Listening to God: Using MetaTerminology to Describe Revelation in a Comparative Theistic Context A. J.

Watson

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Theology Update

Listening to God: Using MetaTerminology to Describe Revelation in a Comparative Theistic Context1

By A. J. Watson
Abstract: Starting from the assertion that comparative theology is inherently dialogical in nature, this paper examines the use of non-confessional meta-terminology and its application in interfaith dialogue. In so doing, it examines potential meta-terms for describing revelation as related in the Bhagavad-Gita, the Quran, and the Gospel of John, and concludes that non-confessional terms aid in the dismissal of normative viewpoints, leading to greater appreciation of commonality and meaning in the truth claims of other faiths and dialogue partners. Key Terms: comparative theology, revelation, interfaith dialogue, Quran, Bhagavad-Gita, Gospel of John

Introduction: Revelation and Meta-Terminology

Comparativeor inter-religioustheology is a relatively new field within the study of religion that emphasizes faith commitments and issues related to confessional religious identity within a pluralistic environment.2 As such, comparative theology is inherently dialogical in application. In fact, one of the central questions asked by the Comparative Theology Group at the American Academy of Religion is, how might members within a particular tradition and those persons out-

side of it learn from one another regarding that tradition?3 This being the case, revelation in a theistic context, for which I use a definition implied by Karl Barth, Francis Clooney, Fazlur Rahman and others as the self-offering or self-manifestation of God, describes the process by which God is revealed to followers and is thus a basic tenet of faith in most theistic religions. Central to this question of revelation is how different religions treat the physical manifestation of God, and what God has to say to believers in that form. Within an interfaith or pluralistic context, then, a believers particular understanding of revelation can provide either an aid to dialogue or a significant stumbling block, as

A. J. Watson is completing doctoral work on comparative missions at Cambridge University. He is a graduate of Harvard Divinity School, and has researched Islam and interfaith dialogue at the Pluralism Project and with the Islam in the West Program at Harvard University.
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2009 Wiley Periodicals and Dialog, Inc.

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the confessional grammar of revelation is driven by that believers interpretation of truth claims. From a dialogical perspective, this begs the question of whether these manifestations are different, and if so, how? Furthermore, can dialogue between faiths about confessional issues be aided through the use of meta/non-confessional terms that are potentially less pregnant with spiritual meaning, thereby enabling believers to better appreciate the revelatory messages of other faiths, a process which is a stated goal of the Comparative Theology Group?4 I propose an experiment that attempts to apply nonconfessional terms in examining how God is revealed to followers, and what God actually has to say in revelatory form. In this article, I propose to briefly sketch out this aspect of revelation through the juxtaposition of three concise, but illustrative, texts from three religious traditions: Chapters 4 and 11 of the Bhagavad-Gita; the Gospel of John, with special emphasis on chapter 4 and chapter 6:41-47; and the Quranic view of prophethood and revelation in the Surah of the Cow: 2.97 as interpreted by the late Fazlur Rahman, a renowned Islamic scholar. In incorporating Quranic revelation, I hope to include an example where God does not reveal him/herself in human form, thereby ideally presenting another view of Gods revelation. In examination of these passages, I will review the revelation of God in two distinct ways: Gods physical manifestation (if any); and the general conclusions drawn from Gods revelation to his/her followers. In so doing, I will apply meta terms for describing the event of Gods revelation, and descriptive terms for two principal ways in which revelation is manifested: direct revelation and revelation by agency. I further subdivide revelation by agency into personal or impersonal revelation. Using the examples of these texts, I hope to briefly, if not comprehensively, illustrate the application of these terms for different types of revelation. Finally, I will attempt to determine if there is a common theme apparent in Gods revelation in all three passages, outline other potential lines of questioning for further consideration, and point towards applications in interreligious dialogue.

Three Denitions of Revelation: Barth, Clooney, and Rahman

What, then, is the definition of revelation? The answer is complicated, because divine revelation occurs in many different religions in different forms, whether as a burning bush, an angelic message, a messiah, a mystical trance, or as a playful lover. Regardless of form, the term is loaded with confessional importance, and as such does not lend itself easily to definition. Some theologians, however, have undertaken the effort, and from their work we can derive parameters for our own further explorations into the nature of revelation.

Karl Barth
In Church Dogmatics I.2, the noted Protestant theologian Karl Barth offers the following definition in his discussion of revelation:
Revelation is Gods self-offering and selfmanifestation. Revelation encounters man [sic ] on the presupposition and in confirmation that mans attempts to know God from his standpoint are wholly and entirely futile . . . revelation tells him something utterly new, something which apart from revelation he does not know and cannot tell either to himself or others.5

Thus, revelation is the self-offering or selfmanifestation of God to humankind in a means that transmits information previously unknown. In the context of Barths theology, this means that revelation is the exact opposite of religion. As Clooney notes on Barth: Because revelation is Gods self-offering and self manifestation, religion all religionsis actually unbelief, a human substitute for the work of God . . . one can only conclude that religion and revelation are irreconcilably at odds with one another.6 He goes on to state that revelation, is not conformed to human expectations as some kind of complement to human striving for the divine. It arrives abruptly, breaks in on the human condition, and shatters

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the various human projects aimed at acquiring the divine.7

Francis Clooney
Thus in its very essence revelation does not conform to human parameters and expectations. It is solely about Gods expression of will and true reality to us, and as weas mere created aspects of that realityhave no role besides subservience to God, revelation can appear at any time to disrupt our activities, and we have scarce option but to submit to this new reality. Taking this line of reasoning further, the religious constructs we develop to transmit the power of revelation among ourselves and from generation to generation are human constructs, the opposite of Gods revelation. As such, they evolve over time and are therefore prone to correction by God at any time. As Clooney notes, this correction is an aspect of God becoming involved in human affairs: Just as the body assumed during a divine descent is real, yet different from that of ordinary humans, so too the activity of God descended to earth is real and effective activity . . . it confronts human ignorance and the inability to understand who God is, by bringing humans into proximity with a God involved in human activities.8

neously foundational to and infinitely beyond our own understanding of our world; third, as human creations of God, revelation smashes our own constructs and realitiesour own perceived truths such as religion, social order, and even timewith Gods true reality; and finally, revelation tells humanity something it cannot know without revelationit cannot be derived or guessed; it is a strictly oneway relation of real truth from God to humanity. As creations of God, we lack the understanding of Gods reality to debate God on that reality; we must ultimately choose to either accept that reality, or not, accepting the consequences of our choice. Thus, with a working definition of revelation in hand, it is appropriate to ascertain non-confessional terms for the forms in which it can occur. As outlined below, there are several of these forms, many of which are shared across faith traditions.

Forms of Revelation: Event or as Text?

While revelation may be the self-offering of God, the nature of that self-offering may appear in different forms. Typically, revelation by God to humanity occurs in two general categories: as a direct event or through a text. For the purposes of this experiment in meta-terminology, we will review revelation as an event, that being the direct event through which Gods intentions are revealed to a human witness. While textual revelation is indeed equally important and is represented in all of the faith traditions that will be examinedthe writings of the Mimamsa theologians noting the transformational power in the reading of the Veda,10 the sacramental readings of the Gospels in liturgical settings, and the muezzin and commentarial traditions on the Quran in Islam to name just a few examples an analysis of the transformational power of textual revelation is an extensive field worthy of separate treatment. In describing revelation as an event, I mean the actual event in which God appears to humanity and provides revelation, and the form taken by God in order to do so. For the purposes of this paper,

Fazlur Rahman
This is also a view that is close to a prevailing Islamic view of God as the source from which all creation emanates. Under this view, any wonders of creation are ayat signsof Gods greatness and generosity. Another interpretation of this perspective, however, places God as the foundation of all true reality. Rahman notes, God is that dimension which makes other dimensions possible; He gives meaning and life to everything. He is allenveloping, literally infinite, and He alone is infinite.9 Revelation, therefore, while perhaps not completely definable, seems to have certain agreed upon characteristics: first, it is the self-offering and selfmanifestation of God; second, it is therefore a true reality in Gods terms, a reality that is simulta-

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I will use meta-terms for this type of revelation that takes both human and non-human form, using three general categories: direct revelation, personal agency, and impersonal agency.

flaming fire, burning up this universe with your blazing glory . . . I cannot find my bearings, I cannot find a refuge; have mercy, God of gods, home of the universe!12

Direct Revelation: Krishnas Celestial Self in the Bhagavad-Gita

Direct revelation is the appearance of God to humanity in true, godlike form, without human embodiment: an understandably disturbing form of revelation that completely rips away the constructed realities of the witness, forcing her/him to stand naked and helpless before the Eternal, the Cosmic, the Omnipotent. Although other, less disturbing forms exist, as will be described below, direct revelation is revelation in its most pure form; it is revelation in its extreme. It is this type of revelation that occurs in chapter 11 of the Hindu sacred text, the Bhagavad-Gita. As RC Zaehner relates, This chapter is the climax of the Gita. In it Krishna reveals Himself in all his terrifying majesty.11 In the Bhagavad-Gita, a conversation takes place between the brave warrior Arjuna and his friend Krishna on the edge of battle against Arjunas kinsmen. Arjuna, expressing doubt in the rightness of his course of action, vows that he will not fight his kinsmen. What follows is a discussion between Arjuna and his friend-god about the correct course of action, and Krishnas desire for Arjuna to engage in battle. In the climax of the discussion, Krishna provides Arjuna with a celestial eye so that Arjuna may view him in his true celestial nature:
The great Lord of power . . . revealed to the son of Pritha . . . his highest sovereign form . . . with many a mouth and eye and countless marvelous aspects . . . garlands and robes celestial He wore . . . [Behold this] God whose every [mark] spells wonder, the Infinite, facing every way! . . . Arjuna said, O God, the gods in your body I behold and all the hosts of every kind of being . . . beginning, middle, or end. You do not knowhow infinite your strength! How numberless your armsyour eyes the sun and moon! So do I see Youyour mouth a

With this revelation, Arjuna is now fully aware of just how different Gods reality is from his. However, as Zaehner explains in commentary: Arjuna does not yet understand the terrible side to his nature displayed . . . nothing in Krishnas teaching had prepared him for this . . . [Arjuna] would sooner know Him [Krishna] . . . in his eternal rest, rather than in his incomprehensible and seemingly savage activity. Krishna now tells him that the reality is quite as fearful as it seems.13 Even so, Arguna does not understand the full import of this revelation of godly reality, so Krishna further drives the point home by revealing himself as time and timelessness itself: Time I am, wreaker of the worlds destruction . . . do what you will, all these warriors shall cease to be, drawn up there in their opposing ranks . . . long since have these men in truth been slain by me: yours it is to be the mere occasion.14 With more discussion in the ensuing chapters, Arjuna is committed to awed obedience to Krishnas will. Arjuna picks up his bow and heads into battle, faith restored and with doubts dispelled (18.73) as to whether killing his kinsmen in battle is a proper action. His God has shown him that obedience to God is what matters over all.

Arjunas Experience of a New Reality

This is the heart of revelation. In the BhagavadGita, God is relating to Arjuna in Gods own terms, showing this particular man, and humanity as a whole, that, as Barth describes, He is God, and that as such He is his Lord. In telling him this, revelation tells him something utterly new, something which apart from revelation he does not know.15 In this particular chapter, Krishna not only reveals himself to Arjuna in his true formnot that of Arjunas god-companion in human guise who has accompanied him through the rest of the BhagavadGitabut he also demonstrates to Arjuna that societal norms such as traditional kinship obligations

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and even time itself break down as meaningless compared to the will of the master of all creation and destruction. As such, Arjuna is faced with a new reality, and this revelation spurs him to action. What is to be gained by such a direct revelation from Krishna? This is, in fact, what Arjuna asks him as well as he stares gaping at Krishnas celestial form: Tell me, who are You, your form so cruel? . . . You best of Gods, have mercy! Fain would I know You as You are in the beginning, for what You are set on doing I do not understand. (11.31-3) Traditional commentary on the Gita views chapter 4 as instructive: Whenever the laws of righteousness withers away and lawlessness arises, then do I generate Myself [on earth],16 a reference that Zaehner argues points to the four classes of ancient Hindu society and the requirements of the three upper classes.17 In this, we see echoes of Barths description of religion (and society) in opposition to revelatory truth: God appears to humanity in order to right that which has fallen out of balance. This is reinforced by Krishna in the Bhagavad Gita: To know God is to share in his mode of being: Who knows my godly birth and mode of operation thus as they really are, he, his body left behind, is never born again: he comes to me.18

Revelation by Agency
Personal Agency: Jesus in the Gospel of John
Revelation also may occur through agency, which itself can take personal or impersonal form. In using the term personal agency, I mean that experience of revelation in which God assumes a form often human but not necessarily so19 and interacts directly with humanity, providing revelation in human terms. An interesting aspect of this form of revelation is that it is often prone to not being recognized as revelation by the people for whom the revelation is intended. In the example of Jesus

in the Gospel of John this is the case, where many who witness Jesus miracles and hear his revelations still question his godly nature because of his human form. In John, Jesus appears as a man, and indicates that he has come down from heaven (6:38) to do the will of God the father.20 Throughout much of John, however, only select groups of people accept Christ as divine in origin. Johns Christ consistently relates his divine origin to humanity, only to have that origin questioned repeatedly by the Jewish community (6:42), his disciples (6:60-4), and his own brothers (7:1-9). In a telling passage, a crowd denies this origin, saying, Is this not Jesus, the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know? How can he now say, I have come down from heaven? (6:42). Despite the many miracles worked by Jesus in the Gospel of John, many remain unconvinced of Jesus divinity because of his human form. Why, then, would God choose to enter into human form, and how does that form affect Gods message? With personal agency, the body becomes a material reality, to be used as an instrument to assist in communication with others.21 In this form of revelation, God walks among humanity in a physical form and imparts godlike reality to us through lessons, miracles, or signs. As with Christ, the body of God is not merely human, but something more perfect: Various theologians . . . agree on a basic quantified analogy: as humans are embodied, so God becomes embodied, though without the impurities, defects, or deleterious limitations that diminish the human . . . Gods involvement uplifts rather than denigrates the human.22 Thus, Gods human form in Christ provides us a direct model for attempting to live the revelatory message. That message, echoed in John 21:19, 12:25-26, and 20:19 (as well as in Mk 1:17 and Lk 5:11), is to follow Christs example in compassion and devotion to God.

Impersonal Agency: The Revelation of the Quran to Mohammad

With the Quran, a different type of agency is seen. Here, impersonal agencya form of revelation

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where God does not speak directly to humanity but rather through a form of intermediaryoccurs. In this regard, it is important to note that the Quran is particularly interesting as unlike in Hinduism or Christianity, orthodox Sunni Islam largely rejects anthropomorphic conceptions of God. In fact, much of Sunni Islamic tradition rejects instances of God speaking directly to humanity, always choosing instead to do so through some form of agent, such as an angel or prophet. As such, revelation by impersonal agency introduces another term for describing an entirely different form of revelation: it is not a revelation involving direct personal experience on Gods termsas with Arjuna viewing God with a celestial eyenor is it God relating to humankind in human terms, as Christ does. Impersonal agency is somewhere in the middle; as such, it has its own benefits and drawbacks. In the Quran, the chosen intermediary is the angel Gabriel, most vividly described in 2.97: It is [Gabriel] who has instilled it in your heart by Allahs permission confirming what preceded it, and as a guidance and good tidings to the believers.23 Islamic scholar Fazlur Rahman notes that, unlike Christ, Muhammad himself was clear on the point that he was not the source of revelation:
The Prophet himself was always only too conscious that his Prophethood was not of his own making and that even his natural capacities could not cause Revelation, which was the sheer mercy of God: Do they say that he [Muhammad] has forged [the Quran] as a lie upon God? If God wills, He shall seal up your heart [so that there will be no more Revelation] (42:24) . . . If We willed, We would surely remove the revelation We have given you; then you will find no one who can help you with it despite Us! (17:86).24

Montgomery Watt and Richard Bell also observe that Islamic tradition is unanimous on the point that Gabriel was the agent of revelation.25 Rahman expands:
God never speaks directly to a human but he may infuse a Spirit in the Prophets mind . . . which makes him see the truth and utter it (Say: This is my pathI call people [to God] on the basis of clear perception [12:108]; He [Muhammad] speaks not from his own desireit is but a Revelation vouchsafed to him[53:3] . . . Whatever the agency of the revelation, however, the true revealing subject always remains God, for it is he who always speaks in the first person.26

God also speaks to humanity in the Quran, but with different implications. Quranic speech is direct and commanding, designed to mercifully guide humankind to control history towards good ends rather than succumb to its vagaries.27 As Rahman describes, the purpose of man [sic ] is to serve God, i.e. to develop his higher potentialities in accordance with the command (amr) of God, through choice, and to use nature (which is automatically muslim, obedient to God.).28 Indeed, it is this dependence on and submission of all creation to God which defines Islam.

Conclusion: Towards Non-Confessional Terminology in Interfaith Dialogue

In this paper, I have undertaken to outline a nonconfessional meta-terminology for three basic forms of event-based revelation using three examples from different faith traditions. While I have done this more as a sketch outlining further areas of work for use in inter-religious conversation, it is clear that distinct terms can be used for event-based revelation: direct revelation, and revelation by agency through both personal and impersonal means. As such, it is my hope that these terms are useful for further work in interfaith projects, and that the use of non-confessional terms can assist in the

In Islam, this form of revelation presents a different problem: reverence for God makes it unpalatable for God to speak directly to humanity. While there is some ambiguityparticularly in the early verses of the Quranas to whether it is God or Gabriel speaking to Muhammad, Quranic tradition has held that God is delivering the message, but it comes through Gabriel as an intermediary.

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discussion of underlying truth claims between members of different faiths. In other words, mine is not an argument for generalization per se, but an invitation to appraise new terms through dialogue that are free of preconceived truth claims. Thus, any generalizing I advocate is done for the sake of encouraging viewpoints that Edward Said describes as swept under the rug.29 As the noted postmodern ethnographer Michael Jackson puts it, generalizing is a means of creating solidarity, not objective knowledge.30 In essence, I suggest that as a faith practitioner it is not possible to be completely objective; so, as Pierre Bourdieu points out in Outline of a Theory of Practice, it is impossible and even undesirable to conceive of oneself as an objective spectator.31 What generalized terms do enable, then, is a setting aside of normative viewpoints in an attempt to find commonality and meaning in the truth claims of other faiths and dialogue partners. At the same time, I think it is important to note the meta-terms I use in this paper, while potentially helpful, are not to be taken as universal constructs. Indeed, the aim of using such terms is to avoid confessional constructs, so to replace one construct with the other is counter productive. The dialogical process I outline for interfaith work is inherently phenomenological: thus, the importance of not fetishizing the language or meta terms I specifically use in this paper can not be overstressed. Put another way, dialogue is best fostered by the discussants developing their own common language; the implication of this is, of course, that there is no normative standard for interpreting specific passages and the discussants are free to bring what they believe to the table. This is, to my mind, the essence of the dialogical aspect of comparative theology. With the regard to the terms themselves, it should be noted that while I have used three separate faith traditions to illustrate these categories, the instances of these revelatory categories are not unique to the faith tradition used. Impersonal agency, for example, appears in JudeoChristian traditions as well, such as in the example of the burning bush. So, too, does direct revelation: Jesus in John 20 transcends death and appears before his disciples, his form so different from their

understanding of reality that they initially do not recognize him. Hinduism, too, has many examples of personal agency: Krishna appears as a child, as a lover of the Gopi, and as the comrade to Arjuna.32 While there has not been enough space to do it here, I envision fruitful ground for discussion between faiths regarding the implications of these different types of revelation and their import within each tradition. In this article, and true to basic tenets of comparative theology, I also do not attempt to judge the truth claims of the various faiths. They may be all true; they may be all false; they may even have varying degrees of truth within their own traditions. What is certain is that they are true to their adherents and so all have relevance. In examining how they are represented, it is again hoped that useful applications can be made in areas relating to interfaith dialogue. Finally, from the examples cited, it is possible to draw some general inferences on the nature of revelation that I hope will prove useful in dialogue between faiths. As the standing definition of revelation I introduced earlier indicates, it does appear that revelation occurs when God wishes to correct human action. When God speakscertainly as in the examples we have reviewedGod is exhorting human followers to leave the old and embrace the new order God has undertaken revelation to bring about. This is the case of Krishna in the BhagavadGita, where he is exhorting Arjuna to forget his family obligations to his kinsmen and his reputation and follow Krishnas will. It is the case of Jesus in John, establishing a new authority over the temple and coming into direct conflict with the Jewish religious hierarchy, establishing a new Kingdom. And it is the case with Gods revelation to Muhammad, where God is commanding the establishment of a new community transcending traditional Arab tribal authority, rejecting polytheist traditions, and establishing a new social order. Thus, if there is a common message to be found in Gods revelatory events, it appears to be the rejection of the traditional order and the taking up of a new one. This is perhaps not surprising, for if Barth and Clooney are in fact right and religion is indeed the lack of faith or unbelief, then it is to be expected

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that God would wish to correct it from time to time.

13. Ibid., 311. 14. Ibid., 311. 15. Barth, Church Dogmatics I.217, 301. 16. Bhagavad-Gita, 4.7 (Zaehner trans.)

Endnotes
1. Presented to the Comparative Theology Group at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion, November 18, 2007 (San Diego, California). My thanks to Francis Clooney, Ithamar Theodor, Jerry Martin, Peter Slater and Allan Keislar, who provided comments and encouragement on earlier versions of this paper. 2. Statement for the Comparative Theology Group within the American Academy of Religion, May 2006, 9. 3. Ibid., 1. 4. Ibid., 12. 5. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics I.2 17 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1956, 1998 impr.), 301. Keith Ward takes issue with the concept that reason cannot judge revelation put forward by Barth, but he especially takes issue with Barths preference for Christian revelation after elucidating this concept. Ward also suggests that Barths approach could lead just as well to [the] acceptance of revelation in other faiths. This is precisely how comparative theology serves interfaith dialogue by suspending judgment on the validity of truth claims and seeking to understand the underlying message, and is the subject of this paper. See Keith Ward, Religion and Revelation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 1621. 6. Francis X. Clooney, Hindu God, Christian God (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 133. 7. Ibid., 134. 8. Ibid., 119. 9. Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of the Quran, 2nd Edition (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1994), 4. 10. Clooney, Hindu God , 139. 11. The Bhagavad-Gita, with a commentary based on the original sources, translated by R.C. Zaehner (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 303. 12. Bhagavad-Gita, 8284, 305309. (Zaehner trans.)

17. Bhagavad-Gita, 184 (Zaehner trans.) 18. Bhagavad-Gita, 4.9 (Zaehner trans.) 19. While this form of personal agency often takes on human form, it need not do so. Clooney cites the work of Satakopan, an eighth-century Vaisnava saint, and his relating of God appearing as a boar, albeit with the divine purpose of lifting the world out of the cosmic ocean. (Clooney, Hindu God, Christian God , p. 11920.) 20. For all Biblical references, I have used The Holy Bible (NRSV), (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1990) and the Harper Collins Study Bible (NRSV), (San Francisco: Harper, 1993). 21. Clooney, Hindu God , 107. 22. Ibid., 124. 23. The Quran: Arabic Text and English Translation, 9 th U.S. Edition, Translated by M.H. Shakir, (Elmhurst, New York: Tahrike Tarsile Quran, 2004); The Quran, English translation of the meaningsA Bilingual Edition, translated by Majid Fakhry (New York: New York University Press, 2004); The Koran, Interpreted, translated by A.J. Arberry (New York: Touchstone, 1996). 24. Rahman, Major Themes, 91. 25. Richard Bell and W. Montgomery Watt, Introduction to the Quran, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 19. 26. Rahman, Major Themes, 99. 27. Ibid., 9. 28. Ibid., 8. 29. Edward Said, Representations of the Individual. The 1993 Reith Lectures (New York: Pantheon, 1993), 1112. 30. Michael Jackson, Things As They Are (Indiana: University of Indiana Press, 1996), 19. 31. Pierre Bourdieu Outline of a Theory of Practice tr. R. Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 96. 32. Bhagavad-Gita, 11:41; Gitagovinda II, translated by Barbara Stoler Miller (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).