CHAPTER THREE GENDER, GENERATION, AND THE REFORM OF TRADITION: FROM MUSLIM MAJORITY SOCIETIES TO WESTERN EUROPE Scninix Avin-Mo.z.vi .xr Anv.xro S.r\.+onr Introduction: Muslim diasporas in European societies The acknowledgement of the durable settlement of Muslims in several European societies has led to a variety of scholarly studies, among which a trend has emerged that points out the inherently European character of Islam. Its basic argument is that the emergence and set- tling of Muslim communities in Europe contributes to massive trans- formations of Islamic forms of organisation of social life, which escape the traps of traditional authority in which Islam is supposedly still mired in Muslim majority societies, and favour forms of individual- isation. The rst type of argument stresses, from a normative point of view, that the inherently liberal and democratic public spheres of Western European societies provide grounds for drastic changes in Muslim thought and social practice and favour a version of Islam with a specic European normative base, labelled Euro-Islam (Tibi, 1998; 2000). This category ultimately de-legitimises any model of Islam that deviates from an enlightened European system of values, in harmony with secular constitutions, as Bassam Tibi puts it (Tibi, 2000, 36). The second variant of scholarly approaches to European- ised Islam (e.g. Babs, 1997; Saint-Blancat, 1997; Roy, 1998; Tietze, 2001) emphasises the plural and changing character of Muslim forms of organisation and social life and identies privatised components of Islam through its encounter with secularised Western societies. The key concept emphasised here is individualisation of religion, which has so far been mainly used with regard to Protestant or Catholic milieus in Western societies (Luckmann, 1991; Bellah, 1991; Hervieu-Lger, 1993). We agree that this second approach innovates substantially on pre- vious ones and shows us a sociologically promising direction, since ALLIEVI_F4_52-77 10/21/02 12:06 PM Page 53 53 orxrrn, orxrn.+iox, .xr +nr nrronv or +n.ri+iox it stresses how the outcomes in Muslims social action is open to a variety of inuences related to social context. At the same time we notice that this perspective tends to overestimate the uidity of the relationship between tradition and social action. The presupposition of uidity is often based on the presumption of an ineluctable ero- sionvia fragmentationof Muslim tradition. This view mostly sub- stitutes or opposes notions of tradition to concepts of modernity, and tends to emphasise how modern Muslims in Europe have indeed become. Furthermore, the overestimation of the pluralistic potential within Western European societies can lead to an underestimation of the de facto and also de jure restrictive conditions for spaces of social action and claims of public representation for Muslims in Europe (ranging from restrictive citizenship laws, through authorities tactics of postponing their recognition of institutionalised forms of Islam, to stigmatising discourses vis--vis Muslims in the public sphere). Finally, if one ultimately assumes a full individualisation of religion and a continuous erosion of traditions, one implicitly de-legitimises any claims for public representation that go beyond the view of indi- vidual citizens entering the public sphere as atomised units. Both scholarly trends risk preventing us from taking into the focus of the sociological analysis the potential of transformation and reform that originates from within Muslim traditions, and their capacity to chal- lenge and unsettle dominant notions of citizenship and the public sphere, as well as the very notion of (modern) politics. Our perspective throughout this article oers an alternative inter- pretation, in that we assume that tradition-rooted categories of social and religious authority do not impair by default autonomous social agency, but are often their necessary condition. They are part and parcel of the processalso located at the delicate juncture of inter- generational change and conictthrough which forms of authority are transformed through the impact of social powers (like those related to education, social disciplining and social distinction), without this implying a pre-fabricated and normative notion of secularisation. The article will start with an introductory section on the role of Islamic reform movements in the process of nation-state formation and transformation in Muslim majority societies at the turn of the 19th century. This background analysis is important, since it provides key knowledge about the way in which Muslim tradition has been subject to transformations both through the encounter with other, competing traditions and through internal interventions. We will focus ALLIEVI_F4_52-77 10/21/02 12:06 PM Page 54 54 scninix .vin-vo.z.vi .xr .nv.xro s.r\.+onr on the extent to which key gures in the reform movements evoked an axis of womens education and Islamic modesty to articulate a concern for the polity that cannot be reduced to mainstream modern institutionalised forms of politics, either liberal or conservative. In the follow-up sections we will illustrate the challenge, and the related transformative potential of the spontaneous and organised forms of social action of Muslims in Europe towards dominant norms. By focusing on Muslim women who publicly wear the headscarf in France and Germany, we will show how the phenomenon of veil- ing in Europe goes beyond the interpretation of a recent and swift coming out of Muslims, or re-Islamisation. Instead it points to a much longer and more complex process that has simultaneously to account for the reform of Muslim traditions and the shifting cong- urations of social powers aecting nation-state institutions, gender, intergenerational change, class and migration. The binding element between the background analysis and the case study is our emphasis on the potential challenge to dominant norms and discourses articu- lated by Muslim actorseither publicly, as in the examples of Muslim reformers at the turn of the century, or on a more informal level of life politics, or rather of the reform of personal life, as in the case of contemporary young women. These challenges, we will argue, are situated and embedded in a discursive Muslim tradition which has constantly been subject to internal transformations. Muslim traditions, the reform process, and the making of the Muslim woman Our starting point is based on the assumption that the notion of tradition is relevant for the sociological analysis of Muslim forms of social life both with regard to Muslim majority societies and as far as Muslim minorities in Europe are concerned. This requires a brief introduction of what we mean by this concept. We conceive of reli- gious traditions as both institutionally and discursively grounded and as a set of moral and social references, which shape discourses and social practices. A living tradition, as Alasdair MacIntyre calls it, presupposes a variety of moral and even emotional dispositions on the basis of which traditions are moulded and transmitted, formed and re-formed. Such dispositions depend on institutional forms of authoritative discourse and on the embeddedness of individuals or groups in specic life narratives, which derive from the past. ALLIEVI_F4_52-77 10/21/02 12:06 PM Page 55 55 orxrrn, orxrn.+iox, .xr +nr nrronv or +n.ri+iox As highlighted by both Alasdair MacIntyre (1981 and 1988) and Talal Asad (1998; 1999), who links MacIntyres approach with social phenomena related to Islam, this understanding of tradition diers substantially from the ideological usage of this concept by especially conservative political theorists. We by no means contrast tradition with reason and the stability of tradition with conict or crisis (MacIntyre, 1981, 218220; Asad, 1993, 200236). Instead, we assume that tra- dition is an eminent part of the motivational prism of social agents: Living traditions, just because they continue a not-yet completed narrative, confront the future whose determinate and determinable character, so far as it possesses any, derives from the past. (MacIntyre, 1981, 223). Consequently, we tend to consider the reform of tradition as a dynamic that cannot be reduced to social-structural elds but has to account foras in Talal Asads wordsthe inherent search for coherence (Asad, 1998) of traditions, a force that produces an impe- tus to self-reform. We claim that if fragmentation occurswhich indeed is the caseit is also because traditions, i.e. their discourses and their institutions, as well as the practices they authorise, have been exposed to permanent internal interventions, and this for quite a while, not only in the modern (or supposedly post-modern) eras, but since their inceptions. However, these interventions must be authorised in some way, and the procedures of authorisation are subject to ever deeper changes, variously related to social-structural elds and dimensions. A key background for concretising these introductory remarks, and to introduce contemporary life politics among Muslims, is the process of reform that took place especially in the second half of the 19th century in the most important centres of the Ottoman empire. 1 Upon the intervention of Muslim reformers engaged as public intellectu- als, educators, and advisors to government, traditional forms of Islamic reasoning acquired a public dimension: the process of formation of virtuous Muslim selves, originally nalised to salvation, increasingly ingrained into issues of collective welfare, social governance, economic development, and public morality. This is not to say that in the era 1 A rst collective eort to connect the reform discourse in the waning Ottoman empire and especially in Egypt to contemporary issues involving Islam and gender in the European metropolis has ushered in a collective work that builds the imme- diate antecedent to the present article (Salvatore, 2001a). ALLIEVI_F4_52-77 10/21/02 12:06 PM Page 56 56 scninix .vin-vo.z.vi .xr .nv.xro s.r\.+onr prior to the advent of modern reform movements Muslim traditions were indierent to the regulation of political authority and economic activities. Islamic jurisprudence ( qh) dealt indeed with a vast array of social issues ranging well beyond ritual obligations, and backed up the jurisprudence through a strong telos, dened by the pros- perity of the community. However, a comprehensive concern for the common good, articulated with regard to standards set by the mod- ern institutions of the state, society, and the economy (as well as the very conceptualisation of these three spheres) has been only devel- oped by Muslim reformers (and their more secular counterparts who were often the reformers pupils). It occurred mainly through their social projects and media, in the historical context of crisis and demise of the Ottoman Empire, de-colonisation, and formation of nation- states. However, we cannot assume that the public intellectuals of the Islamic reform were just playing into the hands of the nation-state. They impacted on state educational and legal policies and initiated autonomous projects within the associational life of the main urban centres, whilst backing up both activities with a public discourse that brought to bear a distinctive view of the Muslim moral being. From that historical moment on, a whole spectrum of dierentiated (and often competing) attitudes of personalities, groups and movements inspired by the reform of Islam has developed till today in the denition and collective pursuit of social goods (Salvatore, 1997). The advent of mass education and electronic media since especially the 1960s has further intensied the reform eorts and the compe- tition among groups and individuals (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996). What is shared by the public discourse of Muslim reformers and their follow-up movements in the 20th century is a twofold mark of distinction. First, they can hardly be described as modernist, in the sense that their discourse is not based on the view of atomised social selves engaging a direct relationship to an impartial (originally abso- lutist) ruler, a view successfully developed in some parts of Europe and ambivalently transported by European powers into their colonial enterprises. The emerging forms of public engagement in the name of Islam (which we can dene as public Islam: Salvatore, 2000) build on a distinctive type of legitimising discourse. Although it might t the nation-state framework according to circumstances, interests and policies, public Islam is not an emanation of nation-state discourses (Messick, 1993, Asad, 1999, Gasper, 2001). The public engagement ALLIEVI_F4_52-77 10/21/02 12:06 PM Page 57 57 orxrrn, orxrn.+iox, .xr +nr nrronv or +n.ri+iox of Muslim reformers is certainly inspired by a variety of sources of inuence, but nonetheless rooted in a genuine sense of belonging to a tradition. It diers most notably from the secularist normative ideal, which builds a key element in nation-state discourse. A second mark of distinction is the reformers critique of local customs, situated mostly in the politics of authenticity, and the call for a revivication of the sacred core texts. This points to the process of negotiation and struggle internal to Muslim traditions. Though often oriented towards a gloried mythical past, such a conicted process lies at the heart of the self-reforming project. The intellectual movement that positioned itself at the hub of the emerging public sphere is often associated with the key-word of Islamic reform (il). It took root in Egypt in the second half of the 19th century. The dilemmas faced and the solutions devised by the reformers cannot be formulated in terms of an allegedly mod- ernist approach of squeezing Islamic traditions into modern institu- tions and leaving behind what was considered unsuitable. Although the reformers did in fact dismiss several methods and institutions of Islamic traditions in the educational and legal elds, they wanted to redress and make t againwhich is the meaning of il, improp- erly translated as reformand not to discard the theological and conceptual apparatus of these traditions. A leitmotiv in the discourse of il was the emphasis laid on the necessary acquisition, by the faithful, of correct moral dispositions. This step was considered as the condition for being able to address and admonish a fellow Muslim and thereby rebuild a moral community of the faithful and contribute to its prosperity. This was an essential condition of the public reason envisioned by the il, and it provided one major entry point of Islamic notions of reason into the structuring of public discourse. A crucial issue in this regard is the upcoming womans question, which turned out to be one of the most powerful topics for the Islamic reformers goal to publicise a distinctive model of education. The axis of gender and education through the inclusion of several classes, including peasants, builds a momentum in which a distinction from both colonial and nationalist discourses could be publicised. The virtual school for girls of the leading Muslim reformer 'Abdallah al-Nadim (18451896) in forms of imagined dialogues published in his journal al-Ustdh (the professor), sets him apart from the later reformer Qasim Amin and even from the rst Egyptian feminist Huda al-Sha'rawi, who are considered the pioneers of the discourse ALLIEVI_F4_52-77 10/21/02 12:06 PM Page 58 58 scninix .vin-vo.z.vi .xr .nv.xro s.r\.+onr on the emancipation of the Muslim woman in Egypt (Herrera 1999), but who primarily addressed an educated audience. Al-Nadims goal was to address girls from both urban and rural backgrounds and from dierent social classes, and in some of his writings he used a colloquial form of Arabic. His educational discourse was geared towards eliciting in the Muslim girls a traditional sense of obligation as future wives and mothers in the context of emerging forms of nuclear family tting a national project of prosperity and indepen- dence, within a socio-political arena dominated by colonialism and resistance to it. While being a sort of pre-emancipatory discourse targeted to women, al-Nadims school pregures the view of the good Muslim woman that was to be later rearticulated under dierent social and historical circumstances by the movement of the new veiling during the rst half of the 1970s. Al-Nadim was a champion of a certain type of education, designed to provide tools for household activities and reecting the image of the mother as the cradle of the nation. His programme was radical both in its anti-colonial spirit and in targeting the upcoming nation as a whole, and therefore those classes and categories of the population considered at risk of being evicted from the social fabric. He targeted especially the Muslim poor, in the context of extremely low school enrolment rates of Muslim girls, and thereby manifested a crucial concern of distinction from both colonial and nationalist programs of womens education. This edu- cational program was from the beginning combined with a specic Muslim dress code, which was designed to externalise womens mod- esty and simultaneously distinguish them from an emerging secu- larised public (Herrera, 1999). The enforcement of a dress code evidencing the modesty and virtuosity of an educated Muslim woman has indeed been from the beginning a sensitive part of the reform discourse, even at a stage where it is expressed in ostentatiously neo- patriarchal tones and only by male actors. The eorts of thinkers, associations and social movements trying to gain a sense for the idea and the wish to live as good Muslims (to live a Muslim life) under modern conditions have been partic- ularly vigorous since the late 1920s, when movements like al-Ikhwn al-Muslimn (the Muslim Brethren) tried to make Islam t the require- ments of social development under the conditions of anti-colonial nation-state building. Within the Islamist socio-political movements and their discourses, the issue of the woman, i.e. the new mother- ALLIEVI_F4_52-77 10/21/02 12:06 PM Page 59 59 orxrrn, orxrn.+iox, .xr +nr nrronv or +n.ri+iox hood and housewifery, is more clearly inscribed in the project laying the seeds for a truly Islamic society to come, a virtuous community tting and at the same time transcending the imperatives of national liberation. This has been particularly clear in a later period, like in the writings of Zaynab al-Ghazaly, the leader of the Muslim Sisters in Egypt from the 1960s to the 1980s (Zuhur, 1992). In the context of the crisis of the nationalist-developmentalist project, since the late 1960s new favourable conditions have been created for this kind of discourse and mobilisation, simultaneously nalised to self-realisation and reconstructing community, and Muslim good life. The contemporary publishing scene presents a steady ow of lit- erature and manuals directed to the Muslim woman, many of them basically articulating the same combination of modesty and education, and catalogues of duties related not only to family and neighbourhood, but also to participation in the aairs of a wider community (poten- tially ranging as wide as the whole transnational Islamic umma). It is symptomatic that contemporary Muslim public gures attribute a high value to religious education and guidance, which is considered as the appropriate path to the rediscovery of true Islam. Parallel to these developments there have been several initiatives, in Egypt (Herrera, 2001), like in India (Winkelmann, 2001) and elsewhere, to establish schools for the proper education of Muslim girls. The aliation of these initiatives to the broader colonial/post-colonial reform movements is evident. In particular the advocacy of female education by Islamic reform movements gives credit to the argument, mentioned before, stress- ing the internal logic of interventions within traditions, which induce a reform characterised by a self-disciplining reection and modula- tion. At the same time the specic forms of education for women, which are propagated in these discoursesmotherhood, wifehood, household skills, etc. on the one hand, and general and/or religious education on the otherpoint to a tension between womens entry into public worlds and the limitation of their activities to domestic- ity. The phenomenon of the new veiling somewhat symbolises and incorporates this tension. This complexity can be observed in dierent times and various contexts, and nds indeed parallels within Muslim diasporas in Europe today. Here the potential of intervention on a tradition can be evinced even in a clearer way than in the context of Muslim majority societies. ALLIEVI_F4_52-77 10/21/02 12:06 PM Page 60 60 scninix .vin-vo.z.vi .xr .nv.xro s.r\.+onr Revival, invention or redenition of tradition? The Islamic headscarf in Europe By moving to a micro-level of the analysis, we want to deepen the argument that a closer scrutiny of Muslim diasporas in Europe reveals a stronger power of living traditions, than the power reected in the idea of a free oating, deliberately chosen religious identity, as illus- trated, for example, in the captivating formula of believing without belonging (Davie, 1990). What we are going to do is to look closer at the phenomenon of new veiling in two Western European soci- etiesFrance and Germany. 2 Without focusing on the practice of veiling as such, we will analyse the modalities through which Muslim tradition is reinterpreted by the individual Muslim living in a non- Muslim-majority society. The focus group of covered women in Western European societies provides an interesting case. On the one hand, the discourses of headscarf-wearing Muslim women reect per- tinently both continuities and transformations within traditions, and the hybrid forms of sociality which result from there. On the other hand, the public visibility of the Islamic headscarf in Western European societies has often been perceived in terms of an either/or logic, which is characteristic for public discourses on Islam in Europe. The headscarf has been either described as a sign of the return to a static tradition, incompatible with Western standards of womens emancipation, secularised publics, concepts of freedom and autonomy, etc. (e.g. Galotti, 1994; Altschull, 1995; Thmmes, 1993; Tibi, 2000). Or it has been interpreted as a religious marker leading per se to the emancipation of Muslim women and thereby indicating the move 2 This section is mainly based on a set of 40 qualitative interviews conducted by Schirin Amir-Moazami with veiled women of the second and third generation of Muslim immigrants in France (Marseille and Paris) and Germany (Berlin). The eldwork has been carried out between Autumn 2000 and Autumn 2001. The inter- viewees were aged between 16 and 33. The majority was either studying, or actively involved in a profession. Four women were not working in the period of the inter- view because they had young children, but they mostly stressed their intention to continue to work or to study at a later stage of their lives. The majority lived in neighbourhoods considered as socially disadvantaged (Kreuzberg, Wedding and Neuklln in Berlin; Northern banlieues in France). Coming from migrant families or (as in two cases) from families of migrant families, they all shared a similar socio- economical background (mainly working class). All women were involved in a Muslim organisation, either as members, and sometimes in leading positions, or in terms of beneting more or less regularly from their services (prayer rooms, conferences, womens groups, religious instruction, etc.) ALLIEVI_F4_52-77 10/21/02 12:06 PM Page 61 61 orxrrn, orxrn.+iox, .xr +nr nrronv or +n.ri+iox towards a modernisation of Islam in Europe (Nkel, 1997; Venel, 1999; Karakasoglu-Aydin, 2000; Klinkhammer, 2000). The phenomenon of veiling in European societies cannot simply be interpreted as a religious practice transmitted from one genera- tion to the next. On the one hand it is not mandatory, on the other hand we can observe a constant rise of young covered women, for whom the headscarf mainly externalises a discovery of a dierent kind of Islam, distinct from the images propagated in the majority society, and also dierent from the versions transmitted by the for- mer generation. However, even if we might nd elements of invented tradition by looking at covered women in Europe, on a closer scrutiny the importance given to the headscarf occurs mainly with the backup of a more solid ground of a living tradition of womens modesty, which was duly reshaped in the discursive and socio-political con- text of reform in the colonial era. A crucial aspect in this context can be denoted as the intergen- erational twist, which leads to both a rediscovery via redenition of Muslim traditions and to shifts in terms of religious authority. As we will show later in more detail, the women with headscarves often oppose their own versions of Islam to the ones of the former gen- eration, and challenge through their education and religious knowl- edge certain norms and values hitherto taken for granted. They criticise, for example, the practice of forced marriages by pointing to their right to choose their husbands, or at least to accept or to refuse the parents suggestionsa right which they support with ref- erence to the Qur"n. The practice of forced veiling is also con- demned with reference to the necessity to discover its importance in a conscious way. It is important to remember in this context that the transmission of religious knowledge and practice, or of religious traditions in a wider sense of the term, is not necessarily a linear process, a one- sided transmission from one generation to the next, but can very well work the other way around. This aspect is crucial in the dis- courses enacted by covered women. The women do not only often claim to have encouraged their mothers to cover themselves or to don the veil in a correct way, as against supposedly incorrect cus- tom-based fashions. They also commonly underline that they have sometimes encouraged their parents to reect over the meanings and implications of religious practices. However, the extended family aects the ways in which the new forms of the true Islam are ALLIEVI_F4_52-77 10/21/02 12:06 PM Page 62 62 scninix .vin-vo.z.vi .xr .nv.xro s.r\.+onr moulded and articulated by the women. The question of gender roles and relations shall further on serve as a key example to scrutinise this ambiguity. Contrary to the dominant discourses on gender equality in Western European societies, the covered women interviewed in France and Germany mostly refer to the Islamic approach to the complemen- tarity of sexes. Consequently, they associate a distinct set of tasks and duties with a relatively condent conception of gender distinc- tion. Thus, the women consider men as responsible for feeding the family through work outside of the household, and women as pri- marily enclosed in the domestic sphere, being in charge of the house and kids. This division is often regarded as sacred and God-given and therefore as a more or less untouchable norm. According to this distinction the Islamic headscarf constitutes an instrument for hiding female sexual attractiveness, since women are considered as particularly seductive. By pointing to such naturally given dierences between men and women, the women reproduce a common dichotomy that associates the body with femininity and the mind with masculinity (see Butler, 1990). While articulating the attempt to overcome this dichotomy by hiding the female body and thereby getting closer to the mind, which is associated with the other sex, the women in fact reinforce the boundaries by following dress codes that are exclusively attributed to the feminine sphere: the head- scarf incorporates the taboo of displaying femininity, while it is itself a strong expression of femininity. On the other hand, the attempt of going back to the noblest dimension of the person, the mind, by hiding markers of ones sexuality, presupposes the existence of a certain essence responsible for the reproduction and naturalisation of the category of sex itself (Butler, 1990, 20). In the distinction between the sacred and the aesthetic body (see also Gle, 1996), the women sometimes put forward a quite polarising discourse vis--vis the majority of non-covered women, whose sinful behaviour puts them opposite the good Muslim women. Thereby some women construct a scheme which does not leave much space for varieties or in-between components: either a woman wears the headscarf, or she is symbolically naked. To be covered implies thus to be puried, whereas being uncovered symbolises to be open a term commonly used by the womenand to be therefore exposed to seduction. It signies impurity, since the risk itself to seduce is considered as arm. ALLIEVI_F4_52-77 10/21/02 12:06 PM Page 63 63 orxrrn, orxrn.+iox, .xr +nr nrronv or +n.ri+iox However, the women are by no means unanimous in their way to use the headscarf or to follow Islamic dress codes. Sometimes they diminish by themselves the distinction between the pure covered and the impure open woman by embracing aesthetic aspects of sex- ualitymake-up, high heals or tight clothes. This is why some women distinguish dierent practices of veiling and oppose right and wrong ways to wear the headscarf. The wrong version can be the tradi- tional usage (i.e. leaving some hair visible), as it has often been worn by the rst generation of Muslim immigrants (see Gaspard and Khos- rokhavar, 1995, 34.). Here, the headscarf also functions as a marker of belonging to a popular class. We can observe a clear tension between the tradition of veiling as reconstructed by the majority of the women as specically religious and scripture-based and what could be dened as the migrated traditions (also dened as new veiling in some literature on Muslim majority societies: cf. MacLeod, 1991; Adelkhah, 1991; Gle, 1996). The wrong way of wearing the headscarf can also be the more commodied and aestheticised ver- sion, as mentioned above. In this sense, a clear distinction between the aesthetic body, usually connected to Western sexual standards, and the sacred Islamic body is actually questioned through the com- bination of sacred and aesthetic elements practised by the women themselves. Through this interplay of sacred and aesthetic elements the headscarf might even become a vehicle of sexual attraction. More importantly, the denouncement by some women of right and wrong versions of the headscarf marks an internal boundary, according to which the community of veiled women is getting much more fragmented than often presented in public discourses, or by the women themselves. It is thus not necessarily always within pre- supposed dichotomies, such as German/Turkish, Muslim/Christian, Oriental/Western, etc. that distinctions are put forward. The bound- aries are much more dierentiated and can very well also be con- structed along the lines of dierent versions and interpretations of Islam, although the women refer to the same sources (cf. also Schiauer, 2000). The dierent versions of covering can therefore become an element in a strategy of life politics based on a distinction in the Bourdieuian sense, though not in the rst instance in terms of belong- ing to a certain social class, but rather in the sense of belonging to the group of good vs. less good Muslims. ALLIEVI_F4_52-77 10/21/02 12:06 PM Page 64 64 scninix .vin-vo.z.vi .xr .nv.xro s.r\.+onr Between political motherhood and the entry into public sphere The emphasis in the discourses of covered women lies in the rst instance on the importance of (Muslim) motherhood which Pnina Werbner (1999) characterises as political motherhood. This reveals indeed similarities to theological-political discourses of female or male Muslim activists in Muslim majority societies both at the turn of the century (e.g. Shakry, 1998; Kandiyoti, 1998) and today (e.g. Abu- Lughod, 1998; Riesebrodt, 2000; Adelkhah, 2001). In order to enhance the status of maternity some women refer to the Qur"n, and/or to a adth, in which the role of the mother is sacredly validated. In this perspective the nature of the woman as the mother and lady of the house is by no means regarded as a limitation, but as a priv- ilege in a double sense. Firstly, because the woman is relieved of earning money, this duty being exclusively predestined for men. Secondly, since in this conception giving birth implies by nature bringing up the children, women are considered as those who trans- mit norms and values to the next generation and therefore retain a large social and political responsibility. As the rst teachers of the children, 3 they are supposed to be in charge of the construction or maintenance of society as much as of the Muslim community. In this sense the domestic sphere is not a merely private domain which is formative for processes of personality-building, but turns out to be a largely societal space. It provides and substitutes a sense of belong- ing, which the wider public (i.e. public institutions) often fails to pro- vide to Muslim minorities in Europe, and in the longer run contributes to the rise of a counter-public, as Leonie Herwartz-Emden puts it for the German context (Herwartz-Emden, 1998, 79). Consequently, the concept of work (outside of the domestic sphere) as a source for womens self-realisation is, if not absent, connoted dierently in the life conceptions of these women. Working outside of the house is not in the rst instance associated with the attain- ment of personal autonomy, but is rather considered as a necessary tool for supporting the family and thus as a means to serve the col- lective welfare. However, the idea of womens autonomy is not com- pletely dismissed in the discourses of these women. It is articulated 3 Interview, Marseille, May 2001. ALLIEVI_F4_52-77 10/21/02 12:06 PM Page 65 65 orxrrn, orxrn.+iox, .xr +nr nrronv or +n.ri+iox in dierent terms and from a dierent angle and not without a cer- tain degree of ambivalence. We face a growing complexity when we deepen the analysis of the womens understanding of public/private engagements. In fact, at a closer scrutiny one could see that although most women pri- marily refer to those Islamic norms that conne women to the pri- vate realm and assign them mostly the roles of mother and spouse, this does not necessarily signify passivity or indierence towards pub- lic engagements. Most notably when being asked about their per- sonal life strategies, the women quite often distance themselves from their condent claims for strictly dened gender roles. Those who are working or studying emphasise their ambition to continue either. The role of the housewife and mother therefore does not necessar- ily prevent the women from occupying or envisaging other roles. Moreover, when asked about their personal life conceptions, the women often put forward their goal to share tasks and duties both inside and outside of the household despite the supposedly Islamic role of women being complementary to men. More adequately, the concept of complementarity itself can become exible to the extent that some women refer to the model of the Prophet in order to stress the desirability, in Islam, of husbands who help their wives in household duties, since the Prophet also used to play with the kids. 4 Especially their longing for education, but also for a profession, alters the boundaries of what their own version of Islam prescribes in terms of womens participation in public life. Both general and religious education turn out to be one of the most important fea- tures in their life politics, while it is not always limited to the goal of achieving better skills for raising children or more eective ways of transmitting Islamic norms and values to the next generation. The tradition of stable gender roles is thus rhetorically preserved, but in practice renegotiated, according to the concrete life situations in which the women nd themselves. Or to put it dierently, for the majority of the women the reference to a predened gender rela- tion often turns out to be more appreciative than normative. It serves as a standard for maintaining an Islamic ideal of complementarity as opposed to equality, but not always as a yardstick for orienting 4 Interview, Marseille, April 2001. ALLIEVI_F4_52-77 10/21/02 12:06 PM Page 66 66 scninix .vin-vo.z.vi .xr .nv.xro s.r\.+onr conduct in a once-and-for-all dened manner. On a closer scrutiny, the ideal of clear-cut gender roles might be subordinated to concrete life situations (career ambitions, study goals, or simply the necessity to contribute nancially to the family income). It is nonetheless necessary to remember that the women often have to face rather restrictive practices of gender inequality within their own family contexts. This clearly puts limits on their ambitions for autonomous life goals and public participation in society. The weight of the institution of the family (as of a network with rela- tively closed milieu boundaries) seems often to be neglected in approaches that overestimate the processes of emancipation and indi- vidualisation among Muslims in Europe (Babs, 1997; Venel, 1999; Klinkhammer, 2000). These women are the ones who often experi- ence repression, once they go too far in their criticism of certain norms and values, taken for granted by the former generations, or once they gain too much autonomy from their family environment (see Khosrokhavar 1997b; Saint-Blancat, 1997; this has also been conrmed by some of the interviewees in the present study). These young women often experience a strong tension between an inferiority in the family environment and the autonomy they have gained in society (see Saint-Blancat, 1997, 124). Most commonly women of the second generation are those onto whom migrated tra- ditions are projected the most pointedlycustoms that are supposed to be in danger of extinction in the host societies, such as family honour, womens sexual abstinence outside of marriage, or (quasi-) arranged marriages. This tension itself reveals the sociological ambi- guity of unspecied notions of traditions as inherited customs that ignore the inherently dynamic character of living traditions, which cannot just be transplanted from one place to another without under- going changes and creating or modifying elds of social power. 5 The scarce capacity of a tradition to ingrain into the mechanisms of social elds (here mainly the school, peer groups, leisure time, associational life) is what can trigger either an attempt to reject, or to revitalise it. Thus, the increasing involvement of the women in these elds of semi-public and public life, including leading positions in female sections of Muslim organisations, and the constantly rising 5 As Edward Shils puts it: The revival of a tradition almost inevitably involves changing the tradition (Shils, 1981, 246). ALLIEVI_F4_52-77 10/21/02 12:06 PM Page 67 67 orxrrn, orxrn.+iox, .xr +nr nrronv or +n.ri+iox levels of educationcompared to the former generationprovide them with tools to struggle against male dominance and dierential treatments in the family milieu. Here Islam can become a means for reinterpreting certain elements of migrated traditions experienced as too strict. The defence of Islam is then situated in a critique of custom. Islam then becomes the religion that prescribes equality before God, regardless of gender. The most relevant aspect in which equality before God is transposed into daily life experiences con- cerns the demand for the (sacred) right to accumulate knowledge through education, which is not limited to the domestic sphere and which therefore requires some involvement in public life. In order to back up this demand, the women frequently refer to the model of the Prophet, who prescribed to both men and women to search for knowledge, even if it is in China. 6 Or they refer to female Muslim gures like '"isha, the wife of the Prophet, and her active involvement in society. Or, more generally, they point to the model of the Prophet himself, through whose life and teaching a large amount of rights was granted to women. In this context we should additionally consider the counter- discursive potential of such arguments. The women not only oppose their idealised model of womens rights in Islam to their parents understanding of gender relations. They also argue assertively against the dominant images of the oppressive and anti-egalitarian character of Islam towards women. One can often witness an insistence on the privileged position of women in Islam, which is targeted against images and discourses on Islam in European societies. The experi- ences of a strong stigmatisation, often channelled through public dis- courses on the backwardness of women in Islam (see Pinn and Wehler, 1995), obviously aect the way in which Islam is lived, reclaimed, and represented by these women. As in the colonial context, gender roles and relations in Islam pro- vide a key issue in the struggle for counter-discursive strategies in the lives of these women. They manifest the importance to be pub- licly involved explicitly as Muslim women, by issuing a distinctive and positive image of Islam. The result is quite often a sort of mir- ror image of the stereotypes commonly projected within French or German public spheres on the unequal and oppressive character of 6 Interviews, Berlin, November 2000; Marseille, May 2001. ALLIEVI_F4_52-77 10/21/02 12:06 PM Page 68 68 scninix .vin-vo.z.vi .xr .nv.xro s.r\.+onr Islam towards women: a duplication eect that leads to a sort of hyperdiscourse of Islam created by auto- and heterostereotypes largely mediated by mass media (Salvatore, 2001b). Consequently, the women tend to turn these images upside down and present Western conceptions of gender relations as a source of womens oppression. While claiming purity for women in Islam, they under- line the abusive constraint of external beauty in the West. The re- denition of Muslim tradition produces a token of distinction towards both the rst generation and the dominant discourses in society. By criticising the authoritarian methods of education, with which most of the young women have been confronted throughout their socialisation, they valorise an education based on mutual understand- ing and equality, again by invoking Islam. The wrong reference to Islam, as some women denounce it, used by the former generation as a means to legitimise prohibitions and restrictions, is uncovered and replaced by their own right and puried versions. These are based on (re)-readings and a (re)-interpretation of the sacred texts, and provide a ground for the struggle for womens dignity. The ref- erence to Islam here becomes a means in the battle for more equality in those contexts in which the former generation has expanded the spheres of arm for women. According to the concrete situation and also the socially situated contexts in which one lives, Islam can thus be a reference for both womens limitation to domesticity, and for redening gender roles, and therefore allowing for a distinctive entry of young Muslim women into the public sphere. These two claims can even occur in one and the same discourse. Which of them turns out to be the most powerful is still an open question, exposed to constant shifts. The emerging life conceptions are incommensurable in culturally specic ways with the dominant ones in the host societies, which none- theless might, at certain points, have informed them. At the same they are quite dierent from any previous understanding of womens roles in the household and family, in most of the cases experienced and transmitted by the former generation. The reinterpretations of Muslim tradition developed by these young Muslim women can thus be assessed as an original transition from a social order in which patriarchal structures are increasingly threatened, to another kind of social order. However, this new order cannot be assimilated to the one dominant at least in the discourse of the host societies. It is ALLIEVI_F4_52-77 10/21/02 12:06 PM Page 69 69 orxrrn, orxrn.+iox, .xr +nr nrronv or +n.ri+iox our contention that the life politics of these young Muslim women impinge upon Muslim traditions in somewhat unprecedented ways. Among the family and community milieus, the womens conscious and consistent recurrence to Islam in several cases initiates indeed changes in the way in which certain rules are negotiated internally to Muslim traditions and communities oras in Farhad Khosrokhavars (1997b) or Stefano Allievis (see his chapter in this volume) words neo-communities in Europe. For example, the reference to equal- ity in Islam often holds a key position in the process of re-evaluating gender roles. It is invoked by the women for negotiations and com- promises, especially as far as the demands for female education and marriage strategies are concerned. Traditions are thereby not com- pletely turned upside down or erased, but redened from within and in a framework available to the women within their family inter- locutors. They consistently demandthough in dierent guisesthe return to a Muslim way of life, and at the same time condemn those interpretations of Islam that may conne them into the domes- tic space or turn them into subjects of male dominance. This strat- egy enhances their power by situating their claims at the core of the tradition. More than that, it gives them interpretative authority, according to a claim of moral correctness that is at the core of the classic repertoire of several generations of Muslim reformers. We maintain that these redenitions of tradition follow in the rst instance an internal logic, a reform of tradition from within, although inuenced, of course, by the redenition of elds of social power. As claimed by Alasdair MacIntyre, it is namely this internal con- tested component which keeps traditions alive: traditions, when vital, embody continuities of conict (1981, 222). At the same time, being familiar with the legal systems and dom- inant norms of the societies in which they have been growing up, these women demand active participation as Muslims through their status as citizens to an extent that diers substantially from the so- called quiet Islam (Cesari, 1995, 34) of the former generation. This attitude erodes both the image of their passive role in society, and challenges the assumption of their integration into the dominant rules and norms of life conceptions. We see in this challenge a poten- tial most notably for unveiling the contradictions inherent in the dis- courses of equality and secularity themselves, which represent contested, and still largely unfullled norms in Western European societies, and ALLIEVI_F4_52-77 10/21/02 12:06 PM Page 70 70 scninix .vin-vo.z.vi .xr .nv.xro s.r\.+onr which often serve as instruments of social control and hegemonic politics towards the claims-raising of minorities. This is also evidenced in the discourses of the young Muslim women interviewed. They are largely aware of the unbalanced eects that abstract universalism can engender (see Khosrokhavar, 1997a). They critically point, for example, to the hypocritical attitude of the public conception of French or German society as deeply anchored in human rights tra- ditions, while Muslim women face restrictions and sanctions when being covered in public institutions. Or they protest against the unfair- ness entailed by the double standards with which dominant concepts like laicit in France, or the status of co-operation between state and religion in Germany are handled, once the question of Muslim rep- resentation is on the agenda. By uncovering the cultural impregna- tion (Habermas, 1993, 181) of such conceptscontrary to their often proclaimed neutralitythe women request to open them up to the new cultural-religious constellations in society, engendered by processes of immigration. They thus reclaim extended possibilities for public forms of religious expressions, by taking up and reinterpreting dom- inant tools and norms. This politics of re-description challenges dom- inant interpretations which, especially in France, often ask Muslims to limit religious expressions to the private domain. At the same time it dislocates dominant notions of the legitimate boundaries of the public sphere, as manifest in the enduring hostilityalso reected in bans and prohibitionsof wide sectors of European societies towards the active presence and participation of veiled women in the public sphere. Conclusion: Muslims social activism and the boundaries of the public sphere The example of veiled women in France and Germany is an example of a phenomenon that can be observed on a wider level and is char- acteristic for an intergenerational struggle for the transformations of Islam(s) thereby engendered in contemporary Europe. Accordingly, a relatively strong family network and related custom-based versions of Islam are confronted with increasingly intellectualised and localised views (in the sense of a recourse to the sacred sources and a per- manent reection on the implications of what it means to be Muslim in a non-Muslim society) put forward by the younger generation, ALLIEVI_F4_52-77 10/21/02 12:06 PM Page 71 71 orxrrn, orxrn.+iox, .xr +nr nrronv or +n.ri+iox often under the label of an authentic Islam. This confrontation also contributes to shifts in Muslim authority towards more exible and pluralised forms. The ensuing politics of authenticity serves to further fragment traditional sources of authority (as, for example mosque- based imams, or parental authority) to the extent that the locus of the real Islam and the identity of those who are allowed to speak on its behalf are becoming elusive. This tendency is obviously reinforced by the comparatively high degree of social power and competence among second and third generation Muslims, as manifest in their networking and interacting with the rest of society, their familiarity with its intellectual avatars and political tools, and, most importantly, their mastery of the dom- inant language. Traditional sources of authority are thereby not nec- essarily or always directly attacked, but challenged from within and also with the internal tools of argument and confutation that are part of the dominant tradition. This points to a continuity in the way in which a discursive Muslim tradition is shaped and redened via internal interventions, which is characteristic for our understanding of (religious) traditions in more general terms. Especially the refer- ences to the true Islam and the politics of authenticity, while being inspired by complex sources of inuence, nd antecedents in the colonial/post-colonial situation of Muslim majority societies. Both contextsthough dierent in time and spacecan be compared inso- far as the intervention and domination by other traditions seem to increase the degree of reexivity as much as the eorts for self-reform in Muslim traditionwhatever the concrete outcomes of these eorts might be. In a wider perspective these processes might at the same time ini- tiate more general shifts from primarily ritual to social forms of Islam in Europeas Islam is becoming an all encompassing source which structures the daily life conduct and at the same time serves as a source of emancipation from the stereotype of the distinct Other based on non-European ethnic origins. This yet speculative assump- tion nds bits of evidence, for example, in the transformations of mosques and praying rooms of Muslim organisations from sites pri- marily devoted to ritual practice to institutions with much wider pro- grams, ranging from conferences, through religious instruction, to a variety of socio-cultural engagements. These developments do not necessarily erase the power of religious personnel, but diversify it and make it more subject to control and sanction. The extended ALLIEVI_F4_52-77 10/21/02 12:06 PM Page 72 72 scninix .vin-vo.z.vi .xr .nv.xro s.r\.+onr role of imams from preachers to socio-political leaders and brokers who increasingly negotiate between the community and local and public institutions points to such changes (see Bistol, 1995, 40). However, it would be reductive to explain the increased social engage- ments of Muslim organisations solely in terms of the new context or through the development of a sort of transnational literacy of migrants and especially the youth. The confrontation withand the interaction withinEuropean societies has indeed accelerated a process of reform and the shaping of a social and public Islam that in Muslim majority societies has emerged much earlier. This indicates, once more, a continuity and not a disruption of Muslim tradition, or bet- ter, a continuity of its reform. This wider background is necessary to understand the more specic and multiple challenges implicated in the life politics of Islamically committed, and covered, young Muslim women in Europe. If our observation is correct, then the roots of transformations in organised forms of Muslim associational and public life cannot be explained through the good or bad interaction between Muslim communities and European authorities alone, but also with refer- ence to the underlying life politics that are predominantly shaped by the reform of tradition. As often conrmed in the literature, many of the most powerful Muslim organisations have increased their port- folio of socio-cultural activities in order to adjust to the demands of the younger generation which is interested in nding linkages between the majority society and their search for a conduct as good Muslims therein. Hence, coping with these demands also follows an internal dynamic. This phenomenon cannot be easily explained by pointing to the frequent suspicions and accusations put forward by public authorities and media, according to which these forms of Muslim public life are mere tactics of Muslim organisations designed to instru- mentalise social engagement for the political mobilisation and radi- calisation of young people, or for displaying a dierent, more apolitical face to the public. Simultaneously, such extended and mutating strategies of Muslim groups necessitate a capacity to cope with legal procedures and local political actors and public authorities in the ongoing struggles for recognition and representationa tendency which is indeed observ- able among large parts of Muslim organisations in Europe (Bistol, 1995; Frgosi, 1998; Seufert, 1999; Amiraux, 2001). This can be inter- preted as a step towards an involvement of socially and politically ALLIEVI_F4_52-77 10/21/02 12:06 PM Page 73 73 orxrrn, orxrn.+iox, .xr +nr nrronv or +n.ri+iox engaged Muslims within European public spheres, instead of their isolation, as often supposed in public discourses. On the other hand, expressing a basic loyalty to the constitutional states in Europe and the acceptance of their basic norms does not necessarily imply an adaptive step towards the privatisation of Islam and Muslims inte- gration into pre-established normative frameworks. What emerges can be characterised as a both/and logic of social action. It points to a variety and open-endedness of processes of redenition of Muslim tradition in Europe, not yet once-for-ever denable, and probably remaining conicted and multi-levelled. Again, the underlying life politicsas in the analysed case of young cov- ered womendesigns a model of potential civil activism that is not strictly homogeneous with the dominant norms, so that while it could t an expanded view of public life in the host societies, it will most likely continue to stir up the suspicion of public authorities and media discourses for not being securely assimilated. This misrecognition cre- ates strains in the normative structures themselves of European public spheres, which risk betraying their promise of inclusiveness towards forms of associated and public life furthering citizens participation via the autonomous organisation of their own lives. It also relativises the argument according to which pluralistic and liberal structures in European societies have facilitated the emergence of organised forms of Islam (Schiauer, 2000; Amiraux, 2001). The control of the public sphere by actors such as journalists, politicians, or scholars, who publicly speak on behalf of Muslims, and the systematic limitation for Muslim actors to represent them- selves collectively, clearly delimits the supposedly open potential of the public sphere and reduces the possibilities for non-conformist Muslims to become equal actors in society. It can be interpreted as a hegemonic policy of representation, dominated by the logic of speaking about and not with the Other. The way in which public debates on the Islamic headscarf have so far been dominated by public intellectuals, politicians and journalists and only rarely left spaces for the women to speak for themselves is a key example in this regard (see Amir-Moazami, 1999, and 2001; Lutz, 1999). To conclude, we would like to reiterate that the increasing demands by Muslims to be publicly represented, which lead to questioning certain public norms (ranging from a reconsideration of gender mix- ity to food consumption in educational institutions), challenges the idea of the friendly coexistence with an abstract, antiseptic Other ALLIEVI_F4_52-77 10/21/02 12:06 PM Page 74 74 scninix .vin-vo.z.vi .xr .nv.xro s.r\.+onr (Zizek, 1998) as between members of a pre-established consensus. This situation turns Muslims into very concrete, i.e. agonistic citi- zens, standing up and raising claims that might shake some taken for grantedand symbolically powerfulmarkers of consensus within Western European public spheres. Again, the outcomes of these chal- lenges are still multiple and open-ended. 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