SEVEN (7) STEPS IN ORIGINAL LAND REG.

PROCEEDINGS cont
6. ISSUANCE OF DECREE OF REGISTRATION
REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE, INC. vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R.
No. L-67451 May 4, 1988 . 2
7. ISSUANCE OF ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
SPOUSES VICTOR ONG and GRACE TIU ONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL. G.R.
No. 121494. June 8, 2000 .. 3
HEIRS OF MARCIANA G. AVILA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and ALADINO
BACARRISAS G.R. No. L-45255 November 14, 1986 .. 5
LEOPOLDO VENCILAO ET AL. vs. TEODORO VANO, ET AL. G.R. No. L-25660
February 23, 1990 ... 8
EUFEMIA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BARROGA ET AL. vs. ANGEL ALBANO, ET AL G.R.
No. L-43445 January 20, 198 13
HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES BRAULIO
ABALOS and AQUILINA ABALOS G.R. No. 128177 August 15, 2001... 14
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF LUISA VILLA ABRILLE G.R. No. L39248 May 7, 1976 . 17
CADASTRAL REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS
RENATO S. SANCHEZ vs. RODOLFO M. QUINIO and ISMAEL M. QUINIO G.R. No.
133545 July 15, 2005 20
TEOTIMO EDUARTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO BELDA and ESTELITA
ANA G.R. No. 121038 July 22, 1999 22
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF LUISA VILLA ABRILLE G.R. No. L39248 May 7, 1976 (supra)

the registration in their names of the lots in question.

But as stated in the Court's decision, the doctrine in Villegas, which relies on the Ambat
case, which in turn merely applied Section 29 of Act No. 3110, is applicable only to cases
where all the records in the Court of First Instance and the appellate court were
destroyed or lost and were not reconstituted.
REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE, INC. and MACONDRAY FARMS, INC., petitioners,
vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Special Third Civil Cases Division), HON.
RIZALINA BONIFACIO VERA, as Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XXIII, MORRIS G. CARPO, QUEZON CITY DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCING
CORPORATION, and COMMISSIONER OF LAND REGISTRATION, respondents.
G.R. No. L-67451 May 4, 1988
RESOLUTION
CORTES., J.:
From this Court's decision dated September 28, 1987, respondent Morris Carpo filed on
October 20,1987 a Motion to Agenda before the Court En Banc and Motion for
Reconsideration. He contends that said decision of the Third Division of this Court
deviated from the doctrine established in Villegas v. Fernando [G.R. No. L-27347, April
28, 1969, 27 SCRA 1119], which is alleged to be "on all fours" with the instant case, and
that the Court erred in adopting the doctrine in Nacua v. de Beltran [93 Phil. 595 (1953)],
as to the effect of failure to reconstitute under Act No. 3110. He likewise contends that
appeal and not certiorari was the proper remedy in disputing the Vera Court's decision of
March 20, 1981.
To this Motion to Agenda before the Court En Banc and Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioner Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. filed its Comment on December 8, 1987.
The Motion to Agenda and Motion for Reconsideration is without merit.
1. There is no dispute that so long as a decree of registration has not been issued,
registration proceedings are still pending. The issue being raised now is whether the
records of LRC Case No. 657 and of TA-G.R. Nos. 209-211 were reconstituted pursuant
to Act No. 3110.
Carpo contends that the records of LRC Case No. 657 and of TA-G.R. Nos. 209-211
were not reconstituted pursuant to Act No. 3110. On the other hand, Realty claims that
the records of the case were duly reconstituted in proceedings before the Commisioner
for Reconstitution of Records of the Supreme Court.
Realty has not presented any Order of Reconstitution. It can therefore be said that there
was failure to reconstitute. However, the more important issue is the EFFECT of failure to
reconstitute on the status of the case IN ITS ENTIRETY.
This issue has been squarely dealt with in the decision now assailed by Carpo's motion.
Carpo however persists in his allegation that the effect of failure to reconstitute is that,
pursuant to the Villegas case, upon failure to reconstitute destroyed judicial records
within the period prescribed by law, the parties are deemed to have waived the effects of
the decision rendered in their favor and their only alternative is to file an action anew for

The facts obtaining in LRC Case No. 657, however, are different. Not all records in the
Court of First Instance and the appellate court were destroyed or lost. There are
authentic records of the case. Thus, as the Court ruled, it is the ruling laid down in Nacua
v. de Beltran, supra, which is applicable. The parties only had to go back to the next
preceding stage in the same case where records are available.
It is therefore incorrect to say that the decision of the Court deviated from the doctrine
laid down in Villegas. There was no deviation. More accurately, the Ambat-Villegas
doctrine is inapplicable to LRC Case No. 657; it is the Nacua doctrine which is
applicable.
Parenthetically, the Villegas case cannot be considered "on all fours" with the case at
bar. Firstly, in the Villegas case, the purported copy of the Court of Appeals decision that
was submitted by the appellate heirs was merely a "certified copy of another copy in the
office of the Land Registration Commission which in turn was copied from a copy of the
Bureau of Lands." No other authentic record of the proceedings PRIOR to the issuance
of the decree of registration existed! In the case at bar, not only are there authentic
records both of the CFI Decision and the Court of Appeals Decision, there is moreover
an official report of the Decision of this Court in Guico V. San Pedro [72 Phil. 415], which
was a petition for review on certiorari interposed by Guico, one of the litigants in the land
registration proceedings before the lower court. In other words, there are records, the
authenticity of which are beyond question, which may form the basis of an order for the
issuance of a decree of registration. Secondly, in the Villegas case, the basis of the order
directing the issuance of a decree of registration was a decision in "Civil Case No. 3726",
but as noted by the Court in that case, it was not even specified what the Civil Case was
about. In the instant case, the proceedings prior to the order directing the issuance of the
decree of registration were admittedly land registration proceedings, which, needless to
say, are proceedings in rem and hence, are binding on the whole world.
2.
The stage of LRC Case No. 657 where records are available is that stage in
land registration proceedings where the court has determined with finality who the rightful
owner of the property is Applying the ruling in Nacua, the parties thereto, or their
successors-in-interest, had to go back to that stage, and then continue with the case until
its finality. This is precisely what the heir of Estanislao Mayuga did.
Counsel for Carpo claims, however, that: (1) The pre-war decision of the Court of
Appeals may never have attained finality as the same might have been appealed; (2)
Even if it be granted that the pre-war decision had become final, the petition filed by
Dominador Mayuga, was not a continuation of LRC Case No. 657, and (3) If the decision
in LRC Case No. 657 indeed became final, then the next step would have been for the
adjudicate to file a motion for execution in said case.
Anent the first argument, counsel does not have to engage in surmises and condjecture.
The pre-war decision of the Court of Appeals was indeed appealed to the Supreme
Court. But the appeal was interposed by Guico, one of the litigants in both the trial and

appellate courts.
Carpo recognizes the decision of this Court in Guico supra. As the Guico case was
simply a continuation of the land registration proceedings, which are proceedings in rem
the Court's decision therein is binding not only on Guico but on the whole world.
As to the second argument, suffice it to say that the fact that Dominador Mayuga's
petition was filed in LRC Case No. 976, and not in LRC Case No. 657, is not fatal. As
stated in the Decision (p. 15), LRC Case No. 657 (filed by Estanislao Mayuga) was jointly
tried and decided with LRC Case No. 976 (filed by Eduardo Guico) and LRC Case No.
758 (filed by Florentino Baltazar, predecessor-in-interest of Carpo), as the three cases
involved Identical parcels of land and Identical applicants/oppositors. Thus, the petition
could validly be filed in any or all of the three cases. As stated in the Decision:
... (I)t cannot be overemphasized that the petition filed by Dominador is NOT a distinct
and separate proceeding from, but a continuation of, the original land registration
proceedings initiated by Estanislao Mayuga, Florentino Baltazar and Eduardo Guico.
(Decision, p.16.)
Lastly, upon finality of judgment in land registration cases, the winning party does not file
a motion for execution as in ordinary civil actions. Instead, he files a petition with the land
registration court for the issuance of an order directing the Land Registration
Commission to issue a decree of registration, a copy of which is then sent to the Register
of Deeds for transcription in the registration book, and issuance of the original certificate
of title. [For an outline of the general procedure in ordinary land registration cases, see
Republic v. Heirs of Villa Abrille, G.R. No. L-39248 May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 57.]
3.
Carpo's claim that the Court erred in ruling that G.R. No. 56471 was an appeal
under Rule 42 and not a special civil action under Rule 65, likewise deserves scant
consideration.
Rule 42 governs appeals from Courts of First Instance to the Supreme Court. Even as
Section 2 (Appeals on pure question of law) thereof requires a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal, said Section 2 must be deemed to have been amended by Republic
Act No. 5440 [1968], which states:
Sec. 3. The Supreme Court shall provide by rule for the procedure governing petitions
for writs of certiorari to review judgments mentioned in Section seventeen of Republic Act
Numbered Two Hundred Ninety-six, as amended by this Act and the effect of the filing
thereof on the judgment or decree sought to be reviewed. Until the Supreme Court
provides otherwise, said petitions shall be filed within the period fixed in the rules of court
for appeals in criminal or civil cases or special civil actions or special proceedings,
depending upon the nature of the case in which the judgment or decree sought to be
reviewed, was rendered; the filing of said petition shall stay the execution of the judgment
sought to be reviewed; and the aforesaid petitions shall be filed and served in the form
required for petitions for review by certiorari of decisions of the Court of Appeals.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitions for review by certiorari of decisions of the Court of Appeals are governed by
Rule 45 which, unlike Rule 42, does not require a notice of appeal nor a record on
appeal.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Agenda before the Court En Banc and Motion for

Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. This denial is FINAL.

SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES VICTOR ONG and GRACE TIU ONG, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. RODOLFO R. BONIFACIO in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
RTC, Pasig City, Branch 159; PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL GRACE S. BELVIS;
DEPUTY SHERIFF VICTOR S. STA. ANA; and PREMIERE DEVELOPMENT BANK,
respondents. [G.R. No. 121494. June 8, 2000]
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Subject of the present petition for review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 34636 dismissing petitioners special civil action for
prohibition with preliminary injunction which sought to enjoin public respondents from
implementing a writ of possession issued in favor of private respondent. The Court of
Appeals likewise denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioners are the mortgagors of an 857 square meter lot and residential house in San
Juan, Metro Manila, evidenced by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. (53788) 030-R.
The real estate mortgage was used to secure a promissory note (No. 275-Z and later
285-W) issued by Kenlene Laboratories, Inc. (debtor company), a domestic corporation,
in favor of private respondent Premiere Development Bank (mortgagee-bank).
Upon failure of the debtor company to pay its amortizations, the mortgagee-bank
extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage under the provisions of Act 3135, as
amended by Act 4118. The mortgagee-bank was the highest bidder. During the one-year
redemption period, the mortgagee filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 159 for the issuance of a writ of possession, which was docketed as LRC
Case No. R-4874.
Upon the filing of a bond, the trial court issued the writ of possession. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and to Recall Writ of Possession, which was denied by the
trial court.
Petitioners-mortgagors filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition with an
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction[1] to enjoin the implementation
of the writ of possession. Petitioners alleged that there is a pending case for annulment
of extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage with an application for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case No. 64604,
with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 157. Petitioners argued that the
implementation of the writ of possession would render nugatory the judgment of the trial
court in Civil Case No. 64604.
Initially, the Court of Appeals granted the TRO, but later dismissed the petition for
prohibition for lack of merit based on:[2] (1) failure to allege that there was no appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, (2) forumshopping (though it did not explain why), and (3) Veloso v. IAC, 205 SCRA 22 (1992)
which held that the pendency of a civil case for annulment of sale or reformation of
contract is not sufficient ground to deny the issuance of a writ of possession or for the
suspension of the resolution thereof. The Court of Appeals likewise denied petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.[3]

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.[4]

In their Memorandum,[5] petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals should have
enjoined the implementation of the writ of possession (LRC Case No. R-4874) pending
resolution of their separate case for annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage (Civil Case No. 64604). Petitioners contend that if Civil Case No. 64604 is
resolved in their favor, the RTC-Pasig, Branch 157 cannot enforce it as against a coequal court which issued the writ of possession, hence the necessary recourse to the
Court of Appeals and this Court.
Petitioners further invoke the case of Allied Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109253,
February 7, 1994,[6] wherein both the SC and CA upheld the trial courts orders setting
aside the certificate of sale and nullifying the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the
ground of prematurity. The mortgagee bank therein foreclosed the real estate mortgage
prior to the maturity of the restructured loan. Worse, there was no publication of the
foreclosure sale. No writ of possession was issued in that case. Hence, Allied is not at
fours with this case, and petitioners not similarly situated.
Petitioners insist that appeal under Act 496 is not an available remedy because it merely
refers to orders and decisions of the trial court in "registration proceedings." Further,
appeal, even if available, would not be an adequate and speedy remedy because it
would not stop the sheriff from implementing the writ of possession.
Lastly, petitioners maintain that the order issuing the writ of possession has not yet
attained finality because of the present petition for prohibition. Inasmuch as the
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings are a nullity, the issuance of the writ of possession
was in excess of jurisdiction, hence correctible by certiorari or prohibition.
On the other hand, in its Memorandum,[7] private respondent (mortgagee-bank)
contends, in gist, that prohibition does not lie since petitioners in fact has two remedies
available - (1) appeal of the order issuing the writ of possession under Sec. 8 of Act
3135, as amended by Act 4118, and (2) their separate action for annulment of
foreclosure of mortgage. For failure to avail of the first remedy, the issue of possession
already attained finality. Private respondent concedes, nevertheless, that its possession
of the mortgaged property would still be subject to the outcome of Civil Case No. 64604.
Further, private respondent claims that the pendency of both the petition for prohibition
and Civil Case No. 64604, both aimed at preventing the implementation of the writ of
possession, constitutes forum shopping.
Simply put, the issues are: (1) Whether or not prohibition lies to enjoin the issuance of a
writ of possession? (2) Whether or not petitioners are guilty of forum shopping?
A writ of possession is "a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to recover
the possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land and give possession of
it to the person entitled under the judgment."[8]
A writ of possession may be issued under the following instances:[9] (1) land registration
proceedings under Sec. 17 of Act 496;[10] (2) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is
in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure
suit, had intervened;[11] and (3) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under
Sec. 7 of Act 3135 as amended by Act 4118.

The present case falls under the third instance. Under Sec. 7 of Act 3135 as amended by
Act 4118, a writ of possession may be issued either (1) within the one year redemption
period, upon the filing of a bond, or (2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without
need of a bond.[12] Sec. 7 of Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118, provides "Sec. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the
Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is
situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in
an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to
indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the
mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be
made under oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral
proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property
registered under the Mortgage Law or under sec. 194 of the Administrative Code, or of
any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any
register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of court
shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in par. 11 of sec 114 of Act
No. 496, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession
issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall
execute said order immediately."
In case it is disputed that there was violation of the mortgage or that the procedural
requirements for the foreclosure sale were not followed, Sec. 8 of Act 3135 as amended
by Act 4118, provides that the mortgagor may file a petition with the trial court which
issued the writ to set aside the sale and for cancellation of the writ of possession within
30 days after the purchaser-mortgagee was given possession. Sec. 8 of Act 3135 as
amended by Act 4118, provides "Sec. 8. The debtor may, in the proceedings in which possession was requested, but not
later than thirty days after the purchaser was given possession, petition that the sale be
set aside and the writ of possession cancelled, specifying the damages suffered by him,
because the mortgage was not violated or the sale was not made in accordance with the
provisions hereof, and the court shall take cognizance of this petition in accordance with
the summary procedure provided for in section one hundred and twelve of Act No. 496;
and if it finds the complaint of the debtor justified, it shall dispose in his favor of all or part
of the bond furnished by the person who obtained possession. Either of the parties may
appeal from the order of the judge in accordance with section 14 of Act No. 496; but the
order of possession shall continue in effect during the pendency of the appeal."
The law is clear that the purchaser must first be placed in possession of the mortgaged
property pending proceedings assailing the issuance of the writ of possession. If the trial
court later finds merit in the petition to set aside the writ of possession, it shall dispose in
favor of the mortgagor the bond furnished by the purchaser. Thereafter, either party may
appeal from the order of the judge in accordance with Section 14 of Act 496, which
provides that "every order, decision, and decree of the Court of Land Registration may be
reviewed . . . in the same manner as an order, decision decree or judgment of a Court of
First Instance (RTC) might be reviewed." The rationale for the mandate is to allow the
purchaser to have possession of the foreclosed property without delay, such possession
being founded on his right of ownership.[13]
In several cases,[14] the Court has ruled that the issuance of a writ of possession is a
ministerial function. "The order for a writ of possession issues as a matter of course upon
the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. The judge
issuing the order following these express provisions of law cannot be charged with

having acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion."[15] Therefore, the
issuance of the writ of possession being ministerial in character, the implementation of
such writ by the sheriff is likewise ministerial.
Contrary to petitioners protestations that Veloso v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 205
SCRA 227 (1992) should only apply to cases wherein the one-year period for redemption
has already lapsed, Veloso makes no such distinction. In said case, the Court merely
observed that "Worthy of note is that petitioners do not impugn the validity of the mortgage at its
inception. Their assault is on it is founded on events allegedly transpiring after its
execution. The tenability of their challenge to the mortgage may well be determined in
the civil action (No. 136559) instituted by them in the Manila Regional Trial Court. But
clearly, the pendency of that action does not and cannot bar the issuance of a writ of
possession to the mortgagee who has, in the meantime, extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgaged property and acquired it as highest bidder in the subsequent public auction
sale. The law is quite explicit on this point, and the right of the mortgagee thereunder
unquestionable. And decisions abound applying the law and declaring it to be the courts
ministerial duty to uphold the mortgagees right to possession even during the
redemption period."[16]
As a rule, any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be
a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession.[17] Regardless of
whether or not there is a pending suit for annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure
itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice of course to the
eventual outcome of said case. Hence, an injunction to prohibit the issuance of writ of
possession is entirely out of place. [18]
The foregoing considered, the petition for review on certiorari assailing the dismissal of
the petition for prohibition must fail.

before different RTCs are concerned, there is no forum shopping.

In fact, in Nartates v. GSIS, 156 SCRA 205 (1987), two cases, one for annulment of
foreclosure proceedings (G.R. No. L-47669) and another for annulment of the writ of
possession (G.R. No. L-47744), both reached this Court at the same time. The Court
consolidated the cases since they both stemmed from the foreclosure of the GSIS of the
property mortgaged to it by petitioner. As to the issuance of the writ of possession, the
Court upheld the issuance of the writ. As to the foreclosure proceedings, the records
being complete, the Court found the foreclosure in order.
In this case, however, only the issue of the implementation of the writ of possession is
before us. Civil Case No. 64604 is still pending with the trial court. Hence, the allegations
as to the failure to comply with procedural requirements of the extrajudicial foreclosure
sale, being factual, is for the trial court to determine.[22]
As of the time of filing the petition, private respondent bank has not yet been placed in
possession of the property. Section 8 of Act 3135 as amended by Act 4118 provides that
petitioners-mortgagors have "30 days after the purchaser was given possession" to file a
petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession cancelled. Hence, the filing
of the petition for prohibition with the CA to enjoin the implementation of the writ of
possession is ill-advised and premature.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA G. AVILA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and
ALADINO CH. BACARRISAS, respondents. G.R. No. L-45255 November 14, 1986
PARAS, J.:

First. Under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, prohibition can only be availed of
if there is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. In this case, appeal under Sec. 8 of Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118, is still
available. Further, petitioners have a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, which is their separate case for annulment of the foreclosure of mortgage.
Second. Prohibition does not lie to enjoin the implementation of a writ of possession.
In PNB v. Adil, 118 SCRA 116 (1982), the Court held that "once the writ of possession
has been issued, the trial court has no alternative but to enforce the writ without delay."
The Court found it gross error for the judge to have suspended the implementation of the
writ of possession on a very dubious ground as "humanitarian reason."
With regard to the second issue, it will be recalled that the essence of forum-shopping is
the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining favorable judgment.[19] It
exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in another.[20] The issuance of the writ of possession
being a ministerial function, and summary in nature, it cannot be said to be a judgment
on the merits, but simply an incident in the transfer of title. Hence, a separate case for
annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale cannot be barred by litis pendentia or res
judicata.[21] Clearly, insofar as LRC Case No. R-4874 and Civil Case No. 64604 pending

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the October 6, 1976 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-05598 (Aladino Ch. Bacarrisas vs. Hon. Benjamin K.
Gorospe, et al), granting certiorari and setting aside the Order of respondent Judge dated
May 24, 1976.
In 1939, the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, as a cadastral court, adjudicated
Lots 594 and 828 of the Cadastral Survey of Cagayan to Paz Chavez. But because Paz
Chavez failed to pay the property taxes of Lot 594, the government offered the same for
sale at a public auction. Marciana G. Avila, a teacher, wife of Leonardo Avila and the
mother of the herein petitioners, participated in and won the bidding. Despite the
provision of Section 579 of the Revised Administrative Code prohibiting public school
teachers from buying delinquent properties, nobody, not even the government
questioned her participation in said auction sale. In fact on February 20, 1940, after the
expiration of the redemption period, the Provincial Treasurer executed in her favor the
final bill of sale. (Rollo, pp. 10-11).
Sometime in 1947, OCT Nos. 100 and 101, covering said Lots 594 and 828, were issued
in favor of Paz Chavez. In opposition thereto, private respondents filed a petition for
review of the decrees on August 25, 1947 at the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental, Branch II, in Cadastral Case No. 17, Lot No. 594 entitled "The Director of
Lands, Applicant v. Atanacia Abalde, et al., Claimants in Re: Petition for Review of
Decree, Marciana G. Avila, Petitioner vs. Paz Chavez, Respondents." After hearing on

the merits, the Cadastral Court promulgated a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the decision of this Court
of December 13, 1940, which adjudicated the lots in question in favor of respondent Paz
Chavez, and declaring NULL and VOID Decrees Nos. 433 and 434 issued by the Chief
of Land Registration Office on June 19, 1947 as well as the certification of title covering
Lots Nos. 594 and 828 of the Cadastral Survey of Cagayan issued by the Register of
Deeds. Judgment is also hereby rendered adjudicating said Lot No. 594 to the heirs of
the late Marciana G. Avila, namely: ..., all residents of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and Lot
828 of the same cadastre to Leonardo Avila, Sr., also of Malaybalay, subject to whatever
RIGHTS OF WAY or EASEMENTS which the government of the Philippines or any of its
instrumentalities may have acquire over said Lots.
The Clerk of Court is hereby directed to send copies of this decision to the Chief of the
Land Registration Commission, the Provincial Fiscal the Provincial Treasurer, and the
Director of Lands. Once this decision has become final, the Chief of Land Registration
Commission shall issue the corresponding decrees and certificate of title in favor of the
above-mentioned heirs of Marciana G. Avila and in favor of Leonardo Avila, Sr.
Paz Chavez appealed the said decision with the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as
CA-G.R. No. 38129-R. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision on March 20, 1974,
the pertinent portion of which, reads:
The legal prohibition cited, therefore, would taint the title of Marciana G. Avila over Lot
594, with a flaw sufficient to make said title not proper for registration, specially as
against the government, who has not (sic) impleaded in the proceedings, on the petition
for review of the decree, to be heard as to whether it would resist the registration of said
lot in favor of Marciana G. Avila.
In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered modifying the decision appealed
from by disallowing the registration of Lot No. 594 in the name of Marciana G. Avila, but
affirming said decision in all other respects, with costs against appellant. Let a copy of
this decision be furnished the Solicitor General and the Provincial Fiscal of Misamis
Oriental for their information and guidance. (Rollo, pp. 11-12).
Upon remand of the records to the Court below, Avila moved for execution, and a writ of
possession which was opposed by Paz Chavez, who was succeeded by the herein
private respondent Aladino Ch. Bacarrisas on the alleged ground that he has the actual
and physical possession of Lot 594 where his residential house has stood since 1946.

the effect of adjudicating, in categorical terms, the possession of Lot 594 in favor of Avila,
there is nothing in the dispositive part nor even in the body of the decision of this CAG.R. No. 38129-R that says that, and since the question here presented is whether or not
cadastral court should place Avila in possession thru a writ of execution, and since the
writ of execution is nothing more, nothing less, than a writ of possession, and since that
writ is given only to the party in the land registration or cadastral case in whose favor
decree had been issued, Manlapas v. Liorente, 48 Phil. 298, or if not a decree, at least, a
judgment of confirmation of title, Director of Lands v. CFI of Tarlac, 51 Phil. 806,-this
must mean that when respondent Court herein issued the writ of execution as to Lot 594,
there really was no legal basis for the same; for Avila had not secured a decree, nor a
judgment of confirmation of title over said Lot 594, since from the fact that this Court of
Appeals had affirmed the decision of cadastral court annulling Chavez (Bacarrisas) to Lot
594, it would not follow that this Court of Appeals had decreed, or in the least, adjudged,
that it was Avila who was the owner entitled to its possession, the conclusion can not
follow from the premise; therefore the writ of execution as to Lot 594 has to be ruled to
have been improvidently issued, and there being no other adequate relief available unto
Bacarrisas, the remedy of certiorari by him chosen was correct.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, this Court is constrained to grant as it now grants certiorari, order
sought to be annulled is set aside, with costs against respondent Avila. (Rollo, pp. 2728).
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated November 29, 1976.
Hence, this petition (Rollo, pp. 9-22).
Respondent filed his Comment on February 28, 1977 (Ibid, pp. 34-37) in compliance with
the resolution of the First Division of this Court dated January 31, 1977 (Ibid., p. 33).
In a Resolution dated March 7, 1977, the First Division of this Court resolved to give due
course to the petition (Ibid., p. 43).
On March 20, 1977, petitioners filed their Brief (Ibid., pp. 58-72) while respondent filed
his Brief on July 6, 1977 (Ibid., pp. 83-92) and petitioners their Reply Brief on August 17,
1977 (Ibid., pp. 100-107).
In a Resolution dated August 29, 1977, the First Division of this Court resolved to declare
this case submitted for decision (Ibid., p. 110.)
The petitioners assigned the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals-

Private respondent's Urgent Motion for Correction of Writ of Execution having been
denied, a certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction suit was filed with the
Court of Appeals, which was docketed therein as CA-SP-05598, alleging, among other
things, that inasmuch as the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 38129-R modified the trial
court's decision by disallowing the registration of Lot 594 in favor of the Avilas, the latter
have no interest, right, claims, title or participation in Lot No. 594 to which they could
claim possession. (Petitioner's Brief, Rollo, pp. 61-63). On said petition, the Court of
Appeals, in a Decision dated October 6, 1976, declared:
CONSIDERING: That decision of cadastral court adjudicating Lot 594 was "disallowed"
by this Court of Appeals, the fact that said decision had also annulled the decree and title
of Chavez to the same in the petition for review, in the mind of tills Court, did not produce

1.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP-05598, OCTOBER 6, 1976,
THE QUESTIONED DECISION, ERRED BECAUSE, WHEREAS SAID COURT
PREVIOUSLY IN CA-G.R. No. L-38129-R, MARCH, 1974, MODIFIED THE DECISION
OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL BY DISALLOWING
ONLY THE REGISTRATION OF LOT 594 BUT AFFIRMED THE ADJUDICATION
THEREOF TO THE PETITIONERS, IN THE PRESENT QUESTIONED DECISION SAID
COURT VIRTUALLY MODIFIED FURTHER THE PREVIOUS DECISION WHICH HAD
LONG BECOME FINAL BY DISALLOWING BOTH THE REGISTRATION AND
ADJUDICATION OF LOT 594;
2.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

PETITIONERS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO POSSESSION OF LOT 594 BECAUSE, SINCE

PETITIONERS' TITLE WAS RECOGNIZED BY SAID COURT PREVIOUSLY IN CA-G.R.
NO. L-38129-R, MARCH, 1974, IT FOLLOWS THAT THEY ARE ENTITLED TO
POSSESS LOT 594;
3.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN THAT TO DENY POSSESSION
OF LOT 594 TO THE PETITIONERS WHO WON IN CADASTRAL CASE NO. 17 OF
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, IS TO MAKE THE
LOSERS IN SAID CASE-THE PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT WHOSE DECREES NOS. 433 and 434 COVERING LOTS 594 AND 828
WERE ORDERED CANCELLED FOR BEING NULL AND VOID, AS THE WINNER, A
SITUATION MOST UNJUST AND UNFAIR; AND
4.
THE HON COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT CORRECTLY CHOSE THE REMEDY OF certiorari FOR THE REASON
THAT THERE IS NOTHING AT ALL IN THE RECORDS TO SHOW AN EXERCISE OF
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR WHIMSICAL AND ARBITRARY EXERCISE
THEREOF.
The pivotal issue in this case is who has the right of possession of the land in question.
Petitioners seek to distinguish between registration and adjudication of land under the
Torrens System, claiming that in the March 20, 1974 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 38129-R, registration of Lot No. 594 in favor of the late Marciana G. Avila
was disallowed, but the adjudication thereof in her favor, was affirmed. In effect, it is their
view that ownership and possession are separated in aforesaid decision, so that they
assert that they are entitled to the possession of Lot 594, although they are not entitled to
its registration in their names.
Such contention is without merit.
While it is true that Marciana Avila, their mother and predecessor-in-interest, purchased
the questioned property at a public auction conducted by the government; paid the
purchase price; and was issued a final bill of sale after the expiration of the redemption
period, it is however undisputed that such purchase was prohibited under Section 579 of
the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, which provides:
Section 579.
Inhibition against purchase of property at tax sale.-Official and
employees of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines are prohibited from
purchasing, directly or indirectly, from the Government, any property sold by the
Government for the non-payment of any public tax. Any such purchase by a public official
or employee shall be void.
Thus, the sale to her of Lot 594 is void.
On the other hand, under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, a void contract is inexistent from
the beginning. It cannot be ratified neither can the right to set up the defense of its
illegality be waived. (Arsenal, et al. vs, The Intermediate Appellate Court. et al., G.R. No.
66696, July 14, 1986). Moreover, Marciana Avila was a party to an illegal transaction,
and therefore, under Art. 1412 of the Civil Code, she cannot recover what she has given
by reason of the contract or ask for the fulfillment of what has been promised her.
Furthermore, in a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and
ordering its registration in his name necessarily carries with it the delivery of possession

which is an inherent element of the right of ownership. (Abulocion et al. v. CFI of Iloilo, et
al., 100 Phil. 553 [1956]). Hence, a writ of possession may be issued not only against the
person who has been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone unlawfully
and adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land registration
proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree. It is the duty of the registration court
to issue said writ when asked for by the successful claimant. (Demorar v. Ibaez, etc., et
al., 97 Phil. 72 [1955]; Abulocion et al v. CFI of Iloilo, et al., supra).
Under the circumstances, possession cannot be claimed by petitioners, because their
predecessor-in-interest besides being at fault is not the successful claimant in the
registration proceedings and hence not entitled to a writ of possession. As correctly
stated by the Court of Appeals when respondent Court issued the writ of execution as to
Lot 594, there really was no legal basis for the same, for Avila had not secured a decree,
nor a judgment of confirmation of title over said lot.
Much less can possession be claimed by private respondents as it is undisputed that the
land in question has been the subject of a tax sale of delinquent property with a final bill
of sale.
Neither did the government file any claim for possession; nor appear to be impleaded in
any of the actions or petitions before the Courts, Its only interest in the land in question
appears to be in the collection of taxes.
Consequently, the situation is evidently one of failure of ownership because of the
violation of Section 579 of the Administrative Code. Otherwise stated, the property
apparently has no owner.
Under the principle that the State is the ultimate proprietor of land within its jurisdiction,
subject land may be escheated in favor of the government upon filing of appropriate
actions for reversion or escheat under Section 5, Rule 91 of the Rules of Court relative to
properties alienated in violation of any statute.
As to the last issue, it has already been ruled that certiorari is proper where the trial court
has already issued a writ of execution of the questioned judgment, the issuance being a
question of law. (Vda. de Sayman vs. Court of Appeals, 121 SCRA 650).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the October 6,1976 Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-25660 February 23, 1990

LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, MAURO RENOBLAS, TELESFORO BALONDIA, FELIX
ABANDULA, FAUSTO GABAISEN, ISIDORO ELIVERA, RAYMUNDO BONGATO,
MARTIN ROLLON, EUSTAQUIO MEDANA, DOROTEO ELIVERA, FRANCISCO
PAGAURA, MACARIO GEPALAGO, GREGORIO ITAOC, ALEJANDRO RENOBLAS,
SIMEON BARBARONA, GREGORIO RENOBLAS, FRANCISCO ASOY, TEOFILA
GUJELING, FABIAN VILLAME, VICENTE OMUSORA, PEDRO BALORIA, GREGORIO
ITAOC, TERESITA ITAOC, FAUSTINO ITAOC, FORTUNATO ITAOC, FLORENTINA
GEMENTIZA, RESTITUTA OMUSORA, ZOILA OMUSORA, FELISA OMUSORA,
ROBERTO HAGANAS, FELISA HAGANAS, FERMIN HAGANAS, VICTORIANO

HAGANAS, JULIA SEVILLA, ROMAN MATELA, MARCELA MATELA, DELFIN

MATELA, PELAGIO MATELA, ROBERTA MATELA, PROCOPIO CABANAS and
SERAFINA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellants, vs. TEODORO VANO, JOSE REYES,
ROSARIO REYES, SALUD OGILVE BELTRAN, AMALIA R. OGILVE, FLORA VDA.
DE COROMINAS, JESUSA REYES, LOURDES COROMINAS MUNOZ, JUAN
COROMINAS, LOURDES C. SAMSON CEBALLOS, SOLEDAD C. SAMSON RAMA,
DOLORES V. GARCES FALCON, JAIME GARCES, JOAQUIN REYES, and PEDRO
RE R. LUSPO, defendants- appellees.
G.R. No. L-32065 February 23,1990
LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SOFRONIO ROLLON, AURELIO ELIVERA, FRANCISCO
PAGAORA, MARTIN ROLLON, GRACIANO MAHINAY, GERARDO ELIVERA,
GREGORIO ITAOC, ISIDRO ELIVERA, DEMOCRITO ELIVERA, FAUSTO GABAISIN,
ALBINO RENOBLAS, EUSTAQUIO MENDANIA, SIMEON BARBARONA,
TELESFORO BALONDA, FELIX ABANDOLA, SATURNINA GEPILAGO, TEOFILA
GOHILING, TOMAS REAMBONANSA, MARCOS HAGANAS, PASTOR ASNA and
MAURO RENOBLAS, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, Judge,
Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch 1, and MARIANO OGILVE, et. al.,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-33677 February 23, 1990
LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SOFRONIO ROLLON, AURELIO ELIVERA, FRANCISCO
PAGAORA, MARTIN ROLLON, GRACIANO MAHINAY, GERARDO ELIVERA,
GREGORIO ITAOC, ISIDRO ELIVERA, DEMOCRITO ELIVERA, FAUSTO GABAISIN,
ALBINO RENOBLAS, EUSTAQUIO MENDANIA, SIMEON BARBARONA,
TELESFORO BALONDA, FELIX ABANDOLA, SATURNINA GEPILAGO, TEOFILA
GOHILING, TOMAS REAMBONANSA, MARCOS NAGANAS, PASTOR ASNA and
MAURO RENOBLAS, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, Judge,
Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch 1, The Provincial Sheriff, Province of
Bohol, and MARIANO OGILVE, et. al., respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
On February 7, 1974, We resolved to allow the consolidation of these three cases,
considering that they involve the same parties and parcels of land: (1) G.R. No. L25660---this is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Bohol (now
Regional Trial Court) 1 dated May 12,1964 dismissing the cases of some of the plaintiffsappellants and its order dated August 25, 1965 denying the motion for reconsideration
and the motion to declare the defendants- appellees in default; (2) G.R. No. L32065--this is a petition for certiorari of the order of the Court of First Instance of Bohol dated
May 14, 1970 directing the execution of its prior order dated May 6, 1969 finding
petitioners guilty of contempt; (3) G.R. No. L-33677--- this is a petition for certiorari with
mandamus and prohibition of the order of the Court of First Instance of Bohol dated June
2, 1971 directing the demolition of the houses of the petitioners.
On February 15, 1988, We resolved to require the parties to manifest whether or not they
are still interested in prosecuting these cases, or supervening events have transpired
which render these cases moot and academic or otherwise substantially affect the same.
On March 25, 1988, the petitioners filed an ex parte manifestation that they are still very
much interested in the just prosecution of these cases.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

G.R. No. 25660
On April 1, 1950, the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an application for registration of
the parcels of land allegedly inherited by them from Juan Reyes, in Land Registration
Case No. 76, L.R.C. Record No. N-4251. On July 26,1951, administratrix Bernardina
Vda. de Luspo filed an amended application for registration. After hearing, the land was
registered under Original Certificate of Title No. 400 (pp. 84-85, Record on Appeal; p. 7,
Rollo).
On October 9, 1962, a complaint for reconveyance of real properties with damages and
preliminary injunction, Civil Case No. 1533, (pp. 2-19, Record n Appeal; p. 7, Rollo) was
filed by plaintiffs-appellants before the Court of First Instance of Bohol. It was alleged that
they are the lawful owners of their respective parcels of land including the improvements
thereon either by purchase or inheritance and have been in possession publicly,
continuously, peacefully and adversely under the concept of owners for more than thirty
(30) years tacked with the possession of their predecessors-in-interest. However, those
parcels of land were included in the parcels of land applied for registration by the heirs of
Juan Reyes, either by mistake or fraud and with the intention of depriving them of their
rights of ownership and possession without their knowledge, not until the last part of
1960 when the defendants-appellees, through their agents, attempted to enter those
parcels of land claiming that they now belong to the heirs of Juan Reyes. To the
complaint, the defendants-appellees moved to dismiss on two grounds (pp. 19-22,
Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), namely: (1) for lack of cause of action and (2) the cause
of action is barred by prior judgment.
On July 20, 1963, the court a quo issued an order denying defendants-appellees' motion
to dismiss (pp. 29-30, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). However, acting on the motion to
set aside such order (pp. 31-32, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), on May 12, 1964, the
same court issued another order reversing itself partially (p. 56, Record on Appeal; p. 7,
Rollo), the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the cases herein of the plaintiffs Alejandro Renoblas, Fausto Cabaisan,
Fabian Villame, Gregorio Ita-oc, Faustino Ita-oc, Fortunato Ita-oc, Roberto Haganas,
Felisa Haganas, Fermin Haganas, Victorians Haganas, Julia Sevilla, Ramon Matela,
Roberto Matela, Procopio Cabaas and Vicente Amosora are hereby dismissed on the
ground of res adjudicata with these plaintiffs paying proportionately eighteenth forty one
(18/41) of the costs, but the petition to dismiss the case of the rest of the plaintiffs is
hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
On May 28,1964, the plaintiffs-appellants whose cases were dismissed filed a motion for
reconsideration (pp. 57- 58, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). On July 24, 1964, the
plaintiffs-appellants whose cases were not dismissed filed a motion to declare the
defendants-appellees in default for failure to file their answer with the time prescribed by
law (pp. 68-75, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). On the other hand, defendants-appellees
filed their opposition to the motion for reconsideration praying that the complaint as
regards the rest of the plaintiffs-appellants be likewise dismissed (pp. 75-80, Record on
Appeal; p. 7 Rollo).
On August 25, 1965, the court a quo issued an order in connection therewith (pp. 82-98,

Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo) denying all motions.

The case is now before Us with the following as assignments of errors (p. 3, Brief for the
Plaintiffs-Appellants; p. 9, Rollo), to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASES OF THE PLAINTIFFSAPPELLANTS WHOSE NAMES ARE ALREADY MENTIONED ABOVE ON THE
ALLEGED GROUND THAT THEIR CASES ARE BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT OF
RES ADJUDICATA.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION OF THE PLAINTIFFSAPPELLANTS WHOSE CASES ARE NOT DISMISSED TO DECLARE THE
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES IN DEFAULT FOR HAVING FAILED TO FILE THEIR
ANSWER WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED BY LAW.
On August 12, 1966, a resolution was issued by this Court dismissing the appeal as
regards the second issue because the order appealed from was merely interlocutory,
hence, not appealable (pp. 35-38, Rollo).
On August 17, 1988, petitioners Alex Abandula, Mauro Renoblas, Simeon Barbarona,
Fabian Villame, Macario Gepalago, Eustaquio Medana, Julia Sevilla, Gregorio Itaoc,
Francisco Asoy and Martin Rollon filed a motion to withdraw their appeal on the ground
that they are now the absolute owners and possessors of their respective parcels of land
subject of Civil Case No. 1533.
The appeal is not impressed with merit.
The plaintiffs-appellants claim that no evidence was presented by the defendantsappellees that they (plaintiffs-appellants) were notified of the date of the trial on the
merits of the application for registration nor were they given copies of the decision of the
trial court. Likewise, they contend that res judicata is not applicable in an action for
reconveyance.
The allegations that no evidence was presented by the defendants-appellees that
plaintiffs-appellants were notified of the date of the trial on the merits of the application
for registration nor were they given copies of the decision of the trial court are new
issues. It is a well-settled rule that, except questions on jurisdiction, no question will be
entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court below and it is within the
issues made by the parties in their pleadings (Cordero vs. Cabral, G.R. No. 36789, July
25, 1983, 123 SCRA 532). The other contention that res judicata is not applicable in an
action for reconveyance is not plausible. The principle of res judicata applies to all cases
and proceedings, including land registration and cadastral proceedings (Republic vs.
Estenzo, G.R. No. L-35376, September 11, 1980, 99 SCRA 65; Paz vs. Inandan 75 Phil.
608; Penaloza vs. Tuazon, 22 Phil. 303).
It is a settled rule that a final judgment or order on the merits, rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, is conclusive in a subsequent case
between the same parties and their successors in interest litigating upon the same thing
and issue, regardless of how erroneous it may be. In order, therefore, that there may be
res judicata, the following requisites must be present: (a) The former judgment must be
final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter
and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be,

between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
cause of action (San Diego vs. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281; Ramos vs. Pablo, G.R. No. 53692,
Nov. 26,1986, 146 SCRA 24).
The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of res judicata is that parties should not be
permitted to litigate the same issue more than once and when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains
unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law
or estate (Sy Kao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 61752, Sept. 28,1984,132 SCRA 302).
The doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by
age, and is founded on the broad principle that it is to the interest of the public that there
should be an end to litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject once
fully and fairly adjudicated. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium (Carandang vs.
Venturanza, G.R. No. L41940, Nov. 21,1984,133 SCRA 344). To ignore the principle of
res judicata would be to open the door to endless litigations by continuous determination
of issues without end (Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 80294- 95, Sept. 21, 1988, 165 SCRA 515).
Thus, when a person is a party to a registration proceeding or when notified he does not
want to participate and only after the property has been adjudicated to another and the
corresponding title has been issued files an action for reconveyance, to give due course
to the action is to nullify registration proceedings and defeat the purpose of the law.
In dismissing the cases of some of the petitioners, the court a quo meticulously
discussed the presence of all the elements of res judicata (pp. 36-38; pp. 42-54, Record
on Appeal; p. 7; Rollo):
There is no question that in that Registration Proceedings, LRC Record No. N-4251,
Land Registration Case No. N-76, the Court of First Instance of the province of Bohol
had jurisdiction of the subject matter, that said court had rendered a judgment on the
merit that was terminated in the Court of Appeals since December, 1958, and that
decision is now final with a decree of registration over the parcels of land described in the
application issued to the applicants.
The subject matter (the parcels of land) now claimed by the plaintiffs in this case at bar
are the same, or at least part of the parcels already adjudicated registration in that
registration case to the persons, some of them are made defendants in this case before
us. The cause of action between the two cases are the same, ownership of these parcels
of land, though the forms of action are different, one is an ordinary Land Registration and
the other is reconveyance.
'It is settled that notwithstanding the difference in the form of two actions, the doctrine of
res adjudicata will apply where it appears that the parties in effect were litigating for the
same thing. A party can not, by varying the form of action, escape the effects of res
adjudicata (Aguirre vs. Atienza, L-10665, Aug. 30, 1958; Geronimo vs. Nava No. L-1 21 1
1, Jan. 31, 1959; Labarro vs. Labateria et al., 28 O.G. 4479).
'Well settled is the rule that a party can not by varying the form of action, or adopting a
different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one
and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or
their privies. (Francisco vs. Blas, et al., No. L-5078; Cayco, et al., vs. Cruz, et al., No. L-1
2663, Aug. 21, 1959).

'Accordingly, a final judgment in an ordinary civil action, determining the ownership of

certain lands is res adjudicata in a registration proceeding where the parties and property
are the same as in the former case (Paz vs. Inandan 75 Phil. 608; Penaloza vs. Tuason,
22 Phil. 303).'
xxx

xxx

xxx

But are there identities of parties in this case before us and the former registration
proceedings? Identity of parties means that the parties in the second case must be the
same parties in the first case, or at least, must be successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the former action or proceeding, or when the
parties in the subsequent case are heirs (Chua Tan vs. Del Rosario, 57 Phil. 411;
Martinez vs. Franco, 51 Phil. 487-1 Romero vs. Franco, 54 Phil. 744; Valdez, et a]. vs.
Penida No. L- 3467, July 30, 1951).
xxx

xxx

xxx

Returning our attention to the case at bar, and with in mind the principles of res
adjudicata above-quoted, we noticed that many of the plaintiffs were not oppositors in the
former registration case, but many are children of the former oppositors. In such a case
we have to determine the case of every plaintiff, if the former decision in the land
registration case is conclusive and binding upon him.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The defendants had proven that the adjoining owners and claimants of the parcels of
land object of registration proceeding had been notified when the land was surveyed.
These persons notified according to the surveyor's certificate, Exhibit "B" were as follows:
Cipriano Samoya, Fausto Baguisin, Silveria Pahado, Enojario Laroda, Alejandro
Renoblas, Heirs of Gregorio Lofranco, Julian Villame, Pedro Itaoc, Adriano Toloy,
Bartolome Omosura, Marcelina Asilon, Gregorio Baguinang, et al., Nicolas Omosura,
Simon Lagrimas, et al., Martin Quinalayo, Gorgonio Baquinang, Demetrio Asolan,
Catalino Orellena, Heirs of Catalina Palves, Manuel Mondano, Angel Mondano,
Victoriano Balolo, Eugenio del Rosario, Verinici Bayson, Felomino Ruiz, Apolonio
Horbeda, and Mun. of Calape.

Victor Omosura, Germana Gahil, Anastacio Orillosa, Enerio Omosura, Valeriano Tuloy,
Cipriano Sanoya, Pablo Dumadag, Andres Reimbuncia, Roman Reimbuncia, Celedonio
Cabanas, Moises Cabanas, Calixto Gohiting, Gervasio Sevilla, Pedro Omosura, Daniel
Itaoc, Luis Omosura, Bartolome Omusura, Nicasio Omosura, Calixto Sevilla, Teodora
Omosura, Jose Sabari, Silverio Lacorte, Silverio Tuloy, Gertrudes Sevilla, Teodora
Sevilla, Magno Orillosa, Gervacia Sevilla, Marcos Hagonas, Eleuterio Pandas, Pablo
Omosura, Fabian Villame, Teodoro Omosura, Magdalina Asilom, Mauricio Matela,
Marciano Ordada, Eusebio Omosura, and Gregorio Repelle, (Exhibit "E"), Atty. Juna V.
Balmaseda in representation of the Bureau of Lands, and Asst. Fiscal Norberto M.
Gallardo in representation of the Municipality of Calape.
Plaintiffs Mauro Renoblas and Gregorio Renoblas are children of plaintiff Alejandro
Renoblas. Plaintiff Telesforo Balanda is son-in-law of Alejandro, being the husband of
Juliana Renoblas, daughter of Alejandro. Plaintiff Alejandro Renoblas was not one of the
oppositors in the registration proceedings, but he was notified of the initial healing of that
registration case and by the surveyor that surveyed the land object of registration (Exhibit
J-Movant). Therefore, the decision of the land registration proceeding is binding upon
him and his case is dismissed on the ground of res adjudicata with costs.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Plaintiff Fausto Cabaisan was notifed by the surveyor and that notice of the initial
hearing. And though he was not an oppositor, the former land registration proceeding is
binding on him. Therefore, this case is dismissed in so far as Fausto Cabaisan is
concerned with costs.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Plaintiffs Gregorio Ita-oc, Teresita Ita-oc, Faustino Ita-oc and Fortunate Ita-oc are
children of Daniel Ita-oc, one of the oppositors in the registration proceedings. They claim
parcel No. 10 described in paragraph 2 of the complaint. Gregorio Ita-oc testified that his
land was inherited by said plaintiffs' mother from her father, Pio Sevilla. The evidence on
record (Exhibits J-3, J- 4, J-5). However (sic), shows that the land is declared in the
name of Daniel Ita-oc, a former oppositor in the registration case. Hence, these plaintiffs
are successors-in-interest of Daniel Ita-oc, and, therefore, are bound by the decision in
that registration case. Their case, therefore, is dismissed, with costs.

The following persons were notified by the Chief of the Land Registration Office of the
initial hearing (Exhibit "J") of the registration proceedings enjoining them to appear on
June 16,1952, at 8:30 a.m., before the Court of First Instance of Bohol to show cause
why the prayer of said application should not be granted: the Solicitor General, the
Director of Lands, the Director of Public Works and the Director of Forestry, Manila; the
Provincial Governor, the Provincial Fiscal and the District Engineer, Tagbilaran, Bohol;
the Municipal Mayor, Gorgonio Baguinang, Demetrio Azocan, Catalino Orellena, Manuel
Mondano, Angel Mondano, Victoriano Bolalo, Eugenio del Rosario, Verinici Bayson,
Filomeno Ruiz, Apolonio Horboda, the Heirs of Gregorio Lofranco, Julian Villame, Pedro
Itaoc, Adriano Toloy, Bartolome Omosura, Marcelina Asilom, Gregorio Baguinang,
Nicolas Omosura, Simon Lagrimas and Martin Quinalayo, Calape, Bohol; the heirs of
Catalino Polvos, Fausto Baguisin, Cipriano Samoya, Silveria Pohado, Enojario, Laroda,
Alejandro Renoblas and Leoncio Barbarona, Antequera Bohol.

"Plaintiffs Roberto Haganas, Felisa Haganas, Fermin Haganas and Victoriano Haganas
are children of Marcos Haganas, a former oppositor in the registration case. Marcos
testified that his claim before was only two hectares, while the claim of his children is
seven hectares, which come from his wife, not from him. These plaintiffs claim two
parcels, one under Tax Declaration No. R-4452, and Tax Declaration No. R-8456. It
appears that Tax Declaration No. R-4452 (Exhibit M) is in the name of Marcos Haganas
and the land described under Tax Declaration No. R-8456 was bought by the spouses
Marcos Haganas and Tomasa Sevilla from Gertrudis Sevilla in 1956 (Exhibit M-3), who
was an oppositor in the registration proceeding. Therefore, plaintiffs Roberto Haganas,
Felisa Haganas, Fermin Haganas, and Victoriano Haganas are successors-in-interest to
properties in which the decision in the registration case is conclusive and binding to their
predecessors-in-interest. Hence, their case here is dismissed with costs.

And after the application had been filed and published in accordance with law the
following persons represented by Atty. Conrado D. Marapao filed opposition to that
registration proceeding: Felipe Cubido, Simon Lagrimas, Simeon Villame, Felix Lacorte,

Plaintiff Julia Sevilla is the wife of Marcelo Matela, who was the oppositor in the
registration proceedings. Plaintiffs Roman Matela, Marcela Matela, Delfin Matela, and
Roberta Matela are their children. She has no son by the name of Pelagic. Julia testified

10

that the land now claimed by her children came from her father Pio Sevilla. The land that
was claimed by Mauricio Matela as oppositor was in his name under Tax Declaration No.
5099. This is the same land now claimed by plaintiffs Julia Sevilla, Ramon Matela,
Marcela Matela, Delfin Matela, and Roberta Matela (Exhibit 0-4). These plaintiffs are
successors-in-interest of Mauricio Matela, who is bound by the decision in that land
proceeding wherein he was the oppositor. Therefore, the case of these plaintiffs are
dismissed with costs.
Plaintiff Procopia Cabanas was the wife of Andres Reambonancia, oppositor in the land
registration proceedings. She claims parcel No. 20 described in paragraph 2 of the
complaint bearing Tax Declaration No. R-8121. It appears that this land is declared in the
name of Andres Reambonancia (Exhibit N-3) who, as oppositor in the land registration
case, is bound by the decision of that case. Therefore, the case of plaintiff Procopia
Cabanas as successor-in-interest to Andres Reambonancia, is hereby dismissed, with
costs.

Constabulary Detachment to effect the commitment if any of them is unable to pay the
fine. The fingerprints of each of these 22 respondents shall also be taken by the
constabulary and filed with the record of this case.
It is so ordered.
On June 4, 1969, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforestated
resolution whereas Ogilve filed an opposition thereto.
On February 14, 1970, the motion for reconsideration was denied. On March 18, 1970,
another motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners on the ground of pendency of
the action for reconveyance in Civil Case No. 1533 and their appeal in G.R. No. L-25660.
On May 14, 1970, the court a quo ordered the proper officers to actually execute the
resolution dated May 6, 1969.
Hence, the present petition.

Plaintiff Vicente Amosora is the son of Enerio Amosora and Florencia Gahil both
oppositors in the former registration case. The land claimed by plaintiff Vicente Amosora
is described as parcel No. 24 of paragraph 2 of the complaint under Tax Declaration No.
R-6107, under the name of his father Enerio Amosora. Since Enerio Amosora was an
oppositor in the former land registration of which this land was a part, the decision of that
land registration case is conclusive and binding not only to Enerio Amosora, but also to
his successor-in-interest, plaintiff Vicente Amosora, whose case therefore, is dismissed
with costs.
G.R. No. L-32065
Upon the death of administratrix Bernardina Vda. de Luspo, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 3561 was issued in the name of Pedro R. Luspo and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
3562 was issued in the name of several persons (p. 36, Rollo).
A writ of possession dated November 6, 1959, a first alias writ of possession dated
January 6, 1961, and a second alias writ of possession dated July 2, 1966 were issued
by the trial court against the petitioners. A sample of the guerilla-like, hide and seek
tactics employed by the petitioners was proved by the official report of the deputy sheriff
dated January 21 1960. Another evidence of petitioners' refusal to sign and to vacate
was a certification dated July 22, 1966 and the Sheriffs return dated October 25, 1966.
On March 29, 1967, a petition for contempt was filed by Mariano Ogilve, who is one of
the registered owners of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
3562, against the petitioners for refusing to vacate the land occupied by them and for
refusing to sign the Sheriffs return.
On May 6, 1969, the court a quo issued a resolution, the dispositive portion of which
reads (p. 47, Rollo):
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, make it of record that Procopia
Reambonansa voluntarily left the land and dropped out from the case; the charge of
contempt against Alejandro Renoblas (who died) is dismissed and each of the remaining
22 respondents are hereby found guilty of contempt under Sec. 3-b of Rule 71 and are
hereby sentenced each to pay a fine of One Hundred Pesos, authorizing the
Constabulary Detachment at or near Candungao Calape Bohol to collect the same and
to transmit the money to the Clerk of this Court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency at the rate of one day for every P2.50 or fraction of a day, the said

Petitioners raise the following issues:

I THAT THE SAID RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ISSUING A WRIT OF
POSSESSION WITHOUT ANY COMPLAINT FILED IN COURT FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY
AND DETAINER, NOR FOR RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF
THE PARCELS OF LAND IN QUESTION AGAINST THE HEREIN PETITIONERS.
II THAT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ISSUING A WRIT OF
POSSESSION AGAINST THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, WHO WERE NOT PARTIES TO
THE REGISTRATION PROCEEDING AND WHO WERE NOT DEFEATED
OPPOSITORS OF THE SAID APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Petitioners contend that they were not claimants-oppositors nor defeated oppositors in
the said land registration case, as their names do not appear in the amended application
for registration; that they have occupied the subject parcels of land for more than thirty
(30) years which began long before the filing of the application for registration; and that
after the hearing of the registration case, they continued in possession of the said land.
In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its
registration in his name necessarily carried with it the delivery of possession which is an
inherent element of the right of ownership. The issuance of the writ of possession is,
therefore, sanctioned by existing laws in this jurisdiction and by the generally accepted
principle upon which the administration of justice rests (Romasanta et. al. vs. Platon, 34
O.G. No. 76; Abulocion et. al. vs. CFI of Iloilo, et. al., 100 Phil. 554 [1956]). A writ of
possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a
registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or
any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final
decree (Demorar vs. Ibaez, et al., 97 Phil 72 [1955]).
The petitioners' contention that they have been in possession of the said land for more
than thirty (30) years which began long before the filing of the application for registration
and continued in possession after the hearing of the registration case, worked against
them. It was a virtual admission of their lack of defense. Thus, the writs of possession
were properly issued against them.

11

However, We do not subscribe to the ruling of the court a quo that petitioners are guilty of
contempt. Under Section 8 (d) of Rule 19, Rules of Court, if the judgment be for the
delivery of the possession of real property, the writ of execution must require the sheriff
or other officer to whom it must be directed to deliver the possession of the property,
describing it, to the party entitled thereto. This means that the sheriff must dispossess or
eject the losing party from the premises and deliver the possession thereof to the winning
party. If subsequent to such dispossession or ejectment the losing party enters or
attempts to enter into or upon the real property, for the purpose of executing acts of
ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession of the person
adjudged to be entitled thereto, then and only then may the loser be charged with and
punished for contempt (Quizon vs. Philippine National Bank, et. al., 85 Phil. 459).
According to this section, it is exclusively incumbent upon the sheriff to execute, to carry
out the mandates of the judgment in question, and in fact, it was he himself, and he
alone, who was ordered by the trial judge who rendered that judgment, to place the
respondents in possession of the land. The petitioners in this case had nothing to do with
that delivery of possession, and consequently, their refusal to effectuate the writ of
possession, is entirely officious and impertinent and therefore could not hinder, and much
less prevent, the delivery being made, had the sheriff known how to comply with his duty.
It was solely due to the latter's fault, and not to the disobedience of the petitioners' that
the judgment was not duly executed. For that purpose, the sheriff could even have
availed himself of the public force, had it been necessary to resort thereto (see United
States v. Ramayrat 22 Phil. 183).
G.R. No. L-33677
On March 22,1971, Mariano Ogilve filed a Motion for a Writ of Demolition which was
granted by the trial court on April 5, 1971 (pp. 42-43, Rollo) against those who were
adjudged guilty of contempt. On April 29, 1971, the petitioners filed an urgent motion for
reconsideration of said order. On June 2, 1971, the trial court issued another order, the
dispositive portion of which reads (p. 48, Rollo):
WHEREFORE, in the absence of writ of preliminary injunction Deputy Provincial Sheriff
Pedro Aparece must not only take P.C. soldiers with him but also carpenters to effect the
demolition, the carpenters being at the expense of the Luspo.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition.
The issue here is whether or not the respondent judge acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and thus excluded the herein petitioners
from the use and enjoyment of their right to which they are entitled when he (respondent
judge) issued the order of demolition on April 5, 1971 and again on June 2, 1971 (p. 107,
Rollo).
On July 14, 1971, this Court issued a temporary restraining order (p. 51, Rollo).
The petition is not impressed with merit.
The petitioners allege that the respondent-judge cannot issue a writ of demolition
pending the resolution of G.R. No. L-32065.
We rule that the petition in G.R. No. L-32065 was not a bar to the issuance of the writ of

demolition. It is significant to note that the subject matter of the petition in G.R. No. L32065 is the order dated May 14, 1970 directing the execution of the prior order dated
May 6, 1969 finding petitioners guilty of contempt and not the writs of possession
themselves. Thus, the respondent Judge correctly issued the writs of demolition. In
Meralco vs. Mencias, 107 Phil 1071, We held:
[I]f the writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of
possession of the land to the successful litigant therein (Demorar vs. Ibanez, 97 Phil. 72;
Pasay Estate Company vs. Del Rosario, et al., 11 Phil. 391; Manlapas vs. Llorente 48
Phil. 298), a writ of demolition must, likewise, issue, especially considering that the latter
writ is but a complement of the former which, without said writ of demolition, would be
ineffective.
xxx

xxx

xxx

[The issuance of the writ of demolition] is reasonably necessary to do justice to petitioner

who is being deprived of the possession of the lots in question, by reason of the
continued refusal of respondent ...... to remove his house thereon and restore
possession of the promises to petitioner.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1)
In G.R. No. L-25660, the appeal is DENIED and the orders of the Court of First
Instance dated May 12, 1964 and August 25, 1965 are AFFIRMED; the motion to
withdraw the appeal of some of the plaintiffs-appellants is GRANTED;
2)
In G.R. No. L-32065, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of the Court
of First Instance dated May 14, 1970 is SET ASIDE; and
3) In G.R. No. L-33677, the petition is DISMISSED and the order of the Court of First
Instance dated June 2, 1971 is AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
EUFEMIA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BARROGA and SATURNINA VILLANUEVA VDA.
DE PACADA, oppositors-appellants, vs.
ANGEL ALBANO, ARSENIO ALBANO, ENCARNACION ALBANO, ROSALIA
ALBANO, assisted by her husband, JUANITO ALBANO, ROSITA ALBANO, assisted
by her husband, ALFREDO RAMIREZ, MIGUEL ALBANO, CHARITO ALBANO, and
PEDRO ALBANO, petitioners-appellees. RICARDO Y. NAVARRO, in his capacity as
Judge of Sala I, Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, respondent. G.R. No. L43445 January 20, 1988
NARVASA, J.:
On November 24, 1925 judgment was promulgated by this Court in Manlapas, et al. v.
Llorente, etc., et al., 1 ruling that: (1) a party in whose favor a decree of registration is
issued by a cadastral court in accordance with the Torrens Act (Act No. 496), or his
successor-in-interest, has "a perfect right not only to the title of the land, but also to its
possession;" (2) he has the right, too, under Section 17 of the same Act, to a writ of
possession as against any "party to the registration proceeding and who is directly and
personally affected and reached by the decree" (or who had been served with process
therein but had not appeared nor answered); 2 and (3) his right to obtain a writ of

12

possession is not subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding
execution of judgments, 3 since the decree "is to exist forever." These doctrines have
since been reiterated and reaffirmed.
"The fundamental rule," the Court said some forty-three years later, 4 "is that a writ of
possession can be issued not only against the original oppositors in a land registration
case and their representatives and successors-in-interest, but also against any person
unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time before and up to the issuance of
the final decree." It also pointed out that neither laches nor the statute of limitations
applies to a decision in a land registration case, citing Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al. 5 to the
following effect:
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant. ... except insofar as it supports his
theory that after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be
enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce
the judgment. ... (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and
is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so
because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as
against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable
time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party.
In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land
registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration,
no further proceedings to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse
or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust
him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39,
regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place
the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land
registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final
without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal. ...
... There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or
issue a decree. The reason is ... that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and
does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the
issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration
Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no
motion therefor has been filed can not prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the
land is ordered to be registered.
The Court restated those same principles in Lucero v. Loot 6 some months later and took
occasion to stress that in Marcelo v. Mencias, decided in 1960, the Court had gone "so
far as to hold that if the writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies
the delivery of possession of the land to the successful litigant therein, ... a writ of
demolition must, likewise, issue, especially considering that the latter writ is but a
complement of the former which, without said writ of demolition, would be ineffective."
The appeal at bar entails nothing more than the application of these established
jurisprudential precepts to the undisputed facts.
In Cadastral Proceeding No. 44 (LRC Rec. No. 1203) of the then Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Norte, a decision was rendered on July 31, 1941 adjudicating a parcel of land

known as Lot No. 9821 in favor of Delfina Aquino. 7 One of the oppositors was Ruperta
Pascual, who was declared in default. 8 However, for reasons not disclosed by the
record, but as to which no sinister or prejudicial character is imputed by the appellants,
the decree of registration did not issue except until after the lapse of fourteen (14) years
or so, or on October 14, 1955; and it was only after twenty-four (24) years had passed, or
on November 17, 1979, that an original certificate of title (No. C-2185) was issued in
Delfina Aquino's name. 9
On August 11, 1970, after the decree of registration had been handed down but before
title issued in Delfina Aquino's favor, the children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual
appellants Eufemia Barroga and Saturnina Padaca-brought suit in the same Court of
First Instance against the children and heirs of Delfina Aquino appellees Angel
Albano, et al. 10 Said appellants alleged that they, and their mother, Ruperta Pascual,
had been in possession of Lot 9821 since 1941 and were the real owners thereof; and
they prayed that Delfina Aquino's title be voided and cancelled, that the defendants be
commanded to reconvey the land to them, and that a new title be made out in their
names. 11
It appears, parenthetically, that Delfina Aquino's title encroached upon a 4-square-meter
portion of an adjoining lot, No. 9822, belonging to a Cesar Castro. So, Castro filed, with
leave of court, a complaint in intervention on February 22, 1987 for the recovery thereof.
After trial on the merits, judgment was rendered dismissing the Barroga's and Padaca's
complaint, and declaring intervenor Castro owner of the 4-square-meter portion
overlapped by Delfina Aquino's title. 12
The correctness of this judgment cannot be gainsaid in light of the recorded facts. The
familiar doctrine of res adjudicata operated to blot out any hope of success of Barroga's
and Padaca's suit for recovery of title Lot No. 9821. Their action was clearly barred by
the prior judgment in the cadastral proceeding affirming Delfina Aquino's ownership over
the property, and in which proceeding the former's predecessor-in-interest, Ruperta
Pascual, had taken part as oppositor but had been declared in default. The judgment of
the cadastral court was one "against a specific thing" and therefore "conclusive upon the
title to the thing." 13 It was a judgment in rem, binding generally upon the whole world,
inclusive of persons not parties thereto, 14 and particularly upon those who had actually
taken part in the proceeding (like the appellants' predecessor, Ruperta Pascual, who had
intervened therein as an oppositor) as well as "their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the
same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. 15
The judgment became final and executory, the appeal taken therefrom to the Court of
appeals by Barroga and Padaca having been dismissed because of their failure to file
brief, and this Court having thereafter refused to set aside that dismissal on certiorari.
Thereafter, at the instance of defendants Angel Albano, et al., the Court of First Instance
ordered execution of the judgment on December 6, 1973. Plaintiffs Barroga and Padaca moved to quash the writ of execution, on December 22, 1973. They argued that there
was nothing to execute since the verdict was simply one of dismiss of the complaint; they
moreover invoked Section 11, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court. 16 But here the matter
apparently ended. No further development anent this case appears in the record.
What the record does show is that on August 8, 1975, the Cadastral Court promulgated
an Order in Case No. 44, LRC Rec. No. 1203, granting the motion of Angel Albano, et al.
for a writ of possession as regards Lot No. 9821; and pursuant thereto, a writ of

13

possession dated August 28, 1975 was issued. Again Barroga and Padaca sought to
frustrate acquisition of possession by Angel Albano, et al. They filed a "Motion to Nullify
Order to Lift Writ of Execution Issued and to Revoke Writ of Possession Issued" under
date of September 23, 1975. 17 Their argument was that as possessors of the lot in
question, they could not be ejected therefrom by a mere motion for writ of possession.

WHEREFORE, the appeal taken by appellants Eufemia Villanueva Vda. de Barroga and
Saturnina Villanueva Vda. de Padaca is DISMISSED, and the Orders of the Court a quo
dated August 8, 1975, September 22, 1975 and March 17, 1976 are AFFIRMED, as
being in accord with the facts and the law. This decision is immediately executory, and
no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration will be entertained.

The motion was heard on October 24, 1975, at which time the parties and their counsel
stipulated upon the following facts, to wit:
1.
That the claimants-petitioners Angel Albano, Arsenio Albano, Encarnacion
Albano, Rosalia Albano, Rosita Albano, Miguel Albano, Jr., Charito Albano, Federico
Albano, Jr. and Pedrito Albano are the children-heirs and successors of Delfina Aquino,
who is the registered owner of Lot No. 9821 covered by O.C.T. No. 0-2185, which decree
was issued on July 31, 1941, marked Exh. A for the petitioners-claimants;
2.
That movants-oppositors Eufemia Villanueva de Barroga and Saturnina Vda.
de Pacada are the children-heirs and successors of Ruperta Pascual, who was an
oppositor in Lot No. 9821, Cad. Case No. 44, LRC Rec. No. 1203, and who was
defaulted in said cadastral case, and decided on July 31, 1941 as follows:
Lote No. 9821 Por incomparecencia injustificada de la opositora Ruperta Pascual, se
desestima su contestacion. Se adjudica este lote No. 9821, con las mejoras en el
existentes, en nombre de Delfina Q. Aquino, filipina, major de edad, viuda y residents del
municipio de Lauag de la provincia de Ilocos Norte.
3.
That the heirs of Ruperta Pascual, namely, Eufemia Villanueva de Barroga and
Saturnina Vda. de Padaca , are in possession of the lot in question since 1941 up to the
present time. 18
The motion was thereafter denied by the Court a quo, by Order dated September 22,
1975. The Court stated that the writ of possession could properly issue despite the not
inconsiderable period of time that had elapsed from the date of the registration decree,
since the right to the same does not prescribe pursuant to the rulings in Heirs of Cristobal
Marcos v. de Banuvar and Lucero v. Loot, 19 It also declared that the segregation of the
4-square meter portion from Lot 9821 and its restoration as integral part of Lot 9822, had
no effect whatever on the Albanos' right to the writ of possession, which was the
appropriate process for the enforcement of the judgment in the cadastral case. Barroga
and Padaca moved for reconsideration. When this proved unavailing, they appealed to
this Court.
The inevitable verdict should by now be apparent. Conformably with the established
axioms set out in the opening paragraphs of this opinion, the appellees, Angel Albano, et
al. must be declared to be entitled to a writ of possession over Lot No. 9821 in
enforcement of the decree of registration and vindication of the title issued in favor of
their predecessor-in-interest, Delfina Q. Aquino; the writ may correctly be enforced
against the appellants, Barroga and Padaca, as successors-in-interest of Ruperta
Pascual, who was a party in the registration proceedings which resulted in the
declaration of Delfina Q. Aquino as the owner of the land subject thereof; and the
appellees are entitled to said writ of possession, despite the lapse of many, many years,
their right thereto being imprescriptible at least as against the persons who were parties
to the cadastral case or their successors-in-interest. 20 The appellants, it must be said,
have succeeded in prolonging the controversy long enough. They should no longer be
allowed to continue doing so.

HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, SPOUSES BRAULIO ABALOS and AQUILINA ABALOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 128177 August 15, 2001
YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:
May a winning party in a land registration case effectively eject the possessor thereof,
whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB?
The instant petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision 1 dated September 20,
1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34930 as well as its Resolution 2 dated
January 15, 1997, denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
We quote the undisputed facts as narrated by the Court of Appeals, to wit
The property subject of this case is a parcel of land containing an area of 24,550 square
meters, more or less, located in Lingayen, Pangasinan, and particularly described as
follows:
A parcel of land (Nipa with an area of 8,410 square meters; fishpond with an area of
14,000 square meters; and residential land with an area of 1,740 square meters, more or
less. Bounded on the N, by river and Filemon Anselmo; on the South by Alejandro
Soriano and Filemon Anselmo; and on the West by Fortunata Soriano.
Originally owned by Adriano Soriano until his death in 1947, the above-described
property passed on to his heirs who leased the same to spouses David de Vera and
Consuelo Villasista for a period of fifteen (15) years beginning July 1, 1967 with Roman
Soriano, one of the children of Adriano Soriano, acting as caretaker of the property
during the period of the lease. After executing an extra judicial settlement among
themselves, the heirs of Adriano Soriano subsequently subdivided the property into two
(2) lots, Lot No. 60052 and Lot No. 8459. Lot No. 60052 was assigned to Lourdes,
Candido and the heirs of Dionisia while Lot No. 8459 was assigned to Francisca,
Librada, Elocadio and Roman. In 1971, Lot No. 60052 was sold by Lourdes, Candido
and the heirs of Dionisia to petitioner spouses Braulio and Aquilina Abalos (hereinafter
referred to as petitioners), while, Elocadio, Francisca and Librada sold their three-fourths
shares in Lot No. 8459 also to petitioners.
On March 14, 1968, the de Vera spouses ousted Roman Soriano as caretaker and
appointed Isidro Verzosa and Vidal Verzosa as his substitutes. Thereafter, Roman
Soriano filedCAR Case No. 1724-P-68 for reinstatement and reliquidation against the de
Vera spouses. The agrarian court authorized the ejectment of Roman Soriano but on
appeal, the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which decision became final
and executory. However, prior to the execution of the said decision, the parties entered
into a post-decisional agreement wherein the de Vera spouses allowed Roman Soriano
to sub-lease the property until the termination of the lease in 1982. In an Order dated

14

December 22, 1972, the post-decisional agreement was approved by the agrarian court.
On August 16, 1976, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, Branch 38, an application for registration of title over Lot No. 60052 and
three-fourths (3/4)pro-indiviso of Lot No. 8459, docketed asLRC Case No. N-3405. Said
application for registration was granted by the trial court, acting as a land registration
court, per Decision dated June 27, 1983. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the land registration court. The petition for review filed with the Supreme
Court by Roman Soriano docketed asG.R. 70842, was denied for lack of merit and entry
of judgment was entered on December 16, 1985.
Meanwhile, it appears that on July 15, 1983, a day after the promulgation of the land
registration court's decision, Roman Soriano, together with Elocadio and Librada
Soriano, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Branch 37, and against
petitioners, an action for annulment of document and/or redemption, ownership and
damages, docketed asCivil Case No. 159568 (sic; should be 15958). Petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground ofres judicata, pendency of another action, laches,
misjoinder of parties and lack of jurisdiction, which was denied by the trial court.
Thereafter, on August 22, 1984, or eleven (11) years after the approval of the postdecisional agreement between Roman Soriano and the spouses de Vera inCAR Case
No. 1724-P-68 for reinstatement and reliquidation, petitioners filed with the agrarian court
a motion for execution of said post-decisional agreement which allowed Roman Soriano
to sub-lease the property. The motion prayed that petitioners be placed in possession of
the subject property, jointly with Roman Soriano, and to levy so much of Roman's
property to answer for the use and occupation by Soriano of 6/7 share of the property.
On October 25, 1984, Roman Soriano filed a motion to suspend hearing on the rental
demanded by petitioners, which, however, was denied by the agrarian court. The
agrarian court likewise authorized the substitution of the de Vera spouses by petitioners.
Soriano's motion for reconsideration was also denied, prompting Soriano to file a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
In the meantime, Roman Soriano died on December 11, 1985. Thus, the complaint
inCivil Case No. 159568 (sic) for annulment of document and/or redemption, ownership
and damages, was amended to substitute Soriano's heirs, herein private respondents, as
party-plaintiffs. The complaint was again amended to include Juanito Ulanday as partydefendant for having allegedly purchased part of the disputed property from petitioners.
On motion of petitioners, the re-amended complaint was dismissed by the trial court on
the ground that the re-amended complaint altered the cause of action. Upon
reconsideration, the dismissal was set aside and petitioners were ordered to file their
Answer, in view of which petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Court of Appeals, docketed asC.A. GR SP No. 22149.
On April 25, 1990, the Court of Appeals denied the petition filed by Roman Soriano
(substituted by private respondents) impugning the denial of their motion to suspend
hearing on the rental demanded by petitioners, and authorizing the substitution of the de
Vera spouses by petitioners, on the ground that no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the agrarian court. Thus, private respondents filed a petition for review on
certiorari with the Supreme Court, docketed asG.R. 93401.
Meanwhile, on December 7, 1990, the Court of Appeals inC.A. GR SP No. 22149, also
denied the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners, ruling that the land
registration court committed no error when it refused to adhere to the rule ofres judicata.

Petitioners then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed
asG.R. 99843.
On June 26, 1991, the Supreme Court promulgated its decision inG.R. 93401, and
granted the petition filed by private respondents. Thus, the decision of the Court of
Appeals denying the petition of private respondents was set aside, and the motion for
execution filed by petitioners inCAR Case No. 1724-P-48 was denied.
On June 22, 1993, the Supreme Court, inG.R. 99843, reversed and set aside the denial
of the Court of Appeals inC.A. GR SP No. 22149, and consequently,Civil Case No.
15958 for annulment of document and/or redemption, ownership and damages, was
ordered dismissed.
On October 18, 1993, private respondents filed with the Department of Agrarian
Adjudication Board (sic), a complaint against petitioners for "Security of Tenure with
prayer for Status Quo Order and Preliminary Injunction" docketed asDARAB Case No.
528-P-93.
Meanwhile, it appears that the decision of the land registration court inLRC Case No. N3405 was partially executed with the creation of a Committee on Partition per Order
dated March 25, 1987. On July 27, 1988, the land registration court approved the
partition of Lot No. 8459, with Lot No. 8459-A assigned to private respondent, and Lot
No. 8459-B assigned to petitioners. For Lot No. 60052, O.C.T. No. 22670 was issued in
the name of petitioners; for Lot No. 8459-B, O.C.T. No. 22687 was issued, also in the
name of petitioner; and for Lot No. 8459-A, O.C.T. No. 22686 was issued in the name of
Roman Soriano. Dissatisfied with said partition, private respondents appealed to the
Court of Appeals, docketed asCA G.R. SP No. 119497. The appellate court affirmed the
partition but reversed the order of the land registration court directing the issuance of a
writ of possession on the ground of pendency ofCivil Case No. 15958.
On November 15, 1993, the trial court in compliance with the decision of the Supreme
Court inG.R. No. 99843, dismissedCivil Case No. 15958, in view of which, petitioner, on
November 25, 1993, inLRC Case No. N-3405, moved for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution and/or writ of possession to place them in possession of Lot No. 60052 and
Lot No. 8459-B. Per Resolution dated January 21, 1994, said motion was held in
abeyance by the land registration court until and afterDARAB Case No. 528-P-93 for
security of tenure with prayer forstatus quo, has been resolved.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied on April 5, 1984, petitioners
interposed an appeal to the Supreme Court, docketed asG.R. 115073. In a Resolution
dated July 27, 1994 issued by the Supreme Court, petitioners' appeal, which was treated
as a petition for certiorari, was referred to this Court [of Appeals] for determination and
disposition.3
The Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the Resolution of the land registration court
and ordered instead the issuance of the corresponding writ of possession in favor of
private respondents. With the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners are
now before us raising the following grounds:
1.
THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS ARE CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGRARIAN REFORM
LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF TENANTCARETAKER.

15

2.
THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS ARE VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISION ON RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
3.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD EARLIER PERFECTED AN APPEAL OF THE
RESOLUTION SUBJECT OF THEIR PETITION.4
Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. There is ownership when a thing
pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by
law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the
owner, among which are the right to enjoy the thing owned and the right to exclude other
persons from possession thereof. On the other hand, possession is defined as the
holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and
physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two
ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder.5 A person may
be declared owner but he may not be entitled to possession. The possession may be in
the hands of another either as a lessee or a tenant. A person may have improvements
thereon of which he may not be deprived without due hearing. He may have other valid
defenses to resist surrender of possession. A judgment for ownership, therefore, does
not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident.6
There is no dispute that private respondents' (petitioners below) title over the land under
litigation has been confirmed with finality. As explained above, however, such declaration
pertains only to ownership and does not automatically include possession, especially so
in the instant case where there is a third party occupying the said parcel of land,
allegedly in the concept of an agricultural tenant.
While the issue of ownership of the subject land has been laid to rest in the final
judgment of the land registration court, the right of possession thereof is, as yet,
controverted. This is precisely what is put in issue in the security of tenure case filed by
petitioners (private respondents below) before the DARAB.
It is important to note that although private respondents have been declared titled owners
of the subject land, the exercise of their rights of ownership are subject to limitations that
may be imposed by law.7 The Tenancy Act provides one such limitation. Agricultural
lessees are entitled to security of tenure and they have the right to work on their
respective landholdings once the leasehold relationship is established. Security of tenure
is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation
of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood.8 The
exercise of the right of ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the rights of an
agricultural tenant.
However, petitioners' status as tenant has not yet been declared by the DARAB. In
keeping with judicial order, we refrain from ruling on whether petitioners may be
dispossessed of the subject property. As ratiocinated inNona v. Plan9
It is to the credit of respondent Judge that he has shown awareness of the recent
Presidential Decrees which are impressed with an even more solicitous concern for the
rights of the tenants.If, therefore, as he pointed out in his order granting the writ of
possession, there is a pending case between the parties before the Court of Agrarian
Relations, ordinary prudence, let alone the letter of the law, ought to have cautioned him

against granting the plea of private respondents that they be placed in possession of the
land in controversy,x x x. At the time the challenged orders were issued, without any
showing of how the tenancy controversy in the Court of Agrarian Relations was disposed
of, respondent Judge could not by himself and with due observance of the restraints that
cabin and confine his jurisdiction pass upon the question of tenancy. (Emphasis ours)
In its challenged Decision, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on the principle of finality
of judgments. It applied the legal doctrine that once a judgment has become final, the
issuance of a writ of execution becomes ministerial. The appellate court held that
petitioner's situation does not fall under any of the exceptions to this rule since his
occupation of the subject land did not transpire after the land registration court's
adjudication became final.
In so ruling, however, the Court of Appeals loses sight of the fact that petitioner's claim of
possession as a tenant of the litigated property, if proven, entitles him to protection
against dispossession.
Private respondents argue that petitioners' tenancy claim is barred byres judicata, having
been ruled upon in G.R. Nos. 99843 and 93401. However, not being an issue in the case
before us, this question should properly be resolved in DARAB Case No. 528-P-93. To
restate, the only issue before us is whether or not a winning party in a land registration
case can effectively eject the possessor thereof, whose security of tenure rights are still
pending determination before the DARAB.
A judgment in a land registration case cannot be effectively used to oust the possessor of
the land, whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the
DARAB. Stated differently, the prevailing party in a land registration case cannot be
placed in possession of the area while it is being occupied by one claiming to be an
agricultural tenant, pending a declaration that the latter's occupancy was unlawful.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34930 dated September 20, 1996, as
well as its Resolution dated January 15, 1997 are SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan in LRC Case No. N-3405 dated January
21, 1994 is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. HEIRS OF LUISA VILLA ABRILLE, defendant-appellant, LAND
REGISTRATION COMMISSIONER and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY,
defendants. G.R. No. L-39248 May 7, 1976
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez
and Atty. Baltazar Llamas plaintiff-appellee.
Jose R. Madrazo, Jr. for defendant-appellant.
Gregorio Bilog, Jr. for defendant Land Registration Commissioner.
ESGUERRA, J.:
This case was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CAG.R. No. 47438-R. The Court of Appeals certified it to this Court for final consideration

16

and resolution of the pure question of law involved.

The factual background of the case is as follows:
On May 9, 1969, a Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Title was filed by the
Republic of the Philippines (represented by the Director of Lands), with the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Branch 1, alleging, among others, the following:
3.
That defendant Commissioner of Land Registration and defendant Register of
Deeds of Davao City whose Offices are at Espaa Extension, Quezon City and Davao
City, respectively. "(are included in this complaint, the first being the public Official
charged under the law with the approval )." subdivision surveys of private lands while the
second is the Official vested with the authority to issue certificates of titles, pursuant to
the provisions of Act 496, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Registration Law;
4.
That defendant Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille (now Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille) is
the owner of a parcel of land in the City of Davao containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED
TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY TWO SQUARE METERS (525.652),
more or less, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 of the Registry of Deeds of
Davao City, issued in her name;
5.
That deceased Luisa Villa Abrille during her lifetime caused the subdivision of
the aforesaid parcel of land into two lots designated as Lots Nos. 379-B-2-B-1 and 379B-2-B-2 under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-69322 which was approved by the Land
Registration Commissioner on March 17,1967;
6.
That under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, Lot No. 379- B-2-B-1 contains
an area of 30,100 Square Meters while Lot No. 379-B-2B-2 contains an area of 577,679
Square Meters or a total area of 607,779 Square Meters, which is 82,127 Square Meters
more than the original area covered in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 in the
name of said defendant Luisa Villa Abrille;
7.
That on March 27, 1967 or ten days after the approval by the Land Registration
Commissioner, said Luisa Villa Abrille was able to secure an order from the Court of First
Instance of Davao in LRC (GLRO) Doc. No. 9969, directing the Register of Deeds for the
City of Davao and Province of Davao, to correct the area of Certificate of Title No. T1439 and thereafter to cancel the same and issue in lieu thereof TCT Nos. T-18886 and
T-18887;
8.
That on March 30, 1967, the Register of Deeds concerned registered Lot 379B-2-B-1 and issued TCT No. 18886 therefor, in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille and on the
same date registered Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 and issued TCT No. 18887 in the name of
Luisa Villa Abrille;
9.
That the registration of Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2, which includes the aforementioned
excess area of 82,127 Square Meters, was not in accordance with law for lack of the
required notice and publication as prescribed in Act 496, as amended, otherwise known
as the Land Registration Law;
10.
That the excess or enlarged area of 82,127 Square Meters as a result of the
approval of the subdivision survey (LRC) Psd-69322 was formerly a portion of the Davao
River which dried up by reason of the change of course of the said Davao River; hence a
land belonging to the public domain; and

11.
That as a consequence thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18887 which
covers Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 of Subdivision Survey (LRC) Psd-69322, wherein the excess
area of land belong to the public domain (not private land) is null and void ab initio.
On June 10, 1969, defendant Register of Deeds of Davao- City filed her answer averring
that she, "in the performance of her ministerial duty, honestly and in good faith effected
the registration of Subdivision Lot No. 379-B-2-B-1 and Lot No. 379B-2-B-2 and the
issuance of corresponding TCT No. 18886 and TCT No. 18887 therefor, respectively, in
view of the approval of the Land Registration Commissioner of Subdivision Plan (LRC)
Psd-69322, and in view of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Davao to correct the
area in Certificate of Title No. T-1439, to cancel the same and to issue in lieu thereof
TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887".
On July 2, 1969, herein defendant-appellants filed their answer admitting the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the complaint; that they admit the increase in
area of the land of their predecessor but that the increase in area of the land was
acceded to and concurred in by the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, and the
same was duly noted and approved by the Court of First Instance of Davao; that they
admit the issuance of TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887 out of Certificate of Title No. T1439 in the name of their predecessor-in-interest Luisa Villa Abrille but that TCT No. T18886 had been cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-19077 was issued in favor of
Gaudencio Consunji, and, TCT No. T-18887 had likewise been cancelled and several
Transfer Certificates of Title were issued thereunder; that the subject increase of area
was made in accordance with law and existing jurisprudence; and that Luisa Villa Abrille,
predecessor-in-interest of herein defendant-appellant, as riparian owner was entitled
under the law to claim, as she did, the increase or excess in area of her original land as
her own.
On August 12, 1969, defendant Commissioner of Land Registration prays for a judgment
on the pleadings and avers in his answer that he has no knowledge of the subject matter
of the complaint since the subdivision plan involved therein was approved by the then
Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio Noblejas; and that on February 19, 1968,
the then Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio Noblejas, issued LRC Circular No.
167 directing the Register of Deeds throughout the Philippines to, among others, deny
the registration of subdivision plans with increased or expanded areas and to withhold
the issuance of the corresponding titles, or if the plans have already been registered and
the titles issued, to recall the titles and to take appropriate steps for their cancellation.
Some private persons, as actual possessors and occupants, tried to intervene in the
case as movant-intervenors but they were denied standing in court by the trial court in its
order of August 16,1969.
On January 6, 1970, the parties litigants submitted in court their "Agreed Stipulation of
Facts" and pray that judgment be rendered by the trial court on their case based on their
stipulation of facts. The "Agreed Stipulation of Facts" of the parties reads as follows:
COME NOW the parties assisted by their respective attorneys, and unto the Honorable
Court, most respectfully submit the following stipulation of facts and allege:
1.
That Lot 379-B-2-B was originally registered on June 28, 1916 in the Registry
Book of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga as Vol. A27, Page 40 under Original
Certificate of Title No. 5609, Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 317, in the name of

17

Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna, father of Luisa Villa Abrille;

2.
That upon the death of the original owner, the said property was inherited by
Luisa Villa Abrille and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 was issued in the name of
said Luisa Villa Abrille;
3.
That subsequently, by virtue of an approved subdivision plan Psd-69322 by the
defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-18886
and 18887 were issued by the defendant, Register of Deeds of Davao, copy of which
subdivision plan is hereto attached as Annex "A", and made integral part hereof;
4.
That Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18886 was subsequently cancelled by
virtue of deed of sale, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19077 was issued in the
name of Gaudencio Consunji a purchaser in good faith and for value;

subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236 is hereto attached as Annex "D" and made integral
part hereof;
8.
That the parties admit that there was an increase in the area of Lot 379-B-2-B,
but the same was with the knowledge of the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner
and the court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV;
9.
That the parties admit that no registered owner has been affected or prejudiced
in the increase in area as only Luisa Villa Abrille as the registered owner holds property
adjacent to the parcel of land in question;
10.
That the portion of land subject of the increase adjoins Lot 379-B-2-B and abuts
the Davao River;

5.
That the said subdivision plan Annex "A" was also approved by the Court of
First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, through an Order dated March 27, 1967, copy of
which order is hereto attached as Annex "B" and made part hereof;

11.
That the parcel of land subject of the increase is fully planted with coconuts,
bananas and other seasonal crops by the defendants, through their predecessor-ininterest;

6.
That the said Order Annex "B" was issued by the Court of First Instance of
Davao, Branch IV, on the strength of the Report of the defendant, Land Registration
Commissioner, copy of which report is hereto attached as Annex "C" and made integral
part hereof;

12.
That the increase in area could have taken place very long time ago as the
coconuts planted thereon had long been fruit bearing;

7.
That much later on, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18887 was by virtue of an
Order of the Court of First Instance, Branch 1, in Special Proceedings No. 1357, entitled:
In the Matter of the Testate Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille, approving a project of partition
cancelled, and in lieu thereof, the following Transfer Certificates of Title were issued to
the following named persons, to wit:
(a)

T-20690 - Huang Siu Sin;

(b)

T-20692 - Huang Siu Sin;

(c)

T-20701 - Josefino Huang;

(d)

T-20702 - Josefino Huang;

(e)

T-20703 - Josefino Huang;

(f)

T-20732 Huang Siu Sin, et al.;

(g)

T-20733 - Huang Siu Sin, et al.;

(h)

T-20713 - Miguel Huang;

(i)

T-23015 - Miguel Huang;

(j)

T-20725 - Milagros Huang;

(k)

T-20726 - Milagros Huang;

which certificates of title were issued on the basis of a subdivision plan LRC Psd-71236
duly approved by the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, copy of which

13.
That Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18886 does not contain any portion of the
increase in area;
14.
That of the certificates of title issued based under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd71236, only Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T- 20725; T-20701; T-20713; and T-20690
contain the increase in area; while all the other certificates of title issued under
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236 do not contain any increase in area;
15.
That the parties agree that the issuance of the Order Annex "B" was without
notice to the Director of Lands.
The trial court thereafter rendered its decision dated January 27, 1970, which reads as
follows:
This is an ordinary civil action for annulment of certificate of title instituted by the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, against the Estate of
Luisa Abrille, represented by Huang Siu Sin, Administrator, the Land Registration
Commissioner and the Register of Deeds of the City of Davao. Because the residue of
the intestate estate of Luisa Villa Abrille had been divided among Huang Siu Sin,
Josefino Huang, Milagros Huang, Miguel Huang and lap Tong Ha, heirs, they were
directed to appear and to substitute for the intestate estate and they did.
The parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
xxx
xxx
xxx
The increase in area of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 5609 of the
Register of Deeds of Davao in the name of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna and
subsequently by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T. 1439 in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille
and finally, based on subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236, by Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. T-20725 in the name of Milagros Huang, T20701 in the name of Josefino Huang, T20713 in the name of Miguel Huang and T-20690 in the name of Huang Siu Sin, is from
525,652 square meters to 607,779 square meters, or 82,127 square meters.
The remedy sought by defendant heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille in order to include the

18

increase in area was a petition for approval of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-79322
recommended by the Commissioner of Land Registration in his Report, and for issuance
of new title under Section 44, Act 496, as amended, filed with this court, which was
assigned to Branch IV.
Even pursuant to Section 44 of Act 496 under which the aforesaid remedy was sought,
notice before the hearing is required. The parties admit that there was no notice to the
persons interested, including the Director of Lands, before the petition was heard.
Worse, the increase in area could not have been included in Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 even assuming arguendo that the same
belonged to the owner of the land to which it is adjacent by the simple expediency of a
petition for approval of subdivision plan and issuance of new titles, because a subdivision
of a registered land under Section 44 of Act 496 does not authorize the inclusion of land
or area not embraced in the titled or in excess of what is stated in the title. And the
approval by the Court of such subdivision plan does not lend validity to it. The subdivision
must be limited to the area stated in the title. Neither amendment of the title under
Section 112 of Act 496 would be a valid remedy 1.
The heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille.. owners of the adjacent estate, might have acquired a
registrable title to the land in question but to bring it under the operation of the Land
Registration Act, a petition for registration under Act 496 should have been filed. More so
when the title acquired is by continuous possession for at least 30 years under a claim of
ownership And even assuming that the land is an accretion, the fact that the riparian
estate is registered does not bring ipso facto effect its accretion thereto under the
operation of the Land Registration Act. No decree of registration of the land based upon
final judgment promulgated by a court of competent jurisdiction after due publication,
notice and hearing, has been issued by the Commissioner of Land Registration and
transcribed by the Register of Deeds of Davao in the registry, for the reason that no initial
or original registration proceedings have been instituted by the owner. And the only way
by which a title to the land in question can be issued for the first time is for the Land
Registration Commissioner to issue a decree of registration based upon final judgment
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction after trial.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered cancelling Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 and directing the Register of Deeds of Davao
to issue new certificates of title in lieu thereof after the portions consisting of 82,127
square meters, the land involved, shall have been segregated therefrom in accordance
with law.
Not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, defendant Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille
brought the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, in
its Resolution dated July 22, 1974, certified the case (CA-G.R. No. 47438-R) to this Court
for consideration and final disposition.
Defendant-appellant maintains that the lower court erred in holding the approval of
Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 of no legal effect merely on ground of lack of notice to
interested persons, and in ordering the cancellation of Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725,
T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690. It is the contention of the defendant-appellant that since
the government agencies having to do with lands know all the time the increase in area
in subdivision plan Psd-69322, and the government agencies concerned tolerated if not
abetted the ultimate inclusion of the involved increase in area, defendant-appellant
should not be made to suffer the effect of the allegedly wrong procedure or step taken in
the approval of the aforementioned subdivision plan. Besides, defendant-appellant

claims that it is their honest belief that the legal remedy taken by them in seeking the
approval of their subdivision plan concerned was well within the law, particularly the
provision of Section 44 of Act 496, as amended.
Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, maintains that the approval of the subdivision plan,
with the increase in area, by the defendant-appellant Land Registration Commission
does not lend validity to the said subdivision plan; and that the issuance of the four
transfer certificates of title (Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690) over the
increased area in question is improper and invalid notwithstanding the conformity of the
Land Registration Commissioner and the subsequent order of the Court of First Instance
of Davao, Branch IV, approving the subdivision plan concerned, as the required giving of
notice to all parties interested in defendant-appellant's petition for approval of subdivision
plan was not at all followed,
Before Us, therefore, for consideration and final resolution, in order to arrive at a
judicious disposition of the case at bar, is whether or not the lower court erred in ordering
the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T20690 which cover the increased area in question totalling 82,127 square meters.
After a careful and thorough deliberation of the matter in controversy, We are of the
opinion and so hold that the lower court acted correctly in ordering the cancellation of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 which
admittedly covered the increased area of 82,127 square meters under Subdivision Plan
(LRC) Psd-71236 (and formerly under Psd-69322) for the City of Davao.
Certainly, the step taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning the court for the approval
of their Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 and then Psd-71236 to include the questioned
increased area of 82,127 square meters is, to say the least, unwarranted and irregular.
This is so, for the increased area in question, which is not a registered land but formerly
a river bed, is so big as to give allowance for a mere mistake in area of the original
registration of the tracts of land of the defendant-appellant formerly belonging to and
registered in the name of their grandfather, Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna. In order to
bring this increase in area, which the parties admitted to have been a former river bed of
the Davao River, under the operation and coverage of the Land Registration Law, Act
496, proceedings in registrations of land title should have been filed Instead of an
ordinary approval of subdivision plan.
It should be remembered that recourse under Section 44 of Act 496, which the
predecessor-in-interest (Luisa Villa Abrille) of the herein defendant-appellant took, is
good only insofar as it covers previously registered lands. In the instant case, part of the
tracts of land, particularly the area of 82,127 square meters, has not yet been brought
under the operation of the Torrens System. Worse still, the approval of Subdivision Plans
(LRC) Psd-69322 and Psd-71236 was without notice to all parties in interest, more
particularly the Director of Lands. For an applicant to have his imperfect or incomplete
title or claim to a land to be originally registered under Act 496, the following requisites
should all be satisfied:
1.

Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private surveyor;

2.

Filing of application for registration by the applicant;

3.

Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court;

4.

Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing together with all the

19

documents or other evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land
Registration Commission;
5.
Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and place of the
hearing in the Official Gazette;
6.
Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those known to have
interests in the property by the sheriff;
7.
or not;

Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the notice

8.

Hearing of the case by the Court;

9.

Promulgation of judgment by the Court;

10.
Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final and instructing
the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree of confirmation and registration;
11.

Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration Commission;

12.
Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding Register of
Deeds, and
13.
Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration book and the
issuance of the owner's duplicate original certificate of title to the applicant by the
Register of Deeds, upon payment of the prescribed fees.
Hence, with the foregoing requisites not having been complied with, the lower court
committed no error in its appealed decision dated January 27, 1970.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.
No special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO S. SANCHEZ, Petitioner, - versus - RODOLFO M. QUINIO and ISMAEL M.
QUINIO, Respondents. G.R. No. 133545 July 15, 2005
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is this appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the following issuances of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51764, to wit:
1.
Decision dated 27 January 1998,[1] reversing and setting aside an earlier decision
of the Regional Trial Court at Makati City dismissing respondents complaint per quieting
of title, etc., thereat commenced by them against, among others, the herein petitioner
Renato S. Sanchez; and
2.
Resolution dated 28 April 1998,[2] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The material facts, as found by the trial court and as adopted by the Court of Appeals,
may briefly be stated, as follows:

At the core of this case is a parcel of land with an area of 300 square meters, more or
less, located at San Antonio Valley I, Paraaque City and originally owned by and
registered in the name of one Celia P. Santiago (Santiago, hereinafter) under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 391688 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. On 12 July 1979,
Santiago sold the disputed parcel to herein respondents Rodolfo M. Quinio and Ismael
M. Quinio (collectively the Quinios). Following the registration of the conveying deed of
absolute sale, the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila, District IV (Makati) issued on 13
July 1979 TCT No. S-89991 in herein respondents name.
A little over thirteen (13) years later, one Renato Sanding, by virtue of a deed of absolute
sale covering the same parcel of land purportedly executed in his favor on 22 February
1993 by Santiago, was issued TCT No. 70372 of the Registry of Paranaque. Renato
Sanding subsequently sold the property to Romeo Abel, married to Ma. Nora S. Abel,
resulting in the issuance in the latters name of TCT No. 72406.
In turn, Romeo Abel sold the subject parcel of land to herein petitioner Renato Sanchez
on 16 November 1993, executing for this purpose a deed of absolute sale in the latters
favor. This sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Paranaque, and, on 17
May 1994, TCT No. 81125 was issued in the name of petitioner.
It appears that, before proceeding with the purchase, petitioner, who happened to own
the lot adjacent to the parcel sought to be acquired, repaired to the Registry of Deeds of
Paranaque to look into the authenticity of TCT No. 72406 which was then in the hands of
Romeo S. Abel. Only upon being assured of the authenticity of Romeo S. Abels TCT
No. 72406 did petitioner conclude the purchase.
Disturbed, as may be expected, when later apprised that their property was the subject
of several transactions and that a building was being constructed thereon pursuant to a
building permit issued to Renato S. Sanchez, the Quinios instituted on 12 May 1994
before the Regional Trial Court at Makati City a complaint for quieting of title and
cancellation of titles against Sanchez and the spouses Romeo Abel and Ma. Nora Abel,
which complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1736, was raffled to Branch 147 of the
court.
After due proceedings, the trial court, in a decision dated 6 July 1995,[3] rendered
judgment dismissing the complaint, it being its holding that Sanchez was an innocent
purchaser for value of the disputed property and, therefore, has a better right over it than
the Quinios.
Following the denial of their motion for reconsideration, the Quinios went on appeal to the
Court of Appeals whereat their recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV NO. 51764. As
stated at the outset hereof, the Court of Appeals, in a decision dated 27 January 1998,[4]
reversed and set aside the appealed decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED. Transfer Certificate
of Title No. S-89991 issued on July 13, 1979 in favor of Rodolfo M. Quinio and Ismael M.
Quinio is forever quieted; Transfer Certificate of Title No. 72406 issued on May 19, 1993
in favor of Spouses Romeo S. Abel and Ma. Nora S. Abel is hereby ordered
CANCELLED including any and all titles, deeds or proceedings derived or that may
emanate therefrom; Defendant-appellee Renato S. Sanchez and any and all persons
acting in his behalf is ordered to DEMOLISH and REMOVE any and all buildings,
structures, tenements and works constructed, built and made on the property covered by

20

Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-89991; Defendants-appellees to jointly and solidarily

pay plaintiffs-appellants attorneys fees in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)
PESOS. Costs against defendants-appellees.

transferee of a vendor bereft of any transmissible rights. Under the foregoing principle
derived from the above case law, Baltazars vendees have no rights as against Good
Earth. Their recourse is against Baltazar himself.

SO ORDERED.

In Torres vs. Court of Appeals,[8] we also said:

In a subsequent resolution[5] dated 28 April 1998, the appellate court denied herein
petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Moreover, even if We grant Mota the status of an innocent mortgagee, the doctrine relied
upon by the appellate court that a forged instrument may become the root of a valid title,
cannot be applied where the owner still holds a valid and existing certificate of title
covering the same interest in a realty. The doctrine would apply rather when, as in the
cases for example of De la Cruz v. Fabie, 35 Phil. 144 [1916], Fule v. De Legare, No. L17951, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 351, and Republic v. Umali, G.R. No. 80687, April
10, 1989, the forger thru insidious means obtains the owner's duplicate certificate of title,
converts it in his name, and subsequently sells or otherwise encumbers it to an innocent
holder for value, for in such a case the new certificate is binding upon the owner (Sec.
55, Act 496; Sec. 53, P.D. No. 1529). But if the owner holds a valid and existing
certificate of title, his would be indefeasible as against the whole world, and not that of
the innocent holder's. Prior tempore potior jure as We have said in Register of Deeds v.
Philippine National Bank, No. L-17641, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 46, citing Legarda v.
Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, Roman Catholic Bishop v. Philippine Railway, 49 Phil. 546, Reyes
v. Borbon, 50 Phil. 791 (Emphasis supplied).

Hence, this recourse by petitioner Renato S. Sanchez.

As we see it, the singular issue to be resolved is who between petitioner, on one hand,
and respondents, on the other, is entitled to the subject land.
Petitioner latches his case on his being an innocent purchaser for value of the land in
question, and asserts the rights and guarantees accorded by law on such purchaser.
We find no merit in the petition.
It cannot be over-emphasized that Santiago sold the subject land in July 1979 to
respondents, who lost no time in registering the conveying deed of sale and securing title
in their names. From that time on, ownership and other rights flowing therefrom over the
land in question pertained to respondents. In other words, Santiago was no longer
possessed of transmissible rights over such property when she executed on 22 February
1993 a deed of sale in favor of Renato Sanding. The aforesaid deed, in fine, could not
have conveyed valid title over the land.
Lest it be overlooked, Santiago, testifying below, denied having executed the deed of
sale adverted to in favor of Renato Sanding. But assuming, ex gratia argumenti, the
authenticity of such deed and the bona fides of the corresponding transaction, the
consequent issuance in Renato Sandings name of TCT No. 70372 and Romeo S.
Abels TCT No. 72406 and petitioners TCT No. 81125 descending therefrom - would not
defeat respondents superior right to the property in question. For, in cases where two
(2) certificates of title covering the same parcel of land are issued to two (2) different
persons, he who holds in good faith that certificate which is earlier in date has superior
right over the land covered thereby. Thus, we said in Margolles vs. Court of Appeals:[6]
Lastly, it is a settled rule that when two certificates of title are issued to different persons
covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail, and, in case
of successive registrations where more than one certificate is issued over the land, the
person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies on
a subsequent certificate. The titles of the petitioners, having emanated from an older
title, should thus be upheld.
Even if petitioner and Romeo S. Abel, the formers immediate predecessor-in-interest,
are to be accorded the status of innocent purchasers for value, as the term is juridically
understood, the superior right of respondents will still have to be posited and recognized.
Baltazar vs. Court of Appeals[7] explains why:
We might assume for the moment and for purposes of argument only that Baltazars
vendees had successfully proven they were purchasers in good faith and for value. Even
so, as between two persons both of whom are in good faith and both innocent of any
negligence, the law must protect and prefer the lawful holder of registered title over the

It may be that one dealing with property brought under the Torrens system of land
registration may rely, as petitioner did with respect to the land in question, on what
appears on the face of the covering certificate without inquiring further as to the title of
the seller or mortgagor.[9] But the guarantee generally accorded a Torrens title holder to
be secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over
the covered property admits of a couple of exceptions. C.N. Hodges vs. Dy Buncio &
Co., Inc.,[10] deals with one of them, thus:
The claim of indefeasibility of the petitioner's title under the Torrens land title system
would be correct if previous valid title to the same parcel of land did not exist. The
respondent had a valid title x x x It never parted with it; it never handed or delivered to
anyone its owner's duplicate of the transfer certificate of title; it could not be charged with
negligence in the keeping of its duplicate certificate of title or with any act which could
have brought about the issuance of another certificate upon which a purchaser in good
faith and for value could rely. If the petitioner's contention as to indefeasibility of his title
should be upheld, then registered owners without the least fault on their part could be
divested of their title and deprived of their property. Such disastrous results which would
shake and destroy the stability of land titles had not been foreseen by those who had
endowed with indefeasibility land titles issued under the Torrens system (Emphasis
supplied).
At bottom then, the present petition basically features an instance where two (2) different
persons acquired by purchase at different times from the same owner (Santiago), the
same piece of registered land. And although the records do not provide clear answer on
how the second vendee, Renato Sanding, in this case, was able to secure a certificate
of title despite the existence of an outstanding valid certificate of title in the hands and
name of the first vendee, herein respondents, who appear to have never relinquished the
document, the stubborn reality is that such a second title was issued and whence two (2)
other titles eventually descended.
Following the lessons imparted by Margolles, Baltazar, Torres and C.N. Hodges, supra,

21

however, whatever right Renato Sanding may have acquired over the disputed property
cannot prevail over, but must yield to, the superior right thereon of respondents, as the
appellate court rightfully held. And, inasmuch as his title is traceable to that of Romeo S.
Abel, who in turn derived his right and title from Renato Sanding, petitioner cannot
plausibly have better rights than either Romeo S. Abel or Renato Sanding, since no one
can acquire a right greater than what the transferor himself has.[11] As the saying goes,
the spring cannot rise higher than its source.
In all, this Court finds and so holds that the assailed decision and resolution of the
appellate court decreeing the cancellation of TCT No. 72406 in the name of Romeo S.
Abel and the derivative TCT No. 81125 in the name of petitioner Renato S. Sanchez, are
in accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.

lot 138 and the homestead application of petitioner should refer to lot 118. 6
Based on the report, the Director of Lands on March 26, 1968, issued an Order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF HEREOF, the Homestead Application no. 11-860 of Teotimo Eduarte is
hereby amended to cover Lot 118, Pls-D, Matnog, Sorsogon and as thus amended, it
shall be given further due course. . . . 7
However, in spite of the said findings, neither the Director of Lands nor petitioner initiated
a suit to cancel the free patent issued to respondents.
Petitioner remained and continuously occupied lot 118 until on December 10, 1986
respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Irosin, a complaint 8 for recovery of
possession and damages against herein petitioner which was docketed as Civil Case No.
263. In their complaint, respondents averred that sometime in August 1985, petitioner by
means of force, threats and intimidation entered the subject to lot without respondents'
consent thereby depriving them of heir possession of the premises.

SO ORDERED.
TEOTIMO EDUARTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO BELDA and
ESTELITA ANA, respondents. G.R. No. 121038 July 22, 1999
BUENA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 40183 which affirmed with modification the decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court of Irosin, Sorsogon, Branch 55 ordering petitioner, as defendant below, to vacate a
parcel of land and to surrender the possession thereof to the respondents.
The facts are undisputed:
Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated at Sua, Matnog,
Sorsogon, denominated as Lot No. 118, Pls 661-D with an area of 27,167 square meters
and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-4991 issued on October 5, 1962.
It appears that March 1, 1963, a letter was sent by the Land Investigator Serafin
Valcarcel of the Bureau of Lands to respondent Belda and Cipriano Bulan calling them to
a conference to settle the wrongful issuance of title to the property they both occupy. 3 At
this conference, neither respondent Belda nor Bulan appeared but petitioner did.
On August 9, 1963, petitioner wrote a letter to the Director of Lands requesting him not to
give due course to respondents' application for a free patent title over lot 118 since what
respondent is occupying is lot 138 which was also titled in the name of Bulan who
refused to accept said title. 4

Traversing the complaint, petitioner asserts that he is the rightful owner of the property in
question; that he has been in possession of the same since 1942; that the title relied
upon by respondents was erroneously issued in their name which was acknowledged by
the Bureau of Lands; that respondents fully know that they are not the owners of the lot
in dispute. Petitioner therefore that he be declared the owner of lot 118 and that
respondents be ordered to reconvey the same. 9
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment on July 15, 1991 in favor of
respondents ratiocinating that petitioner's long inaction to take the necessary steps to ask
for judicial relief is fatal to his cause of action. The lower court also ruled that petitioner
can attack the validity of respondents' title only through a direct and not by a collateral
proceeding. Thus the lower court said:
The defendant Teotimo Eduarte (petitioner herein) should not have waited for the plaintiff
Domingo Belda to file this case against him. He should have taken the initiative to directly
attack the validity of the title within one (1) year from the issuance of the decree of
registration, in this case from November 29, 1962.
The settled rule is that a decree of registration and the certificate of title issued pursuant
thereto may be attacked on the ground of actual fraud within one (1) year from the date
of its entry and such an attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding. The
validity of the certificate of title in this regard can be threshed out only in an action
expressly filed for the purpose. Arcadio Melquiades, et. al. vs. IAC, et. al. (supra.)

On January 31, 1964, the Office of the Director of Lands took note of the protest and
ordered the District Land Officer of Sorsogon to investigate and verify whether the
patentee, herein respondent Belda, is in actual possession of lot 118 to enable the
Director of Lands to determine whether sufficient facts exist to warrant the filing of a suit
for cancellation of the title issued to respondent Belda. 5

And when this period expired Teotimo Eduarte is accorded the remedy to file "an
ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance." Again the defendant did
not to do this but waited until the year 1985 when this case was filed to ask for the
remedy of reconveyance as a special and affirmative defense in his answer of after the
lapse of 23 years from the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 4991 over Lot No.
118 in the name of Domingo Belda. 10

The investigation conducted by the District Land Officer of Sorsogon revealed that
petitioner is in actual possession of lot 118 while respondents occupy lot 138. The District
Land Officer recommended that the free patent application of respondents should refer to

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court, with the
modification that the case shall be remanded to the trial court for determination of the
rights of respondents as owners of the property in dispute and of petitioner as a builder,

22

planter or sower in good faith. It held:

certain parcel of land which is more particularly described as follows:

In the case at bar, plaintiff-appellees' right of dominion is shown by the Original

Certificate of Title No. P-4991.

xxx

It is a well settled principle that a title registered under the Torrens System of Land
Registration cannot be defeated by adverse, open and notorious possession neither can
it be defeated by prescription. Likewise, an action by the registered owner to recover
possession based on a Torrens title is not barred by laches. Thus, appellant's
contentions that appellee's right to reconveyance is barred by laches.
Appellant also faults the lower court for failing to cancel the title of appellee which was
allegedly erroneously titled in favor of the latter.
On this point the Supreme Court has held that it is erroneous to question the validity of
an Original Certificate of Title in an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession filed
by the registered owner of the said lot. Appellant's reliance on the records of the Bureau
of Lands is a defense which partakes of the nature of a collateral attack against a
certificate of title brought under the operation of the Torrens System of Registration.
Sec. 48 of P.D. 1529 explicitly states that a certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding
in accordance with law. Appellant's remedy, therefore, is not in the case at bench.
It appears, however, that appellant has made certain improvements on the property in
dispute. He is, therefore, entitled to specific rights as builder in good faith, in accordance
with Article 448 of the Civil Code . . .:
xxx

xxx

xxx

It thus becomes necessary for this case to be remanded to the court of origin for
reception of evidence necessary for determination of the rights of the parties with respect
to Article 448 of the Civil Code. 11
Aggrieved, petitioner now comes to this Court raising two issues, namely:
1.
Whether or not petitioner can, in an ordinary civil action for recovery of
possession filed by respondents, the registered owners, assail the validity of their title.
2.
Whether or not private respondents' right to recover possession has been
barred by laches.
On the issue of the validity of title, it must be stressed that a certificate of title serves as
evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein. After the expiration of the one year period from the issuance of the
decree of registration upon which it based, it becomes incontrovertible. 12 The decree of
registration and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto may be attacked on the
ground of fraud within one year from the date of its entry and such an attack must be
direct and not by a collateral proceeding. 13
In the case at bench, petitioner raised the following affirmative defense in his answer:
3.

xxx

xxx

5.
That the sole basis of the plaintiff in adversely claiming the aforesaid property is
due to the erroneous issuance of OCT No. P-4991 in his name which covers said Lot No.
118 and this mistaken and erroneous issuance has been duly acknowledged and
investigated no less by the Bureau of Lands;
6.
That plaintiff has never been in actual possession of said Lot No. 118 and
therefore he is not lawfully entitled to such certificate of title No. P-4991, which under the
circumstances he is obliged to reconvey the same to the defendant; 14
The foregoing allegations attack the validity of the original certificate of title issued in
favor of private respondents by the Registry of Deeds of Sorsogon. This is not permitted
under the principle of indefeasibility of a torrens title.
In Ybaez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 15 we have emphatically ruled:
It was erroneous for petitioners to question the Torrens Original Certificate of Title issued
to private respondent over Lot No. 986 in Civil Case No. 671, an ordinary civil action for
recovery of possession filed by the registered owner of the said lot, by invoking as
affirmative defense in their answer the Order of the Bureau of Lands, dated July 19,
1978, issued pursuant to the investigatory power of the Director or Lands under Section
91 of Public Land Law (C.A. 141 as amended). Such defense partakes of the nature of a
collateral attack against a certificate of title brought under the operation of the Torrens
system of registration pursuant to Section 122 of the Land Registration Act, now Section
103 of P.D. 1259. The case law on the matter does not allow collateral attack on the
Torrens certificate of title on the ground of actual fraud. The rule now finds expression in
Section 48 of P.D. 1529 otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
Hence, the issue of the validity of title, i.e. whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can
be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purposes. Whether or not respondents
have the right to claim ownership of the subject land is beyond the province of the instant
petition. 16
We now delve on the issue of laches.
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been
done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. The defense of laches is an equitable one and does not concern
itself with the character of the defendant's title, but only with whether or not by reason of
plaintiff's long inaction or inexcusable neglect, he should be barred from asserting his
claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust to defendant.
17
There is no dispute that the petitioner has been in possession of the land in question
since 1942. Such possession was known to herein respondents as evidenced by the joint
affidavit dated March 18, 1959 executed by respondents Belda and Paterno Garlan, the
fallo of which reads:

That the defendant is the true and lawful owner and in actual possession of that

23

That we, Paterno Garlan and Domingo Belda as adjoining owners of the land possessed
by Mr. Teotimo Eduarte can testify that for more than ten years up to the present time
Teotimo Eduarte was in sole possession of the land applied for a new declaration which
is situated in Teneresan, Sua, Matnog, Sorsogon;
That we further declare that as neighbors, we oftentimes had a get together in our
kaingins helping one another to cultivate and plant each of our corresponding lot and this
exist for some years and we did not know nor ever heard of anybody complaining or
interrupting the peaceful and continuous occupation of Mr. Teotimo Eduarte's lot. 18
Despite knowledge of petitioner's possession, respondents did not do anything to assert
their right over the subject property. They have waited for almost 45 years before
instituting the action for recovery of possession in 1986. Their long inaction to possess or
lay adverse claim to the subject land has been converted into a stale demand, thereby
barring them from recovering the possession of the subject land by laches. 19
Private respondents, however, argue that the adverse possession of petitioner cannot
defeat their title over the subject land, and neither can laches prevent them from
recovering possession because their title to the property is registered under the Torrens
system and therefore imprescriptible.
While jurisprudence is settled as to the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens
Title, we have, in a plethora of cases categorically ruled that a registered landowner may
lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of laches. 20
Similarly, it cannot be denied that no title to registered land in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession, however, this
legal guarantee may in appropriate cases yield to the right of a third person on equitable
principle of laches. Accordingly, in an action brought to recover the possession of certain
land covered by a certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent, it was held that,
while the defendant may not be considered as having acquired title by prescription based
on his long continued possession for 37 years, the registered owner's right to recover the
possession of the property as well as the title thereto from the defendant has, by the long
period of 37 years and by patentee's inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale
demand, thus barring the original owner of such titled land by laches. 21
Applying these legal precepts to the case at bench, it is clear that private respondents
are barred from recovering the subject land from herein petitioner. Their long inaction the
neglect to assert their rights over the said land have been lost by laches. To allow then to
do so would be inequitable and unjust to petitioner.
Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus jura subveniunt. The laws aid the vigilant, not those
who slumber on their rights.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one rendered dismissing the complaint of respondents. Cost against
respondents.
SO ORDERED.

24