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From Chris Nash
MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORDCOMMISSIONSENSTIVESSIEvent:MonteBelger,formerDeputyAdministratoroftheFederalAviationAdministrationTypeofevent:InterviewDate:November24,2003;9:00a.m.SpecialAccessIssues:NonePreparedby:
J
ohnRaidt.TeamNumber:7Location:GSACommissionOfficeParticipants-Non-Commission:MonteBelgerParticipants-Commission:Bill
J
olmstoneand
J
olmRaidtBackground[U]OnSeptember11,2001BelgerwasservingastheactingDeputyAdministratoroftheFAA.1972--StartedwithFAAasasecurityinspectorinTampa,FL.1975-1978-SecuritystaffinFAAWashingtonHQ1979--NewEnglandRegionDivisionManager(Security)inBoston.1980--GreatLakesRegionDivisionManager(Security)1983-84--AirportsManagerinChicago1986--DeputyDirectorforGreatLakes1988--AssociateAdministratorforAviationStandards(includingSecurity)1997-2002-ActingDeputyAdministratorofFAA2002-ShorttenureasActingAdministratorofFAA2002-Sept.13-RetiredCurrentlyworkingforLockheedMartinAVSECLeading
up
to9-11[U]Belgerstatedthattherewerenosignificantdomesticsecurityeventsfor8-10yearspriorto9-11andnointernationaleventaffectingU.S.Carriers.
It
appearedthingwereworkingok.FAAwasprofilingpassengerstocountertheexplosivesthreat.Leadingupto9-11theprimaryconcernofthepublic,CongressandtheFAAwasitsfocusonCOMMISSIONSENSTIVE
SSI
2
congestion,capacityandcustomerservice.FAAhadagoodsecurityteamheadedbyAdmiralFlynn,andFAAleadershiphadmuchconfidenceinthem.[U]Weaknessesofthesystemincludedperformance/detectionproblemsatscreeningcheckpoints-"theinabilitytodetecteverythingallthetime."
In
retrospectsince9-11,inadequatesharingofintelligencewasalsoaproblem.
FAA
SecurityBriefings
[U]FAAACIproducedadailyintelligencebriefing(classified).ThebriefingwouldbereadbyShirleyMiller(Belger'sassistant).AnythingnecessarywouldbecalledtoBelger'sattentionbyMiller.Belgerwouldthenpassanythinghethoughtnecessaryuptotheadministrator.[U]
In
addition,BelgerandGarveyhadanopendoorpolicy.Flynn,andhissuccessorasAssociateDirectorforCivilAviationSecurity,Gen.MikeCanavan,couldseetheAdministratorand/ordeputyanytimetheythoughttheyneededto.Hestressedthatiftherewasanythingthatrequiredaction,hewouldhavelearnedaboutit.
PrevailingThreat9-11
[U]BelgersaidthattheFAAsawaviationthreatsoverseasandtheuseofexplosivesasthebiggestproblemfacingAVSEC.Hewasnotawareofanyincreasedthreatinthesummerof2001.[U]Belgerdidn'trecallseeingthethreatassessmentsfromtheFAAdiscussingtheincreaseddomesticthreat(2001rulemakingdiscussingadomesticBojinkaevent)andthepotentialforsuicidehijacking(CD-RompresentationbyACIPatMcDonnell)Hedidmentionthatintelligencepeopletendtotrytocoverallthebases"astheyareapttodo."
Intelligen
ce/Liaisons[U]BelgersaidhewasunawareofanyproblemsregardingtheFAA'sliaisonstotheIntelligenceCommunity(IC)withrespecttotheiraccesstointelligenceorabilitytofocusonFAAissues.[U]BelgerstressedthatFAAwasdependentontheIntelligenceAgenciesandtheFAAwasalwaysworriedaboutwhetheritwasgettingtheintelligencetheyneeded.Hesaidtherewasnodoubttheyhadmoreintelligenceonforeignratherthandomesticthreats.HewasnotawareofUsarnaBinLadenpriorto9-11.
CAPPSI
[U]
Belgerstatedthattheintentof
CAPPS
wastozeroinmorepreciselyonthethreatposedbybombers.HeindicatedthatapassengerselectedbytheCAPPSprescreeningsystemwouldhavetohavetheirbagsclearedforexplosives.Belgerdidnotseemtobe
awarethattheprofilingsystempriortoCAPPSrequiredthatselecteesundergoincreasedcheckpointscrutinyoftheirpersonandcarry-onbelongings.Hesaidthatiftheseindeedwerethecaseitsimplyreflectedachangeintheperceivedthreat.(HecitedJamesPadgettastheexpertonthearchitectureofCAPPSI).
CheckpointScreening
[U]Belgersaidthechallengeofcheckpointscreeningwastheconstantefforttokeepfolksalertandgivethemthebesttools/technologytodotheirjob.Hestatedthatgetting100percentdetectionwouldbringthenation'saviationsystemtoahalt.Hesaidtheneedwastofindthe"rightbalance"betweendetectionandkeepingtheschedule.Hesaidthatthecivilaviationsystemisfundamentallybuiltaroundschedule.[SS1]Belgerstatedhisimpressionwasthatthesystemwasslightlyimprovingleadingupto9/11.WhileFAAdataonscreeningshowedsomeimprovementtheperformanceproblemswereunacceptable.Theemphasiswasonimprovingtheequipmentandtrainingpeoplebetter.Asanexampleofthatemphasis,BelgeridentifiedanFAAproposedrulependingin2001tocertifyscreenersandincreasetrainingrequirements.HesaidthatAdmiralFlynnpulledbackthefinalrulebecauseheperceivedaninabilitytoquantitativelytestthesystemandperformance.HewantedtoputinplacetheTIP(ThreatImagingProjectionsystem)first.Belgerstressedthatbettertrained,morededicatedindividualswouldbemorelikelytodetectweapons,but,theU.S.domesticsystemwasn'tdesignedtodetectweaponswhichwerenotprohibited.[SS1]Heagreedthatthesystemwasdesignedtostopcraziesandcriminals,butnotthededicatedterrorist.
ResourceAllocation
[U]BelgerstatedthatresourceallocationdecisionsforsecurityweredrivenbyAdmiralFIynn,andthesedecisionsfactoredindatafromimprovedintelligenceinthe1990'sandthefindingsofvulnerabilityassessments.Belgerwasn'tawareoftheapplicationofanyriskmanagementtoolsindeterminingresourceallocation,butagainthiswasFlynn'sresponsibility.
Fines/penaltiesonCarriersforscreeningfailures
[U]BelgercitedhispreviousworkexperienceintheFAAsecurityprogram,includingontheissueoffines.Hestatedthatthepurposeoffinesiscomplianceandenforcement.Complianceistheoverridinggoal.Finesareagoodwaytogettheregulatedparty'sattention.Hecitedtheuseoffinesasaneffectiveattentiongettingtooldealingwithissuesofpilotperformance.Thefinesgottheirattention.Belgernotedthatasasecurityspecialisthefollowedthefinesthatheassessedthroughtothefinaldetermination,which
wasusefulinunderstandinghowandwhathappened.H~saidhedidn'thavethesense
thatotherFAAsecurityenforcementpersonnelengagedinthatsamepractice.Belgersaidthatthefinalsettlementswhichwereoftenlowerthantheoriginalfinedidnot3
of 00
Mfr Nara- t7- Faa- Belger Monte- 11-24-03- 00054
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