the rise of radical Islam in Indonesia. Fifthly, in case India joins the US axis, how far itsinterest would be served with regard to its relationship with Indonesia.The paper has been divided into five parts which includes the brief backgroundof India –Indonesian relations prior to democracy and thereafter. Secondly Indonesianstability and security is how much related to India and thirdly, in the strategic peripheryof India would a strong Indonesia act to India’s advantage. Fourthly, a more secure andstable Indonesia would add to the security of sea lanes of communication. Lastly,Indonesian Islamic extremism has few implications for Indian security.
During the Indonesian struggle for independence in the post Second World Warscenario, the weakness and vulnerability of the Indonesian state was exposed which wasarising from its fragmented social and physical conditions. In addition, an awareness ofthe attraction of Indonesia’s bountiful natural resources and the importance of itsstrategic location between the Indian and Pacific Oceans reinforced an apprehension ofexternal powers. By contrast, that common international outlook encompassed also apropriety attitude towards the regional environment. Pride in revolutionaryachievement, a consciousness of vast territorial scale ,an immense population, extensivenatural resources, as well as a strategic location, produced the conviction that Indonesiawas entitled to play a leading role in the management of regional order within southeastAsia
.Even during the conciliation process with Dutch in the aftermath of the war Britishwere apprehensive of the evolving scenario and were contemplating the sending ofBritish Indian troops for controlling the situation in Indonesia. This was the first possibleinteraction in terms of defence between Indonesia and India. Though in terms of culturaland religious ties the links were historical and the form of Islam that is prevalent inIndonesia is being influenced by India’s tolerant ethos.With regard to political interactions, on the issue of anti-imperialism, anti –apartheid and non-aligned movement saw the convergence of opinion between the twonations. India also took initiative to convene pan-Asian conferences such as the 1947Asian Relations Conference and the 1949 Conference on Indonesia to combatcolonialism. The latter was specifically convened in the wake of the second Dutch ‘PoliceAction’ in Indonesia and sought effective UN intervention to get the Dutch out of thatcountry. In Indian opinion not only was India’s freedom of material significance to thesenew states but equally their freedom was important to India if it wanted to developindependently. Sukarno’s Indonesia therefore appealed to the Indian elites primarilybecause it was perceived as fiercely nationalistic and non-aligned.
Even during theoutbreak of the Korean War, the Indonesian government refused to adopt a position ofeither approval or disapproval towards the belligerents and correspondingly resistedpressures from the United States to become a party to its global policy of containment.This non-aligned position had been encouraged by India’s Prime Minister, JawaharlalNehru, who had strongly espoused Indonesia’s national cause. Mohammed Hatta,Indonesian Prime minister was extremely sensitive to the domestic political atmospherewhich gave rise to such a position. Within the United Nations, Indonesia’s delegationidentified itself with measures for a peaceful settlement in Korea and with support foranti-colonial movements’
.Right since the Bandung conference in 1955; the ideas mootedby the leaders of the two countries had found a stable ground in developing countries.