ce SM Ane BIA TUNEL Double-Edged Diplomacy International Bargaining and Domestic Politics EDITED BY Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, Robert D. Putnam l NN 2.386 | IUPERJ BIBLIOTECA] Data_ C27. 96 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS Berkeley Los Angeles London14 Cantus er and Ty aoe ce an example of conperative bar aiming. Camp David (vee Steim is of course aeons example of comperative bargaining, but {rom the US. side negotiations eave dicen by bipolar security concerns more than by North-South isues, Tis Imre Lakavos, The Methodeliey of Srientjic Research Programmes (Carn bridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 187). and Jamaica (see Kabler) as coerenve, Phis leaves only Diplomacy and Domestic Politics The Logic of Two-Level Games Robert D. Putnam INTRODUCTION: THE ENTANGLEMENTS OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS Domestic politics and international relations are often somehow entan- gled. but our theories have not yet sorted out the puzzling tangle. Ic is fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determine interna tional relations, or the reverse. The answer to that question is clearly “Both, sometimes.” The more interesting questions are “When?” and “Hows” This paper offers a theoretical approach to this issue, but I begin. with a story that illustrates the puzzle. ‘One illuminating example of how diplomacy and domestic polities can become entangled culminated at the Bonn Summit Conference of 1978." In the mid-1970s, a coordinated program of global reflation, led by the “locomotive” economies of the United States. Germany. and Japan, had been proposed to foster Western recovery from the first oil shock.* This propeal had received a powerful boost from the incoming Carter Ad- Prnistration and was warmly supported by the weaker countries. as well fs the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and fe economists. who argued that it would overcome interna- {is imbalances and speed growth all around. On the other hand. the Germansand the Japanese protested that prudent and suceess- fal economic managers should not be asked te bail out spendthrifts. Meanwhile, Jimmy Carter's ambitious National Energy Program re ilo ked in Congress. while Helmut Schnidt led a chorts of 1s uncontrolled appetite for imported ol “ind thett apparent uncenvern about the tabling eollar All stdescoms eed Ghar the world economy was in serious trouble, bat at way not leat white many priv tional paven mained de complantts about the AmericV2 Append was more to blune—tight-hsted German and ese fiscal policies, on slick-jawed US. energy and monetary policies, At the Bonn Summit, however, a comprehensive approved, the clearest case yet of a summit chat left all particl pier than when thes arrived. Helmut Schmidt agreed t add stimulus, amounting to | percent of GNP; Jimmy Carter committed him- sell to decontrol domestic oil pries by the end of 1980; and Take Fukuda pleciged new etforts 10 reach a 7-percent growth vate, Secondary elements in the funn accord included French and British acquiescence in the Tokvo Round trade negotiations: Japanese undertakings to foster import growth and restrain exports; and a generic American promise to fight inflation. Allin all. the Bonn Summit produced a balanced agree: ment of unparalleled breadth and specificity, More remarkably, virtual all parts of the package were actually implemented Most observers at the time welcomed the policies agreed to at Bonn although in retrospect there has been much debate about the economic twisdlom of this package deal, However, my concern here is not whether the deal was wise economically, but how it became possible politically My researeh suggests. first, that the key governments at Bonn adopted policies different trom chose that they would have pursued in the absence fl international negotiations—but second, that agreement was possible only because a powerful minority within each government acwually fa- vored on domestic grounds the policy being demanded internationally Within Germans. a political process catalyzed by foreign pressures ‘was surreptitionsh orchestrated by expansionists inside the Schmid gov ‘ernment. Contrars tothe public mythology. the Bonn deal was not forced ‘ona reluctant or “altruistic” Germany. In fact officials in the Chancellor's Ollice and the Economics Ministry, as well as in the Social Democratic Prey and the trade unions. had argued privately in early 1978 that fur ther stimulus way domestically desirable, particularly in. view of the ap- proaching 1920 elections, However, thee had little hope of overcoming the opposition ol she Finance Ministry, the Free Democratic Party (part of the government coalition), and the business and banking community especially the leadership of the Bundesbank, Publiely. Helmut Selimide posed as reluctant to the end. Only his closest atdsisors suspected truth: that the Chancellor “let himself be pushed” into policy th privatel Lavored. bit soul have found costly and perhaps impossible ichayge deal was nts Irap- onal fiscal he fev enact without the summits package deat Analagousty. on [apart coaliqan of business unterests, che Ministry bt Tatermananal Frade anet Hiden MEE, the toenonie Plime eheycand some expansion niinled pobactany vathin the Liberal Dem berate Panty pushet far adulitional dbomestic stiifas. asing CS) pies Site as ane ob thes prime jngiments saganyst the stubbbors resistance et the Ministry of Finance (MOF). With unlikely that the foreign demands would have been met; but withen external pressure, it is even more unlikely that the expansionists could have overridden the powerful MOF: “Seventy percent foreign pressure, 30 percent internal politics," was the disgruntled judgment of one MOF Fifty-hfty,” guessed an offical from METI? In the American case. too, internal politicking reinforced, and was reinforced by. the international pressure. During the summit prepara- tions, American negotiators occasionally invited their foreign counter- parts to put more pressure on the Americans to reduce oil imports. Key economic officials within the administration favored a tougher energy policy, but thes were opposed by the Presicent’s closest political aides. even after the summit, Moreover, Congressional opponents continued to stymie oil price decontrol, as they had under both Nixon and Ford. Finally. in Apni 1979, the President decided on gradual administrative decomtrol. bringing US. prices up to world levels by October 1981. His domestic advisors thus won a postponement of this politically costly move tuntil after the 1980 presidential election. but in the end, virtually every: ‘one of the pledges made at Bonn was fulfilled. Both proponents and opponents of decontrol agree that the summit commitment was at the center of the administration's heated intramural debate during the win- ter of 1978-79. and instrumental in the final decision.* In short, the Bonn accord represented genuine international policy coordination. Significant policy changes were pledged and implemented by the kev participants. Moreover—although this counterfactual claim is necessarily harder to establish—those policy changes would very prob- ably not have been pursued (certainly not on the same seal the same time frame) in the absence of the international Within each country, one faction supported the poliey shilt being de- manded of its country internationall, but that faction was initials out- numbered. Thus, international pressure was a necessary condition for these policy shifts. On the other hand. without domestic resonance. inter natinnal forces would not have sufficed to produce the accord. nw matter hhow bakunced and intellectual, persuasive the overall package. In the end. each leader believed that what he was doing was int his nation’s interest—and probably in his own political interest, too, even though not all his audes agreed? Yet without the stanmit aceard, he probably woul thot (at could not) have changed polites.0 easily, In that sense. he Bont deal suscesstully meshed domestic and internation: Newher «1 putely domestic ner a purely anternattional analysts «oui ferpretations ast at terms either of shoniestc account for ths episode. I yar at dmternanonl Connses and ttoniestie effects Msevondamage-reversed")/ would represent