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Social Institutions
 First published Thu Jan 4, 2007 
The term, “social institution” is somewhat unclear both in ordinary language and in the philosophical literature (see below). However, contemporary sociology is somewhat moreconsistent in its use of the term. Typically, contemporary sociologists use the term to refer tocomplex social forms that reproduce themselves such as governments, the family, humanlanguages, universities, hospitals, business corporations, and legal systems. A typical definition isthat proferred by Jonathan Turner (Turner 1997: 6): “a complex of positions, roles, norms andvalues lodged in particular types of social structures and organising relatively stable patterns of human activity with respect to fundamental problems in producing life-sustaining resources, inreproducing individuals, and in sustaining viable societal structures within a given environment.”Again, Anthony Giddens says (Giddens 1984: 24): “Institutions by definition are the moreenduring features of social life.” He (Giddens 1984: 31) goes on to list as institutional orders,modes of discourse, political institutions, economic institutions and legal institutions. Thecontemporary philosopher of social science, Rom Harre follows the theoretical sociologists inoffering this kind of definition (Harre 1979: 98): “An institution was defined as an interlockingdouble-structure of persons-as-role-holders or office-bearers and the like, and of social practicesinvolving both expressive and practical aims and outcomes.” He gives as examples (Harre 1979:97) schools, shops, post offices, police forces, asylums and the British monarchy.In this entry the above-noted contemporary sociological usage will be followed. Doing so has thevirtue of grounding philosophical theory in the most salient empirical discipline, namely,sociology.At this point it might be asked why a theory of social institutions has, or ought to have, any philosophical interest; why not simply leave such theorising to the sociologists? One importantreason stems from the normative concerns of philosophers. Philosophers, such as John Rawls(Rawls 1972), have developed elaborate normative theories concerning the principles of justicethat ought to govern social institutions. Yet they have done so in the absence of a developedtheory of the nature and point of the very entities (social institutions) to which the principles of  justice in question are supposed to apply. Surely the adequacy of one's normative account of the justice or otherwise of any given social institution, or system of social institutions, will depend atleast in part on the nature and point of that social institution or system.The entry has five sections. In the first section various salient accounts of social institutions arediscussed. Accounts emanating from sociological theory as well as philosophy are mentioned.Here, as elsewhere, the boundaries between philosophy and non-philosophical theorising inrelation to an empirical science are vague. Hence, it is important to note the theories of the likesof Durkheim and Talcott Parsons as well as those of John Searle and David Lewis.In the second section a teleological account of social institutions is presented. Teleologicalexplanation is out of fashion in many areas of philosophy. However, it remains influential incontemporary philosophical theories of social action.In the third section, the so-called agent-structure question is addressed. At bottom, this issueconcerns the apparent inconsistency between the autonomy (or alleged autonomy) of individualhuman agents, on the one hand, and the ubiquity and pervasive influence of social forms onindividual character and behaviour, on the other.
 
In the fourth section the normative character of social institutions is outlined in general terms.This normativity is multi-faceted. For example, it includes the human goods realised byinstitutions as well as the rights and duties that attach to institutional roles.In the fifth and final section the more specific normative issue of the justice of social institutionsis explored. This section includes a discussion of intra-institutional justice, e.g. the justice or injustice of the reward system within an institution, as well as extra-institutional justice, e.g. the justice or injustice of a power relationship between a government and refugees.
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1. Accounts of Social Institutions
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2. A Teleological Account of Institutions
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3. Agency and Structure
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4. Normative Character of Institutions
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5. Social Institutions and Distributive Justice
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Bibliography
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Other Internet Resources
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Related Entries
1. Accounts of Social Institutions
Any account of social institutions must begin by informally marking off social institutions fromother social forms. Unfortunately, as noted above, in ordinary language the terms “institutions”and “social institutions” are used to refer to a miscellany of social forms, including conventions,rituals, organisations, and systems of organisations. Moreover, there are a variety of theoreticalaccounts of institutions, including sociological as well as philosophical ones. Indeed, many of these accounts of what are referred to as institutions are not accounts of the same phenomena;they are at best accounts of overlapping fields of social phenomena. Nevertheless, it is possible,firstly, to mark off a range of related social forms that would be regarded by most theorists as being properly describable as social institutions; and, secondly, to compare and contrast some of the competing theoretical accounts of the “social institutions” in question.Social institutions
[1]
need to be distinguished from less complex social forms such asconventions, social norms, roles and rituals. The latter are among the constitutive elements of institutions.Social institutions also need to be distinguished from more complex and more complete socialentities, such as societies or cultures, of which any given institution is typically a constitutiveelement. A society, for example, is more complete than an institution since a society—at least astraditionally understood—is more or less self-sufficient in terms of human resources, whereas aninstitution is not. Thus, arguably, for an entity to be a society it must sexually reproduce itsmembership, have its own language and educational system, provide for itself economically and —at least in principle—be politically independent.
[2
 
]
Social institutions are often organisations (Scott 2001). Moreover, many institutions are
 systems
of organisations. For example, capitalism is a particular kind of economic institution, and inmodern times capitalism consists in large part in specific organisational forms—including multi-national corporations—organised into a system. Further, some institutions are
meta-institutions
;they are institutions (organisations) that organise other institutions (including systems of 
 
organisations). For example, governments are meta-institutions. The institutional end or functionof a government consists in large part in organising other institutions (both individually andcollectively); thus governments regulate and coordinate economic systems, educationalinstitutions, police and military organisations and so on largely by way of (enforceable)legislation. Nevertheless, some institutions are not organisations, or systems of organisations, and do notrequire organisations. For example, the English language is an institution, but not anorganisation. Moreover, it would be possible for a language to exist independently of anyorganisations specifically concerned with language. Again, consider an economic system thatdoes not involve organisations, e.g. a barter system involving only individuals. An institution thatis not an organisation or system of organisations comprises a relatively specific type of agent-to-agent interactive activity, e.g. communication or economic exchange, that involves: (i)differentiated actions, e.g. communication involves speaking and hearing/understanding,economic exchange involves buying and selling, that are; (ii) performed repeatedly and bymultiple agents; (iii) in compliance with a structured unitary system of conventions, e.g.linguistic conventions, monetary conventions, and social norms, e.g. truth-telling, propertyrights.In this entry the concern is principally with social institutions (including meta-institutions) thatare also organisations or systems of organisations. However, it should be noted that institutionsof language, such as the English language, are often regarded not simply as institutions but asmore fundamental than many other kinds of institution by virtue of being presupposed by, or in part constitutive of, other institutions. Searle, for example, holds to the latter view (Searle 1995:37). A case might also be made that the family is a more fundamental institution than others for related reasons, e.g. it is the site of sexual reproduction and initial socialisation. Note also that uses of the term “institution” in such expressions as “the institution of government”, are often ambiguous. Sometimes what is meant is a particular token, e.g. thecurrent government in Australia, sometimes a type, i.e. the set of properties instantiated in anyactual government, and sometimes a set of tokens, i.e. all governments. Restricting the notion of an institution to organisations is helpful in this regard; the term “organisation” almost alwaysrefers to a particular token. On the other hand, the term “institution” connotes a certain gravitynot connoted by the term “organisation”; so arguably those institutions that are organisations areorganisations that have a central and important role to play in or for a society. Being central andimportant to a society, such roles are usually long lasting ones; hence institutions are typicallytrans-generational.Having informally marked of social institutions from other social forms, let us turn to aconsideration of some general properties of social institutions. Here there are four salient properties, namely, structure, function, culture and sanctions.Roughly speaking, an institution that is an organisation or system of organisations consists of anembodied (occupied by human persons) structure of differentiated roles. These roles are definedin terms of tasks, and rules regulating the performance of those tasks. Moreover, there is a degreeof interdependence between these roles, such that the performance of the constitutive tasks of one role cannot be undertaken, or cannot be undertaken except with great difficulty, unless thetasks constitutive of some other role or roles in the structure have been undertaken or are beingundertaken. Further, these roles are often related to one another hierarchically, and hence involvedifferent levels of status and degrees of authority. Finally, on teleological and functionalaccounts, these roles are related to one another in part in virtue of their contribution to
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