Monica Lewinsky affair, when Clinton needed a dramatic alternative focus for public attention,to precipitate a hurried, ill-planned and ineffective cruise missile attack on Afghan territory inAugust 1998, launched from American warships in the Persian Gulf. At that point UNOCAL feltthat it had to pull out of Afghanistan, at least formally and for the time being.UNOCAL and the US continued ‘backroom contacts’ with the
Taliban
. Three years later theAmericans revisited the scene. Top secret contacts between the Bush administration andthe
Taliban,
in February 2001, were reported by two retired French Intelligence Officers (DailyTelegraph, London, November, 20, 2001) who wrote that ‘The Bush Administration was ‘willingto accept the
Taliban
regime despite charges of sponsoring terrorism’. The US, they reported,considered the
Taliban
as a ‘source of stability in Central Asia’. But, given the notoriousintransigence of the
Taliban,
the talks did not proceed smoothly. Bush warnedthe
Taliban:
‘Either you accept our offer of a carpet of gold or we bury you under a carpet of bombs!’
He kept his promise.The terrible and outrageous attacks of September Eleven, finally provided the Americans with anopportunity to get rid of the
Taliban
and install in their place a new government with whom theyhoped they could do business. It appears, however, that the transitional government that wascobbled together at Bonn, made up of hostile rival warlords who came together temporarilyunder Karzai, himself a weak US nominee, is unlikely to offer a basis for the stable future thatthe US and UNOCAL are looking for in the new Afghanistan. Warlords are already back inaction in the countryside, defiant of the central authority.
Secularism vs. Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan
There was little of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan until the regime of the military dictator General Zia, who, with Saudi and CIA help, set about promoting Islamic fundamentalism withfanatic zeal. A chain of
Deeni Madaris (religious schools)
soon proliferated throughout Pakistan.Given generous funding, the
madaris
recruited sons of pauperised peasants offering them free board and lodging and ‘religious education’. Their ‘education’ was designed to turn them intoreligious zealots. Some
madaris
also gave military training to their pupils, providing foot-soldiers for the Afghan
Taliban
, as well as for militant
jihadi
groups in Pakistan. The brainwashedminds of the pupils (
taliban)
of the
madaris
were filled with utopian dreams about an ‘
Islamic
’society that they would create, in which there will be plenty and no one will be left in want. Theywere highly motivated to fight for their beliefs. Most leaders of the Afghan
Taliban
were productsof Pakistani (Deobandi i.e. Wahhabi)
deeni madaris.
They kept close links with their Pakistanimentors, notably the leaders of the two factions of the Pakistani
Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam.
More than 70 percent of the larger
deeni madaris
(with more than 40 pupils) belonged to the puritanical ‘Deobandi’ (Wahhabi) tradition.
The Saudis funded them generously
to foster anti-
Shi’a
and anti-Irani ideology. The Iranians responded in kind. But the number of Shi’a
madaris
numbered less than 4 per cent. The
deeni madaris
provided recruits for extremistsectarian groups of which most were heavily armed. Pakistan soon became an arena in whichMiddle Eastern ‘Muslim’ powers played out their rivalry by proxy. Sectarian violence reached ascale that Pakistan had never known before. The fabric of Pakistan’s civil society was being tornapart.