Our purpose in this essay is to examine the relationship between Islam and democracy more closely by focusing our discussion on three pertinent questions: How do Islamists view democracy? What has been their actual conduct in relation to democratic institutions and processes? Finally, under what circumstances would Islamists find democratic political process acceptable, and under what conditions would they deem it uncongenial for their Islamic goals?

In view of the divergent theories and practices within Islamic movements and regimes in regard to the issues of Islam, democracy and the state, it is difficult to formulate a consensus Islamic position on the specifics of an Islamic polity. We will therefore focus our remarks primarily on the ideas of those Islamists who represent mainstream Islamic movements and are regarded as major theoreticians of contemporary Islamic resurgence. Included in this group are Abul Ala Maududi (d. 1979), the founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan; Hasan al Bana (d. 1949), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries; Abbasi Madani of the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria; Rachid Ghannoushi of the al-Nahda Movement of Tunis; and Dr. Hasan al-Turabi of the Islamic National Front of Sudan.3

In the interest of brevity, what is presented here is a condensed and synthesized version of their views on the relationship between Islam and democratic practices.

The Islamist's view of politics and state rests on their fundamental premise that Islam is not a "religion" in the sense in which we speak of Christianity and Hinduism today, i.e., a code of religious beliefs and doctrines, a mode of spiritual orientation, or a set of some outward rituals. Islam is a complete way of life; it covers the entire spectrum of human activities. Islam means total commitment and subordination of all aspects of life - individual, social, economic, political, international - to God. Hence, Islam is both religion and politics, church and state, joined in a single goal of serving God and implementing His commandments.

Thus, unlike the'ulama, who have accepted effective separation between religious authority and the secular power of the state, the Islamists reject this duality as un-Islamic and want to reinstate the pristine unity of religion and

politics by reviving the Prophetic model of the Islamic state. They believe that Islam cannot be implemented in a comprehensive manner without the power of the state; the Qur'anic obligation for all Muslims to "promote good and eliminate evil" cannot be realized without the coercive resources of the state. Hence, according to Islamists, establishment of an Islamic state is not something recommendatory or optional; it is a fundamental obligation for all Muslims.4

There seems to have emerged a general agreement among mainstream Islamists that democracy is the spirit of the Islamic governmental system, even though they reject the philosophical assumption of Western democracy that sovereignty rests with the people. They maintain that the majority's voice can constitute the basis for legitimate exercise of political authority in an Islamic state only if it recognizes and remains within the perimeters of God's political and legal sovereignty. God's sovereignty is understood to have been represented in the Shari\u2019ah, a systematic code of moral-legal imperatives derived from the Qur'an and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. Islamists also argue that since the Qur'an commands Muslims to conduct their collective affairs through mutual consultation (shura) and grants the privilege of God's vicegerency (khalifa) to the entire Muslim community rather than to a single individual or a specific group or class of people, the selection of a Muslim ruler must be based on the free will of the Muslim masses.5

Several conclusions can be drawn from this formulation of Islamists. First, in congruence with their concept of popular vicegerency, Islamists reject the institution of kingship and monarchy as un-Islamic. Maududi's Caliphate and Monarchy and Khomeini's Islamic Government constitute the most devastating critiques and condemnations of monarchic and absolutist rule from an Islamic perspective in modern Islam.6

Their rejection of the hereditary and absolutist rule has become more vocal and aggressive since the Iranian revolution. Their anti-monarchical position was further strengthened during the 1991 Gulf War when Muslim monarchs and emirs were seen collaborating with the Western powers to decimate a fellow Muslim country.7

Second, Islamists, and especially the mainstream Sunni Islamic movements, do not also approve theocracy or rule by the clergy, who would exercise political power on behalf of God. In Sunni Islam, no one can speak for God; it is the consensus of the community at large as reflected in freely expressed public opinion that will determine what the will of God is in a specific case. Maududi describes the Islamic government as "theodemocracy" and "nomocracy," or the rule of law, rather than as a rule of self-appointed spokesman of God. The Shi'ite political theory, on the other hand, can be considered closer to theocracy. According to Khomeini, Islamic leadership is crystallized and embodied in infallible apostles and imams (religiopolitical guides) who are appointed by God. He further maintains that during the occultation of the twelfth imam, religiopolitical leadership of the Muslim community will be exercised by qualified jurists. This he describes as Vilayat- Faqih (governance by Jurists). In both religious and sociopolitical affairs, the

relations of the people with the jurists are defined by the concept of taqlid (imitation), that is, following the infallible imam appointed by God. It is on the basis of this formulation that in the post-Khomeini Islamic Republic of Iran a committee of five jurists who, collectively, represent the hidden imam, can overrule any government policy or law legislated by the elected parliament if they deem it un-Islamic.8

In Sunni Islam, on the other hand, it is the consensus of the community that is the final arbiter in public affairs, and the concept of a veto power exercised by the clergy has no theological and legal basis.9

Third, Islamists are also of the view that it is not the structure of an Islamic state that should constitute the focal point in constructing an Islamic polity; what really matters is the question of its functions, goals and objectives. The specific structural arrangements and institutional features of one Islamic state may differ from another due to differences in material conditions, but their guiding principles and values must reflect those enunciated in the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet.10

Hence, an Islamic state can be unitary or federal, parliamentary or presidential, unicameral or bicameral, depending on the specific needs and circumstances of a given Islamic society.

Fourth, although the Islamists' concept of an Islamic state remains all- encompassing - some would describe it as absolutist since the state seeks to govern and control all aspects of social life - they also emphasize that the methods of governance of the state should not be authoritarian and arbitrary. Islamists suggest several institutional and procedural mechanisms to ensure popular participation, accountability of rulers, protection of civil liberties and the rule of law. The head of the state and government would be elected for a fixed term through free elections based on universal adult franchise. Similarly, members of the Shura (parliament) would also be elected by the people. The Islamic state would be based on the principle of the distribution of power among the three branches of the state: the executive, legislature, and judiciary. The Islamic state would ensure the functioning of an independent judiciary and no one, including the head of the state, would be above law.11

The leaders of the Islamic movements in Pakistan, Malaysia, and North Africa (especially Rachid Ghannoushi of the Tunisian Al-Nahda Movement) define the governmental structure of an Islamic state in terms no different from a Westminster-type parliamentary democracy: universal adult franchise, periodic elections, guaranteed human rights, civil liberties, equal political and religious rights of minorities, an independent judiciary, the rule of law, procedural justice, and multiple political parties. This pluralistic and democratic vision of an Islamic polity has recently found an explicit and profound articulation in the writings and speeches of Rachid Ghannoushi of Tunisia, Professor Khurshid Ahmad of Pakistan Najmuddin Erbakan of Turkey, and Anwar Ibrahim, the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia.12