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I.
C.
DESTRUCTION
OF PAN AM 103
(1988)
AND
RESPONSE
On
December 21, 1988 a terrorist bomb, concealed in a checked bag unaccompanied bythe Libyan agent who planted it, exploded in the cargo hold of Pan Am Flight 103 overLockerbie, Scotland killing270
people.'
Shortly
after
the incident, the administration's top anti-terrorism
official
testified
that thePan Am
103
disaster
reflected
a new trend in aviation terrorism toward sabotage andaway
from
the
customary hijacking threat.
"
In
response,
the
administration announced
a
battery of initiatives to strengthen anti-explosives procedures at facilities consideredhigh-risk, located mostly overseas.
The
procedures included mandatory x-ray screeningofallbaggageand a
100
percent passenger/bag match requirement
'"
Four
months
after
the downing of Pan Am
103,
Secretary of Transportation Sam Skinnerannounced
the
department's plan
to
spend over
$100
million
to
purchase equipment
specifically
designed to detect explosives, unlike the x-ray machines in use at the time.(STILL WORKINGON:List numberofSecurity directives,andrules implementedin1989-199; and the general flavor of changes in the ACSSP's to prove explosivesdetection
was the new
emphasis).On August4,1989 President George Bush signed Executive Order 12686 creatingthePresident's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism. The panel examined the
Pan
Am
103
disaster and on May
15,
1990
issued a comprehensive report, including 64recommendations to improve aviation
security.
1V
In
November of 1990, Congress passed the Aviation Security Improvement Act (PL104-604) to implement a number of the Commission's key recommendations. These includedthe creation of several new aviation security and intelligence billets; mandatory agency
reports
on aviation
threats
and system vulnerability;
and,
new FAA authorities to imposesecurity measures at airports, including
flight
cancellation. (Of the 64, x number wereimplemented)
v
Notably the legislation also implemented a key commission recommendation with regardto performance problems with the
TNA
units sought by the Department ofTransportation, requiring that Explosive Detection Systems
not be
deployed until
the
Secretary could
certify
their reliability
or
otherwise assure they contributed
to
security.
V1
IIa.
CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY
ON
9/11: CONGRESS
Prior to September
11,
2001,
the 107
th
Congress held 25 hearings on aviation issues.None of the hearings focused on the status of aviation security. The primaryCongressional spotlight on aviation was cast on the status of
efforts
to improve aircarriers' customer service and the economic health and commercial health of civil
aviation/"
TheCommission could
find
only three occasionsonwhich SenatorsorMembersofCongresscited the topic of aviation security in
floor
statements during the 107
th
Congress
prior
to September
11,
2001.
Only one bill was introduced on the topic in the same timeperiod. Two of the three floor references to aviation security and the sole bill introducedpertained
to
renaming
an FAA
facility
after
a
former
member
of the
Senate.
VH1
The
General Accounting
Office,
the investigative arm of Congress, issued a singleaviation report in 2001 prior to 9/11. A
major
GAO report on Terrorism (NAME OFREPORT) issued
on
(INSERT), included
a
small section
on
transportation security.
The
GAOreceived (Number) of requests for investigations by Member of Congress on thetopic.
ix
(GAO IS COLLECTING THE INFORMATION)
Thecommission notes that whiletheaviation
funding bill
for FY2002had notbeen
passed
by
Congress prior
to
September
11,
2001,Congressional
funding
for
civil aviationsecurity
had
substantially increased over
the
preceding
five
years
from
$72
million
in FY
1997 to $139 million in FY 2001, (though the amounts appropriated in 2000 and 2001were each approximately $1 million below the president's request).
x
The report accompanying the Transportation Appropriations bill for FY2001,approvedin the
fall
of 2000, did express
Congress'
ongoing frustration with the FAA on security
matters.
"The Committee is extremely disappointed over managementissues which continue to plague the civil aviation securityprogram. Many of these issues have been unresolved forsome
time.. .the
Committee
has
provided substantial bud-
getary
increasesforcivil aviation security programs overthe past few years, and is unsure whether these additionalresources
are
paying
off in
significantly improved
security."
X1
III.
ELEMENTS
OF THE
AVIATION
SECURITY SYSTEM
ON
9-11Sevenmain elements comprisedthe
nation's
aviation security systemin
effect
onSeptember
11, 200l.
xii
1.
Intelligence Collection, Threat assessment and Response: The U.S. intelligence
community
wasresponsibleforcollectingandanalyzing intelligence dataandroutingpertinent informationtoFAA's
Office
ofCivil Aviation Security
Intelligence
which was tasked with assessing the data, analyzing threats anddeterminingfollow-up action by FAA.2. Passenger Pre-Screening:
Air
Carriers' were required
to
analyze passengers
via a
computer program that alerted the airline to those prohibited by the government
from flying
as well as
"selectees"--
those
who may pose a security
threat—
and arandomsamplingofother passengers.The aircarrierwasresponsiblefor
screening
the
checked baggage
of
"selectees"
for
explosives
in
accordance with
an FAA
approved
Air
Carrier Standard Security Plan.3. Secure Area Designation and Enforcement: Airports and Air
carriers,
with FAAguidance
and
approval, were responsible
for
designating secure areas
and
restricting
access
to
authorizedpersonnel
only,
in
accordance
with
FAA approved
Airport and Air Carrier Standard Security Plans.4. Checkpoint Screening for Weapons: Air Carriers (and their contractors) wereresponsible for screening passengers and carry-on luggage for weapons usingmetal detectors
and
x-ray machinery calibrated, operated
and
maintained underFAA minimum guidelines
and in
accordance with
the Air
Carrier StandardSecurity Plan.
5.
Checked Baggage Screening for Explosives: Air Carriers were responsible forscreening
the
checked baggage
of
"selectees"
using Explosives Detection System(EDS) equipment
or a
"suitable"
alternative,
in
accordance
with
an FAA
approvedAirCarrier Standard Security Plan.6. Cargo and Mail Screening: Air Carriers were responsible for categorizing cargobetween known
and
unknown shippers,
and
subjected
the
cargo
to
various tiers
of
inspection
in
accordance with
an FAA
approved
Air
Carrier Standard SecurityProgram.7.
Aircraft
Security:
Air Carriers were responsible for guarding and inspecting their
aircraft;
and for training aircrew on security procedures, in accordance with anFAAapproved
Air
Carrier Standard Security Program.
The FAA was
responsible
for
operating a Federal Air Marshal program placing armed and trained security
officers
on
certain high-risk
flights.
V.b.INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
AND
RESPONSE(INFORMATION ABOUT
THE
EXISTING ALERT LEVEL
AND
WHAT THATMEANS)As of September
11,
2001 eight FAA security directives, requiring air carriers andairports to take
specific safety
precautions, were in
effect
(seven were issued during thecourse
of
2001
and one
dated back
to
2000).None
specifically
referenced
the
Al
Qaeda organization,
the 9-11
hijackers,
or a
threat
to
hijack
a
plane
and use it as a
guided missile.
A
Security Directive issued April 24
th
2000didissue
an
alert regarding
Al
Qaeda operatives including
Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed,(who
the FBI
identifies
as the
main planner
of the 9/11
attack)
and
five
other individualsassociated with Ramzi Ahmed Yousef
and the
1995Bojinka
plot.
(CHECK
TO SEE IF
LIST INCLUDED
Al
QAEDA MEMBERS)(
SEE
WHAT
WAS
BEHIND
THE
MARCH
22
SD).
FAA
issued another
SD on
August
28, 2001
Security Directivewarningairports and air carriers about nine individuals who should receive extra security
screening,
including
physical search. At
least
six of the nine
carried
Pakistani
passports.
(SEE WHAT WAS BEHIND THIS SD AND IF THE PEOPLE ARE KNOWN ALQAEDA).
xiil
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