Tatle vs Municipality of Virac (207 SCRA 157) FACTS In this case, the residents of barrio Sta.

Elena filed complaints against the petitioner because of the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside his warehouse which affected the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious odor, and dust emitted by the machine. A committee was formed and appointed by the municipal council of Virac to in estigate on the said matter. !he committee noted the crowded nature of the neighborhood with narrow roads and the surrounding residential houses. "esolution #o. $% was then passed by the &unicipal 'ouncil of Virac declaring that the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public nuisance within the pur iew of Article (%) of the #ew 'i il 'ode. "espondent municipal officials further contend that petitioner*s warehouse was constructed in iolation of +rdinance #o. ,-, series of ,%.$, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the /oblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of $00 meters from said block of houses to a oid loss of li es and properties by accidental fire or any natural disaster. /etitioner assailed the alidity of the ordinance and a erred that what is prohibited is the construction of warehouses and not the use of the warehouse for storage of abaca and copra. It also contended that the ordinance is discriminatory since other warehouses are allowed to operate within the icinity without being prosecuted. !SS"# 1hether or not +rdinance #o. ,- Series of ,%.$ of the &unicipality of Virac is unconstitutional and oid. $#C!S!%& #o, it is not unconstitutional and oid. !he +rdinance #o. ,-, series of ,%.$, is a legitimate and alid exercise of police power by the &unicipal 'ouncil of Virac and is not unconstitutional and oid as claimed by the petitioner. !he 'ourt also emphasi2ed the criteria of a alid ordinance as follows3 4,5 It must not contra ene the 'onstitution or any statute6 4$5 It must not be unfair or oppressi e6 4-5 It must not be partial or discriminatory6 4)5 It must not prohibit but may regulate trade6 4.5 It must be general and consistent with public policy6 and 4(5 It must not be unreasonable. It is therefore considered as a alid exercise of police power and the said ordinance is of its constitutional character and is alid and binding among the inhabitants of the barrios in Virac.

'a(una 'a)e $evelop*ent Aut+ority vs Court of Appeals

FACTS !his case centered on Section )4k5 of the charter of 7aguna 7ake 8e elopment Authority 4778A5 pro ides that the 778A shall ha e the exclusi e 9urisdiction to issue new permit for the use of the lake waters for any pro9ects or acti ities affecting the said lake. !hen "A :,(0, the 7ocal ;o ernment 'ode of ,%%, was implemented, that municipality in the 7aguna 7ake region interpreted the pro ision of this law to mean that newly passed law ga e municipal go ernment the exclusi e 9urisdiction to issue fishing pri ileges within their municipal waters. Sec ,)% of "A :,(0 states that municipalities shall ha e exclusi e authority to grant fishery pri ileges in the municipal go ernment assumed the authority to issue fishing pri ileges and fish pen permits. <nregulated fish pen occupied almost ,=- of the entire waters which is a iolation of the 7aguna lake carrying capacity. 778A ser ed notice to the general public to the concerned owner who illegally constructed their fish pen and fish cages. !he fish pen constructed therein were remo ed by the 778A, and those of which ha ing no permits were as well remo ed >ish pen owners whose fish pens were remo ed filed in9unction complaint against the 778A on the ground that pro ision of 778A had been repealed by "A :,(0 and they challenge the authority of the 778A in connection with the maintenance and implementation of .regulation on the said lake. !SS"# 1hether or not 778A or the town or municipalities comprising the region should exercise 9urisdiction o er 7aguna 7ake the issuance of permits for fishery pri ileges. $#C!S!%& 778A has the exclusi e 9urisdiction to issue permits within the 7aguna 7ake "egion. !hey ha e the sole and exclusi e authority in regulating the issuance of fishing permit in the said lake. !he charter of 778A should pre ail o er "A :,(0 being a special law. >or under statutory construction, in case of conflict between a special law and a general law, the former shall pre ail. !herefore, charter of 778A being a special law should pre ail o er a general law which is the "A :(,0. 778A therefore, has the sole and exclusi e 9urisdiction o er the said laguna lake.

'i* vs ,ac-uin( (2.0 SCRA /0.) FACTS !he 'ity of &anila granted Association of 8e elopment 'orporation the aut9ority to operate 9ai?alai acti ities pursuant to +rdinance #o. :0(.. /etitioners argued that "epublic Act #o. %.) entitled, @An Act to /rohibit 1ith Aorse "aces and Basque /elota ;ames 4Cai?Alai5, And

!o /rescribe /enalties >or Its ViolationD, effecti ely remo ed the power of the &unicipal Board of &anila to grant franchises for gambling operations. !hey argued that the term Elegislati e franchiseE in said act is used to refer to franchises issued by the 'ongress. +n the other hand, Association of 8e elopment 'orporation contends that "epublic Act #o. )0% which created the &anila 'hapter gi es legislati e powers to the &unicipal Board to grant franchises, and it does not specifically qualify the word Elegislati eE as referring exclusi ely to 'ongress. If such is the case, then "ep. Act #o. %.) did not remo e the power of the &unicipal Board and consequently it was within the power of the 'ity of &anila to allow A8' to operate the 9ai?alai in its 9urisdiction. !SS"# 1hether or not ".A. )0% gi es the 'ity of &anila the authority to grant franchise. $#C!S!%& It is clear from the foregoing that 'ongress did not delegate to the 'ity of &anila the power Eto franchiseE wagers or betting, including the 9ai?alai, but retained for itself such power Eto franchiseE. 1hat 'ongress delegated to the 'ity of &anila in "ep. Act #o. )0%, with respect to wagers or betting, was the power to Elicense, permit, or regulateE which therefore means that a license or permit issued by the 'ity of &anila to operate a wager or betting acti ity, such as the 9ai?alai where bets are accepted, would not amount to something meaningful unless the holder of the permit or license was also franchised by the national go ernment to so operate. &oreo er, e en this power to license, permit, or regulate wagers or betting on 9ai?alai was remo ed from local go ernments, including the 'ity of &anila, and transferred to the ;ames and Amusement Board by Executi e +rder #o. -%$. !he net result is that the authority to grant franchises for the operation of 9ai?alai frontons is in 'ongress, while the regulatory function is ested in the ;AB.

V!''AC%RTA vs1 2#R&AR$% (1.3 SCRA .2/) FACTS !his case in ol es a petition for certiorari against a decision of the 'ourt of >irst Instance of /angasinan annulling an ordinance adopted by the municipal board of 8agupan 'ity. !he ordinance in question is +rdinance $$, entitled @An +rdinance "egulating Subdi ision /lans o er parcels of land in 8agupan 'ityD, passed by the &unicipal Board of the said local go ernment unit.

!he court a quo declared the ordinance as oid because it conflicts with and expands Act )%(, which is a national law. >irst of all Sec., of the ordinance requires that all subdi ision plans be submitted to the 'ity Engineer before it can be appro ed by the 8irector of 7ands. Sec. - of the ordinance further pro ides that a certification of the city engineer is needed before registration of subdi ision plans can be made with the "egister of 8eeds. Section $ also pro ides a ser ice fee for subdi ision plans. 7astly, the ordinance also imposes a penalty for iolations committed. All of the aforementioned sections of the ordinance contra enes Act )%( as the latter does not require submission of plans to the city engineer, nor the issuance of a certification by the same, nor does it pro ide any penalties. !he 'ity of 8agupan argues that the ordinance brings to a halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the go ernment. !SS"# 1hether or not +rdinance $$ adopted by the municipal board of 8agupan 'ity is alidF $#C!S!%& !he court ruled that +rdinance $$ is not alid. !he powers of the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be held alid for when it will impede the exercise of rights granted in a general law and=or make a general law subordinated to a local ordinance. ;eneral law still pre ails o er local ordinances when it does impede the exercise of right granted to the people of this country. !his concern is most especially addressed to the local go ernment units which exercise the police power only by irtue of a alid delegation from the national legislature under the general welfare clause. In the present case, +rdinance #o. $$ suffers from the additional defect of iolating this authority for legislation in contra ention of the national law by adding to its requirements.

CR"4 vs1 ,ARAS FACTS !his case in ol es an issue wherein the municipal corporation of Bocaue, Bulacan prohibits the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such as clubs employing hostesses. It is contended that the ordinance assailed as in alid is tainted with a nullity, the municipality being de oid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling, petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were iolated as the license pre iously gi en to them was in effect withdrawn without 9udicial hearing. !he issue is whether or not a municipal

corporation can prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such as clubs employing hostessesF !SS"# 1hether or not the act of the &unicipality of Bocaue is a powerF $#C!S!%& !he court ruled that the act of &unicipality of Bocaue in prohibiting such trade is not a alid exercise of their police power. It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. !hey may be regulated but not pre ented from carrying on their business. All that petitioners would ha e to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no businesses could legally open, would be sub9ect to 9udicial correction. !hat is to comply with the legislati e will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs sub9ect to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business. It is well emphasi2ed in this case that the local go ernment unit cannot prohibit but 9ust can merely regulari2e such trade and businesses. alid exercise of their police

5"#4%& C!T6 vs1 #R!CTA (122 SCRA 757 FACTS !his case in ol es an issue regarding the Gue2on 'ity 'ouncil which passed +rdinance #o. (,,H, S?() regulating the establishment, maintenance and operation of pri ate memorial cemetery or burial ground within the 9urisdiction of the Gue2on 'ity. Section % of said ordinance states that3 At least six 4(5 percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and ha e been residents of Gue2on 'ity for at least . years prior to their death, to be determined by competent 'ity Authorities. !hen, the Gue2on 'ity 'ouncil passed a resolution requesting the 'ity Engineer, Gue2on 'ity, to stop any further selling and=or transaction of memorial park lots in Gue2on 'ity

where the owners thereof ha e failed to donate the required (I space intended for paupers burial. /ursuant to this petition, the Gue2on 'ity Engineer notified respondent Aimlayang /ilipino, Inc. in writing that Section % of +rdinance #o. (,,H, S?() would be enforced. "espondent of the Aimlayang /ilipino filed with the 'ourt of >irst Instance of "i2al Branch JVIII at Gue2on 'ity a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary in9unction, seeking to annul Section % of the +rdinance in question. It alleged that the same is contrary to the 'onstitution, the Gue2on 'ity 'harter, the 7ocal Autonomy Act, and the "e ised Administrati e 'ode. !he trial court rendered the decision declaring Section % of +rdinance #o. (,,H, S?() null and oid. /etitioners argue that the taking of the respondent*s property is a alid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. !SS"# 1hether or not Section % of the ordinance in question is a power. $#C!S!%& #o, it is not a alid exercise of police power. !here is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six 4(5 percent of the total area of an pri ate cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a pri ate cemetery to benefit paupers. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to pri ate cemeteries. !he court therefore ruled that Sec. % of the +rdinance in question is beyond the limit of the police power granted among the local go ernment unit specifically that of the Gue2on 'ity. alid exercise of the police

%RT!8AS C%M,A&6 A&$ '!M!T#$ ,ART&#RS9!, vs1 F#AT! 2A&: (7. SCRA 533) FACTS !he antecedent fact of the case is that on &arch ), ,%.$, plaintiff, as endor, and Augusto /adilla y Angeles and #ati idad Angeles, as endees, entered into separate agreements of sale on installments o er two parcels of land, known as 7ots #os. . and (, Block -,, of the Aighway Aills Subdi ision, located at &andaluyong, "i2al. +n Culy ,%, ,%($, the said endees transferred their rights and interests o er the aforesaid lots in fa or of one Emma 'ha e2. <pon completion of payment of the purchase price, the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in fa or of Emma 'ha e2. Both the agreements 4of sale on installment5 and the deeds of

sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that3 !he parcel of land sub9ect of this deed of sale shall be used the Buyer exclusi ely for residential purposes 8efendant?appellee, maintains that the area, has been declared a commercial and industrial 2one, per "esolution #o. $:, dated >ebruary ), ,%(0 of the &unicipal 'ouncil of &andaluyong, "i2al and the sub9ect lots there under were acquired by it Eonly on Culy $-, ,%($ or more than two 4$5 years after the area had been declared a commercial and industrial 2one. +n or about &ay ., ,%(-, defendant?appellee began construction of a building to be de oted to banking purposes. !he following day, plaintiff?appellant demanded that the construction of the commercial building on the said lots be halted. !he latter refused to comply, contending that the building was being constructed in accordance with the 2oning regulations. As a result, +rtigas K '+. 7!8 4plaintiff?appellant5 filed a complaint with the trial court, accompanied by a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary in9unction, against >EA!I Bank 4herein defendant?appellee5. !he trial court dismissed the complaint as well as its motion for reconsideration. !SS"#S 1hether or not the trial court erred when it failed to consider that the &unicipal 'ouncil had the power to nullify the contractual obligations assumed by defendant?appellee. $#C!S!%& Les, the trial court erred when it failed to consider that the &unicipal 'ouncil has the power to nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the endees herein. 1ith regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the defendant?appellee M referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the corresponding !ransfer 'ertificates of !itle issued to defendant?appellee M it should be stressed, that while non?impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, ex., Ethe power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. /olice power cannot be infringed by contractual obligation only.

2A'AC"!T vs1 C%"RT %F F!RST !&STA&C# (103 scra 1/2) FACTS !his case in ol es the @+rdinance ()0 M +rdinance penali2ing any person, group of persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any mo ie or other public exhibitions, games, contest or other performances to require children between se en 4:5 and twel e 4,$5 years of age to pay full payment for tickets intended for adults but should charge only one?half of the said ticket.D /etitioners filed a complaint before the 'ourt of >irst Instance praying that the said ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, oid and unenforceable. !he petitioners contend that +rdinance ()0 is not within the power of the &unicipal Board to enact as pro ided

for in Sec. ,.4n5 of "A .$-, the 'harter of the 'ity of Butuan. /etitioners maintain that +rdinance ()0 iolates the due process clause of the 'onstitution for being oppressi e, unfair, un9ust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade, and iolati e of the right of persons to enter into contracts, considering that the theater owners are bound under a contract with the film owners for 9ust admission prices for general admission, balcony and lodge. !SS"# 1hether or not +rdinance ()0 is alid and constitutional. $#C!S!%& !he court ruled that the +rdinance enacted by the &unicipality is in alid and unconstitutional. !his 'ourt agreed with the petitioners that the ordinance is not 9ustified by any necessity for the public interest. !he police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and general welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. !he e ident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who ha e to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for themsel es. A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding sa ings for the parents6 howe er, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these sa ings. !he ordinance does not only make petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penali2es them for failure to comply with it. >urthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficult in its implementation because as already experienced by petitioners since effecti ity of the ordinance, children o er ,$ years of age tried to pass off their age as below ,$ years in order to a ail of the benefit of the ordinance. !his 'ourt sees that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressi e upon the business of petitioners. !he local go ernment unit cannot in anyway enact ordinances that are unfair, un9ust, oppressi e and confiscatory. It is therefore ruled by the court that the said ordinance is unconstitutional and in alid.

San(alan( vs !nter*e;iate Appellate Court (170 SCRA 717) FACTS !he antecedent facts of the case are as follows, upon the direction of &akati &ayor Labut, studies were made on the feasibility of opening streets in Bel? Air Village calculated to alle iate traffic congestion along the public streets ad9acent to Bel?Air Village. !he studies re ealed that subdi ision plan of Bel?Air were appro ed on a condition that its ma9or thoroughfares connecting the public streets and highway shall be opened to public traffic. It is as well pro en that the congestion of the traffic on the said area would be minimi2ed upon the opening of streets in Bel? Air Village. It is only necessary in the interest of the general public to open to traffic to traffic to Annapola, &ercedes, Nodiac, Cupiter, #eptune, +rbit and /aseo de "oxas. !he petitioner

contended that Cupiter streets are for the exclusi e use of BAVA residents. !hey also appeal that the demolition and opening of +rbit streets has loss of pri acy of BAVA residents and depri ation of property without due course. !SS"# 1hether or not the &ayor of &akati may order the opening of the streets as a exercise of its police power. $#C!S!%& Les, the &ayor of &akati has the power to order the opening of the streets of the Bel?Air Village. !he opening of Cupiter Street was warranted by the demands of the common good, in terms of traffic congestion and public con eyance, same as the opening of +rbit Street. !his is not a matter of exercising eminent domain, this is a matter of exercising police power. In connection there with, no 9ust compensation is needed to exercise such delegated power. !here is no taking of property or expropriation without 9ust compensation. !he act of the mayor is in the concept of police power. !his is not a case in which the local go ernment unit exercised its power of eminent dominion, this is a alid exercise of their police power. Such is for the benefit of the general populace and no taking of property was intended. alid

MACAS!A&% vs1 $!%:&% (.27 SCRA .0.) FACTS !his case arose when the &unicipality of /araOaque passed an ordinance which authori2es the closure of certain streets and the establishment of a flea market theron. !hrough a resolution passed by the municipal council, the mayor entered into a contract for the operation maintenance and management of a flea market with respondent /alanyag, a ser ice cooperati e. Aowe er, /etitioner Brig. ;en. &acasiano, /#/ Superintendent of the &etropolitan !raffic 'ommand, ordered the destruction of said stalls. /etitioner &acasiano wrote /alanyag gi ing the latter ten 4,05 days to discontinue the flea market otherwise the market stalls shall be dismantled. !he respondents herein questioned the alidity of the order of Brg. ;en. &acasiano, questioning his authority as well. !he trial court howe er upholds the alidity of the ordinance and has gi en full authority to Brig. ;en. &acasiano to continue with the destruction of the said stalls. !SS"#

1hether or not the ordinance is constitutional and therefore alid. $#C!S!%& Les, the ordinance is alid and constitutional. !he property of pro inces, cities and municipalities is di ided into property for public use and patrimonial property. 4 Art. 423, Civil Code). In the present case, the local roads are used for public ser ice and therefore considered public properties. /roperties of the local go ernment which are de oted to public ser ice are deemed public and are under the absolute control of 'ongress. 4 rovince o! "amboanga del #orte vs. City o! "amboanga.) Aence, local go ernments ha e no authority whatsoe er to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is ested upon them by 'ongress. Section ,0 of the 7ocal ;o ernment 'ode pro ides closure of roads M @A local go ernment unit may likewise, through its head acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian and in accordance with e$isting law and the provisions o! this Code, close any barangay, municipal, city or pro incial road, street, alley, park or square. #o such way or place or any part thereo! shall be closed without indemni!ying any person pre%udiced thereby. A property thus withdrawn !rom public use may be used or con eyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or con eyed.D !herefore, the order of &acasiano in destructing and remo ing the said stall in considered effecti e and alid.

CR"4 vs1 !&T#RM#$!AT# A,,#'AT# C%"RT (175 SCRA 31.) FACTS !he antecedent facts of the case are as follows, /adre "ada market was authori2ed to be operated as a public market of the 'ity of &anila by irtue of "esolution #o. $-0, as amended by "esolution #o. )0(, both series of ,%)%. !he management of said market represent by petitioner 'ru2 wrote &ayor Villegas that the management was withdrawing three?fourths of the area of the market from the direct super ision and control of the 'ity !reasurer*s +ffice effecti e on Cune ,., ,%:0, and from said date the withdrawn portion shall cease to function and operate as a public market. &ayor Villegas allowed the withdrawal of the market as a public market in line with the decision that upheld the right of the operators of the Elcano &arket to withdraw their property from its use as a public market stating, among others, that appro al for the withdrawal by the 'ity of &anila is not e en necessary. Aerein pri ate respondents questioned the said order. !he trial court declared the order alid, in its amended decision, which was re ersed by the 'ourt of Appeals. !SS"# 1hether or not the 'ity &ayor may market. alidly withdraw /adre "ada &arket as a public

9#'$ #+. Eit is axiomatic that only the power that created it can withdraw it.E !he &ayor had no legal authority to, by himself, allows the petitioner to withdraw the ma9or portion of /adre "ada &arket from its use as a public market, thereby also withdrawing it from the city*s constant super ision. !he establishment and maintenance of public markets is by law among the legislati e powers of the 'ity of &anila. Since the operation of /adre "ada &arket was authori2ed by a municipal board resolution and appro ed by the 'ity &ayor, as pro ided by law, it follows that a withdrawal of the whole or any portion from use as a public market must be sub9ect to the same 9oint action of the Board and the &ayor. !he &ayor of &anila, by himself, cannot pro ide for the opening, operations, and closure of a public market.

MA8TA<AS vs1 ,R6C# (81R1 &o1 111077 <uly 20 177.) FACTS !his case arose when /A;'+" opened a branch in 'agayan de +ro, there was an instant opposition from those different sectors of the community, including the local go ernment units. 1ell in fact, the &ayor of the city of 'agayan de +ro brought this instant petition attacking among others, gambling as intrinsically harmful and citing arious pro isions of the constitution and se eral decisions of the court. !he Sannguniang panglungsod passed an ordinance prohibiting the operation of casinos in their place. !SS"# 1hether or not the Sangguniang /anglungsod may pass an ordinance prohibiting the operation of casinos. $#C!S!%& !he court rules that they cannot do so. !he power of /A;'+" to centrali2e and regulate all games o chance remains unimpaired. /8 ,H(% has not been modified by the 7ocal ;o ernment 'ode, which empowers the local go ernment to pre ent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law.

'asino gambling is authori2ed under /8 ,H(%. !his decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Aence, it was not competent for Sangguniang /anglungsod of 'agayan de +ro city to enact ordinances prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and prohibiting the operation of casinos. !hose ordinances are contrary to /8,H(% and the public policy announced therein, therefore ultra ires and oid. It has already been decided that local go ernment unit cannot prohibit but can only merely regulate.

TA& vs1 C%MM!SS!%& %& #'#CT!%&S (1.2 SCRA 527) FACTS !his case in ol es B/ HH. which was enacted to create a new pro ince, to be known as the /ro ince of #egros 8el #orte, in the Island of #egros. It pro ides, among others, that @Sec. ). A plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new pro ince which are the areas affected x x x.D /etitioners contend that the said law is unconstitutional and it is not in accordance with the 7ocal ;o ernment 'ode Sec -, A. J, of our 'onstitution mandates that, @#o pro ince, x x x may be created, x x x except in accordance with the criteria established in the local go ernment code, and sub9ect to the appro al by a ma9ority of the otes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.D Sec. ,%: of the 7ocal ;o ernment 'ode enumerates the condition which must exist to pro ide the legal basis for the creation of a pro incial unit and these requisites are3 @A pro ince may be created if it has territory of at least three thousand fi e hundred square kilometers, x x x.D /ublic respondents argue that B/ HH. should be accorded the presumption of legality, claiming that the said law does not infringe the 'onstitution because the requisites of the 7ocal ;o ernment 'ode ha e been complied with. !hey further argue that the remaining cities and municipalities of the /ro ince of #egros +ccidental, not included in the area of the new /ro ince of #egros del #orte, did not fall within the meaning and scope of the term @unit or units affected.D !SS"# 1hether or not the creation of B/ HH. is constitutional and alid.

$#C!S!%&3 #o, the court ruled that B/ is not constitutional and it is therefore considered alid. It can be plainly seen that the constitutional pro ision makes it imperati e that there be first obtained @the appro al of a ma9ority of otes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected.D !hus, it is inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing pro ince would necessarily be substantially altered in order that there can be created the proposed new pro ince. !wo political units would be affected3 the first would be the parent pro ince because its boundaries substantially altered and the other would be of those in the area subtracted from the parent pro ince to constitute the proposed pro ince.

Flores vs $rilon (223 SCRA 50/) FACTS !his centered in this pro ision in which, pursuant to the pro ision of Sec ,- par 4d5of "A :$$: 4Bases 'on ersion and 8e elopment Act of ,%%$5 &ayor "ichard ;ordon of +longgapo 'ity was then appointed as the chairman and chief executi e of SB&A. !he appointment was questioned by the petitioners contending that Sec ,- par 4d5 infringes the pro ision of Sec :, first par., Art IJ?B of the 'onstitution, which states that @#o electi e official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure.D "espondent contended on the other hand that the appointment is allowed for by Sec %) of the 7ocal ;o ernment 'ode which permits the appointment of a local electi e official to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary function of the office. In which the court has to resol e the issue at hand. !SS"# 1hether or not Sec. ,- par 4d5 iolates the constitutional proscription against the designation or appointment of electi e official to other go ernment post. $#C!S!%& !he court rule that it does iolate the constitutional proscription against designation or appointment of electi e official to other go ernment post while maintaining their position in the go ernment. And yes, it iolates the constitutional proscription. !he fact that the expertise

of an electi e official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment. 7ocal ;o ernment 'ode, particularly Sec. %) is not determinati e of the constitutionality of Sec. ,-, par 4d5 of "A :$$: for no legislati e act can pre ail o er the fundamental law of the land. !herefore, &ayor ;ordon cannot assume any position while still ser ing his term as an electi e official of his area of responsibility.

Villanueva vs Castane;a (175 SCRA 31.)

FACTS !his case in ol es the icinity of /ublic market of San >ernando, /ampangga a strip land which is commonly known as talipapa. !he petitioner is claiming that they ha e the right to remain in that icinity and to conduct business in the area by irtue of a pre ious authori2ation granted to them by municipal go ernment while the respondent deny this and 9ustify the demolition of their stalls as illegal consideration on public property. &unicipal 'ouncil of San >ernando adopted "es. #o. $,H authori2ing $) members of >ernando <nited &erchant and !raderPs Association to construct permanent stags. !he action was protested while the case is pending, the council adopted "es. #o. $% which declared the sub9ect area @the parking place and as the public pla2a, impliedly re oking "es #o. $,H. !he decision was apparently not enforced, the petitioner is not e icted the Associations of 'oncerned 'iti2en and 'onsumer of San >ernando, /ampangga filed a petition for the immediate implementation of "es. $% to restore the sub9ect property to its original and customary use as a public pla2a. VicenteA. &acalino, as officer in charge of the +ffice issued resolution to demolish the stalls in the area.

!SS"# 1hether or not the public pla2a is susceptible for contractual obligation. $#C!S!%&

!he court ruled that the icinity cannot be included as a sub9ect a contract between the local go ernment unit and the petitioners. A public pla2a is considered as beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the sub9ect of lease or any contractual undertaking. Article ,$:, states that @communal things that cannot be sold because they are by their nature outside commerce of are those for public use, such as pla2as, streets, common lands, ri ers, fountains etc.,D !he petitioner has no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contract.

C!T6 %F MA&!'A vs1 CA (177 SCRA .2/) FACTS !he antecedent facts of the case are as follows, Irene Sto. 8omingo buried her husband in this lot at the #orth 'emetery, which was leased to her then by the 'ity of &anila for that period of fifty years. >ull payment of the rental amounting to /.0.00 is e idenced by the said receipt which appears to be regular on its face. Belie ing in good faith that, in accordance with Administrati e +rder #o. ., Series of ,%:., of the 'ity &ayor of &anila, prescribing uniform procedure and guidelines in the processing of documents pertaining to and for the use and disposition of burial lots and plots within the #orth 'emetery, etc., sub9ect 7ot in which the mortal remains of the late Vi encio Sto. 8omingo were laid to rest, was leased to the berea ed family for fi e 4.5 years only, it was certified as ready for exhumation. !he authorities of the cemetery authori2ed the exhumation and remo al from sub9ect burial lot the remains of the late Vi encio Sto. 8omingo, Sr., placed the bones and skull in a bag or sack and kept the same in the depository or bodega of the cemetery. Subsequently, the same lot in question was rented out to another lessee so that when the plaintiffs herein went to said lot on All Souls 8ay in their shock, consternation and dismay that the resting place of their dear departed did not anymore bear the stone marker which they lo ingly placed on the tomb. 8isgusted o er such a sorrowful finding, Irene Sto. 8omingo lost no time in inquiring and was told that the remains of her late husband had been taken from the burial lot in question. !SS"# 1hether or not the operations of the cemetery is a corporate or proprietary function of the 'ity. $#C!S!%& !he court ruled that the operations of the 'ity of &anila of the cemetery is a corporate function. !he #orth 'emetery is a patrimonial property of the 'ity of &anila which was created by resolution of the &unicipal Board of August $:, ,%0- and Canuary :, ,%0). !he administration and go ernment of the cemetery are under the authority of the 'ity Aealth +fficer, the order

and police of the cemetery, the opening of gra es, niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the purification of the same are under the charge and responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. !he 'ity of &anila furthermore prescribes the procedure and guidelines for the use and dispositions of burial lots and plots within the #orth 'emetery through Administrati e +rder #o. ., s. ,%:.. 1ith the acts of dominion, there is, therefore no doubt that the #orth 'emetery is within the class of property which the 'ity of &anila owns in its proprietary or pri ate character. >urthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in fa or of the pri ate respondents. !herefore, those obligations arising from contracts ha e the force of law between the contracting parties.

MA&!'A vs1 T#%T!C% (22 SCRA .2/) FACTS !his case arose when one ;enaro !eotico filed a complaint for damages against the 'ity of &anila, its mayor, the city engineer, the city health officer, the city treasurer and the chief of police for the damages he had sustained when he fell inside an unco ered and unlighted catch basin or manhole along /. Burgos A enue as he stepped down from the curb to aboard a passenger 9eepney. +n its defense, the 'ity of &anila howe er contends that the present case is go erned by Section ) of "epublic Act #o. )0% 4'harter of the 'ity of &anila5 and not by Article $,H% of the 'i il 'ode, because "epublic Act #o. )0% is a special law intended exclusi ely for the city of manila. !he 'ourt of >irst Instance rendered a decision fa oring the city of &anila, the 'ourt of Appeals affirmed the '>IPs decision but ordered city of &anila to pay damages. !SS"#3 1hether or not the case is go erned by Section ) of "epublic Act #o. )0% $#C!S!%& #o, the court ruled that the case is not go erned by Section ) of "epublic Act #o. )0% but by Article $,H% of the 'i il 'ode. In Article $,H% of the 'i il 'ode, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defecti e roads or streets belong to the pro ince, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. 1hat said article requires is that the pro ince, city or municipality ha e either Econtrol or super isionE o er said street or road. E en if /. Burgos A enue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its Econtrol or super isionE by the 'ity of &anila, under "epublic Act )0%. !herefore, the 'ity of &anila may still be held liable for the damages that has been sustained by the petitioner.

<!M#&#4 V1 MA&!'A (150 SCRA 510) FACTS !he antecedent facts of the case are as follows, the e idence of the plaintiff, petitioner herein, showed that in the morning of August ,., ,%:) he, together with his neighbors, went to this Sta. Ana a public market to buy EbagoongE at the time when the public market was flooded with ankle deep rainwater. After purchasing the EbagoongE he turned around to return home but he accidentally stepped on an unco ered opening which could hardly be seen for the reason of the dirty rainwater, causing a dirty and rusty four? inch nail, stuck inside the unco ered opening, to pierce the left leg of plaintiff?petitioner penetrating to a depth of about one and a half inches. After administering first aid treatment at a nearby drugstore, his companions helped him hobble home. Ae felt ill and de eloped fe er and he had to be carried to 8r. Cuanita &ascardo. 8espite the medicine that was administered to him by the latter, his left leg got swelled with great pain. Ae was then rushed to the Veterans &emorial Aospital where he had to be confined for twenty 4$05 days due to high fe er and se ere pain. !SS"# 1hether or not the 'ity of &anila may be held liable. $#C!S!%& Les, the court ruled that the 'ity of &anila may be held liable and must pay for the damages that has been incurred by the petitiober. !his issue has been laid to rest in the case of City o! &anila v. Teotico 4$$ S'"A $(%?$:$ Q,%(HR5 where the Supreme 'ourt squarely ruled that "epublic Act #o. )0% establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the 'ity of &anila for Edamages or in9ury to persons or property arising from the failure of city officersE to enforce the pro isions of said Act, Eor any other law or ordinance or from negligenceE of the 'ity E&ayor, &unicipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said pro isions.E <pon the other hand, Article $,H% of the 'i il 'ode of the /hilippines which, constitutes a particular prescription making Epro inces, cities and municipalities ... liable for damages for the death of, or in9ury suffered by any person by reasonE S specifically S Eof the defecti e condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or super ision.E In other words, Art. ,, sec. ), ".A. #o. )0% refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the ob9ect, thereof, while Article $,H% of the 'i il 'ode

go erns liability due to Edefecti e streets, public buildings and other public worksE in particular and is therefore decisi e on this specific case.

8"!'ATC% vs1 C!T6 %F $A8",A& (171 SCRA 3/2)

FACTS !he antecedent facts of the case are as follows, it would appear from the e idences that has been presented by the claimant on Culy $., ,%:H, ;uilatco, while she was about to board a motori2ed tricycle at a sidewalk located at /ere2 Bl d. accidentally fell into a manhole located on said sidewalk, thereby causing her right leg to be fractured. As a result thereof, she had to be hospitali2ed, operated on, confined, at first at the /angasinan /ro incial Aospital. She also incurred hospitali2ation, medication and other expenses to the tune of / H,0.-.(. or a total of / ,0,000.00 in all, as other receipts were either lost or misplaced6 during the period of her confinement in said two hospitals, plaintiff suffered se ere or excruciating pain not only on her right leg which was fractured but also on all parts of her body6 the pain has persisted e en after her discharge from the &edical 'ity ;eneral Aospital on +ctober %, ,%:H, to the present. 8espite her discharge from the Aospital plaintiff is presently still wearing crutches and the 'ourt has actually obser ed that she has difficulty in locomotion. >rom the time of the mishap on Culy $., ,%:H up to the present, plaintiff has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter, as she has difficulty of locomotion in going up the stairs of her office, located near the city hall in 8agupan 'ity. She earns at least / :$0.00 a month consisting of her monthly salary and other means of income, but since Culy $., ,%:H up to the present she has been depri ed of said income as she has already consumed her accrued lea es in the go ernment ser ice. She has lost se eral pounds as a result of the accident and she is no longer her former 9o ial self, she has been unable to perform her religious, social, and other acti ities which she used to do prior to the incident. !SS"# 1hether or not the 'ity of 8agupan may be held liable. $#C!S!%& !he court ruled in affirmati e. !he liability of public corporations for damages arising from in9uries suffered by pedestrians from the defecti e condition of roads is expressed in the 'i il 'ode as follows3 Article $,H%. /ro inces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or in9uries suffered by, any person by reason of the defecti e condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or super ision. It is not necessary for that certain defecti e road or street to belong to the pro ince, city or municipality for liability to attach therein. !he article only requires that either control or super ision is exercised o er the defecti e road or street. !herefore, making the said 'ity liable for the damaged that has been incurred by the petitioner.

FR!VA'$% vs1 C%MM!SS!%& %& #'#CT!%&S FACTS !he antecedent facts of the case are as follows, that on &arch $0, ,%%., >ri aldo filed his 'ertificate of 'andidacy for ;o ernor. 7ee, another candidate, filed a petition with the 'ommission on Election praying that this >ri aldo be disqualified for that certain election for not yet being considered as a citi2en of the /hilippines. 8uring the elections, >ri aldo garnered the highest number of otes and assumed the position. !hen 7ee filed a petition praying for his proclamation as the elected go ernor be suspended. >ortunately, at H3-0 pm of Cune -0, ,%%., 7ee was then proclaimed as the go ernor. >ri aldo filed a new petition with '+&E7E' seeking the annulment of the Cune -0 proclamation of 7ee and his own proclamation. Ae alleged that on Cune -0, ,%%., at $300pm, he took his oath of allegiance as a citi2en of the /hilippines after his petition for repatriation under /.8. :$. which he filed with the Special 'ommittee on #aturali2ation in September ,%%) had been granted. !he issue is whether or not repatriation of >ri aldo alid and legalF !SS"# 1hether or not >ri aldo can be elected for that position. $#C!S!%& !he court ruled in affirmati e. It concludes that repatriation is alid and legal. <nder /hil law, citi2enship may be reacquired by direct act of 'ongress, by naturali2ation or by repatriation. &oreo er, >ri aldoPs repatriation seasonably cures his lack of citi2enship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and hold office as a go ernor. Ae possessed the citi2enship requirement on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Section -% of 7ocal ;o ernment 'ode must be liberally construed. !he law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citi2enship, unlike that for residence and age. #ow, an official begins to go ern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. >urthermore, Sec -% speaks of EGualificationsE of EE7E'!IVE +>>I'IA7SE, not of candidates. 7iterally, such qualifications should thus be possessed when the electi e official begins to go ern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed. 7eePs argument that the citi2enship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate registered as a oter as under the law a E oterE must be a citi2en of the /hilippines is untenable. If the law intended the citi2enship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered oter, then it would not ha e made citi2enship a separate qualification. !he law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended citi2enship to be a qualification distinct from being a V+!E", e en if being a oter presumes being a citi2en first. !herefore, >ri aldo shall assume the position as the go ernor and ser e thereon.

M#RCA$% vs1 MA&4A&% (81R1 &o1 1350/3= 1777) FACTS !he antecedent facts of the case are as follows, Ernesto S. &ercado and the pri ate respondent Eduardo B. &an2ano were running as candidates for the position as Vice &ayor of the 'ity of &akati in the &ay ,,, ,%%H elections. !he other one was ;abriel V. 8a2a III. After counting the otes, the results of the election were as follows3 Eduardo B. &an2ano ,0-,H.Ernesto S. &ercado ,00,H%) ;abriel V. 8a2a III .),$:. 1 Ernesto &amaril then filed a petition for disqualification. !herefore !he proclamation of pri ate respondent was suspended in iew of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto &amaril who alleged that pri ate respondent was not a citi2en of the /hilippines but of the <nited States. !hen the case thereon proceeded. !SS"# 1hether or not &an2ano can alidly be elected as Vice &ayor ha ing dual citi2enship. $#C!S!%& Les, the court ruled that Eduardo B. &an2ano can be alidly elected as the Vice &ayor of the 'ity of &akati despite of ha ing a dual citi2enship. !he disqualification of pri ate respondent &an2ano is being sought under T)0 of the 7ocal ;o ernment 'ode of ,%%, 4".A. #o. :,(05, which declares as Edisqualified from running for any electi e local position3 . . . 4d5 !hose with dual citi2enship.E @!his pro ision is incorporated in the 'harter of the 'ity of &akati. o begin with, dual citi2enship is different from dual allegiance. !he former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. >or instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citi2ens of a state which adheres to the principle of %us sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of %us soli. Such a person, ipso !acto and without any oluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citi2en of both states.D 8ual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positi e act, loyalty to two or more states. 1hile dual citi2enship is in oluntary, dual allegiance is the result of an indi idual*s olition.

2!&A6 vs $%M!&8% (201 SCRA 50/) FACTS !he antecedent facts of the case are as follows, the Burial Assistance /rogram 4"esolution #o. (0 M assisting those who only earn less than /$,000=month of burial assistance in the amount of /.00.005 made by &akati &ayor Ce9omar Binay, in the exercise of the police power granted to him by the municipal charter, was referred to the 'ommission on Audit after the municipal secretary certified the disbursement of four hundred thousand pesos for its implementation was disallowed by said commission of such disbursements because there cannot be seen any perceptible connection or relation between the ob9ecti e sought to be attained and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. of its inhabitants. Aence, this petition re ol ing around the pi otal issue on whether or not "esolution #o. (0 of the&unicipality of &akati is a alid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. !SS"# 1hether or not "esolution #o. (0, re?enacted under "esolution #o. $)-, of &unicipality of &akati is a alid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. $#C!S!%& Les, the court ruled affirmati ely. "esolution #o. (0 of the &unicipality of &akati is a alid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. !he police power is a go ernmental function, an inherent attribute of so ereignty, which was born with ci ili2ed go ernment. It is founded largely on the maxims, @Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedasD 4use your property so as not to impair others5 and @Salus populi est suprema lexD 4the welfare of the people is the supreme law5. Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and con enience of the people. /olice power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the go ernment. It is elastic and must be responsi e to arious social conditions. !he care for the poor is generally recogni2ed as a public duty. !he support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good. the

'ea(ue of Cities v1 Co*elec FACTS 8uring the ,,th 'ongress, 'ongress enacted into law -- bills con erting -- municipalities into cities. Aowe er, 'ongress did not act on bills con erting $) other municipalities into cities. 8uring the ,$th 'ongress, 'ongress enacted into law "epublic Act #o. %00% 4"A %00%5, which took effect on -0 Cune $00,. "A %00% amended Section ).0 of the 7ocal ;o ernment 'ode by increasing the annual income requirement for con ersion of a municipality into a city from /$0 million to /,00 million. !he rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino /imentel, @the mad rushD of municipalities to con ert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal "e enue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. After the effecti ity of "A %00%, the Aouse of "epresentati es of the ,$th 'ongress adopted Coint "esolution #o. $%, which sought to exempt from the /,00 million income requirement in "A %00% the $) municipalities whose cityhood bills were not appro ed in the ,,th 'ongress. Aowe er, the ,$th 'ongress ended without the Senate appro ing Coint "esolution #o. $%. 8uring the ,-th 'ongress, the Aouse of "epresentati es re?adopted Coint "esolution #o. $% as Coint "esolution #o. , and forwarded it to the Senate for appro al. Aowe er, the Senate again failed to appro e the Coint "esolution. >ollowing the ad ice of Senator Aquilino /imentel, ,( municipalities filed, through their respecti e sponsors, indi idual city hood bills. !he ,( city hood bills contained a common pro ision exempting all the ,( municipalities from the /,00 million income requirement in "A %00%. +n $$ 8ecember $00(, the Aouse of "epresentati es appro ed the cityhood bills. !he Senate also appro ed the city hood bills. !he 'ityhood 7aws direct the '+&E7E' to hold plebiscites to determine whether the oters in each respondent municipality appro e of the con ersion of their municipality into a city. /etitioners filed the present petitions to declare the 'ityhood 7aws unconstitutional for iolation of Section ,0, Article J of the 'onstitution, as well as for iolation of the equal protection clause. /etitioners also lament that the wholesale con ersion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal "e enue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal re enue set aside for all cities under Section $H. of the 7ocal ;o ernment 'ode. !SS"#S 1hether or not the 'ityhood 7aws iolate Section ,0, Article J of the 'onstitution6 and 1hether or not the 'ityhood 7aws iolate the equal protection clause. $#C!S!%& !he court ruled that the 'ityhood 7aws iolate Sections ( and ,0, Article J of the 'onstitution, and are thus unconstitutional. >irst, applying the /,00 million income requirements in "A %00% to the present case is a prospecti e, not a retroacti e application, because "A %00% took effect in $00, while the cityhood bills became law more than fi e years later. Second, the 'onstitution requires that 'ongress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the 7ocal ;o ernment 'ode and not in any other law, including the 'ityhood 7aws. !hird, the 'ityhood 7aws iolate Section (, Article J of the 'onstitution because they pre ent a fair and 9ust distribution of the national taxes to local go ernment units.

MAR5"#4 versus C%M#'#C (2.3 SCRA 53/)

FACTS &arque2, a candidate for an electi e position in Gue2on /ro ince during the ,%%H elections, filed a petition praying for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of "odrigue2 on the ground of disqualification under section )0 of the 7ocal ;o ernment 'ode 4Section )0. 8isqualification. !he following persons are disqualified from running for any local electi e positionU 4e5 >ugiti e from 9ustice in criminal or non?political cases here or abroad.5 "odrigue2 is allegedly criminally charged with insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property in the <nited States and that his arrest is yet to be ser ed because of his flight from the country. !he '+&E7E' dismissed &arque2Ps /etition. "odrigue2 was proclaimed the ;o ernor?elect of Gue2on.

!SS"# 1hether or not pri ate respondent, who at the time of the filing of his '+' is said to be facing criminal charges before a foreign court and e ading a warrant of arrest comes within the term @fugiti e from 9usticeD.

$#C!S!%& #o, the court ruled in negati e. Although it is pro ided in Article :- of the "ules and "egulations implementing the 7ocal ;o ernment 'ode of ,%%, that for a person to be considered a fugiti e from 9ustice, he or she has to be con icted by final 9udgment, but such definition is an ordinate and under circumscription of the law. >or the term !ugitive !rom %ustice includes not only those who after con iction to a oid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to a oid prosecution. !his definition truly finds support from 9urisprudence, and it may be conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.

Ro;ri(ue> v1 C%M#'#C (257 SCRA 55)

FACTS In the &ay ,%%. elections for go ernor, &arque2 questioned "odrigue2Ps candidacy ia a petition for disqualification before the '+&E7E', based on the allegation that "odrigue2 is a Efugiti e from 9usticeE for lea ing the <S where a charge against him for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property was pending. &arque2 claims that "odrigue2 should be disqualified or held ineligible under Section )04e5 of the 7ocal ;o ernment 'ode. '+&E7E' then promulgated a 'onsolidated "esolution for E/' #o. %$?$H 4quo warranto case filed by &arque2 in ,%%$ elections5 and S/A #o. %.?0H% 4present disqualification case5, where it found "odrigue2 a fugiti e from 9ustice in line with the &A"G<EN 8ecisionPs 4,%%.5 definition of Efugiti e from 9ustice.D 1ith "odrigue2Ps walk?out during the hearing of the case, '+&E7E' considered him as ha ing wai ed his right to dispro e the authenticity of &arque2* documentary e idence. #e ertheless, "odrigue2 emerged as the ictorious candidate in the &ay H, ,%%. election for the position of go ernor. Aowe er, '+&E7E' also made a report entitled EEVI8E#'E +> !AE /A"!IES and '+&&ISSI+#*S EVA7<A!I+#E wherein the '+&E7E', after calibrating the parties* e idence, declared that "odrigue2 is #+! a Efugiti e from 9usticeE as defined in the main opinion of the &A"G<EN 8ecision, thus making a ,H0?degree turnaround from its finding in the 'onsolidated "esolution. '+&E7E' opined that intent to e ade is a material element of the &A"G<EN 8ecision definition. Such intent to e ade is absent in "odrigue2* case because e idence has established that "odrigue2 arri ed in the /hilippines 4Cune $., ,%H.5 long before the criminal charge was instituted in the 7os Angeles 'ourt 4#o ember ,$, ,%H.5. !SS"# 1hether or not "odrigue2 is considered a fugiti e from 9ustice as defined by the 'ourt in the &A"G<EN 8ecision. $#C!S!%& #o, the court ruled in negati e. A fugiti e from 9ustice is defined as @not only those who flee after con iction to a oid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to a oid prosecution.D !his indicates that the intent to e ade is the compelling factor that makes a person lea e a particular 9urisdiction, and there can only be intent to e ade prosecution or punishment when the fleeing person knows of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated 9udgment of con iction. Intent to e ade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a con iction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. !his cannot be applied in the case of "odrigue2. "odrigue2 arri ed in the /hilippines on Cune $., ,%H., fi e months before the filing of the felony complaint in the 7os Angeles 'ourt on #o ember ,$, ,%H. and of the issuance of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court. It was clearly impossible for "odrigue2 to ha e known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the <S, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant S much less con iction S to speak of yet at such time. !he 'ourt also agrees with the '+&E7E'.

Ca?rera v1 Court of Appeals (175 SCRA 31.) FACTS

!he /ro incial Board of 'atanduanes adopted "esolution #o.,.H closing the old road leading to the new 'apitol Building of this pro ince to traffic and gi ing the owners of the properties tra ersed by the new road equal area as per sur ey by the Aighway 8istrict EngineerPs office from the old road ad9acent to the respecti e remaining portion of their properties. In ,%:H, part of the northern end of the old road fronting the petitioner*s house was occupied of egetables in ,%:: by Eulogia Ale9andro. Anselmo /ena, who had bought Angeles Vargas*s share, also in the same part of the road, con erted it into a piggery farm. 7earning about "esolution ,.H, the petitioner filed on 8ecember $%, ,%:H, a complaint with the 'ourt of >irst Instance of 'atanduanes for @"estoration of /ublic "oad and=or Abatement of #uisance, Annulment of "esolutions and 8ocuments with 8amages.E Ae alleged that the land fronting his house was a public road owned by the /ro ince of 'atanduanes in its go ernmental capacity and therefore beyond the commerce of man. Ae contended that "esolution #o. ,.H and the deeds of exchange were in alid, as so too was the closure of the northern portion of the said road. Appeal was taken to the respondent court, $ which found that the road was a public road and not a trail but 9ust the same also upheld "esolution ,.H. It declared3 /ursuant to "epublic Act #o. .,H., municipal authorities can close, sub9ect to the appro al or direction of the /ro incial Board, thoroughfares under Section $$)( of the "e ised Administrati e 'ode. Although in this case the road was not closed by the municipality of 'atanduanes but by the pro incial board of 'atanduanes, the closure, ne ertheless, is alid since it was ordered by the appro ing authority itself. Aowe er, while it could do so, the pro incial go ernment of 'atanduanes could close the road only if the persons pre9udiced thereby were indemnified, Section $$)( of the "e ised Administrati e 'ode being ery explicit on this. Before us now, the petitioner insists that Sec. $$)( is not applicable. !he petitioner alleges that the closure of the road has especially in9ured him and his family as they can no longer use it in going to the national road leading to the old capitol building but must instead passes through a small passageway. >or such incon enience, he is entitled to damages in accordance with law. !SS"#3 1hether or not the pro incial board can order the closure of a road and use= con ey it for other purposes. $#C!S!%&3 Les, the court ruled in affirmati e. !he authority of the pro incial board to close that road and use or con ey it for other purposes is deri ed from the following pro isions of "epublic Act #o. .,H. in relation to Section $$)( of the "e ised Administrati e 'ode3 ".A. #o..,H., Section ,, 4II5 4a53 II. !he following actions by municipal officials or municipal councils, as pro ided for in the pertinent sections of the "e ised Administrati e 'ode shall take effect without the need of appro al or direction from any official of the national go ernment3 /ro ided, !hat such actions shall be sub9ect to appro al or direction by the /ro incial Board3 4a5 Authority to close thoroughfare under Section $$)(6 Sec. $$)(. Authority to close thoroughfare. S1ith the prior authori2ation of the 8epartment Aead, a municipal council may close any municipal road, street, alley, park, or square6 but no such way or place aforesaid or any part thereof, shall be closed without indemnifying any person pre9udiced thereby. $ACA&A6 v1 AS!ST!%= <R1 FACTS

!his is a petition for mandamus to the non?action of the city registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the commerce of man. After hearing the parties, on ,, +ctober ,%,) the trial court issued an order dismissing the petitioner*s application for registration of title. Aence, the instant petition for re iew.!he Supreme 'ourt set aside the order of the lower court, and the ordered said court to proceed with the hearing of the petitioner*s application for registration of title. !SS"#3 1hether or not the sale is alid. $#C!S!%&3 Les, the court ruled in affirmati e. !he 'ity is empowered to close city road or street and withdraw the same from public use. Section -, of the "e ised 'harter of 'ebu 'ity 47egislati e /owers5 pro ides that @any pro ision of law and executi e order to the contrary notwithstanding, the 'ity 'ouncil shall ha e the following legislati e powers xxx to close any city road, street or alley, boule ard, a enue, park or square. /roperty thus withdrawn from public ser itude may be used or con eyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the 'ity may be lawfully used or con eyed.E It is undoubtedly clear that the 'ity of 'ebu is empowered to close a city road or street. 8iscretion of the city council cannot ordinarily be interfered with by the court. !he city council is the authority competent to determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public use. !he power to acate a street or alley is discretionary, and the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. >aithfulness to the public trust will he presumed. So the fact that some pri ate interests may be ser ed incidentally will not in alidate the acation ordinance. >urthermore, the "e ised 'harter of the 'ity of 'ebu, in ery clear and unequi ocal terms, states that Eproperty thus withdrawn from public ser itude may be used or con eyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the 'ity may be lawfully used or con eyed.E !hus, the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale to the petitioner is alid.

TA&% V1 S%CRAT#S FACTS !his case arose when the Sangguniang /anlungsod of /uerto /rincesa 'ity enacted +rdinance #o. ,.?%$ which banned the shipment of li e fish and lobster outside /uerto /rincesa

'ity from 0, Can ,%%-?,%%H. 1hile the Sangguniang /anlalawigan , /ro incial ;o ernment of /alawan enacted "esolution #o. -- which prohibited the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of lo e marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of . years in and coming from /alawan waters. +rdinance #o. $ +rdinance /rohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of li e marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms was also enacted. !he respondents implemented the said ordinances, depri ing all the fishermen of the whole pro ince of /alawan and the 'ity of /uerto /rincesa of their only means of li elihood and the petitioners Airline Shippers Association of /alawan and othermarine merchants from performing their lawful occupation and trade. /etitioners Alfredo !ano, Baldomero !ano, !eocenes &idello,Angel de &esa, Eulogio !remocha, and >elipe +ngonion, Cr. were charged criminally on the basis of the ordinances. !he petitioners filed this action claiming that first, the +rdinances depri ed them of due process of law, their li elihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in iolation of Section $, Article JII and Sections $ and : of Article JIII of the ,%H:'onstitution. ;o ernor Socrates and &embers of the Sangguniang /anlalawigan of /alawan defended the alidity of +rdinance #o.$ as a alid exercise of the /ro incial ;o ernment power under the general welfare clause. >urther, the +rdinance applied equally to all those belonging to one class. !SS"# 1hether or not the +rdinance enacted by the 7;< is a alid exercise of their police power. 1hether or not it is under the ;eneral 1elfare 'lause that has been expressly granted on them by the 7;< 'ode. $#C!S!%& !he court ruled in affirmati e. !he 7;' ests municipalities with the power to grant fishery pri ileges in municipal waters and impose rentals, fees or charges there for6 to penali2e, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosi es, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro?ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing6 and to prosecute any iolation of the pro isions of applicable fishery laws. In light then of the principles of decentrali2ation and de olution enshrined in the 7;' and the powers granted therein to 7;<s cannot be doubted. It is clear to the 'ourt that the +rdinances ha e two principal ob9ecti es or purposes3 4,5 to establish a Eclosed seasonE for the species of fish or aquatic animals co ered therein for a period of fi e years6 and 4$5 to protect the coral in the marine waters of the 'ity of /uerto /rincesa and the /ro ince of /alawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing acti ities. !he reali2ation of the second ob9ecti e clearly falls within both the general welfare clause of the 7;' and the express mandate to cities and pro inces to protect the en ironment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the en ironment. !herefore, it is incorrect to say that the challenged +rdinance of the 'ity of /uerto /rincesa is in alid or unenforceable because it was not appro ed by the Secretary of the 8E#". If at all, the appro al that should be sought would be that of the Secretary of the 8epartment of Agriculture.

SA& F#R&A&$% VS1 F!RM# FACTS /etitioner is a municipal corporation existing under and in accordance with the laws of the "epublic of the /hilippines. At about : am of 8ecember ,(, ,%(., a collision occurred in ol ing a passenger 9eepney dri en by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of &acario

#ie eras, a gra el and sand truck dri en by Cose &anandeg and owned by !anquilino Velasque2 and a dump truck of the petitioner and dri en by Alfredo Bislig. Se eral passengers of the 9eepney including 7aureano BaniOa Sr. died as a result of the in9uries they sustained and ) others suffered physical in9uries. /ri ate respondents instituted an action against #ie eras and Balagot before the '>I. !he defendants filed a third party complaint against petitioner and Bislig. !he complaint was then amended to implead petitioner and Bislig. /etitioner raised as defense lack of cause of action, non suability of the State, prescription and negligence of the owner and dri er of the 9eepney. !he trial court rendered a decision ordering the petitioner and Bislig to pay the plaintiffs. !he owner and dri er of the 9eepney were absol ed from liability. /etitioner filed an &" which was dismissed for ha ing been filed out of time. !SS"# 1hether or not the municipality is liable for the torts or quasi?delict that has been committed by its regular employee. $#C!S!%& #o, the court ruled in negati e. &unicipal corporations are agencies of the State when they are engaged in go ernmental functions and therefore should en9oy the so ereign immunity from suit. #e ertheless, they are sub9ect to suit e en in the performance of such functions because their charter pro ided that they can sue and be sued. Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the dri er, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing go ernmental or proprietary functions 4!orio s. >ontanilla5. It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. #e ertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of go ernmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. After a careful examination of existing laws and 9urisprudence, 1e arri e at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of go ernmental functions. Aence, the death of the passenger tragic and deplorable though it may be imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.

M%$A6 VS1 C%"RT %F A,,#A'S FACTS !his case arose when the Sangguniang Bayan of the &unicipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed the "esolution #o. )-?H%, EAuthori2ing the &unicipal &ayor to Initiate the /etition for Expropriation of a +ne 4,5 Aectare /ortion of 7ot #o. (,-H?/ls?) Along the #ational Aighway +wned by /erci al &oday for the Site of Bunawan >armers 'enter and +ther ;o ernment Sports >acilities.E !he "esolution was appro ed by &ayor Anuncio Bustillo and was transmitted to the Sangguniang /anlalawigan for its appro al. !he Sangguniang /anlalawigan disappro ed said

"esolution and returned it with the comment that Eexpropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still a ailable lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the go ernment center.E !he municipality filed a petition for eminent domain against /erci al &oday before the "egional !rial 'ourt. !he municipality then filed a motion to take or enter upon the possession of the land upon deposit with the municipal treasurer of the required amount. !he "!' granted the motion. It ruled that the Sangguniang /anlalawigan*s failure to declare the resolution in alid lea es it effecti e. It added that the duty of the Sangguniang /anlalawigan is merely to re iew the ordinances and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under Section $0H 4,5 of B./. Blg.--:, old 7ocal ;o ernment 'ode and that the exercise of eminent domain is not one of the acts enumerated in Section ,% requiring the appro al of the Sangguniang /anlalawigan. /etitioners ele ated the case in a petition for certiorari before the 'A. !he 'A held that the public purpose for the expropriation is clear from "esolution #o. )-?H% and that since theSangguniang /anlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did not declare "esolution #o. )-? H% in alid, expropriation of petitioners* property could proceed. &eanwhile, the &unicipality had erected three buildings on the sub9ect property3 the Association of Barangay 'ouncils 4AB'5 Aall, the &unicipal &otorpool, both wooden structures, and the Bunawan &unicipal ;ymnasium, which is made of concrete.In the instant petition for re iew, petitioner seeks the re ersal of the decision and resolution of the 'A and a declaration that "esolution #o. )-?H% of the &unicipality of Bunawanis null and oid. !SS"# 1hether or not a municipality may expropriate pri ate property by irtue of a municipal resolution which was not gi en appro al by the Sangguniang /anlalawigan. $#C!S!%& !he court ruled in negati e. Eminent domain, the power which the &unicipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from so ereignty. It is go ernment*s right to appropriate pri ate property for public use or purpose. >or the taking of pri ate property by the go ernment to be alid, the taking must be for public use and there must be 9ust compensation. !he &unicipality*s power to exercise the right of eminent domain is expressly pro ided for B/ --:, the local ;o ernment 'ode in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. 1hat petitioners question is the lack of authority of the municipality to exercise this right since the Sangguniang /anlalawigan disappro ed "esolution #o. )-?H%. !he Sangguniang /anlalawigan*s disappro al of "esolution #o. )-?H% is an infirm action which does not render said resolution null and oid. !he law, Section ,.- of B./. Blg. --:, grants the Sangguniang /anlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution in alid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the &ayor to issue. C!T6 %F 5"#4%& V1 '#@2#R (35. SCRA .73)

FACTS !ri?/artite &emorandum of Agreement was drawn between the 'ity of Gue2on in representation of &ayor Simon, Cr., 7exber Inc. and the &unicipality of Antipolo. A parcel of land located in Antipolo will be allocated as a garbage dumping site of the Gue2on 'ity and 7exber Inc. was hired as the exclusi e supplier of manpower, hea y equipment and engineering ser ices.

+n 8ecember ,$, ,%%$, counsel of 7exber sent a demand letter by then appointed &ayor of the 'ity of Gue2on, &ayor &athay, Cr., for the unpaid ser ice fee which is stipulated din the &emorandum of Agreement. &ayor &athay denied any liability, contending that it is then &ayor Simon Cr. who contracted such ser ices and the contract was not gi en appro al by the 'ity 'ouncil rendering it as oid ang not binding among the parties.

!SS"# 1hether or not appro al of the 'ity 'ouncil is necessary to render a contract entered into by &ayor Simon Cr. alid and binding among the parties.

$#C!S!%& !he court ruled in negati e. <nder the 7ocal ;o ernment 'ode of ,%H- also known as Batas /ambansa --:, no such prior authority or appro al is needed when a &ayor in representation of his city is entering into business transactions. !herefore, the contract entered into by &ayor Simon Cr. is alid and still binding between the 'ity of Gue2on and 7exber Inc. As a result, the 'ity of Gue2on must be obliged to pay the ser ice fee that is due to the 7exber Inc.

&AVARR% A&$ TAMA6% VS1 CA (81R1 &%1 1.1307= MARC9 2/= 2001)

FACTS A acancy was created when &ayor 'alimlim died and such position was succeeded by the Vice &ayor Aquino. Because of such, a acancy for the position of Vice &ayor was also created and such was succeeded by !amayo being the highest ranking member of the Sanguniang Bayan. At the end, a acancy in the Sanguniang Bayan was as well created. #a arro was appointed as a member of the Sanguniang Bayan. Aquino belonged to 7akas #<'8?VA&/I, while both #a arro and !amayo belonged to "E>+"&A?7& political party. !hey assailed the appointment of #a arro as a member of the Sanguniang Bayan for the reason that the person to be appointed to the position acate must come from the same political affiliation of who has caused the acancy. !SS"#

1hether or not the ele ation of the highest ranking or ice mayor created the Sanguninang Bayan $#C!S!%&

acancy in the

!he court ruled that, @whose ele ation to the position next higher in rank created the last acancy in the Sanguniang shall be appointed in the manner required under the law. ;i ing the impression that it is the ele ation of the highest ranking memner of Sanguniang Bayan that created the acancy, therefore, the person to be appointed must come from his political party. !he reason behind the right gi en to a political party to nominate a replacement where permanent acancy occurs in the Sangunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by the people in the election.