Alan Turing_Computing Machinery and Intelligence

Embed Doc
Copy Link
Readcast
Collections

CommentGo Back

Download

Computing Machinery and Intelligence

A. M. Turing

Mind

, New Series, Vol. 59, No. 236. (Oct., 1950), pp. 433-460.

Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423%28195010%292%3A59%3A236%3C433%3ACMAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5

Mind

is currently published by Oxford University Press.Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtainedprior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/journals/oup.html.Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. Formore information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.http://www.jstor.orgThu Apr 5 11:21:34 2007

[October,

1950

MIND 

A

QUARTERLY REVIEW

PSYCHOLOGY

AND

PHILOSOPHY

I.-COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE 

1.

The Imitation Game.

I

PROPOSE

to consider the question,

'

Can machines think

?

'

This should begin with definitions of the meaning of the terms

'

machine

'

and

'

think

'.

The definitions might be framed so as toreflect so far as possible the normal use of the words, but thisattitude is dangerous.

If

the meaning of the words

'

machine

'

and

'

think

'

are to be found by examining how they are commonlyused it is difficult to escaDe the conclusion that the meaning

a

and the answer to tlie auestion,

'

Can machines think

?

'

is to besought in a statistical sirvey sdch as a Gallup poll. But this isabsurd.Instead of attempting such a definition

I

shall replace thequestion by another, which is closely related to it and is expressedin relatively unambiguous words.The new form of the problem can be described in terms ofa game which we call the

'

imitation game

'.

It is played withthree people, a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C) whomay be of either sex. The interrogator stays in a room apartfrom the other two. The object of the game for the interrogator

is

to determine which of the other two is the man and which isthe woman. He knows them by labels

X

and

Y,

and at the endof the game he says either

'

X

is A and

Y

is B

'

or

'

X

is

B

and

Y

is

A

'.

The interrogator is allowed to put questions to

A

and

B

thas

:

C

:

Will

X

please tell me the length of his or her hair

?

Now suppose

X

is actually

A,

then

A

must answer.

It

is A's

28

433

434

A.

M.

TURING

:

object in the game to try and cause C to make the wrong identi-fication.His answer might therefore be

'

My hair is shingled, and the longest strands are about nineinches long.'In order that tones of voice may not help the interrogatorthe answers should be written, or better still, typewritten. Theideal arrangeljaent is to have a teleprinter communicating betweenthe two rooms. Alternatively the question and answers can berepeated by an intermediary. The object of the game for the thirdplayer (B) is to help the interrogator. The best strategy for heris probably to give truthful answers. She can add such thingsas

''

I

am the woman, don't listen to him

!

'

to her answers, butit will avail nothing as the man can make similar remarks.We now ask the question,

'

What will happen when a machinetakes the part of A in this game

?

'

Will the interrogator decidewrongly as often when the game is played like this as he doeswhen the game is played between a man and a woman

?

Thesequestions replace our original,

'

Can machines think

?

'

2.

Critique

of

the New Problem.

As

well as asking,

'

What is the answer to this new form of thequestion

',

one may ask,

'

Is this new question a worthy oneto investigate

?

'

This latter question we investigate withoutfurther adoj thereby cutting short an infinite regress.The new problem has the advantage of drawing a fairly sharpline between the physical and the intellectual capacities of a man.No engineer or chemist claims to be able to produce a materialwhich is indistinguishable from the human skin. It is possiblethat at some time this might be done, but even supposing this in-vention available we should feel there was little point in tryingto make a

'

thinking machine

'

more human by dressing it up insuch artificial flesh. The form in which we have set the problemreflects this fact in the condition which prevents the interrogatorfrom seeing or touching the other competitors, or hearing theirvoices. Some other advantages of the proposed criterion may beshown up by specimen questions and answers. Thus:

Q

:

Please write me a sonnet on the subject of the PorthBridge.A

:

Count me out on this one.

I

never could write poetry.

Q

:

Add 34957

to

70764

.

A

:

(Pause about 30 seconds and then give as answer) 105621.

Q

:

Do you play chess

?

A

:

Yes.

of 00

Leave a Comment