP) in as well as currency devaluation.
transmission utility and the infrastructure peaked in 1997 before
amount sold is fixed so the tailing off, but is now increasing (Figure 1). In industrialised economies, the transfer
private sector has no Telecommunications attracted most of risk to the private sector is considered
demand risk. investor interest. On a regional level, just essential if efficiency gains from
6 per cent of total private investment privatisation of the delivery of basic
went to SSA between 1990 and 2007 services are to reach end users. In SSA,
(Figure 2) and over 70 per cent of this however, the emphasis is on reducing the
Poverty in Focus August 2009 9
Investment Risk
Sector policies are increasingly designed
to ensure that governments—rather than
private businesses—bear investment
risk using sector restructuring and
Source: World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure Database.
government guarantees. The water sector
has been restructured in a number of
countries to separate ownership of the The private sector may make Sector policies
assets from the day-to-day running recommendations or even decisions
of the service. The state assumes the regarding investment, but does not have
have been reduced to
asset ownership and is responsible to finance the investment itself. creating an attractive
for investment in infrastructure, while environment for
operations such as billing and revenue With electricity, PSP has mainly taken the
collection are offered for privatisation. form of stand-alone private generation
investors, to the
This approach has been adopted in plants. These are usually underwritten detriment of competing
Senegal, Ghana, Tanzania and Cameroon, by power purchase agreements (PPAs), priorities such as
and is planned for Angola. whereby the state-owned power
company makes a commitment to
equitable access.
The much-needed finance for buy all the power produced at a price Prices have increased
infrastructure investment is provided fixed in foreign currency. These contract substantially and
by the government and/or donors; terms are usually fixed for 20 years
examples are water privatisation in or more and are underwritten by a
essential investment
Ghana and Tanzania, electricity in Kenya sovereign guarantee, thereby protecting in infrastructure
(Leigland, 2008) and planned electricity the private sector from investment risk. has been neglected
privatization in Senegal. This is intended
to bring in private sector efficiency while Demand Risk
because attention
not deterring investors by requiring Various methods are used to protect has focused
them to actually commit finance. investors from demand risk in the water on privatisation.
sector. These include payment to the costs. They have no control over these technical assistance fees or using transfer
contractor based on availability of service costs and cannot diversify away from pricing to pay a subsidiary company
rather than demand, and a payment essential services such as electricity and for services or inputs. This lowers the
system whereby the government water unless they increase the use of less profitability of the concession but
commits to top up fees if they fall safe alternatives. Consumers of utility increases the overall revenue of
below a certain level. Alternatively, services in SSA have the least bargaining the investor (Leigland, 2008).
remuneration can be in the form of power. Such an approach is a clear
a flat rate that is not based on user fees. demonstration of the way in which the Such practices can be complex and might
needs of investors take priority over not be disclosed, making it virtually
In the energy sector, the contractual those of end users. impossible for the regulator to judge
terms of the PPA mean that demand risk what profit is being made. Weak state
rests with the government. All the power Additional Risks for Governments capacity is presented as a reason for
produced is sold to the state-owned As well as absorbing risks from the introducing PSP, but weak government
transmission utility and the amount private sector, PSP raises further risks for skills can undermine the efficiency gains
sold is fixed so the private sector has governments. The process of preparing PSP is supposed to bring if private firms
no demand risk. for PSP is costly and demanding. are not effectively regulated.
Countries have restructured utilities and
Where demand falls below expectations, drafted new legislation to encourage PSP, Conclusion
the private sector may seek to increase spending vast amounts on consultants, PSP now has such momentum that it is
prices to make up for a decline in the yet governments face the risk that there effectively a policy goal in itself. But the
overall revenue position. For example, will be little or no interest from the efforts that governments make in order
when drought caused a reduction in private sector. to mitigate the risks that the private
power consumption in Uganda because sector faces also mitigate the supposed
of load-shedding, the private distributor In theory, competitive bidding is gains from the introduction of PSP
threatened to raise unit prices in regarded as essential in order to derive in infrastructure in SSA.
order to compensate. efficiency gains from privatisation.
In practice, lack of competition in SSA The private sector brings virtually no
Input Cost and Currency Risk seems to be overlooked. investment finance to water. The finance
Investors prefer prices (rather than that is leveraged in the electricity sector
subsidies) to cover costs, since this In Cameroon, the government spent is at high cost and secured with long-
reduces their reliance on government nearly a decade trying to privatise the term government guarantees.
payments. Institutionalised tariff-setting water utility before finally managing it
practices established in much of SSA in 2007. In Senegal, privatisation of Lack of competition and ineffective
allocate cost fluctuations to end users the electricity distribution utility was regulation threaten to counteract the
through “automatic tariff adjustment” (ATA). attempted in 1997 and again in 2001. The supposed efficiency benefits of PSP.
government is now trying for a third time. By the time the state has enough
This means that variations in exogenous capacity to effectively regulate the
costs such as inflation, exchange rates In Lusaka, plans to privatise the water private sector it could, arguably,
and key inputs like fuel are automatically utility were eventually shelved after provide the service itself.
incorporated into the tariff structure for several years when it became clear
water and electricity; this happened, for that the risk profile was still too high for Furthermore, sector policies have
example, in Ghana, Nigeria and Cape investors. In Malawi, the Lilongwe and been reduced to creating an attractive
Verde. In Uganda, a clear reason for ATA Blantyre Water Boards were readied environment for investors, to the
is to provide operating companies with a for sale in 1996 but privatisation was detriment of competing priorities such
reasonable profit and to give confidence eventually dropped in 2004. as equitable access. Prices have increased
to current and new investors. substantially and essential investment
Sometimes few bids are received. in infrastructure has been neglected
ATA can lead to moral hazard. There is no There was only one bid for the because attention has focused
reason for the private investor to try to privatisation of water in Dar es Salaam. on privatisation.
lower exposure to currency devaluation,
for example, when the cost can be PSP creates information asymmetries.
Regulation relies on information Bayliss, K. (2009). “Private Sector
passed on to consumers. The use of ATA
Participation in African Infrastructure:
pricing methods conflicts with the notion provided by the private firm. Governments Is it Worth the Risk?” Working Paper No. 55.
that risks should rest with those best face a high risk that firms will not comply International Policy Centre for Inclusive
with disclosure requirements, and they Growth (IPC-IG). Brasilia.
able to manage them.
are in a weak bargaining position when Leigland, J. (2008). “The Rise and Fall of
In SSA, end users are not best able few bids have been received. Investors Brownfield Concessions: But Some Signs
of Recovery After a Decade of Decline”, PPIAF
to manage the risk of exchange rate boost their own profits from PSP in Working Paper 6. Public-Private Infrastructure
fluctuations and changes in fuel input various ways, such as paying themselves Advisory Facility (Washington, D.C.).
Poverty in Focus August 2009 11
Financing of Urban
Sewerage Systems
The current discussion of sanitation support the cost of water and sanitation
marginalises sewerage, usually on the improvements in the poorer countries. The sewerage systems in
grounds that it is too expensive for Europe, the United States and
most developing countries. Yet sewerage The need for new urban sewerage is Japan were not developed
systems have a massive impact on public highly concentrated in relatively few through full cost recovery
health, especially child health. This is a countries. Half of all the new sewerage from users; they were paid for
classic example of a public good, and connections needed to meet a target of by distributing the costs
an affordable infrastructure investment halving the urban population without a among the public, using
for countries in which the great majority household sewerage connection are in just taxation and cross-subsidy
of people need a connection. four countries: India, China, Indonesia and
Brazil. Three-quarters of all the connections The explicit or implicit
Urban sewerage was first developed needed are in just 20 countries. position of most of the
in the ancient cities of the Indus valley official donor publications
The next question is how this need can
around 4000 BC, and is thus a South is that, despite the clear
be met, and particularly how it should be
Asian invention. The first modern balance of benefits,
financed. The main policy advice of
system was introduced in London household sewerage
donors and development banks
in the nineteenth century, and had connections cannot
emphasises three key policy positions:
four key features: be afforded.
1. the technology of a network of
the insistence on the need to finance
developments through cost recovery The idea that the private
sewers throughout the city, flushed
from users; sector can or will invest
by water;
significant money in
2. public administrative structures to
the preference for a central role
developing sanitation
for the private sector;
finance, build and manage these or sewerage systems is
“expensive works”; the assumption that sewer systems are also now known
too expensive and thus unaffordable. to be wrong.
3. a public environmental measure,
rather than an attempt to alter
The UN World Water Development Report
individual behaviour;
(WWDR), for example, states:
4. a universal public measure applied
“Population growth and burgeoning
to everyone, not selectively targeted
water demand have convinced most
(Mackenbach, 2007).
policy-makers that the cost of water
system development will increasingly
These same principles have been applied
have to be met by users, especially if the
in every high-income country in the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
world. It was very expensive to develop
are to be achieved … With private sector
the system and it was financed from
participation—ranging from small water
taxation or massive cross-subsidies:
vendors to large private utilities—
“public financing of sanitation
projected to increase in the next decades,
infrastructure was seen as the only
the issue of pricing is critical”
option for ensuring investment adequate
(UNESCO, 2006, p. 419).
to protect public health” (UNDP, 2005, p. 83).
However, the sewerage systems in
The same principle of cross-subsidy Europe, the United States and Japan
continues to be applied in Europe at a were not developed through full cost Hall D. and E. Lobina (2008), “Sewerage Works –
transnational level. The European Union recovery from users; they were paid Public investment in sewers saves lives”,
Public Sector International Research Unit (PSIRU),
raises taxes in all member states, the for by distributing the costs among the University of Greenwich, UK. Available at: <http://
equivalent of €20 per person per year, to public, using taxation and cross-subsidy. www.psiru.org/reports/2008-03-W-sewers.doc>.
12 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
by Ashley C. Brown,
Poverty Issues in Harvard Electricity Policy Group,
John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University
Infrastructure Regulation:
Why, Who and How?
Infrastructure policy and lose service because they are unable to
regulation is fraught with externalities pay, the network becomes smaller and its If the poor lose service
that cannot go unaddressed. One value for all customers is diminished. because they are unable to
externality that unquestionably intrudes Enabling the poor to retain electricity, pay, the network becomes
into infrastructure regulation is the water and other infrastructure service smaller and its value for all
provision of regulated products and may also have net social benefits in customers is diminished.
services to those who cannot afford the areas of health, the environment,
to bear the full cost of obtaining them. encouragement of microenterprises The rationale for
In dealing with the dilemma of making and even education. Finally, if affordable finding ways to provide
infrastructure available to the poor, some access is provided there is less incentive infrastructure services to
basic issues are unavoidable. They can be to illegally obtain service and a greater the poor seems compelling
characterised as Why, Who and How. likelihood of producing some revenue for a variety of reasons.
rather than none at all. Subsidies to the
Why? poor therefore provide real benefits Since doing so will
The basic reasons for supplying such and do not only entail costs. doubtlessly require
services as electricity, water/sanitation, subsidies, it is critical that
telecommunications and fuel to the poor Who? the subsidy, if it is to be
are both humanitarian and pragmatic. Despite the indisputable evidence that effective and sustainable,
Those basic services allow the poor to regulatory decisions about infrastructure should be efficient,
have a better quality of life, be healthier, can have significant social effects, there is well targeted at the
be better educated and informed, and a vigorous debate about whether poor, and professionally
lead more productive lives. The provision regulators are the appropriate authorities administered in ways
of these services to areas where the poor to address those issues, or whether such that limit politicisation.
are concentrated also increases the decisions should be left to policy-makers.
likelihood of broader economic
development that makes possible a long- Those who contend that regulators
term and sustainable reduction in poverty. should refrain from intruding into
externalities such as poverty argue that
Enabling poor households to obtain regulators are given specifically-defined
infrastructure services is not simply a legal powers. The exercise of those
matter of humanitarianism. There are powers may well have effects far beyond
often overlooked network benefits for the regulated sector but, in the view
everyone in keeping poor customers on of those who take a narrow view of
the network. If a cross-subsidy is designed regulatory powers, that does not justify
so that tariffs for poor consumers require regulators stepping outside those
them to make payments that cover all of constraints. Proponents of that view,
the variable costs of serving them, and to however, neither deny the effects
make some contribution to the fixed costs of regulatory actions nor necessarily
of the system, then all other customers believe that those effects should go
benefit by retaining the subsidised unaddressed. Rather, advocates of
customers on the network rather than limited regulatory powers contend
losing them and having to absorb the that addressing the external effects
fixed costs that otherwise would have of regulatory policies and decisions
been paid by the poor. should be left to broader policy-makers,
such as legislators and/or executive figures.
In telecommunications, having more
people connected enhances the value of Legislative and executive decision-
network access for everyone. If the poor makers, it is argued, are more
14 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
accountable to the public in making approaches: (i) consumption-based; to the consuming public in general.
what are essentially political decisions. (ii) age-based; (iii) geographically-based; Consumption-based approaches,
Moreover, political authorities have and (iv) income-based. therefore, while relatively easy to effect,
access to broader resources than those may be highly inefficient.
available to regulators (such as the public Consumption-based
treasury and taxing powers) to address The consumption-based approach Age-based
the external effects. Some maintain that assumes that, as a general rule, the poor Age based programmes assume
since the resources available to consume less infrastructure service than either that age and poverty are closely
regulators are the revenues collected do more affluent customers. Thus tariffs correlated, or that age groups such as the
for regulated services and products, might be designed so that customers pay elderly or children merit subsidies as part
any effort to direct those revenues less for an initial block of consumption of a general social welfare programme.
toward social objectives—such as than for consumption above that Since this article is about poverty, it does
alleviating poverty—will inevitably threshold (for example, $0.05 per kWh of not discuss the latter motivation. Such
distort price signals that will adversely electricity per month for the first 60 kWh, programmes, particularly when focused
affect the overall efficiency of the sector. and $0.09 per kWh for every kWh on retirees, are often politically popular
consumed beyond 60 kWh). Another and are therefore appealing to some
Of course, a countervailing argument variation of the consumption-based politicians. The programme design is
is made by those who contend that approach is to use a two-part tariff quite straightforward: either through
regulators must be conscious of, and (one part reflecting fixed costs and the some methodology or administrative
perhaps should specifically address, the other reflecting variable costs) and to fiat, a discounted tariff is established
external effects of their decisions. There allocate a greater share of the costs for all customers who are age-eligible or,
are several arguments for that point of to the variable part of what the perhaps, who have age-eligible persons
view. The first relates to the fact simply customer pays. Since the fixed costs are in the household.
because laws may not explicitly address unavoidable but the variable costs can
externalities does not necessarily mean be avoided by reducing consumption, The benefits of an age-based programme
that policy-makers did not intend low-use customers are advantaged. are that it is both easy to administer and,
regulators to address them, but only While the latter approach is not absent fraud, is utterly transparent in
that they did not or could not have ordinarily used specifically to help the terms of who benefits. The problem,
anticipated all of those effects. Moreover, poor, those who favour a consumption- however, is that many households have
most regulatory statutes require that based approach have often argued that elderly and children who are not poor,
regulators fully consider the impact it serves that purpose. and who therefore do not need a subsidy
of their decisions on consumers. for utility service. Hence age-based
The benefits of the consumption-based programmes are not poverty-specific
A second argument is that regulators, approach are that it is relatively easy to and are therefore highly inefficient.
being somewhat insulated politically, administer, it encourages conservation, As noted below, it is possible to
can address poverty issues in a more it is generally consistent with superimpose an income test on an age-
targeted, efficient, less politicised and longstanding tariff practices, and it is based programme, but that means that
therefore more sustainable manner than easily understood. If pre-paid meters are a decision has been taken to make
politicians.1 Hence there is a trade-off: used, it also has the benefit of being self- service affordable to some poor
on the one hand, regulators may create enforced. Those benefits, however, may householdsbut not to others.
cross-subsidies in order to address be outweighed by the weaknesses of the
poverty issues, and thereby make pricing approach. The most important weakness Geography-based
less efficient; on the other hand, they is that its basic assumption—that Usually, geography-based programmes
are more likely than politicians to the poor and low-volume users are are based only partly on consideration
make subsidisation more efficient and essentially the same consumers—may for the poor. More often than not they
sustainable. On balance, the trade-off very well be wrong. Many low-volume are designed to promote rural services
may be worth making. In many cases, consumers are not necessarily poor, such such as electrification, or to foster
political officials, in order to avoid as the elderly, single-person households economic development in a particular
making difficult choices, would simply and users in vacation homes. region. As with age-based programmes,
prefer that regulators assume a tariff is set on the basis of some
responsibility for the poor. Since eligibility is based on consumption, methodology or by administrative fiat,
not income, many relatively affluent and that tariff provides a discount to
How? customers will gain from tariffs designed customers located in a defined territory.
Regardless of who decides, there to benefit the poor. Additionally, Understandably, such programmes are
are fundamentally different ways of modifying the allocation of costs appealing to local politicians.
designing subsidies and cross-subsidies between fixed and variable costs in
for the poor. Each approach has both order to subsidise the poor better, as The benefits of a geography-based
beneficial and adverse aspects. They fall opposed to actually reflecting costs, can programme are that it is very simple
broadly into four different structural send significantly distorted price signals to administer and, like age-based
Poverty in Focus August 2009 15
programmes, is transparent in terms companies often use for failure to Enabling the poor
of identifying the beneficiaries. enforce payment obligations. The
The problem is that most if not all problem is that the system is difficult to retain electricity,
geographic regions have poor and to administer because it requires water and other
non-poor residents. Thus the subsidy documentation of income-eligibility, infrastructure service
will have many unintended beneficiaries, a process that can be labour-intensive
a circumstance that makes it inefficient and subject to fraud. This difficulty may also have net
and of dubious sustainability. It is also might be mitigated when there are other social benefits in
highly subject to politicisation, as has government programmes that require the areas of health,
happened in India, where rural subsidies income, eligibility and a person’s
are prevalent and are very difficult to participation in such a programme the environment,
eliminate or even reduce once they automatically makes them eligible encouragement of
are in place. for an income-based payment system. microenterprises
Income-based As regards income-based payments and even education.
The income-based approach is (as opposed to income-eligibility
conceptually simple. Poverty is usually requirements), economists have argued
defined in terms of family income, and that the price signals are incorrect since
customers whose income is below a the customer payments are not linked
certain threshold are offered services to consumption. Thus, it is argued,
under tariffs designed to maintain income-based programmes provide an
service to the poor. Once eligibility is incentive for inefficient and wasteful use
determined, there may be two basic of energy. For many customers that may
second stages. One is to apply one be true, but the poor cannot afford to
of the other approaches (consumption, buy as many appliances that use energy
geography, or age) and superimpose or water, and thus it is not clear that
an income eligibility test for them so price signals carry much significance.
that customers can only qualify for the Additionally, customers being served on
subsidy if their income qualifies and an income-based tariff can be required to
they meet one of the other criteria. take part in energy-efficiency programmes.
by Alison E. Post,
University of California,
Berkeley
The Paradoxical Politics
of Water Metering in
Argentina
Two contrasting yet related scenes countries. This article examines efforts to
Metering consumption can be observed in Argentine cities introduce water metering by privatised
provides strong during hot summer months. In affluent utilities in the Argentine provinces. It
disincentives against central districts, apartment building highlights the types of political resistance
wasteful consumption, superintendents begin the day by encountered and the strategies identified
reducing total demand and washing off the sidewalks in front of by utilities and political officials to
thereby helping utilities their residences, waving hose nozzles address household concerns.
maintain adequate pressure from side to side as if water were free.
levels in outlying districts. Meanwhile, in outer and often less Water Metering Provisions in Argentina
affluent districts, water pressure falls to under Washington Consensus Reforms
Introducing water metering such low levels that utilities must ration In response to pressure from the national
service; running water may only be government, most of the Argentine
on a more widespread basis
available a few hours a day. provinces chose to “modernise” their
in developing countries
water and sanitation systems during
promises to have numerous
Water metering systems can help rectify the 1990s: 11 provinces granted 30-year
positive effects, especially
such unfair allocations of a scarce resource. management and investment contracts
for poorer city-dwellers
Metering consumption provides (concession contracts) to private
living on the urban fringe.
strong disincentives against wasteful operators, and two others established
consumption, reducing total demand and state-owned private companies that
Metering should lower
thereby helping utilities maintain adequate would be monitored by independent
overall demand, thereby pressure levels in outlying districts. regulatory agencies.1 Contracts and the
allowing utilities to expand enabling laws establishing regulatory
services and improve Reducing total demand, where there is agencies stipulated very ambitious water
pressure levels in outlying shortage of water, also enables utilities to metering targets for the new service
districts with fewer major use existing infrastructure more efficiently, providers in many cases.
new investments in thereby freeing up system capacity for
system capacity. expansion into the urban fringe, where the Table 1 shows the eight provincial
urban poor tend to live in many developing concessions granted during the 1990s
countries. This is very important, because that had stringent targets. Note that
the construction of facilities such as water these contracts typically required
and sewerage plants does not tend to concessionaires to install meters for
be accorded political priority; after all, between 50 and 100 per cent of their
they are not as visible as bridges or residential customer base within
schools and do not deliver concrete the first few years of the contract
benefits to individual constituents. or face financial penalties.
As a result, governments tend to under-
1. The contract for the Buenos Aires metropolitan invest in such “invisible” infrastructure. Problems of Implementation
area was granted by the national government rather
than a provincial government. Three other provincial Between 10 and 15 years after the start
concessions were granted after the 1990s: Catamarca, Water metering, along with private sector of the Argentine concession contracts, as
La Rioja and a contract encompassing one part of
Buenos Aires province. management and regulation, was Table 1 indicates, no concessionaire has
advocated by international institutions met its contractual targets. Only two have
2. As Table 1 indicates, only one of the eight contracts
was cancelled: the Azurix contract. The rest remained under the Washington Consensus reform come close to meeting their goals: Aguas
in place as of January 2009. programme of the late 1980s and 1990s. de Corrientes and Servicio de Aguas de
3. See the August and September 2004 issues of Despite the aforementioned benefits for Misiones (SAMSA).2 Importantly, this lack
El Tribuno, the provincial newspaper for Salta, Argentina. overall system efficiency and for poorer of progress is observable in concessions
4. While tariff hikes of 100 per cent in the province city residents in particular, efforts to that have been widely regarded as
of Tucumán received international attention, more
typical in Argentina were increases of 5-20 per cent
introduce water metering have met keen successful in terms of extending services
at any one time. political resistance in developing to new users, such as Aguas de Salta.
Poverty in Focus August 2009 17
Table 1
Argentine Concessions from the 1990s with Stringent Water Metering Targets* and Progress toward Water Metering Goals
Concessionaire Year of Contractual Target Metering rate for residential Metering rate in 2003,
(Province) Contract users circa 1997** 2004, 2005, 2006***
Aguas de Corrientes S.A. 1991 Meters for 100% of customers 88% (9/97 - 8/98) 2003: 96%
(Corrientes) a by 3rd year of the contract. 2004: 92%
Aguas de Formosa S.A. 1995 Meters for 100% of non-residential 19% (1997) 2003: 15%
(Formosa)b users within 12 months; meters for 2004: 14%
50% of residential users within 2 years. 2005: 14%
Aguas de Santiago S.A. 1997 Meters for 100% of non-residential 0% (11/97 - 8/98) 2003: 0.4%
(Santiago del Estero)c users within 2 years; meters for 50%
of residential users within 2 years
(except in two villages).
Aguas Cordobesas S.A. 1997 Meters for 20% of households by end 0% (5/97 - 4/98) 2003: 16%
(Córdoba)d of year 1, 40% by end of year 2,
100% by end of year 5.
Aguas de Salta S.A. 1998 Meters for 10% of households by the end 0% (8/98 - 9/98) 2003: 1%
(Salta)e of year 1; by year 2, 30%; by year 3, 50%; 2004: 8%
by year 4, 70%, by year 5, 90%.
Obras Sanitarias 1998 Meters for 95% of customers 0% (11/97 - 10/98) 2003: 5%
de Mendoza S.A. by 2005. 2004: 8%
(Mendoza) f 2005: 8%
2006: 9%
Azurix S.A. 1999 Meters for 40% of households by year 5; 37% (1996) 2003: 40%
(Buenos Aires) g 70% by year 10, 100% by year 15.
Servicio de Aguas 1999 Meters for 90% of users in Posadas by 58% (1997)**** 2003: 77%*****
de Misiones S.A. year 3; for 90% in Garupá by year 6.
(Misiones)h
Notes: * Not included: concession contracts for Tucumán, Santa Fe, and the Buenos Aires metropolitan area, which had less stringent metering targets; ** Metering rates calculated from
data reported by companies in ENOHSA-COFES (1999); residential users comprised the vast majority of accounts, and consumption by non-residential users was typically metered before
privatisation; *** Metering rates reported by companies from the ADERESA benchmarking project, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006; **** Company (SAMSA) records indicate that the metering rate
was only 18.4% at the beginning of the concession. An additional 20% of consumers were billed at metered rates but had non-functioning meters or no meter at all; ***** SAMSA reports
that, as of 2008, the company meters 95% of its consumer base.
Source: a.: Pliego de Bases y Condiciones, Capítulo 10; b.: Pliego de Condiciones Particulares, Anexo V, Parte E; c.: Pliego de Bases y Condiciones, Anexo V, Artículo 14.5; d.: Pliego de Bases
y Condiciones, Anexo XIII, Artículos 1.14, 1.15; e.: Contrato de Concesión, Artículo 4.2.1; f.: Contrato de Concesión, Anexo II, Capítulo III; g.: Contrato de Concesión, Anexo F, Artículo 2.2;
and h.: Contrato de Concesión, Anexo I.
What has stood in the way of water meters, staged major protests in There were, however, more subtle
implementation? One might suppose the central city, and voted not to accept reasons why consumers rejected
that tariff systems did not provide metering at neighbourhood assemblies.3 metering, reasons that stem from
concessionaires with financial incentives widespread reservations about the
to switch consumers from fixed charges What prompted these strong public motives of public and private institutions
to metered consumption. In the reactions against meter installation? in societies plagued by corruption.
Argentine contracts listed above, Let us start with the obvious explanations. The fact that different households
however, concessionaires could generally First, metering was introduced at the paid different rates, for instance,
charge higher tariffs when consumption same time as other controversial measures aroused scepticism; who was to ensure
was metered and when households designed to move utilities to cost-recovery, that meters functioned correctly and
consumed above a certain allotment. including scaled tariff increases, the more bills were being calculated fairly?
Rather, the main stumbling block has vigorous enforcement of bill payment, Technical difficulties only contributed
been consumer resistance. The historically and the “regularisation” of clandestine to such doubts. Invisible leaks in
quiescent population of Santiago del connections.4 Initially, regulatory household pipes, for example, could
Estero province, for instance, took to the frameworks for most of the contracts also lead to extremely high monthly
streets to march in protest against the required households to pay for the cost consumption rates. In areas where
installation of water meters, and secured of meters in instalments. Governments companies were unable to provide
a multi-year delay in the metering and firms responded to protests sparked constant levels of water pressure,
programme (Tenti, 2005, p. 165). Meanwhile, by this second issue by shifting the customers also wondered if they were
in neighbouring Salta province, financial burden for meter installation paying for air rather than water coming
individuals vandalised newly-installed onto the firm or government in most cases. through their pipes.
18 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
Ways Forward introduced. This gives individuals utilities to expand services and improve
The difficulties encountered in the a sense of whether they should pressure levels in outlying districts with
Argentine provinces highlight moderate consumption levels before fewer major new investments in system
the importance of approaching the the new rates come into effect. capacity. Recent efforts to implement
introduction of meters in political metering under the Washington
terms; consumer expectations and Utilities can schedule meter installation Consensus, however, have faced
scepticism must be anticipated and after stabilising water pressure in given significant political resistance.
addressed pre-emptively. Fortunately, districts, so as to avoid disputes
one can glean some effective strategies about measurement. Future efforts to introduce metering
from the Argentine concessions. Finally—and most effectively, should be preceded by careful thinking
according to officials of the Misiones about political strategy, particularly the
Metered tariff formulas must be clear concession—utilities should question of how to address longstanding
and intelligible to consumers when proactively identify households with citizen scepticism about the motives
they read their bills. abnormal consumption levels before the of public and private institutions.
The aforementioned strategies identified
Rates for modest levels of consumption introduction of metered billing
and send specialised technicians in the Argentine context may be of use in
should be lower than those for higher
to investigate if households have dealing with consumer resistance in
levels, and a level of consumption
serious leaks on their property. other settings.
adequate for modest family living
should cost no more than the fixed- According to most contracts,
rate regime. fixing such leaks is a household’s
Asociación de Entes Reguladores de
responsibility; such proactive efforts
Meter installation will meet less by a utility, however, will help
Agua Potable y Saneamiento de América
Latina (ADERASA) (2003, 2004, 2005, 2006).
resistance if firms or governments foot neutralise the most likely opponents Ejercicio Anual de Benchmarking.
the cost of installation. Users will of Processed data.
to metering once it is introduced.
course end up funding meters ENOHSA-COFES (1999). La Cobrabilidad
through regular tariffs, presuming de los Servicios Sanitarios en Argentina.
Introducing water metering on a more
the system is not subsidised, but Buenos Aires, ENOHSA-COFES.
widespread basis in developing countries
users are unlikely to see this.
promises to have numerous positive Tenti, María Mercedes (2005). La Reforma
Utilities can send households bills effects, especially for poorer city-dwellers del Estado Santiagueña: La Gestión política
en los 90’. Santiago del Estero, Argentina:
containing meter readings for several living on the urban fringe. Metering should Ediciones Universidad Católica de Santiago
months before metered billing is lower overall demand, thereby allowing del Estero.
income status of households may hinder failure to meet legally binding targets led Equity
cost recovery and discourage private to the termination of the contract. Equity refers to providing all households
investments. Moreover, there is a risk of with the same level of access to utilities
agency capture, preventing governments In what follows we tell an empirical story. despite their income status. A policy-
from fulfilling their regulatory role. We use data from national household maker could redistribute wealth either
surveys carried out by Bolivia’s Instituto by transferring physical assets from rich
Ascertaining whether privatisation Nacional de Estadistica (INE) between 1992 to poor households or by increasing
improves access to utilities is an empirical and 2005. We analyse access to water in provision to the poor more than
matter. Bolivia provides an interesting the period before and after privatisation proportionally. This latter approach
example, having privatised the water in the cities that privatised water seems to be reasonable in the case
utility in two important cities in the last provision and in those that did not. This of utility infrastructure.
decade. Water provision in La Paz and allows us to determine how far the private
El Alto was privatised between 1997 provider attempted to push the limits of Access to piped water became more
and 2005. Private participation was private provision and in the process how equitable (deconcentrated) under
effected through “concession contracts”. far, paradoxically, the poor benefited. the private concessions (see Figure 1).
Access to water is considered from three In 2005, the difference in coverage rates
An international water consortium won perspectives: delivery (coverage rate), between the poorest 20 per cent and the
the concession in those two cities. equity (concentration of access) and richest 20 per cent of the population fell
A 30-year contract (1997–2027) was granted affordability (water expenditure). from 30 to 4 percentage points in El Alto
for the operation and maintenance and from 15 to 4 percentage points
of, as well as investments in, water Delivery in La Paz, compared to the period prior
and sewerage provision. The upgraded The most fundamental indicator for to privatisation. A pro-poor increase in
infrastructure would remain under state assessing delivery is the water coverage access to water is especially noticeable
ownership after the concession period. rate—a headcount of households with in El Alto. Extending access to the poorest
In the other two largest Bolivian cities, in-house access to piped water. Access to households in particular led to a sharp
water provision remained cooperatively the utility is closely related to income: de-concentration in access to water.
managed (Santa Cruz) and under public connection fees are an entry barrier for
provision (Cochabamba).1 the poor, and infrastructure (extended An already high coverage rate in the
water grids) barely reaches slums or upper quintiles of the population,
Political discontent and popular informal settlements. Hence the poorest however, does not necessarily imply an
mobilisation, however, led to the early quintiles of the population usually have extension of the water supply to lower-
termination of the contracts in 2005. more limited access to piped water. income areas. As mentioned earlier,
Why were the private concessions ended private investment lacks market
prematurely? When the concession The analysis shows that in-house incentives to serve areas of low
contracts were drawn up, the government access to water has expanded more
and the company agreed coverage than proportionally in cities with
1. A caveat in the analysis arises from the fact that
targets: by 2001, installing 71,752 new private provision. In Cochabamba, Cochabamba was privatised for a short period of
water conections—roughly universal access deteriorated in this period, less than a year in 1999 (see Hailu and Hunt, 2008).
For a detailed escription of the empirical framework
access in La Paz and 82 per cent coverage while in Santa Cruz the coverage rate and limitations of the analysis, see Hailu et al. (2009).
in El Alto. Yet the private provider failed remained fairly constant (see Table 1).
2. We calculate a performance index based on
to meet the agreed targets. In addition, Furthermore, the results point to a Kakwani’s achievement function. The index is a
upward adjustment of tariffs provoked positive relationship between having non-linear transformation of the original coverage
indicator, taking the starting level into account and
public outrage. Eventually the access to water and living in cities allowing specification of the appreciation of degree
unpopularity of cost recovery and the where the water utility was privatised. of effort (Kakwani, 1993).
20 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
Concluding Remarks
From a delivery perspective, the network
expanded more in the cities where
provision had been privatised than in
the others. Of course, we cannot tell
whether this would have been the
outcome in La Paz and El Alto if there
had been no private intervention. Indeed,
household income has risen over the
years, which would naturally lead to
an increase in access to water because
of the affordability of connection fees.
Nonetheless, an interesting feature
of these cities is the large, pro-poor
character of water services expansion.
The explicit five-year expansion targets
imposed by the concession contracts
seem to have played a critical role in
the high growth of new connections.
Note: The concentration curves show the distribution of access to water in each city. The lowest quintile (the poorer 20%)
of population in El Alto, who had in 1996 14.6 percent of all water connections, increased its share to 19.5 percent
by the end of the concession period. In a perfect equality world, the bottom 20 percent of population should hold Apart from the expansion of access, the
20 percent of the total water access. As the curves move inwards (toward the equality line), a more equal distribution
of the access to water is observed.
price of water services and households’
capacity to afford water must also be
Source: Prepared by the authors based on household survey data released by INE.
taken into account. It is usually accepted
that households would spend more on
purchasing power. Hence the pro-poor (scheduled every five years after the water if the utility were private.
increase in water access in La Paz and concession) allowed a further 12 per cent
El Alto stemmed mainly from enforcement increase in water prices. That is not necessarily what we have
of the targets in the concession contract. found in a cross-city comparison in the
The contracts explicitly demanded that In a cross-city analysis, as expected, period of privatisation. It is true that,
the companies provide services to low- the poorest income quintiles reveal the before privatisation, water tariffs are
income areas and, as stated, the target highest incidence of households that adjusted so as to offer an attractive cost
was to reach very high levels of coverage. cannot afford water. In 2001, the share recovery outlook for prospective firms.
of households that spent more than 3 In this case, households suffer a one-off
Affordability per cent of their income on water bills welfare loss. But quite a large proportion
Households should not spend more was as high as 64 and 78 per cent for of poor households in the cities where
than 3 percent of their income on water the poorest quintiles in non-privatised the utility is public or cooperatively
bills. This is the acceptable affordability Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, managed could not afford water either.
threshold. Although data on household respectively. Throughout the period, Hence affordability seems to be a
water expenditure is not available for the moreover, average household water problem in these cities as well.
period immediately before privatisation, expenditure, by income quintiles, was
we can compare expenditure over 2001 persistently higher in these cities than The chief message of this analysis
and 2005. Before the concessions in in those with privatised provision. is that privatisation contracts not
La Paz and El Alto, a 19 per cent upward always fare well in poor countries.
adjustment in water prices was offered The burden of water expenditure was The concessions in La Paz and El Alto
as an inducement to private companies. heaviest for poor households in Santa failed. Though the poorest households
In 2001, the first revision of targets Cruz, which spent on average 8.8 per had better access than before, price
Poverty in Focus August 2009 21
increases created a negative perception connections stipulated in the contract, Hailu, Degol, Rafael Osorio and Raquel
Tsukada (2009). “Privatisation and
among consumers. Spending on the government felt compelled to Renationalisation: What Went Wrong in
infrastructure and service provision demand termination of the contract. Bolivia’s Water Sector?” IPC-IG Working
reaches the limits of profitability. Paper No. 58. International Policy Centre for
Inclusive Growth. Brasilia.
The company could no longer exploit the
ability to pay and engage in cost recovery. Hailu, Degol and Portia Hunt. (2008). “Utility
Provision: Contract Design in the Interest Kakwani, Nanak (1993).
of the Poor”, IPC-IPG Policy Research Brief “Performance in Living Standards:
Furthermore, since the concessionaire No. 10. International Policy Centre for An International Comparison”, Journal of
did not comply with the number of new Inclusive Growth. Brasilia. Development Economics 41, pp. 307–336.
The characteristics associated with Note: MS = minimum salary, which was equivalent to about US$200 in June 2007.
households and individuals without Source: National Household Sample Survey (PNAD).
22 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
services should mainly benefit poor techniques to data from the National We use a difference-in-differences
families. In what follows, we suggest that Sanitation Information System (SNIS).1 method to compare the change in
private sector participation in the water This includes information on several outcome in the treatment group before
sector has been successful in doing just technical indicators related to water and after the treatment (here, privatisation),
that, and therefore should be considered services over the period 1995–2003 to the change in outcome in the
a viable alternative to public provision. for a large number of municipalities. control group (here, the municipalities
that did not privatise their water services).
To a great extent, water supply services in The control variables in our model are
Brazil still reflect the policies established GDP per capita, productivity, investment, By comparing changes, it is possible
under the National Sanitation Plan and cost variables that try to capture to isolate the effects of treatment from
(Planasa) in 1971, which favoured large- economies of scale and density, besides other factors affecting the outcome.
scale investments and cross-subsidy auxiliary dummies. According to our As in the previous estimations, this
schemes. The sector is dominated by results, private provision increases method generates a positive and
regional companies that serve a large access to water supply by more than 26 significant estimated coefficient for
number of municipalities and have per cent compared to public provision. private provision, confirming the
extensive networks. Since the mid 1990s, positive impact of privatisation on
however, many municipalities have More importantly, the impact of private the population’s access to water services.
chosen to outsource the provision of water provision is higher in the lower income
services to privately owned or operated deciles, indicating that the benefits of It is safe to say, therefore, that private
companies. In urban areas, there were higher access rates due to privatisation provision has led to an improvement
about 1,350 water and sewage entities accrue mostly to poorer municipalities. in access to water services in Brazil, and
in 2006, of which 32 had been privatised. that this effect was more pronounced
in municipalities at the bottom of the
In the North region of Brazil, Manaus, It is safe to say, income (GDP) per capita spectrum. These
the capital of the state of Amazonas, and therefore, that private results allow us to conjecture that low-
Novo Progresso in the state of Pará are income households have benefited the
the only cities where water is supplied
provision has led to an
most in that respect, since Brazil has a
by private companies. In the Middle West improvement in access relatively high coverage rate in water
there are private enterprises in the states to water services provision (compared to other developing
of Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul and countries) and higher-income families are
Tocantins. The Southeast has most of the
in Brazil, and that
usually the first to get access.
private experiences, mainly in the states this effect was more
of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, but pronounced in Part of this result might be attributable
also in Espírito Santo and Minas Gerais. to investment obligations assumed by
In the South, the states of Paraná and
municipalities at
private operators at the time they were
Santa Catarina have tried the private the bottom of the granted their concessions. Total scheduled
provision of sanitation services. income (GDP) investments by private operators until
per capita spectrum. the end of their concession contracts
Private ventures undertaken so far differ (between 2025 and 2030) amount to
considerably in terms of financing R$3.38 billion (about U$1.54 billion), of
and tariff structures. In some cases, These results, however, do not take which R$1.10 billion (about U$500 million)
companies subscribed the totality into account possible “inertia” effects. or 32.7 per cent had been disbursed by
of their initial capital, while in others This means that our results might be the end of 2004. Disbursements to the
relatively sophisticated financing schemes spurious if private provision were end of 2009 are estimated at half the
were set up, including equity and debt. disproportionately introduced in total value of investments.
municipalities that had higher access
Tariff structures are in line with those rates at the outset. To address this issue, Additionally, privately owned or managed
adopted in the past by the sector, we use a different dataset that allows companies in Brazil generally invest more
based on minimum consumption rates us to compare municipalities before than public companies or governments,2
and increased block-rate tariffs, and and after the privatisation of water which may be one of the reasons
differentiated according to user groups. supply services. for the relative success they have had in
In some cases, price-cap regulation increasing access rates (see Figures 2–4).
was implemented. Concessions are The database is from the Brazil Human
the contractual instrument of choice Development Atlas (HAD), made available
in most cases. by the United Nations Development 1. Published by the Programme for the Modernisation
of the Sanitation Sector (PMSS) of the Brazilian
Programme in Brazil. This database
Ministry of Cities.
In order to evaluate quantitatively consolidates socioeconomic data available
2. In Brazil, these can be grouped into autarky,
the impact of private provision on in the 1991 and 2000 Brazilian direct public administration, and publicly owned
access, we first apply panel data Demographic Censuses. or managed companies.
Poverty in Focus August 2009 23
At the beginning of 2003 the MME In the Amazon region there are projects developed. Experience in Germany
decided to restructure PRODEEM, and in to test and implement demonstrations has shown that this goal cannot
2005 it was incorporated into an initiative units of a conventional diesel engine be met until an appropriate
called Light in the Countryside. that has been adapted to operate with economic policy framework and an
palm oil. CENBIO (http://cenbio.iee.usp.br) environmentally sound regulatory
In Brazil there are many small and has developed two pilot plants using palm framework have been created, and
medium-sized communities that are oil in adapted engines in Pará state, with until specific promotional measures
isolated from the urban centres and quite significant results. have been implemented.
are not connected to the utility. Hence
they depend on fossil fuel for electricity RETs, in addition to their undisputed 3. In many regions, RET supply
production, particularly in the Amazon ecological advantages, are often the most structures are inadequate. Market
region. But several of these places have economical means of supplying energy development is hampered by a
favourable conditions for the use of to remote and thinly populated areas. shortage of qualified suppliers,
renewable energy sources, such as The typically decentralised renewable rudimentary distribution channels, and
photovoltaic (PV), small hydropower energy systems using local energy sources inadequate service and maintenance.
(SHP), biomass and so forth. can be easily adapted in size and capacity
to meet a modest demand, and thus are Nonetheless, in recent years there
Given these conditions and the new especially suitable for overcoming energy have been decisive improvements
rules for universalisation of electricity poverty in rural areas. in the conditions for expanding the
services, it can be expected that more use of sustainable energy systems in
generation systems will be installed developing countries. Renewable energy
using local energy sources in the Biomass is a good encompasses a number of sources and
not too distant future. technologies at different stages of
option for decentralised development and maturity.
For remote villages, PV, SHP and biomass electricity generation.
systems are the best options. Brazil’s The most used forms Generally speaking, many of the
intense solar radiation favours PV technologies have become mature
technology and biomass, circumstances
are agricultural residues, over the last decade; they are no longer
that allowed the development of such wood residues, vegetable curiosities for a dedicated few, but
pilot plants. But PV systems still have oils and biogas. have become big business. Large global
high installation costs and are feasible companies have entered the markets
only when other systems are not for wind, solar and biomass technologies,
available. Thus the development of PV Renewable energy installations are and the traditional finance community
solar energy in Brazil is recent and its therefore already contributing to the is gradually mainstreaming renewable
contribution as an alternative energy reduction of greenhouse gas emissions energy into its lending portfolios.
source is still tiny. from the energy sector, albeit on a
very modest scale. Many long-term In this context, RET can play a significant
In these isolated communities, the projections predict that renewable role in increasing the energy supply,
costs of transporting fuel (diesel oil) energy will play a major role in the mainly in remote regions, since adequate
to the community make the fuel price global energy supply in the second policies are being implemented to
double that in urban areas, while half of the twenty-first century. overcome the barriers discussed here.
bioenergy production costs are lower Such policies should include special
than for diesel oil. Besides transport Despite these advantages, the incentives to local utilities for RET,
costs there are environmental pollution dissemination of technologies using including appropriate capacity building
risks during transportation, such as renewable energy sources has not yet for operation and maintenance, as well
the danger of fuel spillage. Electricity acquired the desired momentum. as economic subsidies.
generation from biomass is appropriate Projects to spread renewable energies,
Goldemberg J. and S. T. Coelho (2003).
in these conditions (Goldemberg and particularly in developing countries, “Renewable Energy – Traditional Biomass
Coelho, 2003). must overcome several obstacles: vs. Modern Biomass”, Energy Policy 32 (6),
pp. 711–714.
Biomass is a good option for 1. Even RETs that are competitive from a IBGE (1992). Pesquisa Nacional de
decentralised electricity generation. business management viewpoint Amostragem por Domicílios – PNAD.
The most used forms are agricultural must surmount the hurdle of the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e
Estatística. Brasilia.
residues, wood residues, vegetable oils high initial investment costs. Lack of
and biogas. Vegetable oil pilot plants security makes loans hard to obtain, IBGE (2001). Censo demográfico. Instituto
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística.
match the conditions of users, resources, especially in rural areas. Brasilia. Available at: <www.ibge.gov.br>.
technologies and capacities. But
constraints arising from the law 2. In many places, fair competitive MME (2003). Programa Luz para Todos
(Light for All Programme). Ministry of
regulating the CCC make it hard conditions have to be established Mines and Energy. Brasilia. Available at:
to secure the benefits of the fund. before markets for new RETs can be <http://www.mme.gov.br/luzparatodos>.
Poverty in Focus August 2009 27
Impact on Poverty
The privatisation of public utilities (2005), privatisation is ideally assessed
remains a controversial topic in using CGE models when the goal is An inadequate and
the policy arena. In many parts to verify the impact of relative price unreliable electricity
of the developing world, privatisations changes on different markets and supply is one of the most
designed to improve efficiency and cost socioeconomic groups. Macroeconomic serious constraints on
recovery have often been associated with assessment is also important because economic growth in
large price increases that have caused utility reforms typically affect other many Sub-Saharan
enormous social and political tensions economic markets such as labour, African countries.
(Birdsall and Nellis, 2003). In Africa the investments and savings, which can have
infrastructure privatisation process has a significant effect on poverty and on the The Millennium
been more sluggish (Estache, 2005), but welfare of the poor. In recent years, these Development Goals (MDGs)
slowly emerging evidence on the effects models with micro modules have been and the countries’ poverty
of reforms is hinting at similar problems. used extensively in distributional impact reduction strategies call
Distributional impact analysis applied in analysis in developing countries. What for increasing electricity
Senegal and Mali provides useful does the evidence tell us? coverage by 2015.
information for future reforms.
Reform in Mali
An inadequate and unreliable electricity Mali’s public utility operator, Energie
supply is one of the most serious du Mali (EDM), was established in 1960,
constraints on economic growth in shortly after independence, with capital
many Sub-Saharan African countries. The from the Malian government and the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) French Development Agency. It offered
and the countries’ poverty reduction both water and electricity services.
strategies call for increasing electricity
coverage by 2015. Reaching this goal Initially, EDM operated small diesel-fired
and meeting demand will require generating plants in Bamako and several
massive investments, which will have to secondary cities. The cost of producing
be accompanied by reforms in the sector. electricity was very high, which
encouraged the Malian government
When a utility is privatised, it might be to develop hydro power through the
necessary to raise the price of electricity construction of three plants. As a public
in order to generate the funds needed utility, EDM suffered from the same
to reach the coverage target (capital problems that afflicted other African
expenses) set out in the poverty utilities, including mismanagement
reduction strategy, as well as to cover and political interference.
operating expenses. Raising prices,
however, has implications for economic In 1986, EDM adopted a performance
activity in many sectors of the economy contract to try to improve operations but
and for the welfare of households. In the the process was disrupted by political
past, public electricity companies have instability. In 1994, the government
run deficits and governments have cross- solicited bids to manage the utility.
subsidised electricity consumers. The international competition was
won by a French-Canadian consortium
In this article we apply a computable including (SAUR, Hydro-Québec and EDF).
general equilibrium (CGE) model to Each member of the consortium was
analyse the impact of pricing reforms in responsible for functions at EDM.
the electricity sector in Senegal and Mali. The contract went well for the first year
As suggested by Parker and Kirkpatrick or two, after which relationships between
28 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
the partners and the Malian board of production and distribution, promote
Reforms of the
directors deteriorated, and the contract regional cooperation, and raise the rate
was cancelled in March 1998. of electrification in rural areas. Despite electricity sector
two failed attempts at privatisation, the should include an
In 2000, the Malian government prepared government reiterated its will to privatise
aggressive programme
a 20-year concession contract, which was Senelec. To date, progress towards the
won by SAUR (the government retained chief goal of the proposed reform—to to extend the network
ownership of 40 per cent). Under this increase the supply of electricity and the and increase the
contract, the operator would be required share of the population with access
access of the poor.
to increase coverage from 80,000 to to it—has been modest.
300,000 electricity customers and, in
urban centres, to increase access Findings of the Distributional transfer/direct subsidy programme1
from 34 to 97 per cent by 2020. Impact Analysis for poor households directly affected
The impact analysis of electricity price by higher power prices—for those
The associated investment needs were increases and compensating schemes to connected to the grid—attenuates
about 20 billion CFA francs per year. poor households was performed for the the negative effect.
The contract specified a formula for tariff two countries. The first important finding
adjustments until a regulator, created by of price increases (ranging from 10 per However, the negative general
the same reform, could begin to enforce cent to 45 per cent) is their relatively equilibrium effect on factor payments
a price-cap approach. The Ministry of small distributional impact. The small (labour, land and capital) overrides the
Mines, Energy and Water retained negative impact is promising since positive general equilibrium effect of
responsibility for the technical compensating policies are financially the goods and services price decreases;
supervision of EDM. feasible and this situation should help hence other households are negatively
implement price increases. affected by those scenarios. It is
Reform in Senegal important to highlight that the cash
During the first attempt to reform the The three main explanations for these transfer programme is relatively cheap
electricity utility, a consortium assumed results are: the relatively small extent because so few of the poor are presently
full management in January 1999. of the electricity network (including connected to the grid.
In September 2000, just 18 months after household and non-household
the privatisation, the new government consumers); the very small portion These findings highlight the importance
of Senegal bought back the consortium’s of poor households connected to the of taking into account the general
share of the utility. In the second network; and the relatively high prices equilibrium effect of proposed reforms
attempt, the consortium that won of electricity before the reforms. This in order to fully capture their impact
the tender refused to complete the situation is very different from that in on poverty and inequality. Few poor
deal, leading to another failure. many Latin American countries and households are connected to the
centrally planned economies in Europe. electricity grid. Moreover, few of the
The pricing practices of Senegal’s Original prices were in the ranges of or poorest households are likely to benefit
electricity utility, Senelec, are quite just below the average tariffs in countries from early extensions of the network.
standard. Prices are differentiated by of the Organisation for Economic
voltage: users of higher voltages are billed Cooperation and Development (OECD). Thus it is not surprising that increases
the highest price, and the price drops with in power prices have little direct effect
the voltage. Since March 2002, various on most poor households, whereas a
pricing schemes have been implemented The Millennium much larger group will be affected by
for specific clients. Tariffs are relatively Development Goals the general equilibrium effects of the
high by West African standards. Proposed increases. In both countries, however,
(MDGs) and the
changes in Senelec’s prices must also be the biggest losers are the poor
authorised by an administrative process countries’ poverty households not connected to the
before taking effect. reduction strategies power grid, because unconnected
households receive no transfers but
call for increasing
With respect to investment, the three- suffer from the general equilibrium
year public investment programmes for electricity coverage effects of the price increases.
2000/02 and 2002/04 foresaw investments by 2015.
amounting to 8 per cent of the country’s Analyses similar to that presented here
total productive investment. The plan can be very useful in policy-making
confirmed the government’s intention Our cost-recovery simulations clearly by illuminating the paths by which
to increase the supply of electricity. produce positive effects for the electricity the effects of reforms are transmitted
Other goals of the investment were to utility in both countries, but negative to the poor. It is also possible to
increase efficiency in production, improve ones for government, households and measure the strength of those effects,
the institutional framework for firms. The compensatory direct cash by providing clues to the design of
Poverty in Focus August 2009 29
effective compensatory policies for direct effects of price increases, but also Center for Global Development,
(Washington, D.C.). pp. 281–296.
groups disproportionately affected for negative general equilibrium effects
by the reforms. of needed reforms. Parker D. and C. Kirkpatrick (2005).
“Privatisation in Developing Countries:
Reforms of the electricity sector should A Review of the Evidence and the Policy
Birdsall N. and J. Nellis (2003). Lessons”, Journal of Development Studies
include an aggressive programme to “Winners and Losers: Assessing the 41 (4), pp. 513–541.
extend the network and increase the Distributional Impact of Privatization”,
World Development 31(10), pp. 1617-1633.
access of the poor. Additionally, because
the general equilibrium effects on the poor Estache, A. (2005). “On Latin America’s 1. Both types of transfer programme are equivalent
can be clearly negative, it is important to Infrastructure Experience: Policy Gaps and in the model, since we assume zero management
the Poor”, in J. Nellis and N. Birdsall (eds.), cost of the cash transfer programme. The direct subsidy
explore alternative targeting policies to Reality Check: The Distributional Impact programme would consist of maintaining the price
compensate the poor—not only for the of Privatization in Developing Countries. of electricity constant for poor households.
Rural Ghana
Women spend several hours a through its associated benefits, such as
day performing domestic chores and reducing waterborne diseases, lowering Women’s income
caring for other household members. infant mortality and preventing the poverty in developing
In developing countries, the burden of threat of violent aggression towards countries is usually
domestic activities is intensified by the women on their way to the water exacerbated by
lack of basic infrastructure, such as access sources, which are often located time poverty.
to water and electricity. The time spent on some distance from their homes.
domestic chores is not remunerated and Infrastructure provision,
it represents significant forgone income Thus far the literature has, however, not such as access to indoor piped
for women. Infrastructure provision, presented much empirical evidence on the water or community-provided
such as access to indoor piped water relationship between infrastructure and services, potentially reduces
or community-provided services, access to labour markets. One example is women’s time burden.
potentially reduces women’s time Ilahi and Grimard (2000), which show that
burden. The saving includes time spent in rural Pakistan, poor infrastructure (water
on loading, unloading and purifying access) reduces the time that women
water, and on walking to and from the devote to market-oriented activities and
water source. Testing for rural women in increases women’s total work burden.
Ghana, access to water infrastructure (in
the community or the household) seems Other studies only argue that women
to be significantly related to a decrease are more likely to be time-poor than
in their total working time. men (e.g., Bardasi and Wodon, 2006, for
Guinea). Coulombe and Wodon (2008)
Women’s income poverty in developing found that access to infrastructure does
countries is usually exacerbated by time not significantly affect the total amount
poverty. Releasing time constraints would of hours women work in Ghana,
enable women to engage in productive thus suggesting that time saved from
activities (enter the labour market), domestic work due to infrastructure
dedicate more time to other domestic provision might be used for
activities (such as childbearing or caring remunerated activities.
for elderly household members), pursue
education or have a little leisure (which To contribute to this debate and provide This article is based on: Costa, J.; D. Hailu; E. Silva
may also be used for improving health). some additional empirical evidence we and R. Tsukada (2009) “The implication of water and
electricity supply in Ghana for the time allocation of
Furthermore, access to safe water improves investigate the effect on women’s time women”, Working Paper No. 59, International Policy
overall household living conditions use of providing households with basic Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG). Brasilia.
30 International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
infrastructure. More specifically, we fetch water, and the majority of them per cent of men spend less than 20 hours
analyse how access to piped water spend up to 15 hours a week doing so. a week doing so. On the other hand,
influences women’s allocation of time 96.5 per cent of women spend time
between paid (labour market) and unpaid This labour division and specialisation on domestic work, and 81.8 per cent
activities (domestic chores and leisure) may imply efficiency gains for the of total women spend more than
in rural Ghana. household and, therefore, optimal 20 hours a week. Interestingly, despite
household behaviour. Nevertheless, the heavy domestic workload, 80 per
The Theory women as individuals have less control cent of women also spend some time
Studies of time allocation are often over the household assets (less economic on market work, which includes any
based on Becker’s (1965) utility model, autonomy) and a higher workload. kind of income-generating activity
whereby households combine time and (even simple home-produced goods).
market-purchased goods to produce Figure 1 shows that the total work time
commodities that comprise their utility (domestic plus market work) is much The data shows that domestic work
functions. A household maximises utility higher for women. For instance, 19.3 and fetching water are responsibilities
in line with the commodities and leisure per cent of women work more than 112 that fall mainly on women. Our next
time consumed: its problem is deciding hours a week, while for men a proportion step is to investigate how water
on the consumption level and time ten times smaller does the same. provision might determine women´s
allocated to each activity (water time use. We use econometric models
production, market labour, household Some 79.1 per cent of men in rural Ghana to test the relationship between having
activities and leisure). This is constrained spend time on domestic work, but 61.6 water infrastructure and the time women
by its available income and a daily
time endowment.
by Nitish Jha,
Energy and Resources Institute,
New Delhi
Barriers to Community-
Based Water Supply
and Sanitation in India
In India, there is an urgent need to nationwide water supply coverage (WHO
The questions that bedevil address the institutional and social and UNICEF, 2006). According to that source,
service delivery in India’s obstacles to the provision of water 87 per cent of the population was covered
water supply and sanitation and sanitation. Institutional hurdles, in 2004, up from 70 per cent in 1990.
sector is why, despite more compounded by bureaucratic inertia and Of those covered in 2004, almost 70 per
than six decades of official the lack of political will to foster greater cent lived in rural areas (Figure 1). These
convergence, create a breach between national-level statistics seem to be at odds
efforts to bring these utilities
project planning and implementation. with unofficial sources and, even if true,
to the poor, access to safe
Meanwhile, attitudinal and socioeconomic they conceal wide regional disparities.
water is still highly
barriers pose challenges not just to
inequitable and open
the operation and management According to WHO and UNICEF (2006),
defecation remains
of community-based schemes but, sanitation coverage increased from a mere
widespread. in some cases, to their very adoption. 14 per cent to 33 per cent in the period
1990–2004, and most of the gains were
In many communities, Despite the large investments in water in rural areas (see Figure 2). The estimates
disadvantaged groups are infrastructure for drinking purposes seem quite low, but it is possible that the
excluded from decision- and other domestic uses, India still ranks real circumstances are worse because
making processes. 133rd among 180 countries for its poor these figures are based on physical
water availability—1,880 cubic metres per infrastructure delivered, rather than on
person annually. Over 480 million people observations of the actual practice of
(or at least 45 per cent of the population) indoor sanitation. Even in terms of nominal
still lack access to adequate safe drinking sanitation, however, as indicated by
water (Pangare et al., 2006). Nonetheless, standard coverage, India appears to be
figures on water supply coverage worse off than some low-income countries.
indicate that India is well on its way
to covering its entire population of The questions that bedevil service
more than 1 billion (see Figure 1). delivery in India’s water supply and
sanitation sector is why, despite more
The mid-term assessment report of the than six decades of official efforts to
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) bring these utilities to the poor, access
for water supply and sanitation shows that to safe water is still highly inequitable
India has surpassed Target 10 in terms of and open defecation remains widespread.
Studies reveal that there are problems
with the way in which these schemes are
planned and delivered by governments,
on one hand, and users’ receptivity of
the schemes, on the other.
Community-Based Provision:
A Recent Institutional Innovation
Given these problems and the private
sector’s negligible presence in this field,
a new model is being tried, in keeping
with recent thinking in international
policy circles about how best to supply
these utilities to rural and some poor
urban communities. This fresh approach
combines water and sanitation delivery,
and entails transfer of the management
of the drinking water supply and
sanitation schemes from state
governments to user communities. Source: Prepared using data from WHO and UNICEF (2006, p. 32).
Failure to take account of such matters the extent of the burdens borne at Thus, for community-managed utility
often results in communal toilets being different levels within a community— provision to be sustainable in the long
built in a sanitary “no man’s land” or in individuals, households and groups. For term, donor and implementing agencies
an area where one social group uses the example, an examination of the prevailing should pay more attention than they
toilet to the exclusion of all others. gender division of labour in the rural have so far to social and attitudinal factors.
Because of the consequent lack of well- water and sanitation sector may highlight In the medium term, they should also
defined roles and duties, these structures the exclusion of women from decision- consider the importance of “handholding”
are poorly maintained and ultimately fall making in both the household and public in the capacity building process. Until
into disuse. Conversely, some realms, despite their responsibility for such time as there is greater parity in
counterintuitive attitudinal factors result many of the tasks in this sector. Based on decision-making, there should be less
in some village residents preferring open an appraisal of the gender division of emphasis on participatory management
defecation to indoor sanitation. For labour in any given community, therefore, per se and more on factors such as
instance, for relatively wealthy, high- a concerted effort can be made to ensure institutionalising leadership and rules,
caste women who are otherwise subject that women play a role equal to men in all building skills and creating knowledge.
to ritual seclusion, communal defecation aspects of decision-making in the sector.
allows for a degree of social interaction
that they would lose if they opted for Other fault lines may stem from caste or Black, M. and R. Talbot (2005). Water—
A Matter of Life and Health: Water Supply
toilets in or near their homes. class. A caste-based analysis may show and Sanitation in Village India. Oxford
that one group bears an inordinately University Press, New Delhi and UNICEF.
Recommendations heavy burden for sanitation in the
McKenzie, D. and I. Ray (2005). “Household
Community schemes complement rather community but is simultaneously Water Delivery Options in Urban and Rural
than replace traditional water and excluded from drawing water from the India”, Working Paper 224. Stanford Center
sanitation management. A scheme brings village well. This burden will grow if social for International Development (SCID),
Stanford University.
with it a new set of tasks to be performed, relations remain unchanged, even as a
and thus imposes an additional burden. new scheme is being introduced. In India, Pangare, G., V. Pangare and B. Das (2006).
Certain individuals bear the brunt of this projects have been scuttled because local Springs of Life: India’s Water Resources.
heavier burden of water and sanitation if elites have captured resources such as Academic Foundation. New Delhi.
the new intervention ignores the existing water. Moreover, schemes are often World Health Organisation (WHO)
division of labour. designed to exclude certain groups on and United Nations Children’s Fund
the basis of their caste or religion, which (UNICEF) (2006). Meeting the MDG Drinking
Water and Sanitation Target: The Urban
An explicit account of water- and may correlate with their weaker political and Rural Challenge of the Decade.
sanitation-related tasks and roles reveals and economic status. WHO Press. Geneva.
Privatisation: Impact on Human Rights compromising equal, affordable and Physical accessibility: Marginalised
By ratifying one of the key international physical access to sufficient, safe and populations such as indigenous
human rights treaties, the ICESCR, acceptable water” (CESCR, 2002, p. 9). people and deprived urban
governments pledge to realise four Human rights, therefore, provide a yardstick populations should obtain equal
dimensions of human rights in delivering to guide the adequate delivery of services. access (and also to obviate the
basic services: their availability, physical danger that providers might “cherry-
and economic accessibility, acceptability Human Rights: Guiding Privatisation pick” the most lucrative customers).
and quality. But reality is often different. A state’s main obligation in privatisation
For instance, Bolivia’s “water war” processes is to protect people’s human Monitor compliance of private actors and
in Cochabamba attracted significant rights—in the case of water, for example, ensure access to remedies: The draft
attention for human rights reasons. by preventing third parties from adversely guidelines on the right to water
The government followed the World affecting equal, affordable and physical presented to the UN Sub-Commission
Bank’s recommendation that no subsidies access to enough safe, acceptable water. on Human Rights (UN, 2005) call for the
should be given to ameliorate the establishment or the authorisation of
increase in water tariffs. Tariffs increased With this in mind, a number of practical independent institutions such as human
by as much as 200 per cent. For some, steps can be suggested from a human rights commissions or regulatory
this translated into bills that amounted rights perspective to guide the private agencies to carry out monitoring
to 20–25 per cent of household monthly provision of basic services. activities in a manner that ensures
income. Privatisation, moreover, did not full transparency and accountability.
adequately protect their customary uses of Undertake an impact assessment: Where such In addition, the guidelines stress
water, such as for agriculture. Widespread assessments have been undertaken on that everyone should have access to
protests and civil unrest ensued, which water privatisation projects, they have administrative or judicial procedures
eventually led to the cancellation of the been able to systematically identify risks, in order to complain about acts or
concession. Did the Bolivian government for instance with regard to accessibility omissions in contravention of the
violate its people’s economic rights? and quality of the water supply; examples right to water and sanitation.
include the Argentine cases documented
The sharp increase in water tariffs made it by Rights and Democracy (2007). In summary, using a human rights
difficult for many Bolivians to economically framework as a guide is not only a
access (afford) water. Households were cut Consider alternatives through genuine public matter of legal obligation for states that
off from the water supply altogether, participation: Governments that have have signed the relevant human rights
so people may not have been able to guaranteed the right to water in their treaties. It is also vital for setting and
physically access water. By disallowing constitutions, as South Africa does, are raising standards of a life in dignity
customary indigenous uses, the open to involving the private sector across countries.
arrangement did not ensure that water but require local governments to first
was supplied in ways that are culturally consider public alternatives, including
acceptable. Privatisation arrangements can community-managed schemes, social CESCR (2002). General Comment No. 15: The
also affect water quality, such as when privatisation or internationally-financed Right to Water. Geneva, UN Committee on
Economic Social and Cultural Rights. UNHCHR
close monitoring by a regulator is lacking. schemes (COHRE et al., 2007).
website, <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
0/a5458d1d1bbd713fc1256cc400389e94/
Signatory states also have three kinds of Negotiate loan conditions with lenders: This is $FILE/G0340229.pdf>.
obligations: to respect, protect and fulfil often politically difficult, given many
human rights. While the obligation to countries’ dependence on support from COHRE et al. (2007). Manual on the Right
to Water and Sanitation. Geneva,
respect requires that the state itself refrain donor institutions. The renationalisation Washington, D.C., Berne and Nairobi,
from interfering with the enjoyment of of utilities in Bolivia, however, shows clearly Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions,
people’s human rights, the obligation that civil society pressure can open up American Association for the Advancement
to protect requires a state to prevent third space for governments to (re-)negotiate of Science, Swiss Agency for Development
and Cooperation, United Nations Human
parties from interfering with those rights. concession contracts (see the article by Settlements Programme. COHRE website,
The obligation to fulfil requires states Hailu, Osorio and Tsukada in this issue). <http://www.cohre.org/store/attachments/
to actively strengthen people’s ability to RWP%20-%20Manual_final_full_final.pdf>.
meet their own needs and, if individuals Regulate private actors through legislation
Rights and Democracy (2007). Human Rights
or groups cannot provide for themselves and the design of service agreements: In their Impact Assessments for Foreign Investment
in exceptional cases, to provide the duty to protect, states must regulate Projects. International Centre for Human
realisation of those human rights. third parties to ensure that privatisation Rights and Democratic Development.
Montreal. Rights and Democracy website,
does not lead to a decline in access to <http://www.dd-rd.ca/site/_PDF/publications/
In the case of the privatisation of utilities by the poor. For example, globalization/hria/full%20report_may_2007.pdf>.
basic services, the emphasis of a state’s they need to ensure:
obligation is on protecting the human UN (2005). Draft Guidelines for the
rights of people relative to private actors. Economic accessibility: Poor households Realization of the Right to Drinking Water
should not be disproportionately and Sanitation. UN Sub-Commission on
The relevant UN committee thus stresses
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.
that “where water services […] are burdened with water expenses Geneva. UNHCHR website,
operated or controlled by third parties, compared to richer households <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/
States […] must prevent them from (CESCR, 2002). water/docs/SUb_Com_Guisse_guidelines.pdf>.
International