Transatlantic Security Task Force Series
include more eﬀorts to oster cooperation with countries that are not “natural” partners or NAO, but that could provide valuable assistance in out-o-area missions. Tey include BRIC countries — especially India, as an increas-ingly important international actor, which shares the allies’ commitment to democratic values. At the same time, cooperation with regional actors should be urther reinorced, particularly in regions acing persisting security challenges (especially the Middle East, the Balkans, and North Arica). Trough recent reorms, NAO has developed the type o institutional structure needed to develop a multitude o partnerships, including more ﬂexible ormats and a single toolbox o activities in order to provide partners with more cooperation options. Te challenge now is to use that structure in ways that are beneﬁcial both to the Alliance and to its various partners. In the 1990s, partnership arrangements within the rame-work o the Partnership or Peace (PP) became eﬀec-tive tools or promoting liberal democratic norms and enhancing regional security in the ormer communist bloc. In the 21
century, the Alliance could and should continue its norm-dissemination activities through its various partnerships with countries emerging rom conﬂict and/or seeking to shed authoritarian legacies. Tis is likely to be easier in the Balkans (Bosnia, Montenegro, and Serbia) than in the Middle East or North Arica, in a situation in which countries rom the Balkans seek inclusion into the Alliance and are more inclined to regard NAO as an authoritative “teacher” o democratic norms. But the transatlantic allies also need to think harder about what the Alliance can oﬀer — in terms o trust-building measures, training, or a model or security reorm — to those partners that do not seek/are not eligible or NAO membership. For instance, the allies could use institutions such as the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) to acilitate participation in more intensive training, systematic dialogue, and exercises aimed at achieving better coordination with the Alliance at diplomatic and operational levels. As the mission in Libya has demonstrated, such coordination can be valuable in the context o operations in regions that are important to the transatlantic allies, but in which Western actors have limited inﬂuence and weak legitimacy. In the longer term, systematic practical cooperation within the MD and the ICI may also acilitate the dissemination o democratic norms (especially in civil-military relations) in that region.
Building New “Communities of Practice”
NAO can and should play an important role in promoting transatlantic security by becoming more systematically involved in eﬀorts to address a series o non-conventional yet increasingly prominent security challenges that may not require a military response, including cyber threats, piracy, and organized crime (particularly in connection to illegal traﬃcking in drugs, weapons, and human beings). Addressing such challenges could make a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in terms o enhancing transatlantic security, and would be ar less costly than military operations. Such missions would, however, require the development o diﬀerent capabilities and skills. Above all, these non-conventional security challenges involve strong civilian components; consequently, the allies should seek to build a new type o partnership between NAO (which continues to have signiﬁcant material and symbolic assets that could be used in crisis-management) and a range o civilian agencies. Tese include institutions rom the public domain (e.g. national and international agencies involved in policing and intelligence-collection, NGOs involved in eﬀorts to combat illicit transnational ﬂows) and rom the corporate world (e.g. companies involved in providing cyber security, private security companies, etc.). Achieving coordination and cooperation among institu-tions that have diﬀerent compositions, cultures, assets, and mandates is bound to be diﬃcult. Nevertheless, the allies should strive to build new types o “communities o practice” that bring together various actors, uniting them around a common set o understandings about the nature o new security challenges and shared bodies o practical knowledge, skills, and procedures required or addressing those challenges. Such communities o practice could sustain cooperation between NAO and civilian actors beyond particular missions, making it easier or the allies to address security challenges that transcend conventional categories and divides between public and private, domestic and international, and economic and
The allies should seek to build a new type of partnership between NATO and a range of civilian agencies.