Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Record and to Continue Trial; Response to Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Record and to Continue Trial; Order of January 11, 2002, in the Arizona state action. It is oxymoronic for the State court trial judge to base the ruling of January 11, 2002, on the fact that Davidsons did not file an objection to the Motion to Withdraw. This ruling presumes that Davidsons had no objection to their legal counsel’s withdrawal, which is simply not true. The trial judge’s seriously flawed reasoning also presumes that Davidsons suddenly acquired an obligation to retain new legal counsel, or else appear in the trial court pro se, simply because of the Motion to Withdraw. If an objective observer follows this flawed reasoning to its logical conclusion, an attorney’s contractual and professional responsibility to act in their client’s behalf as their retained legal counsel in any State court proceeding, can be immediately shifted from attorney to client, without the clients’ written endorsement, simply by filing a Motion to Withdraw, even after the action is set for trial, under color of Arizona Rule 5.1. It is an oxymoron to say that Davidsons failed to object to the Motion to Withdraw, during the interval of time (“the gap period”) between the Motion to Withdraw and the Order granting attorney withdrawal. As their retained legal counsel in the State court proceeding, MJM and QBSL were still under contractual and professional duty to Davidsons during the gap period. With their Motion to Withdraw, MJM and QBSL ceased providing Davidsons with legal representation (effective or otherwise), under color of Arizona Rule 5.1.
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Record and to Continue Trial; Response to Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Record and to Continue Trial; Order of January 11, 2002, in the Arizona state action. It is oxymoronic for the State court trial judge to base the ruling of January 11, 2002, on the fact that Davidsons did not file an objection to the Motion to Withdraw. This ruling presumes that Davidsons had no objection to their legal counsel’s withdrawal, which is simply not true. The trial judge’s seriously flawed reasoning also presumes that Davidsons suddenly acquired an obligation to retain new legal counsel, or else appear in the trial court pro se, simply because of the Motion to Withdraw. If an objective observer follows this flawed reasoning to its logical conclusion, an attorney’s contractual and professional responsibility to act in their client’s behalf as their retained legal counsel in any State court proceeding, can be immediately shifted from attorney to client, without the clients’ written endorsement, simply by filing a Motion to Withdraw, even after the action is set for trial, under color of Arizona Rule 5.1. It is an oxymoron to say that Davidsons failed to object to the Motion to Withdraw, during the interval of time (“the gap period”) between the Motion to Withdraw and the Order granting attorney withdrawal. As their retained legal counsel in the State court proceeding, MJM and QBSL were still under contractual and professional duty to Davidsons during the gap period. With their Motion to Withdraw, MJM and QBSL ceased providing Davidsons with legal representation (effective or otherwise), under color of Arizona Rule 5.1.
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Record and to Continue Trial; Response to Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Record and to Continue Trial; Order of January 11, 2002, in the Arizona state action. It is oxymoronic for the State court trial judge to base the ruling of January 11, 2002, on the fact that Davidsons did not file an objection to the Motion to Withdraw. This ruling presumes that Davidsons had no objection to their legal counsel’s withdrawal, which is simply not true. The trial judge’s seriously flawed reasoning also presumes that Davidsons suddenly acquired an obligation to retain new legal counsel, or else appear in the trial court pro se, simply because of the Motion to Withdraw. If an objective observer follows this flawed reasoning to its logical conclusion, an attorney’s contractual and professional responsibility to act in their client’s behalf as their retained legal counsel in any State court proceeding, can be immediately shifted from attorney to client, without the clients’ written endorsement, simply by filing a Motion to Withdraw, even after the action is set for trial, under color of Arizona Rule 5.1. It is an oxymoron to say that Davidsons failed to object to the Motion to Withdraw, during the interval of time (“the gap period”) between the Motion to Withdraw and the Order granting attorney withdrawal. As their retained legal counsel in the State court proceeding, MJM and QBSL were still under contractual and professional duty to Davidsons during the gap period. With their Motion to Withdraw, MJM and QBSL ceased providing Davidsons with legal representation (effective or otherwise), under color of Arizona Rule 5.1.
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