T

nr

T

:riicn

4



J

::

1

+ :r

P

oii+ics.

A C

ri+ic:i

R

r-

A

rrr:is:i

175

Blackwell Publishing Ltd Oxford, UK MUWO The MuslimWorld 0027-4909 2006 Hartford Seminary January 2006 96 1

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

T

nr

T

:riicni

J

::

:+



:r

P

oii+ics

: A C

ri+ic:i

R

r

-A

rrr:is:i

T

nr

M

tsii

W

orir

The Tabligh

i

Jama

a

t
and Politics: A Critical
Re-Appraisal

Yoginder Sikand

Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World
Leiden, The Netherlands

Introduction

T

he twentieth century has witnessed the emergence of a number of
movements for religious revival, revitalization and reform among
Muslims all over the world. Much has been written about this
phenomenon by various scholars. Of particular concern in writings on the
global Islamic revival has been what is referred to in the literature as Islamist
movements, movements whose principal goal is the establishment of an
Islamic state or states based on the

shar

i

ah

. On the other hand, Islamic
movements that prefer to steer clear of direct involvement in the affairs of the
state or those which do not explicitly aspire to acquire political power for
themselves in the immediate future have been generally ignored by scholars.
One of these, probably the largest Islamic movement in the world today, is the
Tabligh

i

Jama

a

t (TJ).

1

The TJ was launched in the mid-1920s in colonial north India and today
has a presence in virtually every country where Muslims live.

2

Its founder,
the charismatic

a

lim

, Maulana Muhammad Ilyas (18851944), believed that
Muslims had strayed far from the teachings of Islam. Hence, he felt the urgent
need for Muslims to go back to the basic principles of their faith, and to strictly
observe the commandments of Islam in their own personal lives and in their
dealings with others. This alone, he believed, would win for the Muslims the
pleasure of God, who would then be moved to grant them success (

fal

ah

) in
this world and in the life after death.
Ilyas own political views have been the subject of considerable debate.
Most writers on and critics of the TJ, as well as TJ authorities themselves,
tend to see the TJ as completely apolitical. They have taken the movements
aloofness from direct involvement in party politics as adequate proof of the
T

nr

M

tsii

W

orir

V

oitr

96

J

:t:r

2006

176
movement being allegedly apolitical. Thus, for instance, Faruqi opines that the
TJ advocates a complete and deliberate isolation from politics.

3

Likewise,
Sadowsky asserts that while the TJ is not secularist in the Western sense, it
does not, in contrast to Islamist groups, advocate a totalitarian conation of
religion and politics, believing that Islam does not specify an ideal political
system or a universal and timeless blueprint for a political utopia.

4

TJ activists
and leaders also insist that they have nothing to do with politics. We concern
ourselves only with what is in the heavens above and the grave below is a
favorite Tabligh

i

refrain. While several scholars have indeed questioned the
Tablighis claim to being apolitical, with one even accusing it of hiding its true
political aims in order to protect itself from repression

5

, no detailed analysis
of what Masud calls the TJs political vision

6

has as yet been undertaken.
The TJs political vision is not explicitly stated by the movements leaders
and can only be uncovered through an examination of the various political
roles that it has played in different spatio-temporal contexts. This, however,
is no easy task. For one thing, the TJ has no ofcial literature of its own in
which the stand of the movement on political affairs is articulated. In the words
of a Tablighi activist, the movements policy is no literature, no talk, no
expenditure (

na parcha, na charcha, na kharcha

).

7

This is said to be not
only a reection of Ilyas own belief that Islamic missionary work was, above
all, a practical activity, and not something to be simply written or talked about,
but also a strategy to avoid coming to the notice of government authorities
which might seek to interfere with the activity of the movement. As another
Tablighi activist puts it, Let sleeping dogs lie. Why wake them up when we
are still weak?.

8

Another major difculty in analyzing the TJs attitude towards political
affairs is that statements of its leaders can be interpreted in different, indeed
contrary, ways to suggest either a total disavowal of politics or advocacy of
a true Islamic form of politics. Thus, for instance, Anwar ul-Haq quotes Ilyas
as having said that, The aims of modern political authority and Islam do not
coincide, and that if Islam were to make any progress it must be divorced
from politics.

9

On the other hand, Sa

eed Ahmad Khan, a leading Indian
Tablighi ideologue, insists that In order to turn the hearts of the people
towards Allah you need the politics of the Prophet. Through the politics
of the Prophet people develop the qualities of inner reliance and piety.

10

In order, then, to examine the TJs political vision, one needs to move
beyond an examination of TJ verbal discourse to an understanding of the
various political roles that its activists have played in different contexts. These
roles may often seem contrary to each other, such as, for instance, promoting
a de-politicized understanding of Islam in some cases and thus effectively
countering the appeals of Islamist groups, while in other cases promoting
T

nr

T

:riicn

4



J

::

1

+ :r

P

oii+ics.

A C

ri+ic:i

R

r-

A

rrr:is:i

177
a climate of heightened Islamic awareness conducive to the emergence and
growth of Islamist movements or even participating in militant struggles or
assuming key posts in state structures. In effect, these various political roles
that the TJ plays in different contexts point to the fact that overall political
vision of the movement is determined by the basic requirement for the
movement to survive and expand and to sustain a commitment to Islamic
activism.
This article seeks to argue that contrary to what TJ leaders and activists
insist, the movement does indeed have a political vision, and is, through the
various political roles that it plays, deeply engaged in questions of power,
legitimacy and authority which are the very stuff of politics. While it is true that
the movements immediate focus has been on the reform of the individual
rather than the capture of state power, this does not mean that the TJ has
nothing at all to do with politics, for this is to take a very narrow and restrictive
view of the political. If we shift our attention from the affairs of the state alone
and see politics in more comprehensive terms, as the dynamics of power in
society as a whole, the notion that anything can be apolitical in a political
world strikes one as simply absurd. As Imtiaz Ahmad notes of the TJ, Even
staying aloof from party politics or even such personal acts as growing a beard
or donning a veil are themselves powerful political acts, political statements
that have their own political implications.

11

And, as Mumtaz Ahmad remarks,
individual choices to remain aloof from direct involvement in party politics,
when added together, have their own share of political consequences because,
For religion and for politics, whether the original choice is neutrality or
activism the result is equally political.

12

In this sense, then, the TJ can hardly
be said to be apolitical at all. As this article argues, individuals associated
with the TJ have been playing major political roles in various contexts.
Further, the movements activities have their own share of broader political
implications, which have not received the critical attention by writers on the
movement which they deserve. In other words, the TJ does indeed have
a long-term political vision of its own, which must be seen as distinct from
its immediate objective of the reform of individual believers, exhorting them
to become true Muslims and strictly abide by the commandments of Islam
in their personal lives.
Like other movements, the TJ has undergone a process of transition over
time, and along with this, its attitude towards questions of power has also
witnessed a subtle shift, which is not immediately noticeable to activists in the
movement, for it projects itself as faithfully following in the footsteps of its
founder. This article also looks at how the movements stance on questions of
power and politics has gradually changed over time, with the death of Maulana
Ilyas in 1944 marking a crucial watershed in this regard. The shifts in the
T

nr

M

tsii

W

orir

V

oitr

96

J

:t:r

2006

178
political stance of the movement are then sought to be linked to the changing
political contexts in which the movement has had to operate after Ilyas death.

Maulana Ilyas and His Approach to Politics

Maulana Muhammad Ilyas was born in 1885 in the town of Kandhla in the
Muzaffarnagar district of the then United Provinces. His family was particularly
noted for its piety, and for its commitment to the cause of Islamic reform
spearheaded by the noted eighteenth century scholar of Delhi, Shah Waliullah
(170362). Faced with the rapid decline of Muslim political power, Shah
Waliullah had insisted that Muslims should strictly abide by the teachings of
their faith, for this alone would win them the grace of God, who would
then be moved to grant them political strength in the face of the growing
power of their non-Muslim foes. Shah Waliullah spawned a powerful
movement of Islamic revival which spread over much of north India.

Ulama


inspired by the Waliullahi tradition began to crusade against what they saw as
the pervasive non-Islamic practices of the Indian Muslims, urging a strict
practice of the teachings of the faith. Faced with the growing power of the
British, Shah Waliullahs son Shah

Abdul

Aziz (17461824) declared India to
have become a land of war (

dar ul-harb

). One of Shah

Abdul

Azizs leading
disciples, Sayyed Ahmad Shahid (17861831), along with Shah Isma

il,
grandson of Shah Waliullah, and several thousand followers, went further and
declared an armed

jih

a

d

against the Sikhs in the Punjab, hoping to establish
an Islamic state in the North-West Frontier Province. The local Pathan Muslims
did not, however, take kindly to the forcible imposition of the

shar

i

ah by
the mujahidin and rose up in revolt. Sayyed Ahmad and Shah Ismail lost
their lives ghting the Sikhs at Balakot in 1824. Yet, the mujahidin movement
that they had launched refused to die out, and sporadic uprisings led by
followers of these two heroes continued until after the British take-over of the
region in the 1870s, after which they were forcibly crushed by the colonial
authorities.
Although in the face of colonial power, Muslims soon realized the futility
of attempting to reinstate Muslim rule through force of arms, the dream of
an Islamic state in India refused to die out, continuing to inspire many. The
stories of Hazrat Shah Abdul Aziz and Sayyed Ahmad Shahid, writes one
author, were constantly on the tongues of the men and the women of the
family of Maulana Muhammad Ilyas. Ilyas mother and the other women in
the family, we are told, would regale the children with stories not about
parrots and mynahs but about these brave and great leaders.
13
The memory
of Muslim political power and the struggles to revive it thus played a seminal
role in the formation of Ilyas own personality from childhood itself, as it did
in the case of numerous other Muslim leaders of his time.
Tnr T:riicn4 J::1+ :r Poii+ics. A Cri+ic:i Rr-Arrr:is:i
179
Ilyas was given a traditional Islamic education. At the age of twelve he
was sent to Gangoh to study under the reformist alim Maulana Rashid Ahmad
(18291905), where he spent nine long years. After this, in 1908, he proceeded
to the Dar ul-Ulum at Deoband, the leading Islamic reformist seminary in
India. The founders of the Dar ul-Ulum saw themselves as preservers of the
Islamic sciences from the onslaught of the forces of modernity, Westernization
and materialism. Ilyas years at the madrasa exercised a seminal inuence on
his own thinking. While at the madrasa he is said to have taken an oath of
jihad against the British from the leading Deobandi scholar Maulana Mahmud
ul-Hasan, who himself was to play a leading role in mobilizing the Muslims of
India against British rule.
14
From Deoband, Ilyas proceeded to the Mazahir
ul-Ulum at Saharanpur, a sister institution of the Dar ul-Ulum. In 1910 he
was appointed as a teacher here, a post that he occupied till 1917, when he
shifted to Delhi to take charge of a madrasa run by his elder brother, Maulana
Muhammad, who died in that year. Ilyas had intended to make teaching his
career, but the rapidly changing political conditions of the times forced him to
change his plans and to launch what was to go on to become one of the largest
Islamic movements of modern times. As we shall see, the very genesis of the
movement that Ilyas launched lay in his response to what many Muslims
saw as the menacing political challenge of aggressive Hindu organizations
at the time. In this sense, in its very origins the TJ can be said to have been
a response to a complex political situation that the Indian Muslim community
was faced with, in the context of growing Hindu communalism and the
emergence of Islamic revivalist movements and movements for the promotion
of Muslim communal interests, such as the Muslim League. To argue that Ilyas
had no concern whatsoever for political developments that were now posing
grave challenges to the community is, therefore, completely misleading.
By the early 1920s Hindu-Muslim conict, which had been steadily
growing with the onset of British rule, witnessed a sudden upsurge, with the
emergence of numerous aggressive communal bodies and movements. British
policy had all along been to encourage these differences so as to shore up
imperial rule. In an effort to win the support of Muslim and Hindu elites, from
the closing years of the nineteenth century onwards the British began allowing
for a limited, although growing, participation for Indians in the colonial
administration. Access to junior government posts was apportioned for various
communities dened on the basis of religion. By the second decade of the
twentieth century, such opportunities for Muslim and Hindu elites were
considerably increased, as a result of mounting pressures and demands on the
colonial state. Increasing the numbers of their co-religionists now assumed a
particular urgency for Hindu and Muslim leaders, for numbers now crucially
mattered in the struggle for power. In 1922, the Hindu revivalist Arya Samaj
Tnr Mtsii Worir Voitr 96 J:t:r 2006
180
launched a well-organized campaign to bring into the Muslim fold a large
number of Muslim groups that had still retained many customs and practices
associated with their pre-conversion Hindu past. In a few months they claimed
to have made several hundred thousand such converts. Muslim leaders reacted
with panic at the news, and several efforts were launched for tabligh, or
Islamic mission, aiming principally at bringing back the apostates into the
Muslim fold and preventing further conversions to Hinduism by spreading
Islamic awareness among nau-Muslims (new Muslims), Muslim communities
who had still retained many of their earlier Hindu customs. The TJ was only
one of several such Islamic missionary groups that were launched at this time
in response to the Arya challenge, but it was the only one to outlive its founder
and grow into a global movement.
15
Ilyas believed that the loss of the political power of the Muslims and their
increasing marginalization at the hands of non-Muslim forces, in India as well
as elsewhere, owed entirely to Muslims having abandoned the path of the
faith. Hence, he insisted, if Muslims were to strictly practice Islam in their
personal lives they would earn Gods grace, and God would then enable bless
them with success ( falah) both in this world and in the life after death. God
would be moved to grant Muslims political power as his khulafa or deputies
if only they would go back to the path of the Prophet Muhammad and his
Companions. Muslims were promised that if they faithfully followed the
example of the Prophet in their personal lives they would dominate over non-
believers and would be destined to be the masters of each and every thing
on this earth.
16
Political power, Ilyas declared, can never be the objective
of a true Muslim. However, Walking in the path of the Prophet, he said, if
we attain political power then we should not shirk the responsibility.
17
Hence,
political power, Ilyas insisted, was not to be shunned, but neither was it to
be directly struggled for. Rather, it would be granted as a blessing by God to
the Muslims once they returned to the path of Islam, after which the Islamic
state and social order would be established.
18
The immediate task before the
Muslims, therefore, was to strictly practice Islam in their personal lives and to
abide by its basic principles, which Ilyas presented in the form of what were
later to be called as the chhe baten or the six principles: kalima shahada
(the Islamic creed of confession, There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is
the Messenger of Allah), namaz (ritual worship) ilm-o zikr (knowledge of
the basics of the faith and constant remembrance of God), ikram-i muslim
(respect for other Muslims), tashih-i niyyat (purication of the intention) and
tafrigh-i waqt (sacricing time for missionary work).
19
Ilyas saw the chhe baten as a means to gradually develop an Islamic
awareness among the Muslim masses, particularly the nau-Muslims. By
abiding by these strictures, ordinary Muslims would gain a sufcient
Tnr T:riicn4 J::1+ :r Poii+ics. A Cri+ic:i Rr-Arrr:is:i
181
understanding of Islam and commitment to the demands of the faith. This
would then inspire them to abide by the teachings and rules of Islam in their
collective affairs. Once sufcient numbers of Muslims began to pattern their
personal as well as collective affairs in accordance with the laws of Islam, God
would bless the Muslims with political power, and eventually an Islamic state
based on the shari ah would come into being. In this regard, it is interesting
to note, Ilyas did not differ with Islamist activists as to the nal goal. Rather,
where he departed from them was on the appropriate means of attaining the
goal of an Islamic state and society in the specic Indian context of his times.
In contrast to the Islamists, who called for the capture of political power and
control over the state in order to establish Islamic rule, Ilyas advocated a
bottom-up approach, working in a gradual manner, encouraging individual
Muslims to strictly abide by the teachings of Islam in the belief that ultimately
an Islamic society, crowned with an Islamic state, would come into being.
That the ultimate acquisition of political power in the future was of central
importance to Ilyass own vision of Islam is clearly evident in the reports that
we have of his association with other Islamic leaders of his times. Mumtaz
Ahmad writes that while Ilyas saw his movement as geared particularly at
ordinary Muslims, inspiring them with a dedication to Islam, he was not
opposed to other contemporary movements which were struggling for Muslim
political power. In fact, he was of the view that the TJ and such Muslim
movements were complimentary to each other, rather than rivals, as both had
an important role to play, albeit operating in different spheres and using
different methods. There should be no competition or rivalry between them,
Ilyas insisted.
20
According to Manzur Numani, (d. 1997) a close disciple of
Ilyas, in a conversation with a group of Indian Muslim politicians, confessed
Ilyas once that he was under great obligation to them on two counts: rstly,
because they were engaged in trying to improve the worldly conditions of
Muslims; and secondly, because by their involvement in politics they had
diverted the attention of the British [colonial] authorities towards them,
thereby leaving him free to carry on with his own work without interference
from the state.
21
This suggests that Ilyas understanding of individual reform
and his distance from matters related to the state can be read as reecting an
underlying, unwritten division of labour the TJ focusing on the individual,
while other Muslim groups working in the political sphere. This point is
acknowledged by an Indian Muslim alim whose sympathies lie with both the
TJ and the Islamist Jamaat-i Islami, who claims that the TJs aloofness from
overt political involvement is simply a temporary pious pragmatic policy
(mukhlisana hikmat-i amali) to enable it to carry on the work of promoting
Islamic consciousness, even in situations where governments may place
Islamist groups under strict control. The TJ, he says, has no differences with
Tnr Mtsii Worir Voitr 96 J:t:r 2006
182
Islamist groups on the ultimate goal of establishing an Islamic political order.
Its immediate focus is, however, on individual reform simply because one
organization cannot perform all the many tasks involved in the struggle to set
up an Islamic system.
22
In other words, according to this reading of the history of the TJ, the
movement was intended to complement the efforts of Islamist groups
working in the political sphere to establish the Islamic system. This belief
is strengthened by the fact that Ilyas himself shared a common vision and
commitment with numerous Islamic activists who were deeply involved in
the struggle for political power. Ilyas is said to have remarked on numerous
occasions that his movement aimed at implementing the teachings of the
renowned Deobandi alim and advocate of a separate Islamic state of Pakistan,
Ashraf Ali Thanwi, albeit using its own unique methods. Ilyas close
association with leading pro-Congress Deobandi scholars, such as Hussain
Ahmad Madni, who were at the forefront of the struggle against the British,
and whom he accepted as his mentors, suggests that he shared with them the
aim of acquiring political power for the Muslims, although, as in the case with
Thanwi, he felt that his own methods of working were more suitable to
working among the nau-Muslims. This is also the case with Ilyas association
with Maulana Sayyed Abul Ala Maududi, the founder of the Jamaat-i Islami,
the leading South Asian Islamist movement. In 1939, Maududi visited Mewat,
the area south of Delhi which Ilyas had specially chosen for his work, and
wrote a lengthy article in his Tarjuman ul-Quran in fulsome praise of Ilyas
work, hailing it as a major milestone on the onward march of Islamic revival
in South Asia.
23
Ilyas reciprocated this gesture by declaring that the real work
(asal kam) of Islam was what Maududi was engaged in working to
establish Islam as a complete way of life and social system in its all-embracing
wholeness (iqamat-i din), modestly adding that his own efforts were only the
initial work (ibtidai kam).
24
In a letter to a disciple, Zahir ul-Hasan, Ilyas
rebutted those who thought that his movement was concerned only with ritual
worship, arguing that the TJ was intended to revive Islam in its entirety
(iqamat-i din), sharing this goal with Islamist groups. The chhe baten were
intended to be simply a means for iqamat-i din particularly suitable to the
Indian context, where Muslims were a minority and where un-Islamic practices
were widespread among the Muslims, particularly the nau-Muslims.
25
The TJ and Politics After Ilyas
A distinct shift seems to have been witnessed in the TJ and its approach to
questions of power and politics after Ilyas death in 1944, a trend that seems
to have been particularly noticeable in the aftermath of the Partition of India
in 1947. In post-47 India, with Muslims having been rendered a vulnerable and
Tnr T:riicn4 J::1+ :r Poii+ics. A Cri+ic:i Rr-Arrr:is:i
183
beleaguered minority, the aggressive communal politics of groups such as the
Muslim League that had characterized the earlier decades were no longer a
feasible option for the community. Any separate political assertion by Muslims
would have invited stern Hindu reprisals. The Muslim League wound itself up
in most parts of the country, with many of its leaders opportunistically joining
their one-time inveterate foe, the Congress Party. Most Muslims transferred
their allegiance to the Congress, seeing it as the only bulwark against the
looming threat of Hindu militancy. In a context of Muslim insecurity and the
growing strength of Hindu revivalism, the TJ began presenting itself as
completely apolitical. It is difcult not to agree with the assertion that this was
itself a well thought-out political strategy to accommodate itself to the new
political context. Keeping aloof from involvement in political activities, the TJ
leadership, under Ilyass son, Maulana Muhammad Yusuf (d. 1965), believed
that this was the only way in which that the movement could carry on with its
activities without provoking the state and aggressive Hindu revivalist forces.
Hence, in the post-1947 period, the TJ began being characterized by an
increasing insularity from not just political involvement, but from other worldly
affairs as well. Its claims of having nothing to do with politics now came to be
asserted with pride, as if political involvement itself were a grave sin.
Despite claims of being completely apolitical, the TJs activities themselves
continued to have serious political implications. Indeed, there was no way in
which this could not have been the case, in that its concern with Muslim
identity, faith and commitment have had a crucial bearing on how Muslims
relate to the broader society in which they nd themselves. In such a situation,
even the decision to remain aloof from politics, as conventionally understood,
has crucial political consequences. As the movement began to spread, from the
early 1950s onwards, outside the connes of South Asia to which it had until
then been restricted, the political implications of TJ work in different contexts
became increasingly clear. In some cases it enabled Muslims to pragmatically
adjust to secular polities, while in other contexts it played an important role in
assisting Islamist movements in their opposition to incumbent regimes. In both
cases, the TJ has been, in crucial senses, an important political actor, its claims
to being completely apolitical notwithstanding.
The TJ and Secularism
In contrast to Islamist groups, the establishment of an Islamic political
order is not an immediate objective of the TJ. While Ilyas did see an Islamic
state as an ultimate goal of his movement, he believed that it would come
about after Muslims began to lead their personal lives in full accordance with
the teachings of Islam. However, given human weakness and the propensity
to falter, as well as the almost impossibly high standards of piety that Ilyas laid
Tnr Mtsii Worir Voitr 96 J:t:r 2006
184
down for Muslims to follow, the emergence of a critical number of committed
Muslims that would move God to grant Muslims political power over others
and establish an Islamic political system was effectively postponed into the
indenite future. Until then, Muslims would need to engage in constant
striving to pattern their own personal lives in accordance with the teachings of
Islam, while living under a non-Islamic political order. This pragmatic
adjustment to the reality of the absence of an Islamic political order enabled
Muslims active in the TJ to come to terms with the existence of secular or non-
Islamic regimes, while remaining true to the demands of their faith. For the
Muslims of India this meant that they could adjust to a system of non-Islamic
rule, and to what was, at least in theory, a secular political system, while
hoping that by faithfully abiding by the dictates of their faith and engaging in
missionary work among others, the day might dawn when God would grant
Muslims political power.
Under Maulana Yusuf this pragmatic accommodation to the political
context in which Indian Muslims found themselves an increasingly
marginalized minority grew more pronounced. While Ilyas had refrained from
condemning Muslim political groups, seeing them as co-workers for the same
divine cause, albeit using different methods and working in different elds, the
TJ now began to consciously distance itself from groups such as the Jamaat-i
Islami and its agenda of iqamat-i din. The most signicant event in this regard
was the publication in the early 1950s of a diatribe against the Jamaat-i Islami
by the leading Tablighi ideologue and nephew of Ilyas, Maulana Muhammad
Zakariya. Titled Fitna-i Maududiyat (The Chaos that is Maududism) the book
insisted that Maududis understanding of Islam was wholly wrong. Further,
under Yusuf and Zakariya, the TJs stance on political involvement, indeed on
worldly involvement as such, began undergoing a distinct transformation.
Thus, in the eyes of its critics, instead of seeing the chhe baten as a means for
the iqamat-i din, as Ilyas himself is said to have envisioned it, it now grew
into an end in itself. Hence, some allege, the quest for the iqamat-i din,
including the establishment of an Islamic political order, was replaced by the
chhe baten as the ultimate objective of the TJ.
26
Along with this, critics argue,
a strict distinction began to be made in Tablighi discourse and practice, which
has no sanction in Islam, between din (religion), on the one hand, and duniya
(worldly affairs), on the other. The duniya began being looked upon with
scorn and hatred, and TJ activists were encouraged to remain aloof from
worldly involvement, including, of course, all political affairs.
This shift in the movements stance on politics must be seen as a response
to the increasingly threatened position of the Muslim minority in post-1947
India, enabling the movement and its participants to come to terms with a
situation of Hindu rule, under a theoretically secular dispensation. For the
Tnr T:riicn4 J::1+ :r Poii+ics. A Cri+ic:i Rr-Arrr:is:i
185
movements activists, its silence on political affairs enabled them to support
secular political parties of their choice and to make pragmatic decisions
unhindered by the ideological constraints that bind members of groups
such as the Jamaat-i Islami. In this regard, Masuds contention that the TJ
is vehemently opposed to secularism and that it would not support secular
political parties needs to be qualied.
27
While the movement is undoubtedly
opposed to secularism as understood as hostility or indifference to religion,
and while its leaders do not explicitly advocate the cause of any particular
political party, it allows for its followers vote for parties of their own choice.
By remaining silent on issues related to party politics, seeing this as a worldly
affair and hence not within the purview of religion (din), it has enabled
Muslims associated with the movement to conduct their politics on pragmatic
lines. Thus, for instance, in India, most Tablighi activists, like other Muslims,
vote for secular parties, and in the Britain, for the Labour Party.
The movements growing aloofness from direct involvement in political
affairs in post-1947 India has helped the TJ ourish in an environment
characterized by considerable and, in recent years, growing anti-Muslim
hostility. Thus, for instance, in the period 197577, when the then Indian Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi declared a state of emergency and banned several
religious organizations, including the Jamaat-i Islami, the TJ was spared and
allowed to carry on its activities unhindered. It is an indication of the markedly
politically quiescent theology of the TJ, which is quite acceptable to the Indian
state, that the TJ continues to have its global headquarters in the very heart of
Delhi. As the movement has expanded to other countries where Muslims live
as minorities, and where Muslim political involvement would be looked upon
with suspicion, such as in Europe and America, the TJs disavowal of any
political aims has enabled it to function relatively free of state control. The TJs
silence on political affairs may be thus seen as an implicit support for ruling
establishments. It has, in this way, worked as a powerful weapon for social
control, which has made political elites in several countries directly or
indirectly support it to counter assertive Islamist movements as well as threats
from leftist forces.
The TJ has enabled its followers to come to terms with the secular state
by, in a sense, personalizing Islam, making a de facto distinction between
religion and politics, din and duniya. In the absence of Muslim political
power, it is each Muslim individual who is seen as the repository of Islam, and
it is thus the individual Muslim that is its target of reform in the immediate
sense. The TJ sees present-day Muslims living in a situation similar to what
it calls the Prophets Meccan period (makki daur), when the Prophets
followers in Mecca were still learning about their faith. This is contrasted with
the later Medinan period (madani daur) when, in Medina, the Muslims were
Tnr Mtsii Worir Voitr 96 J:t:r 2006
186
now so committed to Islam that the Prophet could establish a full-edged
Islamic state.
28
In this way, while not denying the centrality of the Islamic state,
the TJ effectively postpones its establishment into the indenite future, when
Muslims would become so rm in their faith as to bring back to life the days
of the Companions of the Prophet in Medina. For the present, however, it
allows for Muslims to adjust themselves to a situation of non-Islamic rule,
analogous to the Meccan situation, while remaining committed to their faith.
This accommodation to secularism is, however, ambiguous and not free from
tension. The TJs advocacy of global Muslim unity is an implicit critique of the
nation-state system.
29
Likewise, its efforts at building a sense of Muslim
identity, bringing Muslims all over the world together in a common mission,
while ignoring national, sectarian, ethnic and class barriers, maintaining a
strong sense of separate cultural identity and superiority, condemning the
popular culture that Muslims in local contexts share with others and refusing
to even countenance the possibility of inter-faith dialogue with others has
important political consequences in religiously plural societies like India.
There is little doubt that the sense of cultural separatism and heightened
identity consciousness fostered by the TJ can be taken advantage of by
more assertive Islamist groups that have a more explicit political agenda.
Herein lies the crucial importance of the politics of culture, religious
identity and civilization differences, a phenomenon which, if Samuel
Huntington is to be believed, is all set to dictate the terms of international
political discourse.
30
The politically quiescent nature of the TJ has won for it sharp criticism in
some Muslim circles, who see this posture as calculated to serve the political
interests of what are described as the enemies of Islam. Some Muslims see
the TJ as a tool in the hands of anti-Islamic forces by helping to de-politicize
Muslims by preaching otherworldliness and disdain for power. Thus, a
Malaysian Islamic activist, Nik Abdul Rahman, remarks that the TJ has made
Muslims docile, fate-oriented and has [made them] shun active involvement
in real life things like politics and society.
31
Similarly, Amir Ali writes that by
opposing participation in politics and insisting on separation of religion from
politics de facto secularism the TJ has emerged as the new dream of
anti-Islamic forces, for the enemies of Islam dread the prospect of Muslims
acquiring political power which alone can challenge their hegemony.
32
In a
similar vein, Arshad ul- Qadri, a leading Indian Barelwi
33
ideologue, alleges
that the TJ was, in fact, set up by the British colonial rulers of India to create
dissension in the ranks of the Muslims and to blunt their spirit of jihad. During
the Cold War years, he alleges, the movement was used by the American
Central Intelligence Agency, along with the Saudis, in their global war against
communism. In India, he says, the TJ is being indirectly supported by militant,
Tnr T:riicn4 J::1+ :r Poii+ics. A Cri+ic:i Rr-Arrr:is:i
187
anti-Muslim Hindu groups, who see this world-renouncing movement as
working to prevent Muslims from struggling for their rights and opposing
Hindu hegemony, including mass murders of Muslims by Hindu mobs.
34

Another Indian Barelwi alim, Muhammad Rizvi, writes that the TJ is working
to only further strengthen the political foes of the Muslims, for the movement
insists that Muslims should not protest when they are attacked and killed in
pogroms instigated by militant Hindu groups in India, or by the Israelis in
Palestine.
35
Likewise, according to another Barelwi source, the TJ is a deviant
sect which is being used by the enemies of Islam to help them in their
continuing battle to prevent governance by the laws of Allah from being
re-established in the world.
36
In other words, these writers see the TJ as
deeply involved in politics, one that is calculated to strengthen the enemies
of Islam, despite its claims to the contrary.
Some Islamists have seen the TJ in similar terms. Tabish Mahdi, a leading
ideologue of the Jamaat-i Islami of India accuses the TJ of working to further
the designs of the forces of falsehood (batil ) because of its silence on
political affairs. He writes that by ignoring the importance of jihad against
oppressors, the TJ promotes the interests of anti-Islamic powers. The TJ, he
says, has misinterpreted the concept of jihad by projecting it as more or less
synonymous with going out on Tablighi missionary tours. In this way, he says,
the TJ plays straight into the hands of such inveterate foes of Islam as the
Jewish Mission, the Unbelievers and the Devil himself in their war against
Islam.
37
In a similar vein, a Pakistani Ahl-i Hadith activist accuses the TJ of
having killed the spirit of jihad by sword among the Muslims.
38
Another
Islamist supporter also accuses the TJ of remaining silent on the importance of
jihad, while focusing simply on ritual matters.
39
Its aloofness from politics is
traced back to its early origins, and it is said to have been a brainchild of the
British to pacify the Muslims in order to distract them from their duty to
upheld (sic.) and defend the Islamic state.
40
In this way, these writers insist
that the TJ is actively engaged in politics, albeit of a sort that is calculated to
harm the interests of Islam and its followers.
The variety of the political roles that the TJ has played in different social
contexts has been determined by the exigencies of survival and expansion of
the movement. In some cases the TJ has acted to counter the inuence of
Islamist groups and to enable Muslims to come to terms with the reality of non-
Islamic state structures, while in others it has lent support to Islamist groups,
indirectly, by promoting an environment in which Islamist groups can ourish,
as well as more directly. In such cases, participation in the TJ and a rm belief
that the world has strayed far from the path of God can be seen as expressing,
in symbolic terms, a powerful critique of existing political systems. At the same
time, it represents an implicit questioning of the very legitimacy of corrupt
Tnr Mtsii Worir Voitr 96 J:t:r 2006
188
ruling elites with their un-Islamic ways. In this regard, as Dasetto notes, the
TJ goes to the heart of the problem of power[ . . . ] without touching it
41
, thus
making the movement a vehicle for symbolic social protest, a weapon of the
weak or an everyday form of resistance in Scotts terms,
42
a role particularly
important in countries where democratic dissent and opposition are banned.
In this way, by at times working to support secularism, while other times
assisting Islamist groups in their struggle for an Islamic political order, the
overall political role of the TJ has been ambiguous.
The TJ and Politics in Muslim Majority Countries:
Some Empirical Instances
The diverse political roles that the TJ has played, an indication of what we
have called its political vision, can be seen in the dynamics of its relations
with the state, on the one hand, and Islamist forces, on the other, in several
Muslim countries. In Pakistan, where it has a strong presence, the TJ, Mumtaz
Ahmad writes, has been indirectly encouraged by the authorities as a counter
to the Islamist Jamaat-i Islami, which, with its campaign for an Islamic political
order, poses an increasingly powerful political challenge to ruling elites.
Ahmad writes that in addition to Pakistan, in other Muslim majority countries
where the TJ is strong such as Bangladesh and Malaysia, it has played an
important political role in de-politicizing a large number of religiously
inclined people by casting them as itinerant preachers, and thus effectively
weakening the appeal of Islamist movements and helping those in power.
43
In
these and other cases, it has, as Moosa says, played an eminently political role
in defending the status quo.
44
In some cases, on the other hand, involvement in the TJ has been a means
for Islamist activists to carry on their work free from state repression, enabling
Muslims to express their commitment to their faith in a manner that is not seen
as politically threatening or potentially subversive. In this way, the TJ has
helped promote an environment of heightened commitment to an activist
vision of Islam which is conducive for the growth of Islamist movements.
Thus, for instance, in Bangladesh, as Alam notes,
Immediately after the emergence of Bangladesh, Islamic political parties
stopped their activities. It was necessary for many Islamic political
leaders to go underground or ee away (sic.) from the country in order
to save their skin (sic.) and even their lives. It was only the muballigs
[missionaries] of the Tablighi Jamaat who continued their work without
any interruption. Their objective was not to enkindle Pakistani
sentiment, but to keep Islamic sentiment alive. It was the silent and
unpublicized work of the muballigs which created conditions for the
underground Islamic leaders to appear on the surface.
45
Tnr T:riicn4 J::1+ :r Poii+ics. A Cri+ic:i Rr-Arrr:is:i
189
Likewise, Alam tells us, in the aftermath of the Bangladeshi Liberation War
(197172), when Islamist organizations were banned and severely repressed
for their alleged involvement in abetting the Pakistani Army, numerous
Jamaat-i Islami activists sought cover under the TJ in order to escape arrest
and to carry on their work unhindered. Recognizing the supportive role that
the TJ might play in relation to Islamist movements, Alam writes that the TJ is
silently preparing Muslims all over the world for a goal that he sees it as
sharing with Islamist groups to engage in the lesser jihad or physical
warfare against the enemies of Islam in case the need so arises. The initial
groundwork is being done by training its activists to sacrice their money and
time on missionary work. However, he says, if occasion arises and if the
policy is changed, Tableeg is the Islamic movement which can call upon its
dedicated followers not only to donate their time and money but also their
lives in the cause of Islam. Tabligh activists, Alam writes, have apparently
been so well trained that in the battle against the enemies of Islam, which
might actually involve using swords and weapons, they shall not desert the
amir and will plunge into the battleeld red by the zeal of the Prophets
grandson Imam Husain, who drank the nectar of martyrdom in the eld of
Kerbala.
46
In the same vein, another TJ sympathizer writes that by focusing on
the chhe baten, the TJ has been merely laying the groundwork for a much
greater mission, which includes physical jihad, in case the need so arises, and
the struggle for the establishment of an Islamic polity, a goal central to the
agenda of Islamist movements as well. In both tabligh and jihad, he says,
one can perceive a congruence of aims and objectives, both being
manifestations of the same impulse.
47
Another important manner in which the TJ has acted to promote the aims
of Islamist groups and has thus played a crucial political role is evidenced by
the signicant number of individuals associated with the TJ being inspired by
involvement in the movement to take to more assertive political positions as
members or leaders of Islamist organizations. Thus, several leading Islamist
activists have had their rst exposure to Islamic reform and revival in the
TJ. These include Prof. Ghulam Azam, amir of the Jamaat-i Islami of
Bangladesh,
48
Rachid Ghannoushi, leader of the Tunisian Islamic Tendency
Movement
49
and Farid Kassim, senior leader of the Hizb ut-Tahrir in the United
Kingdom.
50
A more sensational case is that of one Muslih al-Shamrani, who,
along with three other men, was accused of having planted a bomb at an
American military base in Saudi Arabia that resulted in the death of seven
people. Al-Shamrani had started off as an activist of the TJ. Then, one year
later, red by an irrepressible zeal for the cause of Islam, he traveled to
Afghanistan and then to Bosnia to participate in the jihad against the Russians
and the Serbs.
51
In these cases, in addition to scores of others less well known,
Tnr Mtsii Worir Voitr 96 J:t:r 2006
190
involvement in the TJ provided the early inspiration for Islamic activists to
commit themselves to working for the cause of Islam and global Muslim unity,
after which they have moved on to more assertive Islamic political movements.
Some TJ activists, while remaining within the movement, have, in their
personal capacity, begun to advocate armed jihad and Islamist-style politics,
though this is not the ofcial policy of the TJ leadership. Thus, for instance,
Ayub Patel, a TJ activist, insists that the movement is geared to revive
everything that the Prophet came with [. . .] including politics [and] jihad as
well as the Islamic khilafah (Caliphate).
52
Islamists, thus, enjoy an ambiguous relationship with the TJ. While, as we
have seen, some condemn it for allegedly being apolitical and thus helping,
inadvertently or otherwise, the enemies of Islam, others welcome its role in
promoting a general Islamic awareness among Muslims and thus helping the
cause of Islamist movements. Thus, for instance, some Muslims associated with
the Taliban in Afghanistan, which, like the TJ, has its roots in the Deobandi
reformist tradition,
53
see the TJ as playing a complimentary role. A website
advocating the cause of the Taliban also advocates the cause of the TJ.
54

Likewise, another Muslim website, based in Europe, sees participation in the
TJ and involvement in armed jihad as complimentary to each other, both
essential tasks in the process of establishing the supremacy of Islam. Thus, in
a signicant fatwa it announces that Religious education, tabligh [through
participation in the work of the TJ] and jihad are different ways of discharging
this collective responsibility [of dawa or invitation to Islam] and they are all
important in their own right. It is but natural, it goes on to say, that there
should be a division of labor between TJ activists, working for promoting
Islamic awareness and commitment, and ghters engaged in jihad against
unbelieving enemies.
55
Such co-ordination between armed militants and
Tablighi preachers is not limited to the world of cyberspace, however. Reports
speak of active involvement in the work of the TJ of the militant Pakistan-
based Islamist group, Harkat ul-Mujahidin (HM), which has been a key actor
in conicts in Kashmir, Bosnia, Chechenya and Tajikistan. A HM spokesman is
reported to have claimed that, Our people are mostly (sic.) impressed by the
TJ. Most of our workers come from the TJ.
56
It has also been alleged that TJ
activists have been involved in armed uprising in Uganda against the
government of President Yoweri Museveni.
57
In some Muslim countries, the TJ counts among its activists several senior
government ofcials, who play an important role in furthering the aims of the
movement and promoting a gradual Islamization of state structures and civil
society institutions. In this way, too, the TJ has served important political
functions. Thus, In Bangladesh, the TJ is active among the countrys armed
forces.
58
Likewise, in Chechenya, several members of the Cabinet, including
Tnr T:riicn4 J::1+ :r Poii+ics. A Cri+ic:i Rr-Arrr:is:i
191
the Chechen Deputy Prime Minister, have been active in the TJ.
59
In Pakistan,
TJ activists have gone the furthest in assuming active political roles.
Muhammad Raq Tarar, a senior TJ activist, served as President of Pakistan
for a considerable period till he was deposed in June 2001 by the countrys
military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf. While President, Tarar is believed
to have played a key role in the introduction in the Pakistani Senate of the
Shariah Bill that sought to impose Islamic law in the country. Among the
reasons for his appointment as President is said to have been a concern to
counter the radical appeal of the Jamaat-i Islami and its campaign for an
Islamic political order in Pakistan.
60
Tablighi activists in Pakistan have not
desisted from active involvement in electoral politics either. Thus, Mufti
Mahmud, khalifa (deputy) of the leading Tablighi ideologue, Maulana
Muhammad Zakariya, rose to become Chief Minister of Pakistans North-West
Frontier Province, and later went on to play a leading role in the agitation for
the Prophetic System (nizam-i mustafa) which led to the toppling of the
then Pakistani Prime Minister, Zulqar Ali Bhutto.
61
Another senior TJ activist,
Lt. Gen. Javed Nasir, served as the head of Pakistans Inter-Services
Intelligence, being responsible for the formulation of Pakistans policy in the
Afghan war. Nasir is also alleged to have provided covert military support to
militant Muslim groups in about a dozen countries.
62
The TJ is said to have
several supporters among Pakistans top army brass. In 1995, the Pakistani
army arrested several army ofcers and civilians associated with a break-away
faction of the TJ based at Taxila on charges of allegedly plotting to assassinate
the then Pakistani Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto.
63
Yet another way in which
leading TJ activists have actively intervened in politics is the patronage that
they accept from state authorities on occasion. Thus, for instance, the former
Prime Minister of the country, Nawaz Sharif, once arranged for Maulana Tariq
Jamil, senior Tablighi leader, to address members of his cabinet on the
responsibilities of rulers in the light of Islamic teachings. In his lecture, the
Maulana is said to have appealed to Sharif to enforce an Islamic system
similar to that in neighboring Afghanistan under the Taliban.
64
Mumtaz Ahmad
writes that in the 1960s Pakistans President Ayub Khan actively sought to court
the TJ through various forms of patronage, using it as a counter to the
Jamaat-i Islami, which was vehemently opposed to his regime.
65
In this way,
TJ activists have not desisted from occupying important political posts and
using their access to power to further the cause of their movement.
As this general survey has sought to indicate, an examination of the
various ways in which the TJ and its activists have been deeply implicated in
politics, demands a considerable reconsideration of generally held views of
Tablighi apoliticalness. A more sensitive and nuanced understanding, one
that goes beyond the level of verbal discourse of Tablighi ideologues to reveal
Tnr Mtsii Worir Voitr 96 J:t:r 2006
192
the different and complex political roles that it has played and political
functions that it has served, clearly suggests that many in the TJ are indeed
impelled by a long-term political agenda, one which, for fear of repression,
they deliberately choose not to explicitly articulate. Whether or not the leaders
of the movement share these perceptions is difcult to say, however, but the
fact that they have remained silent on the matter might suggest a tacit approval.
Conclusion
In various different spatio-temporal contexts, as we have attempted to
show, the TJ has played a variety of political roles and its activities have had
political consequences of far-reaching political importance. In this sense, one
can indeed speak of a long-term political vision of the TJ. This vision is not
explicitly articulated by TJ authorities in ofcial declarations or texts but is
readily apparent in the political implications of the TJs activities in different
situations. In this light of this, it is difcult to agree with Mumtaz Ahmads
assertion that, In fact, the Tablighi Jamaat detests politics and does not
involve itself in any issues of sociopolitical signicance.
66
The different political roles that the TJ has played have been determined
essentially by the needs for survival and expansion of the movement and the
impulse to carry forward the movements agenda of promoting Islamic
awareness and consciousness. In countries where Muslims are a minority or in
Muslim majority countries where Islamist opposition movements are heavily
suppressed, the TJ has enabled Muslims to come to terms with a de facto
separation of religion from politics. This pragmatic accommodation to the
secular state does not mean a whole-hearted acceptance of secularism as an
ideology, however. Rather, it has meant, in effect, toleration of what seems, in
the immediate future, to be an unchangeable situation, with the hope and
belief that ultimately God would bless the Muslims with political power, and
that they would then be able, once their faith is sufciently strong, to establish
an Islamic polity to enable Islam to be implemented in its entirety.
By pragmatically accommodating itself to a secular dispensation, the TJ is
seen by many ruling regimes as a counter to more assertive Islamist opposition
groups. With its concern for the life after death and its disdain for worldly
affairs, the TJ is seen as a powerful supporter of the status quo. Not
surprisingly, in many countries, both Muslim as well as other, while Islamist
movements have been heavily repressed, the TJ has been allowed to function
with few or no restraints, and has been indirectly patronized by governments.
This political role of the TJ has won it sharp criticism from several Islamists,
some of whom go so far as to condemn it for what they see as its serving the
interests of the enemies of Islam, variously described as Western imperialists,
Zionists and Hindu fascists.
Tnr T:riicn4 J::1+ :r Poii+ics. A Cri+ic:i Rr-Arrr:is:i
193
On the other hand, there is evidence to show that the TJ has, in some
situations, worked to the advantage of Islamist groups struggling for the
establishment of a normative Islamic political order in their own countries.
Its work at the grass-roots level in promoting Islamic awareness and
consciousness provides fertile ground for Islamist movements to take root, and
several noted Islamist leaders have, in fact, had their rst exposure to Islamic
activism in the TJ. In addition, as we have seen, in countries like Pakistan,
Afghanistan and Chechenya, some TJ followers have assumed clearly political
roles, both as government ofcials as well as jihad activists, making their
position on politics hardly distinguishable from that of the Islamists. In both
capacities they have been concerned to advocate and advance the cause of an
Islamic vision that is inseparable from an Islamic state, sharing this vision with
Islamist groups.
The political vision of the TJ, then, is dictated by the needs of the
movement to survive and expand in different situations. Despite its apparent
rigidity, in practice the movement displays a remarkable exibility that allows
it to ourish in different contexts, its political roles in each context being
determined by the overall imperative to expansion while remaining free from
state repression. As we have attempted to show, the understanding that the TJ
has nothing whatsoever to do with politics is completely misplaced, being
based on a supercial reading of statements of Tablighi leaders. As this article
has sought to suggest, in order to uncover the political vision of the TJ, one
needs to move beyond a simple acceptance of the statements of TJ leaders, the
level at which most analysis of the TJ has hitherto been restricted, to examine
the actual political consequences of TJ activity in different contexts.
Endnotes
1. For a detailed study of the Tablighi Jamaat, see Yoginder Sikand, The Origins and
Development of the Tablighi Jamaat (1920s1990): A Cross-Country Comparative Study
(Orient Longman, New Delhi, 2002).
2. Zia ur-Rahman Faruqi, Ulama-i Deoband: Kaun Hain, Kya Hain? (Dar ul-Kitab,
Deoband, 1992), 43.
3. Ziya ul-Hasan Faruqi, The Tablighi Jamaat, in S. T. Lokhandwala (ed.) Islam and
Contemporary India, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, 1971, 60.
4. Yahya Sadowsky, Just a Religion: For the Tablighi Jamaat, Islam Is Not
Totalitarian, http://www.brook.edu/press/review/sadosu96.htm.
5. Elke Faust, Close Ties and New Boundaries: The Tablighi Jamaat in Britain and
Germany, in Muhammad Khalid Masud (ed.) Travellers in Faith Studies of the Tablighi
Jamaat as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal (E. J. Brill, Leiden, 2000),
150.
6. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Ideology and Legitimacy, in Muhammad Khalid
Masud (ed.) Travellers in Faith Studies of the Tablighi Jamaat as a Transnational
Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal (E. J. Brill, Leiden, 2000), 97.
7. Interview with Muhammad Qasim, Dewsbury, 11 November, 1995.
Tnr Mtsii Worir Voitr 96 J:t:r 2006
194
8. Interview with Hussain Ahmad, Gurgaon, 10 June, 1996.
9. M. Anwar ul-Haq, The Faith Movement of Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas, George
Allen & Unwin, London, 1972, 170.
10. Saeed Ahmad Khan, Ek Qimati Mashwara (Maktaba Subhaniya, Punahana, n.d.),
24.
11. Interview with Imtiaz Ahmad, New Delhi, 5 February, 1996.
12. Mumtaz Ahmad, Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia The Jamaat-i Islami
and the Tablighi Jamaat of South Asia, in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.)
Fundamentalisms Observed (University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1991), 522.
13. Muahmmad Ubaidullah Baliyavi, Tarikh-i Dawat-o Tabligh, Arshi Publications,
Delhi, n.d., 15.
14. Ibid., 24.
15. For a general overview of Muslim reactions to the Arya Samaj movement, see
Yoginder Sikand, The Fitna of Irtidad: Muslim Missionary Response to the Shuddhi
Movement of the Arya Samaj in Early Twentieth Century North India, Journal of Muslim
Minority Affairs, vol. 17, no. 1, 1997.
16. Ehtisham ul-Hasan Kandhalawi, Muslim Degeneration and its Only Remedy,
in The Teachings of Tabligh (Idara-i Ishaat-i Diniyat, New Delhi, 1989), 8.
17. Anwar ul-Haq, op. cit., 137.
18. Syed Mohamed al-Bukhary, The Work and Position of Tablighi Jamaat,
http://leb.net/pipermail/lexington-net/200-February/001823.html.
19. Ashiq Ilahi Bulandshahri, Aqsi Chhe Baten, Jaseem Book Depot, Delhi, n.d.
20. Mumtaz Ahmad, op. cit., 521.
21. Abdul Majid Khatib Vellori, Tehrik-i Dawat-o Tabligh (Dar ul-Tabligh, Vellore,
n.d.), 18.
22. Ashfaq Ahmad Hussain, Maulana Wahiduddin Khan Ki Fikri Kalabaziyan:
Mudir-i al-Risala Aur Tablighi Jamaat (Majlis-i Ihya-i-Tauhid-o Sunnat, Hyderabad, n.d.),
115134.
23. This was published in the Shaban 1939 issue of the journal. The full text is to be
found in Vellori, op. cit., 5865.
24. Hakim Khwaja Iqbal Ahmad Nadwi, Mai Bhi Hazir Tha Vahan, Zindagi-i Nau,
vol. 4, no. 2, March 1986, 44.
25. Ubaidullah Fahad Falahi, Tarikh-i Dawat-o Jihad Bare Saghir Ke Tanazur Main
(Hindustan Publications, Delhi, 1996), 309.
26. Hakim Nadwi, op. cit., 5254.
27. Masud, op. cit., 99.
28. http://fx.nu/quest/movements/tabligh.html.
29. Shail Mayaram, Resisting Regimes: Myth, Memory and the Shaping of a Muslim
Identity (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1997), 239.
30. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993,
2249.
31. Nik Abdul Rahman, The Ulema: Zionist Tools?, http://www.ropelist.com/articles/
english/zionist.html.
32. M. Amir Ali, The Dream of Anti-Islamic Forces, http://www.iiie.net/Articles/
DreamOfAntiIslam.html.
33. This term refers to traditional Muslims associated with the cults of the shrines of
Sus in South Asia, who are vehemently opposed to the TJ as well as the Deobandi tradition
in which it is rooted.
34. Arshad ul-Qadri, Tablighi Jamaat: Haqaiq Aur Malumat Ke Ujale Main
(Maktaba Jam-i Nur, New Delhi, n.d.), 99112.
Tnr T:riicn4 J::1+ :r Poii+ics. A Cri+ic:i Rr-Arrr:is:i
195
35. Muhammad Rizvi, The Roots of Islamic Fundamentalism (Raza Academy,
Stockport, 1994), 60.
36. http://www.raza.co.za/151.htm.
37. Tabish Mahdi, Tablighi Nisab: Ek Mutala (Halim Book Depot, New Delhi, n.d.),
5679.
38. Masud, op. cit., 106.
39. http://fx.nu/quest/movements/tabligh.html.
40. http://fx.nu/quest/movements/tabligh.html.
41. Felice Dasetto The Tablighi Organisation in Belgium, in Tomas Gerholm and
Yngve Georg Lithman (eds.) The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe (Mansell, London
and New York, 1988), 162.
42. James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1985).
43. Mumtaz Ahmad, op. cit., 522.
44. Ebrahim Moosa, Worlds Apart: Tablighi Jamaat in South Africa Under Apartheid,
19631993, in Muhammad Khalid Masud (ed.) Travellers in Faith Studies of the Tablighi
Jamaat as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal (E. J. Brill, Leiden, 2000), 220.
45. A. Z. M. Shamsul Alam, The Message of Tableeg and Dawa (Islamic Foundation
Bangladesh, Dhaka, 1985), 1324.
46. Ibid., 1324.
47. http://fx.nu/quest/movements/tabligh.html.
48. Sikand, The Origins and Development of the Tablighi Jamaat, op. cit., 264.
49. John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Makers of Contemporary Islam (Oxford
University Press, New York, 2001, 95).
50. Sikand, The Origins and Development of the Tablighi Jamaat, op. cit., 241.
51. Nichols Goldberg, Close-up: CIA-Made Terrorists in Saudi Bombing?, The Seattle
Times, 10 July, 1996.
52. http://www.salaam.co.uk/noticeboard//messages/463.html
53. For a detailed treatment of Deobandi reformism, see Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic
Revival in British India: Deoband 18601900 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1982).
54. http://almadinah.org
55. http://www.murabitun.org/new/jama.html.
56. Daghestan: Focus on Pakistans Tablighi Jamaat Background of Tablighi
Jamaat, http://www.saag.org/papers/paper80.html.
57. Gerard Prunier, The Geopolitical Situation in the Great Lakes Area in the Light of
the Kivu Crisis, http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/country/writenet/wrilakes.htm
58. Interview with Brigadier (retd.) Muhammad Abdul Haz, former Director-General,
Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Dhaka, 3 November, 1996.
59. Daghestan: Focus on Pakistans Tablighi Jamaat Background of Tablighi
Jamaat, http://www.saag.org/papers/paper80.html.
60. Jassim Taqui, Politicising the Tablighi Jamaat, http://paknews.com/articles/1999/
jan/art1jan-15html.
61. Muhammad Ashfaq Hussain, op. cit., 115.
62. Daghestan: Focus on Pakistans Tablighi Jamaat Background of Tablighi
Jamaat, http://www.saag.org/papers/paper80.html.
63. Ibid.
64. Sharif Organises Islamic Lecture for his Ministers, Hindustan Times, New Delhi,
17 September, 1999.
65. Mumtaz Ahmad, op. cit., 518.
66. Mumtaz Ahmad, op. cit., 518.