The Leaders of Iran’s ‘Election Coup’

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders chant slogans during their meeting with President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, not pictured, in Tehran, Iran, Sept. 11, 2007. (AP Photo/ISNA, Rouhollah Vahdati, File)

By MUHAMMAD SAHIMI in Los Angeles | 16 June 2009

[TEHRAN BUREAU] The rigged presidential election in Iran — a coup d’etat, according to Mohsen Makhmalbaf, a
spokesman for the main reformist challenger Mir Hossein Mousavi, and other analysts — has prompted protests both
inside and outside Iran. There is, however, little understanding about the ideology and motivation behind the
operation.

The coup leaders represent the second generation of Iran’s revolutionaries. They tend to be in their early to mid-
fifties, so they were young at the time of the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979. They all supported the Revolution, and
most of them joined Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) almost immediately after the Revolution that toppled Shah
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s regime in February 1979. They fervently supported the young revolutionary government,
and then fought two fierce wars in the 1980s under the command of their clerical masters — Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini, and Hojjatol-eslams Ali Khamenei (the present Supreme Leader) and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (the
former President), and others. [Hojjatol-eslam is a clerical ranking lower than an ayatollah.]

The young revolutionaries fought against far better financed Iraqi forces for eight years, expelled them from all of the
Iranian territory occupied by Saddam Hussein’s forces, and ended the war in a stalemate, which was a great
achievement for Iran considering its international isolation while Iraq was supported by the West and the Soviet
Union.

Domestically, the young revolutionaries fought a bloody war with the forces of Mojahedin-e Khalgh Organization
(MKO), an armed Islamic leftist group that had fought against the Shah’s regime. After the MKO began assassinating
Iran’s revolutionary leaders in June 1981, the young revolutionaries and the IRGC waged a bloody battle with them
as well, executing MKO members and sympathizers by the thousands, and forcing them into exile in Iraq, where they
collaborated with Saddam Hussein’s regime in its war with Iran.

At the same time, exploiting the threats to Iran’s national security as their excuse, the young revolutionaries helped
their clerical masters impose extreme political repression in Iran. All of the independent newspapers and publications
were shut down, and almost all political groups were banned, save those that were subserviently loyal to the clerical
establishment.

The result of the repression was the effective elimination of all secular groups from Iran’s political scene. At the time,
there was no great resentment expressed by the population at large. The country was at war with a powerful external
enemy supported by the West and the Soviet Union, while at the same time, the MKO was also carrying out
assassinations internally. But the elimination of the secular political forces was a terrible blow to Iran’s political
development.

After the war with Iraq ended in 1988, thousands of political prisoners were executed in the summer of 1988.
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini passed away in June 1989, and Iran began to gradually recover from casualties, both
economically and politically. The economic reconstruction was led by Mr. Rafsanjani, then president.

The young revolutionaries then broke off into two camps, generally speaking. In one camp were those who believed
that the country needed a political opening and a relaxation from the extreme repression that existed in the 1980s.
This group included not only those who had fought the war with Iraq, but had also carried out the fight with the MKO.
Many of them were members of the intelligence apparatus, which gave them a realistic assessment of what the
country’s needs politically. Members of this group were mostly Islamic leftists, and were instrumental in the birth of
the reform movement in the 1990s. They are still active in the reformist camp, and include such prominent reformists
as Dr. Saeed Hajjarian, Mohsen Armin, and Dr. Ali Reza Alavi Tabar, all leading reformist strategists.

The young revolutionaries in the second camp remained within the ranks of IRGC. By the early 1990s, they had risen
up to command important positions within the Guard. People such as Major General Mohammad Ali (Aziz) Jafari, the
top IRGC commander; Brigadier General Yadollah Javani, the head of the IRGC’s political directorate; and Brigadier
General Ali Reza Afshar, the deputy Interior Minister, belonged to this group. Some of the second-generation
revolutionaries of this camp joined the government, including Ezatollah Zarghami, who runs the Islamic Republic
National Radio and Television, and Mr. Ahmadinejad. These were the right-wing revolutionaries.

The death of Ayatollah Khomeini had another long-term consequence whose effect is felt today. His death allowed the
ultra-right reactionary clerics to gradually make a comeback in Iran’s political scene. Such clerics belonged to the
Hojjatiyeh Society. Founded in 1954 by Sheikh Mahmoud Halabi as an Islamic organization opposed to the Bahai
faith and the Sunni sect of Islam, the Hojjatiyeh was penetrated by SAVAK, the Shah’s dreaded security agency in the
1960s and 70s, which used it as a buffer against the spread of Communism in Iran.

Hojjatiyeh members believe, as most Shiites do, that the Mahdi, the Shiites 12th and last Imam, will come back some
day to save the world from corruption. But, they also believe that they should “prepare” society for Mahdi’s return. In
the early days of the Hojjatiyeh, its adherents believed that a chaotic society would provide the best conditions for the
return of Mahdi, a view that is rejected by most Shiites.

The Hojjatiyeh did not participate in the 1979 Revolution. In fact, it also actively opposed it. At that time, they believed
in group leadership and, therefore, they also opposed Ayatollah Khomeini’s concept of Valaayat-e Faghih
(governance of the Islamic jurist), which is the backbone of Iran’s Constitution and bestows upon the Supreme
Leader most of the constitutional power. Thus, Ayatollah Khomeini banned them in 1983 and said famously about
them, “they cannot even run a bakery, let alone a country.” Hojjatiyeh went underground and patiently waited to make
its comeback.
When the Hojjatiyeh started to make a comeback in the 1990s, its member no longer used that name. In fact, some
of them even denied that they belonged to the Hojjatiyeh. Instead of believing in a chaotic society for the return of the
Mahdi, they began advocating an Islamic Government led by an unelected Supreme Leader, rather than an Islamic
Republic. Their present leader is Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, a hard-liner who has openly opposed
any elections. Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi issued a Fatwa two weeks ago saying that if the achievements of Mr.
Ahmadinejad in spreading Islamic values around the world, it is proper to do what it takes to re-elect him, implying
that fraud and cheating are allowed (a view which has been rejected by other Ayatollahs). He once said, It does not
matter what people think. They are ignorant sheep.

Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi believes that sovereignty does not reside with the people — it resides with God. He also
believes that the Supreme Leader is selected by God and is Mahdi’s deputy in his absence. In his opinion, the task of
the ayatollahs in the Assembly of Experts (AE), a constitutional body that appoints the Supreme Leader and monitors
his performance (and can even dismiss him), is to discover who the selected Leader is. He believes people must
never question the Supreme Leader and obey him absolutely. He is currently a member of the AE. Former reformist
president Mohammad Khatami has referred to Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi’s followers as shallow-thinking traditionalists
with Stone-Age backwardness.

Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi’s base of power is the Haghani seminary in Qom that was founded in 1964 under the name
Montazeriyeh seminary; it was renamed after Mr. Haghani Zanjani, a wealthy merchant with connections to the
Hojjatiyeh, endowed the seminary. His disciples include the Intelligence Minister Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejehei (a
graduate of the Haghani), Mojtaba Hashemi Samareh (a senior aid to Mr. Ahmadinejad), and Mr. Ahmadinejad
himself. In fact, all of Iran’s Intelligence Ministers since the 1979 Revolution are graduates of the Haghani.

After Ayatollah Khomeini’s death, in order to create a political cover for himself and his followers and counter the
accusations that he had opposed the Revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi also founded the
Imam Khomeini Educational Institute in Qom — even though he opposed the Ayatollah and had turned down the
invitation of his students to join the Revolution — and publishes a weekly, Partow-e Sokhan. He is the spiritual leader
of many of the top commanders of the IRGC. The Basij militia, a paramilitary group controlled by the IRGC, has also
been deeply penetrated by his disciples as well, as has been the Judiciary. Ayatollah Khomeini’s chief of staff,
Ayatollah Ahmad Tavassoli, said after the election of Mr. Ahmadinejad in 2005 that, “the executive branch of the
Iranian government, as well as the troops of the IRGC, have been hijacked by the Hojjatiyeh.”

Ever since he was elected the President in 2005, Mr. Ahmadinejad has repeatedly spoken about the “Islamic
Government of Iran,” rather than the “Islamic Republic of Iran,” as well as the return of Mahdi, hence advocating
Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi’s views. Followers of the Ayatollah make up an important segment of Mr. Ahmadinejad’s
supporters. He has also repeatedly accused Mr. Rafsanjani and other first-generation revolutionaries of being corrupt,
and has claimed that he knows of thousands of corruption cases, mostly pointing to first-generation leaders, although
he has never ever presented any concrete evidence. Thus, he has been sending signals of what is to come (see
below).

In Iran the elections are supervised by the Interior Ministry. There is no independent organization for the elections.
The Interior Minister, Mr. Sadegh Mahsouli, and his principal deputy for the elections, Mr. Kamran Daneshjou, are
both close aids and friends of Mr. Ahmadinejad and former commanders in the IRGC. Many of the provincial
governors who also play important roles in the elections are former military men. Mr. Mahsouli had actually come out
in support of his old friend.
Ever since General Jafari was appointed the top commander of the IRGC, he has been warning against internal
dissent and internal “enemies,” clearly implicating the reformist/democratic groups. He even re-organized the IRGC to
better respond to domestic disturbances.

In the last week of the campaign, signals started emanating from the high command of the IRGC that it was not
happy with developments. General Javani warned on June 8 in Sobh-e Saadegh (True Dawn), the weekly published
for the armed forces, that the high command of the IRGC considers the campaign of Messrs Mousavi and Karroubi
tantamount to preparing for a “velvet revolution.” He warned that the IRGC “will kill it [the velvet revolution] at its
inception.” Kayhan, the newspaper that acts as a public mouthpiece for the IRGC/security forces, also warned of a
colored revolution. This was a clear signal something was being planned behind the scenes to prevent a victory by a
reformist candidate. The leaders and ideologues behind the election coup were none other than second-generation
revolutionaries, mostly from the IRGC, whose spiritual leader is Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi.
The goals behind the coup include the following:

The first goal is to purge first-generation revolutionary leaders (with the exception of Ayatollah Khamenei). The main
target here is former president Rafsanjani, a powerful politician who heads two important Constitutional bodies, the
Assembly of Experts (AE), and the Expediency Council that arbitrates the differences between the Majles
(parliament) and the Guardian Council. Also included in this group are Mr. Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri, a mid-ranking
cleric, former Speaker of the Majles, and a strong critic of Mr. Ahmadinejad; Mr. Mahdi Karroubi, the second reformist
candidate in the election and a disciple of Ayatollah Khomeini; and Mr. Mir Hossein Mousavi, the main reformist
candidate, and Iran’s Prime Minister in the 1980s.

Why do they want them out of the scene? For three reasons. One is that the coup leaders consider themselves —
and rightly so — as the saviors of Iran. They are the ones who fought Iraq for eight years. Secondly, at least part of
the IRGC high command wishes Iran to be in a perpetual revolutionary state, but believes that the first-generation of
revolutionaries have sold out the ideals of the 1979 Revolution.

In his “victory” speech on Sunday, Mr. Ahmadinejad never once mentioned Ayatollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic,
or even Ayatollah Khamenei, his main supporter. The significance of the intentional omissions should not be missed.
Just as Joseph Stalin and Deng Xiaoping kept Vladimir Lenin’s and Mao Zedong’s pictures everywhere, they always
acted in the opposite way of what they appeared to be advocating; Iran’s second-generation revolutionaries will keep
Ayatollah Khomeini’s pictures everywhere, but will act against his teachings, including his most famous saying,

The scale [for people’s acceptance of a politician] is people’s vote.

The second goal of second-generation revolutionaries is moving the country closer to an “Islamic Government,” and
further away from an “Islamic Republic.” This is done by making elections a meaningless process by resorting to any
means available, including rigging and manipulation. This move has marginalized reformist and democratic groups in
Iran.

The third goal is to start preparations for the eventual successor to Ayatollah Khamenei. He is known to be ill. By
accusing Mr. Rafsanjani of corruption, the second-generation revolutionaries wish to eliminate him — the head of the
Assembly of Experts appoints the Supreme Leader — as the natural successor of Ayatollah Khamenei, hence paving
the way for Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi who is a member of the AE. Everything appeared to have been planned well in
advance, but the coup leaders did not expect the people to stand up to them.

Under Mr. Ahmadinejad, the IRGC has penetrated important sectors of Iran’s economy, and is rapidly developing a
monopoly on a majority of a wide range of government projects as well as the private sector. On the other hand, Mr.
Rafsanjani and his associates also have extensive economic activities and interests. They also favor foreign
investments in the country, whereas the IRGC opposes it because it cannot compete with modern technology and
planning.

This is a pivotal moment in Iran’s history. If the reformists and the Iranian people cannot reverse the outcome of Iran’s
rigged elections, Iran will enter a dark period of dictatorship, with no light at the end of the tunnel. The country will be
controlled completely by the military/security forces, with an unelected Supreme Leader as its titular head, and no
elections (or extremely meaningless ones). This would be a terrible development for the rest of the world as well.

Copyright © 2009 Tehran Bureau