China Goes Its Own Way

MARTIN JACQUES NATHAN GARDELS

I I

GORDON CHANG DANIEL BELL

WEI JINGSHENG

Buoyed by its creditors hold on the United States and its ability to withstand the harsh winds of recession blowing from across the Pacic, China has graduated in its own mind from an emerging economy to a world power. From their confrontation with Google to their renewed repression of dissidents to their dissing of President Obama, Chinas leaders clearly feel that the time has come for the world to accomodate China, not vice-versa. Is the West ready for this new reality? Is Chinas new arrogance well-founded, or is it going to be the next bubble to burst? As it moves beyond the primary stage of socialism is it ready to open up politically? In this section, some top China scholars, one of Chinas most well-known dissidents and a former US spy chief discuss these issues.

From Communism to Confucianism: Chinas Alternative to Liberal Democracy

DANIEL A. BELL

is professor of political philosophy at Tsinghua University in Beijing and

the author of Chinas New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society.
beijing Four decades ago, it would have been suicidal to say a good word about Confucius in Beijing. Confucius was the reactionary enemy, and all Chinese were encouraged to struggle against him. Chairman Mao himself was photographed on the cover of a revolutionary newspaper that announced the desecration of Confuciuss grave in Qufu. My own university was a hotbed of extreme leftism. How times have changed. Today, the Chinese Communist Party approves a film about Confucius starring the handsome leading man Chow Yun-Fat. The master is depicted as an astute military commander and teacher of humane and progressive values, with a soft spot for female beauty. What does this say about Chinas political future? Confucius bombed at the box office, leading many to think that the revival of Confucianism will go the same way as the anti-Confucius campaigns in the
The party has yet to re-label itself the Chinese Confucian Party, but it has moved closer to an ofcial embrace of Confucianism.

Cultural Revolution. But perhaps its just a bad movie. Confucius received the kiss of death when it went head-to-head against the blockbuster Avatar. A vote for Confucius was seen as a vote against the heroic blue creatures from outer space. In the long term, however, Confucian revivalists may be on the right side of history. In the Cultural Revolution, Confucius was often just a label used to attack political enemies. Today, Confucianism serves a more legitimate political function; it can help to provide a new moral foundation for political rule in China. Communism has lost the capacity to inspire the Chinese, and there is growing recognition that its replacement needs to be grounded at least partly in Chinas own traditions. As the dominant political tradition in China, Confucianism is the obvious alternative. The party has yet to re-label itself the Chinese Confucian Party, but it has moved closer to an ofcial embrace of Confucianism. The 2008 Olympics highlighted Confucian themes, quoting The Analects of Confucius at the opening ceremonies and playing down any references to Chinas experiment with communism. Cadres at the newly built Communist Party school in Shanghai proudly tell visitors that the main building is modeled on a Confucian scholars desk. Abroad, the government has been symbolically promoting Confucianism via branches of the Confucius Institute, a Chinese-language and cultural center similar to the Alliance Franaise. Of course, there is resistance as well. Elderly cadres, still inuenced by Maoist antipathy to tradition, condemn efforts to promote ideologies outside a rigid Marxist

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framework. But the younger cadres in their 40s and 50s tend to support such efforts, and time is on their side. Its easy to forget that the 76-million-strong Chinese Communist Party is a large and diverse organization. The party itself is becoming more meritocraticit now encourages high-performing students to joinand the increased emphasis on educated cadres is likely to generate more sympathy for Confucian values. But the revival of Confucianism is not just government-sponsored. On the contrary, the government is also reacting to developments outside its control. There has been a resurgence of interest in Confucianism among academics and in the Chinese equivalent of civil society. The renewed interest is driven partly by normative concerns. Thousands of educational experiments around the country promote the teaching of Confucian classics to young children; the assumption is that better training in
The biggest capitalist class in China has the least percentage of the population, yet it is the group receiving the most benet from the current regime. However, some people within this class have also realized the inevitability that the Chinese Communist Party cannot carry on much further. A group of men of letters fed by these people is therefore designing various schemes for the post-Communist era. There is a common element of interest with the big capitalist class that is shared by the poor and petty bourgeoisie: democracy and human rights. So democracy and human rights are on the minds of most of the Chinese people. However, the democracy advocated by the different classes is different in nature. This is why the argument over the different kinds of democracy in Chinas future has been getting more and more intensied over the last few years. One faction thinks that the democracy means that every person in all classes will participate while another faction emphasizes a democracy ruled by the elite. Generally speaking, the people who have power, inuence and university educations are more likely to lean toward a democracy ruled by the elite. The reason is very simple; because they themselves are the elite. It is human nature that people want to hold power and inuence in their own hands. If complete control is not possible, then the inclusive group could be expanded further. But overall, the closer they hold power to themselves, the better. For the same reason, the poor people who constitute Chinas vast majority and are far away from power and inuence dont want power controlled by the elite minority. Thus, for me, the essence of a democratic politics is really a politics that is good for the poor or at the least a politics not aligned against the poor.
WEI JINGSHENG

Elite Democracy

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the humanities improves the virtue of the learner. More controversiallybecause its still too sensitive to publicly discuss such questions in mainland ChinaConfucian thinkers put forward proposals for constitutional reform aiming to humanize Chinas political system.
AN UPHILL STRUGGLE

| Yet, the problem is not just the Chinese govern-

ment. It can be an uphill struggle to convince people in Western countries that Confucianism can offer a progressive and humane path to political reform in China.

A Challenge to WesternStyle Liberal Democracy?

The following excerpt is taken from Chinas New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday
Life in a Changing Society by Daniel A. Bell (Princeton University Press, 2009).
BEIJING Does Confucianism pose a challenge to Western-style liberal democ-

racy? There are reasons to think that they are compatible, if not mutually reinforcing. Many theorists argue that they are compatible, such as Sor-Hoon Tan in his book Confucian Democracy. In political practice, they have often proved to be compatible: Wang Juntao, a leading Chinese dissident who was jailed for ve years over the 1989 Tiananmen pro-democracy protests, argues that many of the key gures in various democracy movements in contemporary Chinese history drew inspiration from Confucian values. Such inuential early-twentieth-century gures as Sun Yat-sen, Kang Youwei, and Liang Quichao received a Confucian education, and they argue that democratic institutions such as parliamentary systems, elections, and equal rights are natural extensions of Confucianism. Jiang Qing, the contemporary Confucian intellectual, contrasts his Confucian theory with Western-style liberal democracy and argues that Confucianism is more appropriate for China. But his institutional proposals take on board certain liberal assumptions such as freedom of religion: He argues for the establishment of Confucianism as a state religion and compares the system to state religions in the United Kingdom and Sweden with other religions not being prohibited. Even official sources point to the possibility of reconciling Confucianism with liberal democracy. On October 12, 2006, the newspaper Nanfang Zhoumou (Southern Weekly) perhaps the leading intellectual newspaper in China published an editorial on the meaning of the term harmonious society. It invokes the quote in the Analects of Confucius that exemplary persons seek harmony, not conformity. Then it breaks down the characters in the term harmony, with the explanation that the rst literally refers to grain into the mouth, meaning people and social security, and the second refers to everything

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Why does the revival of Confucianism so often worry Westerners? One reason may be a form of self-love. For most of the 20th century, Chinese liberals and Marxists engaged in a totalizing critique of their own heritage and looked to the West for inspiration. It may have been attering for Westernerslook, they want to be just like us! but there is less sympathy now that Chinese are taking pride in their own traditions for thinking about social and political reform. But more understanding and a bit of open-mindedness can take care of that problem.
For most of the 20th century, Chinese liberals and Marxists looked to the West for inspiration. There is less

can be spoken, meaning democracy and the freedom of speech. The editorial goes on to say that the welfare state requires democracy and the rule of law as an underlying framework. Confucian emphasis on meritocracy rule by the most talented and publicspirited members of the community might seem to conict with democracy, but there have been institutional proposals to combine the two desiderata. In a manuscript titled A Faith in Life and Kingly Way of Politics (unpublished in mainland China), Jiang Qing puts forward an interesting proposal for a tricameral legislature that includes representation for peoples representatives, Confucian elites chosen by competitive examinations that test for knowledge of the Confucian classics, and elites entrusted with the task of cultural continuity. The last proposal that elites would include descendants of Confuciuss family stands about as much chance of being realized as proposals for reinstituting more seats for hereditary aristocrats in the British House of Lords. But the possibility of a bicameral legislature, with one political institution composed of democratic leaders chosen by free and fair competitive examinations, and another of meritocratic leaders chosen by free and fair examinations, is more consistent with commitments to Confucian meritocracy and modern-day democracy. But which institution should have priority? Here things become more complicated. At the local level, all sides in the debate recognize that leaders should be democratically elected. The Chinese government introduced direct village elections in 1988 to maintain social order and combat corruption of leaders, and they have since occurred in some 700,000 villages across China, reaching 75 percent of the nations 1.3 billion people. Of course, such elections are not free of problems. There have been worries about the quality of decision-making and the extent to which local elections really curb the power of local cadres and wealthy elites. In response, the government has backed experiments with deliberative continued on next page 

sympathy now that Chinese are taking pride in their own traditions for thinking about social and political reform.

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Another reason may be that the revival of Confucianism is thought to be associated with the revival of Islamic fundamentalism and its anti-Western tendencies. Perhaps the revival of closed-minded and intolerant Christian fundamentalism also comes to mind. But the revival of Confucianism in China is not so opposed to liberal social ways (other than extreme individualistic lifestyles, in which the good life is sought mainly outside social relationships). What it does propose is an alternative to Western political ways, and that may be the main worry. But this worry stems from an

A Challenge to WesternStyle Liberal Democracy? (continued)

democracy at the local level designed to address such problems. Such experiments hold the promise of aiding the democratic education process and securing more fair outcomes from that process. Once democracy becomes institutionalized at the local level, it can then be further extended to township, city, and provincial levels. But empowering democratically elected leaders at the national level is far more controversial. It is one thing to debate and vote on the price of water and electricity and the relocation of farmers one expects that local citizens with the detailed knowledge required for making choices that intimately affect their daily lives are best placed to make such judgments. It is another to ask voters to make informed judgments about empirically complex issues such as settling interprovincial disputes or assessing the trade-off between economic growth and safeguarding the environment for future generations, the sorts of issues that may be only distantly related to their lives. And what about asking the people to make life-and-death decisions such as whether or not to go to war or how best to curb virulent contagious infections? With respect to decision-making at the national level, one hopes not only for fair representation and local solidarity, but also for deliberators with the ability to process large amounts of information as well as sensitivity to the interests of different kinds of people, including foreigners and future generations that are affected by national policies. It is not just the government that balks at the prospect of turning over the levers of the Chinese state to 800 million residents with primary-school education. Few academics teaching in mainland Chinese universities including those who call themselves liberals favor countrywide democracy within the next decade or so (and discussions are completely free in the context of alcohol-fueled dinners with friends). The inuential intellectual Yu Keping titled his recent book Democracy Is a Good Thing, but the lead essay argues that our construction of political democracy must be closely integrated with the history, culture, tradition

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honest mistake: the assumption that less support for Western-style democracy means increased support for authoritarianism. In China, packaging the debate in terms of democracy versus authoritarianism crowds out possibilities that appeal to Confucian political reformers. Confucian reformers generally favor more freedom of speech in China. What they question is democracy in the sense of Western-style competitive elections as the mechanism for choosing the countrys most powerful rulers. One clear problem with
In China, packaging the debate in terms of democracy versus authoritarianism crowds out

and existing conditions in our nation. In practice, it means that elections should be extended all the way up to the choice of representatives for the National Peoples Congress, but only from candidates screened by the party. Even those critical of the lack of commitment to democracy among contemporary Chinese intellectuals may betray certain assumptions that are difcult to reconcile with rule by elected politicians. Cai Dingjian of the Chinese University of Law and Politics has written an essay (in Chinese) titled In Defense of Democracy! A Response to Contemporary Anti-democratic Theory. The essay is an important academic and political contribution to the debate on democratization in China. Cai argues forcefully against some of the most frequent objections to democratic rule in China that it benets only majorities, that it undermines stability and economic development, and that it contributes to corruption. To support the view that the quality of the people does not undermine the prospects of democracy, however, he draws on Singapore founding father Lee Kuan Yews point that Singapores Chinese immigrants (largely from poor or undereducated backgrounds) have succeeded in establishing a good society based on the rule of law. What Singaporean Chinese can do, mainland Chinese can do, whether its the rule of law or democracy. But Singapores rule of law relies on legal punishments that control detailed aspects of everyday life: as the joke goes, Singapore is a ne city. And Singapore wasnt anything close to democracy at Chinas level of wealth and education (the same is true of Taiwan and South Korea). Today, there are elections, but Singapore-style democracy means overwhelming dominance of the ruling Peoples Action Party along with harsh punishments for opposition politicians that range from public humiliation to bankruptcy and exile. Even more worrisome, Lee himself is perhaps the most notorious defender of rule by meritocratically selected political elites, a view he supports with dubious continued on next page 

possibilities that appeal to Confucian political reformers.

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one person, one vote is that equality ends at the boundaries of the political community; those outside are neglected. The national focus of the democratically elected political leaders is assumed; they are meant to serve only the community of voters. Even democracies that work well tend to focus on the interests of citizens and neglect the interests of foreigners. But political leaders, especially leaders of big countries such as China, make decisions that affect the rest of the world (consider global warming), and so they need to consider the interests of the rest of the world.

A Challenge to WesternStyle Liberal Democracy? (continued)

eugenic theories. Lees view is that education wont sufce; there will always be a minority of people endowed with superior innate intelligence (such as his own son, the current prime minister of Singapore, and other family members that control key levers of the economy), and they should be societys leaders. And the rulers themselves get to decide on who counts as the best and brightest. This is not, to put it mildly, the kind of model supporters of democracy should endorse. So for the foreseeable future, it is highly unlikely that democratic rule at the national level will emerge in China. The proposal most likely to garner support from government ofcials and intellectual elites who are best positioned to think about and implement political reform is for a strong, meritocratically chosen legislature that has constitutional priority over the democratically elected house. The proposal might gain additional support if it incorporates the following features:
I

The deputies in the meritocratic house are chosen (by examinations) for

seven- or eight-year terms and there are strict penalties for corruption.
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The examinations test for the Confucian classics, basic economics, world

history, and foreign language, and they are set by an independent board of academics randomly chosen from Chinas universities that is sequestered from the rest of society during the examination process.
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There is substantial deliberation before decisions are taken in the merito-

cratic house, and most debates are televised and transmitted to the public on the Web.
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The national democratic legislatures main function is to transmit the peo-

ples (relatively uniformed) preferences to the meritocratic house. At the provincial, township, city, and village levels, the top decision-makers are chosen by means of competitive elections, and decisions are taken in deliberation forums.
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Freedom of the press is basically secure, and there are many opportunities

to raise objections and present grievances to deputies at the national level. Farfetched? Its no less so than scenarios that envision a transition to

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Hence, reformist Confucians put forward political ideals that are meant to work better than Western-style democracy in terms of securing the interests of all those affected by the policies of the government, including future generations and foreigners. Their ideal is not a world where everybody is treated as an equal but one where the interests of non-voters would be taken more seriously than in most nation-centered democracies. And the key value for realizing global political ideals is meritocracy, meaning equality of opportunity in education and government, with
Rather than subordinating Confucian values and institutions to democracy as an a pri-

Western-style liberal democracy (because both scenarios assume an end to oneparty rule), and it answers the main worry about the transition to democracy: that it translates into rule by uneducated people. As more Chinese gain access to education, and democratic values and practices become more entrenched, the democratic legislature can be empowered relative to the meritocratic house. Strong democrats may prefer to abolish the meritocratic house in due course or at least reduce it to an advisory and symbolic function if it helps to strengthen the democratic system but there may be a case for more permanent empowerment of the meritocratic house when democratic processes threaten to get out of hand. During a seminar at Tsingua University in October, 2006, the comparative political scientist Adam Przeworski noted that nonpartisan institutions play an important role in resolving conicts when partisan politics cannot produce sufcient consensus for nonviolent decision-making, and that the meritocratic house could serve this function in the Chinese context. Like the Thai king, it would intervene only in exceptional cases. There may be the worry that the strong meritocratic system becomes entrenched fossilized, like the American constitutional system and hard to change once its in place. But what if it works well? The deputies debate at length. They favor policies that prioritize the needs of the disadvantaged. They consider the interests of all those affected by policies, including future generations and even foreigners. For long-term planning, they favor technological change that frees workers from the need to engage in drudge labor. They also try to limit the environmental impact of new technologies. And what if the large majority of Chinese seem satised with strong meritocracy? Should we complain just because the system doesnt satisfy our ideas about democratic rule, or should we allow for the possibility that there are morally legitimate, if not superior, alternatives to Western-style liberal democracy?

ori dictum, they contain a division of labor, with democracy having priority in some areas and meritocracy in others.

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positions of leadership being distributed to the most virtuous and qualified members of the community. The idea is that everyone has the potential to become morally exemplary, but, in real life, the capacity to make competent and morally justifiable political judgments varies among people, and an important task of the political system is to identify those with above-average ability.
CONFUCIAN VALUES IN PRACTICE

| What might such values mean in

practice? In the past decade, Confucian intellectuals have put forward political proposals that aim to combine Western ideas of democracy with Confucian ideas of meritocracy. Rather than subordinating Confucian values and institutions to democracy as an a priori dictum, they contain a division of labor, with democracy having priority in some areas and meritocracy in others. If its about land disputes in rural China, farmers should have a greater say. If its about pay and safety disputes, workIn the past decade, Confucian intellectuals have put forward political proposals that aim to combine Western ideas of democracy with Confucian ideas of meritocracy.

ers should have a greater say. In practice, it means more freedom of speech and association and more representation for workers and farmers in some sort of democratic house. But what about matters such as foreign policy and environmental protection? What the government does in such areas affects the interests of non-voters, and they need some form of representation as well. Hence, Confucian thinkers put forward proposals for a meritocratic house of government, with deputies selected by such mechanisms as free and fair competitive examinations, that would have the task of representing the interests of non-voters typically neglected by democratically selected decision-makers. One obvious objection to examinations is that they cannot test for the kinds of virtues that concerned Confuciusexibility, humility, compassion and publicspiritednessand that, ideally, would also characterize political decision-makers in the modern world. Its true that examinations wont test perfectly for those virtues, but the question is whether deputies chosen by such examinations are more likely to be farsighted than those chosen by elections. There are reasons to believe so. Drawing on extensive empirical research, Bryan Caplans book The Myth of the Rational Voter:Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies shows that voters are often irrational, and he suggests tests of voter competence as a remedy. So examinations would test for basic economic policy (and knowledge of international relations), but they would also cover knowledge of the Confucian classics, testing for memorization as well as interpretation. The leading Confucian political thinker, Jiang Qing, argues that examinations could set a framework and moral vocabulary for subsequent political actions, and successful candidates would also need to be evaluated in terms of how they perform in practice.

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Farfetched? Its no less so than scenarios that envision a transition to Westernstyle liberal democracy (because both scenarios assume a more open society). And it answers the key worry about the transition to democracy: that it translates into shortterm, unduly nationalistic policymaking. Its also a matter of what standards we should use to evaluate Chinas political progress. Politically speaking, most people think China should look more like the West. But one day, perhaps, we will hope that the West looks more like China.
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Voters are often irrational.

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