How to Reduce a Functional Psychology

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How to Reduce a Functional Psychology?

Patricia Kitcher

Philosophy of Science

, Vol. 47, No. 1. (Mar., 1980), pp. 134-140.

Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28198003%2947%3A1%3C134%3AHTRAFP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H

Philosophy of Science

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DISCUSSION:HOW TO REDUCE A FUNCTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY?*

PATRICIA KITCHERf

University of Vermont

The argument that a functional psychology would be irreducibleto neurophysiology has almost become a commonplace in philosophicalpsychology. Hence, the claim made by Robert Richardson in ''Func-tionalism and Reductionism" (1979), that the considerations adducedto show that functionalism in psychology is incompatible with reductionto physiology are insufficient for the task, should come as somethingof a shock.

I

will try to clarify three of the issues Richardson raises.First,I

will

look briefly at Richardson's parting comment that thebelief in the autonomy of psychology has adverse methodologicaleffects on psychology and neurophysiology. Next,

I

will take up theargument of section

1.3

(Richardson 1979), that afunctional psychologymust be purely functional or computational. Finally, I will explorethe implicit claim that the case of genetics can shed some light onthe issue of reduction in psychology. With these points in sharperfocus, we can assess Richardson's basic contention that Putnam andFodor (and many others) are mistaken in believing that functionalismin psychology implies the autonomy of psychology.

XI.

$be Methodoflogicall

Paint.

I think this issue is a red herring. Theburden of the autonomy of psychology doctrine is that psychologicalcategories

will

not coincide with neurophysislogical categories. Butthis does not imply that understanding the psychological organizationof the brain would be useless in determining its physiological organiza-

'Received July 1979; revised August 1979.

TI

commented on Robert Richardson's "The Autonomy of Psychology: Putnam'sModest Proposal" (1978) at the Eastern Division Meetings of the A.P.A. in Decemberof 1978. At the time he sent me that paper, Professor Richardson kindly includedacopy of the longer paper, "Functionalism and Reductionism"

(1979),

of which theA.P.A. paper was a part.

I

am grateful to several people, particularly

N.

J. Blockand Philip Kitcher, for encouraging me to expand my A.P.A. comments into a replyto Professor Richardson's larger project.

I

am also grateful to an anonymous refereefor

Philosophy of Science

whose perceptive comments led me to clarify some keypoints.

Philosophy

of

Science,

47 (1980) pp. 134-140. Copyright

O

1980

by

the Philosophy of Science Association. 

135

ISCUSSION: FUNCTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

tion. To take a simple schematic example, if psychology tells us thatA-states always produce B-states, and if we know that A-states aresometimes instantiated by neurophysiological states of kind N,, andthat all instances of B-states in human beings occur in a certain regionof the brain, then we should look for some mechanism connectingN,,-states to that cerebral location. From the other direction, knowinghow the brain works would provide numerous clues about the functionalrelations among mental states. Again, a fictional example can illustrate.Suppose that physiologists discover a welter of pathways from thevarious regions of the human brain associated with imagination toneural areas which control motor activity. This would suggest thatimagination only appears to be an entirely armchair activity; partof imagining may involve the testing of motor readiness as well asthe testing of hypotheses. To claim that psychology cannot be reducedto neurophysiology is not to claim that they are totally unrelated.Only the latter, extreme position could sunder research in psychologyfrom research in neurophysiology.

2.

Functional Psychology and Computational Psychology.

Let us saythat a psychology is "functional" if it specifies the type-identityconditions for each psychological state at least partly by referenceto its relations to inputs, outputs, and other psychological states.

A

computational psychology would specify the type-identity conditionsfor psychological states solely by reference to their relations to input,outputs and one another. Hence there are two varieties of functionalpsychology: the purely functional or computational and the mixed,which employs relational and some sort of intrinsic characterizationsof psychological states. In section 1.3 (1979), Richardson hopes toshow that results concerning the relation between autonomy andcomputational psychology can be generalized to all functional psychol-ogies (1979, pp. 537-539). This is afunny way to put the point, however,since what he argues is that a commitment to functional psychologyand to the autonomy of psychology yields a commitment to computa-tional psychology. ("If this much is granted, a computational viewis inevitable.") Were it cogent, this argument by itself would demon-strate a very strong relation between the claim that psychology isautonomous and the claim that psychology is functional, but not purelyfunctional,

viz,

the relation of inconsistency.I wish to consider this argument, not because it is relevant to thedebate between Richardson, and Putnam and Fodor, who both seemto support the computational view, but because it is essential to thelarger issue of the possible forms a psychological theory might take.Psychological theorizing is hard enough, without having to restrict

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