Analysis

November 12, 2013

Summary: The EU is confused about how to influence Turkeys democratization course. When Turkey had a viable EU membership prospect, EU conditionality steered democratization efforts. But Turkeys EU accession process was stifled due to the Cyprus problem and civilizational compatibility questions, rather than on the basis of democratization deficits. The setbacks Ankara incurred in its regional strategic positioning and challenges in re-engineering society would presumably lead Ankara to re-embrace the EU anchor. However, the grounds for establishing a new Turkey-EU solidarity around an EU vision for Turkey are weak. Without a fundamental change in how the Turkish leadership talks about the EU and treats its critics, a turnaround in the mood is unlikely. Without clear-cut carrots and sticks, can the EUs soft power in this country be salvaged? Under these circumstances, is the EU impotent in terms of Turkeys democratization?

Turkeys Europeanization: Conspiracy or Democracy?

by Diba Nigar Gksel
Introduction On October 16, the EUs progress report on Turkey was released. As expected, positive remarks and harsh criticism co-exist. An effort to keep the negotiation process on track sets the tone. In reality, the EU is confused about how to influence Turkeys democratization course. When Turkey had a viable EU membership prospect, EU conditionality steered democratization efforts. But Turkeys EU accession process was stifled due to the Cyprus problem and civilizational compatibility questions, rather than on the basis of democratization deficits. Therefore the EUs leverage over Turkeys democratization has been seriously hindered, particularly given that Ankaras government is domestically popular and holds supposed geostrategic leverage. Proponents of Turkeys EU process have been geared at keeping hope alive, arguing that there is no drama on the horizon of Turkey-EU relations, that the process will not derail, and that rejuvenation is just around the corner. There were hopes vested in the elections of heads of state in France in 2012 and Germany in 2013 for a turnaround in EU attitudes. When political polarization grew in the summer, President Abdullah Gul hinted that the EU accession process was a vision around which entrenched social divides could be bridged. Cautious optimism increased that a EU-indexed agenda might be embraced as a safeguard of Turkeys pluralism. However, keeping hopes from dimming is a challenge. Though a social democrat won in France, a radical departure in the French position toward Turkey has not been observed. The German elections did not deliver new Turkey-related balances either. The European Parliament elections of May 2014 will determine the next president of the European Council, president of the European Commission, and high representative for foreign affairs.1 A glance at the trends in Europe, with right wing parties and anti-immigration positions gaining ground, does not bode well for Turkey. After the Gezi Park protests, the firing of many critical journalists, intimidation of businesspeople associated with disloyalty, measures to deter students and professionals from protesting, and deliberate exacerbation of social polarization hardly encourage optimism
1 http://www.cer.org.uk/insights/eus-rubiks-cube-whowill-lead-after-2014

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with regard to Turkeys normalization on its own devices. One problem is the politics of conspiracy. Another is the creeping fear that democratization a la Turkey is not going to produce Europeanization. The setbacks Ankara incurred in its regional strategic positioning and challenges in re-engineering society would presumably lead Ankara to re-embrace the EU anchor. However, the grounds for re-establishing solidarity are shaky. AKP representatives have stirred Euro-skepticism among their constituencies by accusing their European counterparts of trying to sabotage Turkeys regional prowess. These conspiracy theories have also alienated Turkeys advocates in the EU. Meanwhile, AKP-critics perceive EU efforts to positively motivate the Turkish government as appeasement, a position grounded in another set of conspiracy theories holding the West responsible for the rise of AKP. Without a fundamental change in how the Turkish leadership talks about the EU and treats its critics, a turnaround in the mood is unlikely. Without clear-cut carrots and sticks, can the EUs soft power in this country be salvaged? Under these circumstances, is the EU impotent in terms of Turkeys democratization? Is Europeanization a Conspiracy? When the uprisings commonly referred to as the Gezi Park protests broke out in urban centers of Turkey this spring, the government attributed them to international actors bent on preventing the rise of Turkey as a regional leader. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan pointed primarily to Western players as the culprit. This has fed into the characterization of government critics in Turkey as undemocratic, Islamophobic, and unpatriotic. Setting the debate on these paradigms practically renders any opposition as politically incorrect. Ironically, almost a decade ago, AKP critics also perceived an international conspiracy by the West though in their version the plot was in favor of AKP. The presentation of the Turkish realities as living proof that Islam and democracy could co-exist was perceived as a self-serving pro-AKP conspiracy. While the United States searched for a partner in the region to shoulder burdens, Europeans, albeit incoherently, appeared to seize the opportunity to find an alternative to membership for Turkey. The AKPs so-called

The setbacks Ankara incurred in its regional strategic positioning and challenges in re-engineering society would presumably lead Ankara to re-embrace the EU anchor. However, the grounds for establishing a new Turkey-EU solidarity around an EU vision for Turkey are weak.
leverage over its Arab brothers granted it geostrategic trump cards and immunity from domestic critics. Brussels first embarking on an accession process and then clumsily stalling it had already left Turkey lacking a compass. As the AKP basked in the light of the Arab Spring, opponents of the government perceived an affirmation of their conspiracy theories playing out. It looked like Turkeys course had forever changed, and by nature of this course, it could only be driven by the AKP. In retrospect, Washingtons search for a model for the Arab countries, coupled with the ill-fate of Turkeys EU membership process and weak domestic opposition, trapped Turkey in a system of very weak checks and balances. Among AKP critics in Turkey, resentment toward the West lingers, in effect limiting the influence of the EU in Turkey, and ironically enabling AKP to dismiss EU prescriptions at its convenience. Democratization versus Europeanization Fall 2013 witnessed a democratic step forward with the lifting of obstacles for covered women (those wearing Islamic attire) to attend university and work in state institutions, including the parliament. However, the regular moralizing rhetoric of the prime minister (followed by policy adaptations) casts an illiberal shadow on this and

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other freedoms that have been granted. Meanwhile, Alevi, Kurdish, and Greek Orthodox communities had concrete expectations for rights that were left unaddressed by the September 30 democratization package. Furthermore, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender citizens have basic rights problems that could have been alleviated with simple wording adaptations to anti-discrimination clauses. More generally, the features of the political culture and system that lead to selective justice, unchecked power, censorship in the press, and politization of personal lifestyle choices are ever more prevalent. Implying the resistance in society to some of the expected reforms, the prime minister explained that steps could not be taken despite the nation. This raises the question, does the ballot box not necessarily bring about European values and rights in this country? Or can it not yet, without leadership reflecting a strategic choice in this direction, or without a viable prospect of membership? When the country faces local, presidential, and parliamentary elections in the next year and a half, this is a critical question. The breakdown of traditional nationalist taboos in Turkeys democratization debates has been a result of Europeanization. However it has come at a time of excessive domestic power consolidation, political showdown, loss of a viable EU membership goal, and alternative visions involving Turkeys leadership in the Middle East. Thus it has brought about some very un-European tendencies. The parameters that have framed the thinking of Turkish opinion leaders until recently assumed that democratization was linked to Europeanization. Today, this cannot be taken for granted. Debates on any given night on Turkish TV can include questioning of Turkeys fundamental choices from the 1920s onwards ranging from the wisdom of choosing the Latin alphabet, adopting a nation state model, using the Gregorian calendar, or abolishing the Caliphate. Questions abound about whether these decisions were part of a grand Western conspiracy to prevent Turkey from leading a united Islamic bloc. Integration without Accession A Gamble? How can the EU influence Turkeys future choices? If the EU criticizes Ankara more harshly and the Turkish leadership responds with even more negative rhetoric about the EU, this could supposedly increase bitterness in half of the country, and deadlock the relations further. On the other hand, the EUs appeasement of the government in face of violations is also a blow to the EUs transformative power in Turkey, and reinforces the fear and fatalism that is barring critics from actively joining the political arena. If the EU accession process is derailed, it will certainly not be democracy that strengthens in Turkey. But without a stick at hand, such as the threat of suspension of the accession process on the basis of democratic criteria, the EU is unable to affect the personal and political expediency calculations of Turkeys political elite, which understands the importance of the EU anchor for maintaining the relatively stable status quo of the political and economic order in Turkey. Chugging along in Turkeys EU accession, opening one more chapter for negotiations, and meanwhile investing in more and deeper people-to-people exchanges between Turks and Europeans for a long-term convergence of visions and capabilities, appears to be the least risky and most likely course. Much of the debate in the EU among friends of Turkey is now focused on how Turkey can be integrated absent a viable accession process, through, for example visa liberalization or at least using the available leeway in the Schengen visa code to foster increased mobility increasing educational exchanges, and supporting Turkish civil society through more flexible instruments. To be effective, in addition to enabling the young generation to have European experiences through exponentially increasing travel and education opportunities, tailor-made initiatives for civil society and media are needed. To make the EU relevant for young Turks involved in shaping the future of their country, engaging community leaders that have emerged across the country after Turkeys Spring season protests, strengthening the watchdog capabilities of

The breakdown of traditional nationalist taboos in Turkeys democratization debates has been a result of Europeanization.
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Turkish civil society, and launching reconciliation programs that facilitate structured dialogue between the polarized sides of the Turkish society could be useful. However, if links between critical Turkish civil society, business, academia, and media and their European counterparts continue to be spun by government authorities as unpatriotic, undemocratic, and Islamophobic conspiracies, and hostility against this mobilization is provoked among conservative masses in Turkey and the Arab world, then such engagement will hardly heal Turkeys polarization or nudge the Turkish society Europe-wards. In sum, there are also risks to a diluted EU role in Turkey. It can play an enabling role for the Turkish leadership if there are no red lines that, if crossed, would spell the end of the process.

About the Author

Diba Nigar Gksel is editor-in-chief of Turkish Policy Quarterly. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of GMF.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-profit organization through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, Warsaw, and Tunis. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

About the On Turkey Series

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