The Thing

by

Howard Hill

Godless House Posted to Scribd : Monday, 06 January 2014.

Without mental activity, without the mixing and compounding of ideas, no individual could gain any great knowledgecould not, certainly, discover any general truth, law or rule of action ; and it is equally certain, that without the free interchange of thoughts between individuals the greatest possible progress can not be made by collective man. And it should always be borne in mind, that it is only in the aggregate that man is great or does great things. The greatest individual, alone, is narrowly limited, both in power and time for action. He is of few days and full of trouble. He thinks a few thoughts, adds a trifle to the knowledge of his race, and passes away. Mankind, however, as a whole, is an organism that encircles the world ; is million-eyed, looking out into the universe in all directions at the same time ; lives for agespossibly for a number of years so great as to be incomprehensible by a single mind. He builds cities ; establishes governments ; creates systems of philosophy ; weighs the earth and the other planets as in a balance ; measures the distances of the more remote heavenly bodies, and calculates their positions in space a thousand years aheadutilizes Natures forces ; discovers her laws ; and is fast finding out the hitherto secret ways of God. (No Beginning, Maple, 1899, pp. 48 49.)

Contents
Page Introduction 5

Preliminary Chapter Language as the Factor of Decoupling

that Created Hoyles Thing

6 22

When antisemitism isnt antisemitism because it is the truth

Chapter 1 I

Hoyle at Large
Humans are animals, certainly, but what is the human animal !

26 34

Chapter 2

The Books Origins and Social Context I II

Hoyle Knowing it all

41

42 44

Chapter 3

Hoyles Scientific Naturalism

47

Chapter 4 I

The Build-up
Perspective

51 53

Chapter 5

The Argument Lotzes Microcosmos Kants Allusion to the Thing

66

Chapter 6

133

Chapter 7

154

Chapter 8

The Thing Creates Law, as Law Creates the Thing

159

Chapter 9

Geographers Find the Thing Too

162

Chapter 10

Back to Hoyle

167

Conclusion I II III
Hoyles Thing as Secular Object of Human Consciousness Capturing Thingness Facts lie Before us, only needing a true point of view

179 181 185 190

Bibliography

194

Introduction
Yesterday, after so many years panning around in old volumes of a sociological turn, I finally struck gold. And where did this momentous event occur ? In my bedroom, after I had pulled four books from a shelf to check over to see if they were worth keeping, as per my usual habit aimed at controlling the incessant accumulation of volumes that happens in my house. And the book in question took me completely by surprise. A slight volume, looking pretty innocuous, my first foray into its contents took me to the last chapter on religion and drew a sharp criticism from my pencil. But other intriguing chapter headings drew me into the meat of the work where I began to notice some extraordinary reasonings. Our guide does not quite get us where we want to go, but he is brilliant, and in a way wholly unlike anyone else. He was a scientist, I associate his name with astronomy, but I would have to check out his biographical details online to confirm this as I have never given the man a second thought previously. The inspiration for this new piece of work then, is drawn from Man and Materialism by Fred Hoyle, 1957. I have a second edition that I presumably picked up years ago from the charity shops where I use to get so many of my books before the internet came into its own. So this extraordinary work has been sitting under my nose, unnoticed, for years. What I immediately realised once I had spent half an hour capturing pieces of Hoyles reasoning, was that there was far more here than I could rip out and paste into my ongoing work, My Idea, and runoff a few remarks on. This was going to require its own dedicated work. I would love to take whole chapters and offer them to the world but laws suppressing freedom of expression and access to knowledge, excused on the criminal basis of copyright extended to the point of madness, cause me to hesitate to be so cavalier. The plan is to take passages and work with them, and see where we go. As it is, of this moment I have scarcely read any of the work. Ideally it would seem worth reading the whole of this slim, easy reading volume. But it kicks off with some very disconnected material as regards what we have in mind as being the inner gem to this work. As to our title, Hoyle provides it, the Thing is his word for what w e always refer to as the human Superorganism.

Preliminary Chapter

Language as the Factor of Decoupling that Created Hoyles Thing Sunday, 03 November 2013 Peeling spuds to go with my roast chicken just now my mind wandered freely, as it is apt to do when engaging in a simple menial task, the subject that surfaced was the linguistic nature of knowledge, as it has been conceived by me in this work over the last few weeks. I suppose this is what the intellectuals would categorise under the heading of a theory of knowledge, but the point I want to bring out here is simple, too simple to constitute a theory perhaps, but so neat I absolutely love it, and to that end, that of its importance, I want to bring it to the readers attention now, for fear it would otherwise go unnoticed amongst the bulk of the material. That language is a behavioural product of our somatic physiology is a long standing argument that we have developed into the abstract idea of linguistic force as a natural force creating human society in all its details. This idea says that our anatomy obliges us to speak, whereupon linguistic force is projected into social space to form a language, by a process of accumulation and fixation into what becomes a social structure, a culture. This linguistic process organises individuals into a superorganic being, a human superorganism. So far so good, this is old stuff for us. But the little gem coming forth now extends this simple conception of the nature of linguistic force one step further, applying it to knowledge itself ! This is a truly radical idea, for me at least. We have long recognised that knowledge is the accumulated product of this process whereby linguistic force condenses into language and culture, but the subtle adjustment we now make smoothes out what is otherwise a jarring conception. Language will of started out as a comparatively simple act of verbal expression. The anatomy of speech will of been fully formed and in place, but the power of speech that we have today is vastly different from that which this anatomy first delivered. Rather as the dextrous hands we possess today are identical to those of the first of our kind, but where these same appendages only crafted flint tools in the first ages of our species, today they create computers and other amazing objects too numerous to mention. Nothing has changed, except everything ! What has changed, is the accumulated information directing the activity that our human anatomy is engaged in. Hence we say linguistic force is the creator of all social form, where linguistic information delivers a linguistic programme directing human action in an accumulative process that constitutes the growth of the living human animal, a superorganism. The myriad of individual actions occurring in a society every day, are oriented by the linguistic programme to give the end result we know as society, and this orienting requirement, without which our species could not of evolved its special attributes of speech and dexterity that deliver superorganic form, is delivered by the focus of linguistic force upon an abstract identity, a social identity such as Judaism, which acts as a core within the interconnected human biomass, drawing all activities towards itself, and hey presto, society is born !

And again, as with the abstract nature of words, by abstract identity we mean an identity that acquires substance from an initial flow of information delivering linguistic expression to a functional purpose, that of creating a superorganism. So that while Judaism is the master identity to which we are all attached by our multifarious identities, the actual mode of appearance of the master identity could of been anything, and has been many things in other times and places, although it would of course have to possess specific structural content delivering the attributes of a master identity by organising the biomass it was part of appropriately. The inspirational insight was provided by an old author I was dipping into, Hermann Lotze, saying that language is not created consciously by people, but through the accumulated activities of people which come to act upon later generations. Thus we do not create the language we speak, this language takes possession of us and makes us part of it. Seeing this idea being directly expressed prompted me toward the far more radical idea that this is precisely how knowledge comes into existence too. The process whereby language evolves in the autonomous manner described, leads to the realisation that language is an abstract phenomenon, meaning that what words mean is essentially arbitrary, because while any word can mean anything, but they come to mean something specific via this process of fixation, which equates to the formation of authority, social authority in fact. And it is from this fact that we came to speak of linguistic force projecting authority into social space from which not only social form arises, but more particularly, social structure, hierarchy, and the power wielding elite, which it can be seen from this account, is intimately linked to the meaning fixed in language. It is one thing to come to accept that this account of language is valid, for all that it shifts the balance of human nature away from the individual and toward a super individual form. But to extend this idea to knowledge is a far more radical idea. Firstly this suggests that as language is essentially abstract, so knowledge must likewise be essentially abstract if it is just a more substantial form of language, and nothing more. If we wish to resist this idea it is easy to do so because all our mental conditioning is geared up to such resistance, in order that the abstraction which is fixed in knowledge can be maintained. But for atheist scientists like ourselves this is just the kind of model we need to account for religion, which is indeed as abstract as abstract can be. Yes, religion, which is an elaborate form of knowledge, must exist, the only accounts of it not existing relate to the most primitive of human groups, the Andaman Islanders for example, of whom some Victorian era visitors said they had no idea of a higher power or any creation myth. We may wonder how true this was, but it is what was reported, and it was notable because it was so exceptional. That religion must exist is therefore accepted, and that all religions vary in detail, while at the same time possessing common themes, such as a creation myth explaining why the chosen people, the people in question that is, were created, but this variety within conformity precisely matches that abstract quality of language that we have just identified. And just as we see common factors in religions as just noted, the fact that Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, while feigning much difference, and only admitting a commonality based upon the higher attributes of religious identity, as monotheism, reveal their true biological nature as one social identity because they draw all people following these different identity patterns to the same basic creation myths, and such like essential common elements pertaining to any religion. From which it follows that knowledge is merely a more substantial form of linguistic expression, and absolutely nothing more. This point is of interest as regards religion because everyone, without exception, that I know of, accepts that religion is created by individuals in order to provide them with an explanation for their existence, and as such religion is a supremely practical kind of knowledge. This idea helps religion confront science by giving religion a scientific nature. But we prefer to shift in the

opposite direction. Rather than making abstract knowledge conform to the rise of absolute knowledge fixed in reality as it is, we prefer to make science conform to the abstract nature of religion. This is seen in our realisation that the greatest of all science, Darwinism, is not science at all, it is in fact an abstraction of scientific thinking given a solid form that passes for real science because it is backed by authority. We said that linguistic force projects authority into social space, whereby the projection of authority results in a material structure that contains linguistic force, which means that established authority can then control the form in which linguistic force materialises, and that is how science comes to be made in an abstract form which is identical to that of a religious identity ! Authority as described here in this abstract form, is the being of the human animal, the superorganism. What this means is that just as the language we use is vastly more sophisticated today than it was when our kind first spoke, so the real product of linguistic expression, as in knowledge, is likewise vastly more substantial and complex. Thus we have vast dictionaries defining words and many terms for all sorts of incredible ideas, making our language incredibly powerful. But still our language cannot escape the essential abstractness that is inherent to it, whereby any word can come meaning anything, and it is only a matter of the formal manner in which it has come to mean what it does that gives a word an appearance of something more real than this. And the same applies to knowledge. What we have just said of religion as a structural elaboration of language giving us a linguistic form that is nonetheless ultimately abstract in nature, allowing a multiplicity of religions to exist, each religion being a mode of identity of course, remains equally true of science. This is a truly radical thought, and it takes some getting your head around. What this idea helps us to understand is how even our greatest scientific ideas can be as abstract as any other body of knowledge that ever existed, such as a religion. And this is what Darwinism is. This is an idea that we have banded about a great deal for some years now, but this idea of knowledge as a form of language and nothing more, and hence equally abstract, is the first one we have ever managed to contrive to make sense of this most perplexing idea that Darwinism is not science. And to think it was all inspired by a potato ! How good is that ? Not much to do with Hoyle I know, but there it is. Wonder how my chicken is doing ? Wednesday, 06 November 2013 Look at this, this is amazing, I just found it while continuing to run through books with a view to reducing my library :

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Duty to Speak To speak is above all to possess the power to speak. Or again, the exercise of power
ensures the domination of speech : only the masters can speak. As for the subjects : they are bound to the silence of respect, reverence, or terror. Speech and power maintain relations such that the desire for one is fulfilled in the conquest of the other. Whether prince, despot, or commander-in-chief, the man of power is always not only the man who speaks, but the sole source of legitimate speech : an impoverished speech, a poor speech to be sure, but one rich in efficiency, for it goes by the name command and wants nothing save the obedience of the executant. Static extremes in themselves, power and speech owe their continued existence to one another ; each is the substance of the other, and the persistence of their coupling, while it appears to transcend history, yet fuels the movement of history : there is a historical event when once what keeps them separate, hence dooms them to nonexistence, has been done

away withpower and speech are founded in the very act of their meeting. To take power is to win speech. Of course, the above remarks refer first and foremost to societies based on the division : masters/slaves, lords/subjects, leaders/citizens, etc. The hallmark of this division, its privileged locus of proliferation, is the solid, irreducible, perhaps irreversible fact of a power detached from society as a whole since it is held by only a few members. It is power that, having become separate from society, is exercised over, and if need be, against society. The focus of attention here has been the whole series of societies with a State, from the most archaic despotisms to the most modem of totalitarian States, going by way of the democratic societies, whose State apparatus, for all its liberalism, nonetheless remains in remote control of legitimate violence. Speech and power hand in hand, bosom friends even : nothing rings truer to our ears accustomed to that very message. Yet, the conclusive evidence of ethnology cannot be ignored : the savage world of tribes, the universe of primitive societies, or againand it is the same thingsocieties without a State, afford our reflection, strangely, the same alliance of power and speech detected in societies with a State. Over the tribe reigns the chief, and the latter also reigns over the language of the tribe. In other words, and especially as regards the primitive American tribes, the Indians, the chiefthe man of poweralso holds the monopoly of speech. In the case of these Savages, the question to ask is not : who is your chief ? but rather : who among you is the one who speaks. The master of words is what many groups call their chief. It would seem, then, that power and speech cannot be conceived of separately, since their clearly metahistorical bond is no less indissoluble in primitive societies than in formations with a State. It would be less than exacting, however, to stop at a structural definition of this relationship. In fact, the radical break that divides societies, whether real or possible, according to whether they have or do not have a State, is bound to affect the way power and speech are linked. How, then, does this bond operate in societies without a State ? The example of the Indian tribes tells us. (Society Against the State, Clastres, 1977, pp. 128 9. First pub. in French, 1974.) As wonderful as this description of the relationship between language and social power, or authority, is, it is useless in terms of explaining anything without being put into orbit around the true pivot of observation and interpretation that indicates that individuals do not exist, because the human animal is a superorganism. Naturally Clastres is oblivious to this idea, hence all the flowery waffle in which these marvellous sentiments about the link between language and authority are couched. Although as a Frenchman working in the seventies he must of been very familiar with the idea of the social organism. Even in its heyday this idea was never appreciated for it real scientific meaning however, this is an impossible idea for anyone to handle because of the consequences of its reality for our Jewish society. Instead of realising that it is language itself that creates hierarchical social structure, he makes its link to power the product of a malign division, and hence instead of seeing this horribleness as natural he makes it out to be some kind of external growth unnatural to society, the product of nasty individuals serving themselves, it really is too pathetic, his interpretation that is. Hence we have this weird notion of the power of an elite being exercised against society, which is akin to saying the brain is used against the body it is part of, or the Jews are parasites, as Hitler said, instead of the master race within a superorganism consisting of a complex order of races, in which one race must take the role of the brain, delivering identity and purpose to the human animal, exactly as the Jews do. Even recognising that the exact same function is served by language irrespective of the social

conditions, still does not prompt him to seek a naturalistic explanation that is independent of human will, instead he sticks rigidly to the mindless dictate of the controller of speech that is social authority under the autocracy of Jewish identity, that says all human activities must be treated as political, as arising from conscious human intentions. Looking just now at an early anthropological work presenting ideas on the development of language I found this : As in the course of ages mans knowledge became wider and his civilisation more complex, his language had to keep up with them. (Anthropology, Tylor, Vol. 1, 1930, p. 106. First pub. 1881.) Which is, as we can see, arse about face according to implications of a linguistic force creating a linguistic programme delivering a superorganic being. On the face of it Tylors representation of the linguistic process of evolution makes more sense since we can hardly imagine the word for pottery being established before pots existed ! Hence activities arise and are described, not the other way around as we appear to suggest. But this way of thinking smacks of the creationist manner of refuting genetic evolution by saying that an eye, for example, is only any good if it works as an eye, a partially evolved eye therefore makes no sense and must of arisen perfectly formed. Except in the case of language the arena of operations is somewhat different to those of a material body created under the impress of genetic information. In the social domain language covers every facet of human activity and language therefore has a complex form, it consists of both a mundane and an abstract aspect simultaneously, rather as a tool made of wood, like a mallet, is still wood even though this material aspect is submerged by the sophisticated form that craftsmanship had given it. so that we just call it a mallet. The same dynamic applies to the development of words by way of use. Obviously numerous mundane terms of a directly functional, object based nature, exist in any language, like names identifying family members or relatives. These would be the equivalent of the mallets wooden substance. Over time social complexity would add significance to such terms, without the actual terms altering, although new words would be added to the language to enable the complexity of social structure that language exists to create, like father-in-law. So it is not as Tylor simplistically, and disingenuously suggested, that new forms emerged and language caught up by naming them, but rather it is as we say, that language creates social structure woven in conjunction with linguistic elaboration, reflecting the creative function of language relative to social forms. And of course the compound nature of linguistic products, as in language and knowledge, is reflected in the substantial aspect of their abstract form. Hence words like religion and science that we have said are abstract, have their abstract form impressed into an underlying substantive base, as the mallet has its form imbued into wood. Thus when we say that knowledge is abstract we do not mean it is a total abstraction, obviously, only that in the end, as with Darwinism, the end product, in this case a theory of evolution, is false. But this falsity is imbued into a bedrock of factual, real knowledge, to which it gives an overall false appearance. A false appearance which, like that which the mallet gives to the wood, is admirably functional for the purposes of the craftsmen who made Darwinism over the course of generations by tweaking knowledge here, suppressing it there, and emphasising it in a finished, approved of form. Next we have this little gem :

Language like a house is built stone by stone. One brick is laid on at a time by each mason. When a course is finished another course is begun. In building the temple of language much time is needed. The masons are mankind and the work proceeds slowly. There is this difference. The bricks of the temple of language are formed by evolution one out of another. Some change occurs in the alphabetic elements of a word and the meaning changes slightly. The new sound constitutes a mark sufficiently distinctive to denote permanently the new meaning attached to the new word. The following principles may be observed in all languages. 1. When one word is formed from another, a slight change in the sense is accompanied as a distinctive mark by a slight change in the sound. This is true in all languages. (Evolution of the Hebrew Language, Edkins, 1889, p. 3.) When Edkins speaks of the nature of linguistic evolution he expressly separates the linguistic process from that of human creativity, which is a unique attitude to take towards language, which is invariably portrayed as the product of human conscious will. He proceeds to describe the mechanical aspect of the linguistic process whereby linguistic force produces language by acting through individuals, toward ends that have accumulated over time. What is missing from this wonderful representation is the essential clue to its nature, whereby the resulting form is identified as social structure, rather than by the analogy of a temple. This description adds detail to our general speculations laid out above where we speak of basic linguistic elements dealing with immediate objects like family members serving as the basis of elaborate social forms, or institutions building upon an earlier linguistic foundations, so we might have the idea of a father as a head of a family becoming the logical route to a chief leading the group, structures only made possible by the ability of language to conjure them up and fix them in a form of knowledge that individuals can be organised in accordance with. This gives us a nice subtle impression of how the deeply abstract idea of linguistic force can emerge from its abstract state to become the active creator of all social forms. I am not sure that the exact meaning of the first universal principle of linguistic development aids our argument directly, but it is nice in so far as it expresses his idea that all languages are of a like kind and evolve in the same way. From which it follows that all human languages must have an identical biological function, and they must also produce the exact same end product, as in a superorganism. On this question of words creating social forms that we can then act in keeping with, and not before, the next passage is delightful : We often imagine that we can possess and retain, even without language, certain pictures or phantasmata ; that, for instance, when lightning has passed before our eyes, the impression remains for some time actually visible, then vanishes more and more, when we shut our eyes, but can be called back by the memory, whenever we please. Yes, we can call it back, but not till we can call, that is, till we can name it. In all our mental acts, even in that of mere memory, we must be able to give an account to ourselves of what we do, and how can we do that except in language ? Even in a dream we do not know what we see, except we name it, that is, make it knowable to ourselves. Everything else passes by and vanishes unheeded. We either are simply suffering, and in that case we require no language, or we act and react, and in that case we can react on what is given us, by language only. This is really a matter of fact and not of argument. Let any one try the experiment and he will see that we can as little think without words as we can breathe without lungs.

We may say, for instance, that we know the blue sky, or we know that the sky is blue. But how do we know it ? Nothing can be blue without us. Outside there may be millions of vibrations of luminous ether, but what we call blue is ours, just as what we call sweet is ours. Sugar is not sweet, we are sweet ; the sky is not blue, we are blue. And who tells us anything about the sky ? How do we know that there is a sky and that it is blue ? Should we know of a sky if we had no name for it ? We have only to try to think of sky without naming it, and we shall find that sky and all that it conveys to us is gone. And so with everything else. If a language has no name for father-in-law, the people who speak it do not know what father-in-law is. They know a person who is the father of their wife, supposing they have names for wife and father, but they do not know any father-in-law. Try to teach a savage what a circle is ; you can only do it by giving him a name. You may point to a wheel ;that will give him the percept or presentation of a wheel. You may give him a rope, fastened to a pole, and making him go round will give him the percept of running round. But the concept of a circle, and more particularly of a perfect circle cannot be produced or fixed in the mind, except through a name and its definition. It may be said that a geometrician can define a circle without a name, but how does he define it ? Again, by means of names. If he calls a circle a figure, he uses a name ; if he calls it plane figure, comprehended by a single curve line, he is dealing in names ; and even if he called it a mere something, he would still be within the spell of names. We may try what we like, if we want to think, if we want to add and to subtract, we can do it in one way only, namely, by names. (Introductory Lectures on the Science of Thought, Mller, 1888, pp. 46 48.) The sweetness of substances is there regardless of whether animals able to identify it as such exist to identify it as sweet, so this idea of sweetness being an attribute of ourselves rather than the foodstuff may cause some difficulty of acceptance, but the point he is striving to make is indeed the very essence of the nature of language, as in language creates material form by naming. This creative act might begin with naming material forms that already exist, but its biological function is to create forms that did not previously exist and can only exist, as Mller says, because we name them, and these linguistically generated forms are the social substance of which the human super-genetic animal is composed. If we think about how different cultures are sensitive to different features of the world according to the significance of those features in their world, this might help us appreciate this tricky idea. The classic example from anthropology is the Eskimo having six words for snow but no word for toothache, until we introduced them to processed food ! But it is fascinating the way he says we are sweet, and we are blue, I like that. So nothing exists until there is a name for it, which reminds us of the question Whats in a name ? To wit the answer is everything. Here is a passage I just examined that indicates this in a very sophisticated manner that is highly relevant to our world : The branch of shamanism, however, of which I am about to speak, is of a more special character, and refers to that shamanistic transformation of men and women in which they undergo a change of sex in part, or even completely. This is called soft man being ; soft man meaning a man transformed into a being of a softer sex. A man who has changed his sex is also called similar to a woman and a woman in similar condition, similar to a man. Transformation of the first kind is much the more frequent ; indeed, I had no opportunity of seeing personally an instance of the second kind, and my information is gathered only from hearsay.

(The Invert as Shaman, Bogoras, in Primitive Heritage, 1954, p. 426.) When we think of the precise word that we use to identify this cross gender phenomenon these days, as in homosexual, with all the weight of political meaning incumbent upon this word, and we compare it to the simple, literal manner in which this tribal community recognised this behavioural inclination, and indeed how the intellectual of only half a century ago named it, as invert, we get a real flavour of how the words used to identify this universal human behaviour, this natural human behaviour, massively effects what this behaviour is in society, and the structural consequences for society surrounding this fact. And indeed this is why I dislike homosexuality today, because it is an institution, and that makes it an arm of oppressive political authority, the homosexual cause having become a major bastion of political power today, neatly indicated by all the fuss over that most disgusting idea, gay marriage. Disgusting because this makes homosexuals bastions of traditional authority ! A most peculiar turnaround from their pariah status during the first years of my life. In relation to our argument that homosexuality evolved to enable an intensified structural order to come into existence by creating a type of individual specially evolved to form a core master elite, distanced from normal social activity, as in becoming a shaman for example, this discussion is important because it shows in precise detail how language works with such aberrant anatomical individual characteristics of personality, to produce novel social form, where, in this case, the homosexual personality is to social structure as wood is to the mallet we discussed above. Which gives us an insight as to how linguistic force could act as a continuum of the genetic force of information bringing about biological evolution. For what we seem to be describing in this scenario is a means by which homosexual personalities were drawn out of the species genome by the action of linguistic force on the being of the superorganism. Whereby those superorganisms which contained such individuals within their biomass became more hierarchically structured and hence more powerful relative to their neighbours whom they therefore eventually replaced or absorbed into an engorged superorganic form, in a process of globalisation that we see powering along today. We would only experience this process of biological evolution taking place at the level of social structure in terms of its cultural manifestation, so that even when modern intellectuals study this process they only see the linguistic skin displayed by people in their social activities, as in the myths and religious formulas displayed, under which the genetic substructure lies, as the structure of a material underlies and is said to inform the sculptors work. Sociobiology has made a pretence of recognising this reality in a truly scientific manner, by adopting the naturalistic attitude of science, exactly as Darwin did in fact, but its arguments are entwined in Darwins false science of natural selection theory, that forces all its interpretations to obey the false pivot of observation that says the human animal is the superorganism. In the above we indicate that the evolution of linguistic form has a feedback loop linking it to the genetic basis of individual somatic form, which our Atheist Science says only exists for the sake of the superorganism. Thus we have a three tiered structure unified by a flow of information, as in the genome, the individual, and the superorganism. The genome is the repository of the latent potential of human biological corporate nature, which realises it objective in the living being of the human animal, which is the superorganism. Between this source of latent potential and its realisation in a living being, is the unitary object of structural creation, the individual. Thus we have one flow of information in operation here, occurring in two modes of expression, the genetic and the linguistic. There are only two modes of information in this three tiered from because the end product, the human being, the

superorganism, is not possessed of a functional role, it simply is, for it exists in its own right, because it is the end point of human existence, hence it has no need of what we call consciousness. When sociobiologists broach this subject they get bogged down in a model that has to involve all the elements that we just identified, but where the individual is seen as the object of being with two environmental factors pressing on either side, giving us a three part structure consisting of the genetic pool of information, society, and the individual. This results in a tussle over whether or not universal behaviours exist, and the implications regarding their genetic basis if they do. To question the existence of universal behaviours is a way of denying the existence of human biological nature, and tantamount to denying the existence of society as a necessary feature of human existence. No wonder science cannot deal with humans. Incest comes to the fore in this discussion of universal behaviours, and it is suggested that a taboo against incest exists universally because without it the societies that allow incest to take place become internally weakened genetically, and eventually die out ; I read this the other day but for the life of me I cannot find the book I read it in, so youll just have to put up with my summary rendering of the idea. Comparing this sociobiological logic explaining human social life to Atheist Science logic, is like comparing the flint knife to the latest computer, there is no comparison. Sociobiology looks facile and pointless, and it is. Whereas our ideas seem sublime and perfect, because they are ! All because we adopt the true pivot of interpretation that is the superorganism, whereas the sociobiologist, through their obedience to natural selection, adopts the false pivot of the individual as the human animal incarnate. I have never given any thought to an explanation of incest or its proscription before, but doing so now my mind first leaps to the reality that the individual does not exist, this is after all our reference point for all interpretations of human behaviour as a feature of humans in general. Seen as a functional aspect of the human animal as superorganism, we can immediately see how this being would require a level of diversity to exist amongst the unitary elements from which its form is created. If all cells are identical what kind of animal do we get upon their combination ? A very simple one, a sponge type thing. If therefore a complex animal is to evolve it requires that from the outset a degree of complexity must be written into its genome, at the level of cellular differentiation. Applying this idea to persons seen as cellular units of superorganic being would explain why a diversity of personal types should be ensured by a cultural taboo against incest, where inbreeding undermines the diversity of unitary types. The question is how a linguistically established taboo manages to deliver this requirement ? The sociobiologist seems to make the superorganic object, as in society, a unitary individual subject to natural selection, and in doing so they would appear to of hit upon the correct solution, but more by accident than design, so that they do not understand their achievement. The impact of inbreeding is felt in the social consequences, requiring a means of control preventing it. But the control is not genetic, the requirement is genetic, the control is linguistic, and as such incest taboos do indeed give us a direct insight into the link between genetic and linguistic information reducing the individual to an agent of superorganic being. We have argued that homosexuality is drawn out of the genome by delivering structural intensification experienced in linguistic form, which has the effect of empowering the superorganic being. Homosexual inclination rooted in genetic makeup is reinforced, which in turn intensifies the development of social structure delivered by linguistic elaboration. Hence we give a positive role to linguistic expression that makes it integral to the process whereby personality types are evolved. This relates to behaviours as features of individual activity, and social structures as the accumulated effect of varied individual

activities. This suggests that certain types of individual are products of an expressly linguistic effect, for just as we say language engenders structure that preserves the linguistic forms that have created it, so the individuals of an exceptional kind, such as homosexuals, that we have just said are created by their special relationship to linguistic expression of social value, became features of those social structures that their presence enhances, such as the priestly figure mentioned already. In the case of incest we have another fascinating case for it too involves the management of sexual activity, also in a mode of prohibition. We can imagine this cultural activity being a precursor of the homosexual bent, where incest served an identical role in delivering structure through a linguistically formulated censure of specific couplings, which eventually secured a collective pattern of behaviour fixed in a linguistic identity programme, allowing the latent potential human corporate nature to blossom. If we take incest control to be one of the earliest behavioural impositions of linguistic force, we can imagine it arising when superorganisms consisting our of our kind, or one of our closest precursors even, lived in small homogenous groups, making up a faunal distribution of such groups across the African landscape that supported our closest prehuman relatives. In small groups the inevitable tendency is toward inbreeding, and since our species is all about creating a superorganism the primary requirement would of been to increase diversity within the gene pool, which could well of been the initial spur to linguistic development capable of imposing such a sophisticated prohibitions as that which requires groups to seek mates from related, but separate gene pools. This being a common feature of tribal life, where people must take partners from outside the family group, leading to all sorts of amazing cultural elaborations on this extended family theme. In More than the Parts : Biology and Politics by Birke and Silvertown, 1984, we have a critique of sociobiology which attacks the suggestion that incest taboo is genetically fixed as a whispering within (p. 20), because it occurs often enough in Western societies somewhat removed from the small world venues where we have just suggested this taboo arose. But the point here is that the role of language is not included in the explanation, so that the scenario has a vital link in the biological process of taboo formation missing. And that is the flaw in sociobiology, it is a genetic paradigm, it is Darwinian, it is individualistically focused on the person. Today there is no taboo against incest because we no longer live in a world of taboos, we are ruled by laws, which are a higher manifestation of linguistic programming. The idea that a behavioural taboo is genetic does indeed mean that it should exist in each persons DNA, as Birke and Silvertown indicate. But that is not the nature of a taboo, taboos are linguistic programmes, and this is something that all science is forbidden to consider. The closest we get to this idea is that of the meme, but again this is subject to Darwinian fictions, so that we never have a true model of evolution uniting genetic and linguistic information to the extent that persons are transformed into cells and the human animal, seen for what it is, a superorganism. As in so many aspects of law in our society, we have law breakers, people who reject the values loaded into law, and so brothers and sisters, fathers and daughters, mothers and sons, go at it like bunny rabbits, if the occasion arises. I wonder if any case of queer brothers has ever existed and been taken to this conclusion, ooh, that one is a stomach churner, but one we are forced to mention in this brave new world of bumfuckers paradise, because we want to show our obedience to the mandatory taboo on inclusivity in public statements, where omission would otherwise commit the worst of all crime, a hate crime, in this case homophobia ! From these considerations we might say that law breaking personifies freedom of choice, which in turn personifies the role of linguistic information in structural formation. Language creates the gimbals of fixed programming about which the individual moves freely while retaining a fixed position relative to superorganic form. This could well be why we are exposed to so much law breaking in the media, as a curious means of reinforcing the linguistic requirement to obey by appeasing the urge to disobey, as seen in

fiction, while reinforcing the need to obey is seen in the reporting of punishment and the negative effect of crime seen in the news. It is as if criminality personifies the essence of individuality, even in the way it insists upon obedience to law that thwarts individuality. It is a complicated little scenario this, which reminds us of the curiously dualistic aspect of master race identity bound up with the Judaism cum antisemitism dynamic. This business about incest and how its control is realised would benefit from some precise detail : The Chinese people is divided into a number of clans, each distinguished by a name, which is borne by all its members, and corresponds to a surname, or better to a clan-name, among ourselves, for the wife adopts her husbands, and the sons and daughters inherit it. The number of these clan-names is limited ; Davis thinks there are not much above a hundred, but other writers talk of three hundred, and even of a thousand. Now, the Chinese law is that a man may not marry a woman of his own surname, so that relationship by the male side, however distant, is an absolute bar to marriage. This stringent prohibition of marriage between descendants of the male branch would seem to be very old, for the Chinese refer its origin to the mythic times of the Emperor Fu-hi, whose reign is placed before the Hea dynasty, which began, according to Chinese annals, in 2207 B.C. Fu-hi, it is related, divided the people into 100 clans, giving each a name, and did not allow a man to marry a woman of the same name, whether a relative or not, a law which is still actually in force. There appear to be also prohibitions applying within a narrower range to relation on the female side, and to certain kinds of affinity. Du Halde says, that persons who are of the same family, or who bear the same name, however distant their degree of affinity may be, cannot marry together. Thus, the laws do not allow two brothers to marry two sisters, nor a widower to marry his son to the daughter of a widow whom he marries. In Siam, the seventh degree of blood-affinity is the limit within which marriage is prohibited, with the exception that the king may marry his sister, as among the Incas, the Lagide dynasty, etc., and even his daughter. Among the Land Dayaks of Borneo the marriage of first cousins is said to be prohibited, and a fine of a jar (which represents a considerable value) imposed on second cousins who marry. In Sumatra, Marsden says that first cousins, the children of two brothers, may not marry, while the sisters son may marry the brothers daughter, but not vice vers. In the same island, it is stated, upon the authority of Sir Stamford Raffles, that the Battas hold intermarriage in the same tribe to be a heinous crime, and that they punish the delinquents after their ordinary manner by cutting them up alive, and eating them grilled or raw with salt and red pepper. It is stated distinctly that their reason for considering such marriages as criminal is that the man and woman had ancestors in common. (Researches into the Early History of Mankind, Tylor, pp. 280 281. First pub. 1865.) As can be seen from this fascinating material the enactment of incest prohibition is not determined by genetic information, but by linguistic identity information delivering social structure, which therefore unwittingly obeys strictures determined by genetic factors forming part of the human superorganisms genome, as it evolved to transform individuals into units of superorganic being. The savoury dish of incest is nicely flavoured with a hint of mythical sentiment, in the reasoning which makes for such a meal, in that the blood of ancestors must not be mixed in the progeny of direct descendants, Mmmmm, yummy ! Such accounts certainly explain why anthropologists are so clear about incest prohibition being the one

indisputably universal behaviour. Although this is ridiculous, almost all human behaviours are universal, merely differing in expression, as language is universal but capable of appearing in an infinite variety of actual languages. Given that linguistic force creates linguistic identity programmes, that deliver the human animal in superorganic form, it is a given that all human social forms are as universal in principle as is the human act of speaking a language in a social setting. It is quite remarkable that such universality can of been a matter of great debate that persists to this day ! No greater proof could be needed to show that science no more exists as a free enterprise today than it has ever done so in the past, which is another myth that science likes to promulgate about itself nowadays. The next passage we are going to avail ourselves of takes us back into the farthest reaches of our species origins, helping us apply our thoughts on the evolutionary nature of human socio-sexual dynamics even more deeply then we have managed so far : Concealed ovulation. To keep their males sexually interested enough to accept responsibility for their offspring, your ancient fore-mothers had to evolve not just their behavior but their anatomy : one thing that makes us unique as primates is the fact that men cannot tell when a woman is fertile. Ovulation is hidden not only from men, but from women themselves : until less than a century ago it was impossible for any woman on earth to tell when she was ovulating, and before that no one even knew that ovulation occurs. Information about human sexuality is very recentand still not widely understood, even among that small percentage of the human population thats college educated. The grand result of the absence of oestrus is that human beings can have sex anytime, and that sex is about a lot more than just babiesit has become its own and sufficient reward. Bonobos (the species of pygmy chimpanzees that shares more DNA with humans than any other life formmeaning they are your closest nonhuman relatives) are the only other primates that can have sex anytime for fun and sociality. People who study chimpanzees and bonobos have said that chimps settle sexual problems with power, but bonobos settle power problems with sex. Dolphins can have intercourse at any time too, but we don't yet know enough about them to say how their hypersexuality factors into their social organization. In any case, neither they nor bonobos nor any other creatures have anything like the human family. The origin of that uniquely human institution depended on the loss of seasonal sexuality and the recognition of paternity. For your ancestors, the relatively permanent attachment of a male to the mother-child dyad proved immensely successful. Recognition of the father-child dyad converted the old male-female dyad into something new : the father-mother dyad. The improved security which that development brought kept so many offspring alive that, again and again, populations increased in number beyond the carrying capacity of their ranges, forcing people to colonize ever more of the world. (Culture as Given, Culture as Choice, Dirk van der Elst, 1999, pp. 67 68.) To make the point it is seeking to make correctly, the above quote should of begun by saying that in order for nature to produce a mammalian species of true superorganic form, it needed to turn hominid mating behaviour into an intensely social bonding hub, from which deeply social unit, the process of superorganic extension could proceed. This sentence utilises the true pivot of observation that is the superorganism, as it is this pundit uses the false, religious hub, of individual being.

The point being dealt with in the above passage is nonetheless extremely important, although the true nature of its importance is missed entirely by the author because his mind is in a fixed orbit rotating around the idea of the person as the foci of human evolution. Hence he talks more like a politician than a scientist, going on about the need for women to keep men interested in them, to be in love so to speak, rather than acting in a typically promiscuous animal fashion. What is actually being indicated here is the manner in which our proto-human forebears were transformed into a fully human form as superorganisms, by manipulating sexuality to generate social structure, exactly as we have been seeking to reason about above in relation to homosexuality, this being a modern aspect of sexual behaviour animating our contemporary social structure and dynamics, and incest, an old fashioned concern now more associated with pre-civilised peoples, because incest is irrelevant once a population has become sufficiently large and dense. Right from the off then it would seem that the elaboration of sexual behaviour has served as a means to deliver a social anatomy of superorganic being. Firstly by isolating the individual breeding pair into forming a social unit in their own right, as the hub of a family unit of social order that already negates the existence of the individual as an end existing for themselves, this being what Elsts argument about getting males to feel a bond to their offspring really means. The family in turn is widely recognised as the building block of social life, although nowadays its relevance has become blurred by modern conditions that have loosened the pair bonding imperative by taking authority away from individuals, shifting it towards the ever more centralised power of the state, vested in laws that touch on every minute detail of our personal lives. This process of evolution by extracting new types of structure from within a species by manipulating sexual dynamics, suggests the term inversion, where extracting the latent potential of a species anatomy to form a superorganism takes the part that evolution normally attributes to the external environment. Inversion in this sense means delimitation of the evolving individual form from the amorphous social milieu, thus enabling the creation of social structure whereby a species turns in upon itself to create internal complexity across its population, by transforming individuals into functional elements of social life. As opposed to developing new species in an externally oriented response to the physical environment, in the traditional manner espoused by Darwin. The end result of an internally oriented formation of a new species, is still a new species, but as can be seen in the case of humans, while we are as different from our nearest relatives as whales are from deer or birds are from dinosaurs, individually we retain a very close resemblance to chimpanzees. And this is because nature created the humans animal as a superorganism in a process delving into the latent potential of mammalian physiology as it had been realised in the primate line, hence the outer appearance of individuals was not the targeted structure of transformation required to become a new kind of animal. If we compared the human animal as a superorganism to the chimpanzee, we would see that the human animal is as different from the apes as whales are from their terrestrial forebears. The evolution of complexity via a process of inversion was not the object of the process. The evolution of complexity was directed towards creating an all embracing superorganic form of being. So that inversion toward a diversity of individual types and their related structures, such as those of the family, had to be countered by the imposition of a taboo forcing families to look outside themselves for mating partnerships. We know that inbreeding is detrimental to offspring, so the genetic factor is relevant, but more than this we understand that the whole point of evolving complexity by manipulating mating anatomy was to create a superorganic species of mammal. So we would expect that even as the internalisation of form within a species proceeds to create isolated foci of social structure,

families, these same structures must take on the functional role of into units of a higher social order of collective being, by reaching outwards towards one another. From which principle we recognise the functional nature of a universal incest taboo denoting the opposite swing of the evolutionary pendulum, to that which pair bonding anatomy had necessitated as the other limit of the sexual pendulums arc. Of course the attachment of males to their own bloodline is often reported in animals, so that a lion will kill cubs in order to bring a female into heat so that he can sire his own offspring. Which indicates that the sexual dynamic hangs on a wire of such linkages, and therefore the shift to a more attached pair bonding structure seen in humans was evidently a perfectly reasonable direction for evolution to take in order to bring the greatest form of living being into existence as an expression of the latent potential of the mammalian kind, as a superorganic species of mammal : the human. What the above ruminations suggest is a coherence to the idea of linguistic force acting in conjunction with genetic information, which is acting as the more fundamental expression of the information force of life. In terms of superorganic form this suggests that genetic force acts as a centripetal force treating the genome of a species as an environmental niche to be responded to by evolving complexity that delivers an extended superorganic being, composed of individuals suitably evolved for the purpose. Wherein the process of genetic evolution acting in this inner genomic direction produces its own counteracting mode of expression as part of the newly evolved somatic anatomy of superorganic being, a centrifugal force of information that gives the superorganic structure a dynamic impetus forcing its integrated complexity to extend outwards, in a manner that expresses the genetically evolved capacity for integrated complexity based upon the newly evolved individual types. This centrifugal force is language, that we refer to as linguistic force creating social structure. Thus we have the genes acting as a centripetal force of information and language acting as a centrifugal force of information, together delivering superorganic form. Genetic evolution drives inward, creating the individual as the foundation of structural complexity, which language organises into an extended social form. Language obviously has itself to be a product of genetic evolution, but the point is well made in Hoyles conception of the Thing existing due to the act of decoupling, which separates the individual from the social being, which takes on an existence of its own independent of any, and all individuals, making individuals subservient to it, even though the Thing only exists as a product of individual existence. But not as a by-product, which is how science treats society, the superorganic being is the end product of the biological evolution that has created individuals that are made for society. The mechanism of decoupling is the genetically evolved anatomy of speech, and according to these present musings, language acts in conjunction with genetic evolution by delivering a counterbalancing force to that of the genetic force acting inwardly upon the latent genetic potential of a species genome. This is why language is a necessary feature of superorganic being, it is the somatic adaptation for social life, as wings are the somatic adaption for aerial life. Genes it seems make solid forms which are defined by information of identity, that in turn sets these forms into a spatial arrangements according to their specific nature as determined by the physical environment they exist within, that their anatomy is adapted to. So that while language takes on a special role in human evolution it is only the expression of extended form denoting identity, that is an inherent feature of all life, for without identity a life form cannot replicate itself, and replication is what defines life. This idea indicates why language always culminates in an identity form, as religion, above all else. We tease out this Newtonian type of idea whereby living form arises from a force of information acting in a manner akin to the creative forces of the celestial domain, where we see gravity bringing together and impulsion reacting oppositely, from this idea of genetic evolution penetrating living matter to unleash structural potential, which then takes substantial forms that interact in a manner that imparts a structural definition to the space

they occupy, as physical matter is condensed and then set at distances in space accordingly. This nicely brings us into touch with Hoyles real work as an astronomer who is famous for ideas relating to the ultimate forces creating the universe, having coined the name Big Bang, in derision at the idea it named, which has oddly become the accepted term for this leading idea on where the universal force of impulsion comes from. But if our model is at all valid then it cannot be limited to the creation of superorganic form that has inspired its conception. It suggests that the force of information that creates life has a dual nature allowing it to create substantial form, revealed in the two modes of the information force whose pinnacle of creation is the human animal, as a superorganism. Because here we have both the genetic inner acting force, and the linguistic outer acting force, taken to their maximum degree of creative expression in living form. From whence our amazing attributes of creativity flow. As we have already seen, homosexuality was called inversion a few generations ago, and this carries the same meaning as we applied to the isolation of sexual activity bonding the human mating couple, in that homosexuals are an inevitably isolated portion of any society, if only by virtue of their numbers as a percentage of the population, and usually the isolation is far more severe, it being in the nature of this sexual coupling that it is not linked to a family, but rather, we have argued, to another structural form, that of an elite core, with the homosexual as priest, a role that can be elaborated to whatever extent, depending upon societys complexity. So this is exactly as we would expect. In order to create a mammalian superorganism starting from the base material of primate form, sexual delineation was altered in a manner that involved a kind of fractal descent into a vortex of human corporate nature, that saw the individual increasingly reduced to a cellular unit of superorganic being. This is the process of inversion seen in the creation of pair bonding giving rise to both the family and homosexual coupling, giving rise to foci of increasingly exclusive association, where exclusive association simply equates to social structure. Clearly genes were responsible for the anatomical changes dealt with in the above passage quoted, but the counterbalancing of this genetic process of evolution seen in the linguistically applied taboo on incest, hints at the manner in which linguistic anatomy might of come into its own simultaneously, in support of this genetic process that was directed at the evolution of superorganic, or social form. This indicates a parallel dimension to a dual information dynamic running simultaneously in one direction. Which explains our eternal obsession with dualisms and our fixation upon genetic and linguistic information as continuums within the human evolutionary process wherein the genetic gives way to the linguistic. In our reworking of the evolutionary paradigm, where we have the human animal as the superorganism, this dualism that allows modern humans to break away from nature via the umbilical chord of linguistic expression, is transformed into a unilinear process composed of a parallel bandwidth of biological information, whereby genetic and linguistic information flows in unison within the human animal existing as a superorganism. We are only conscious of the linguistic component of the human system, but in fact at all times the influence of the genetic underpinnings and the linguistic superstructure are working in unison. Thus genetic evolution has created this special anatomy described by Elst as an ever present aspect of our world that we take for granted, but which makes no sense without the constant organising effect of the linguistic programme that linguistic anatomy has accumulated over time, to enable the genetic underpinnings to serve their purpose of creating a human superorganism. It is as if the human anatomy that Elst identifies as evolving to enable social form to come into being were likened to the components of a computer, which requires software to make those components meaningful. So the changes in female anatomy

linked to the adjustment in male sexual behaviour are the components of superorganic being that require a linguistic programme to enable them to work according to their genetically oriented purpose of delivering social form. This form being a latent potential of mammalian anatomy awaiting expression for as long as mammals persisted as the pinnacle of lifes evolution without having yet filled this particular niche of social being, the essence of which is the inversion of the primate animal form into itself, by producing individuals that are themselves cellular units of an extended superorganic form. Elst concludes with a flat, uninspiring, Darwinian type explanation for the success of the family strategy, as seen in more sproggs, yawn ! But as we have explained, this is all about drawing a superorganic mammal out of existing mammalian forms, and that meant drawing a cellular unit of individual being into the light of existence, which in simple terms meant that the success of this evolutionary process is seen in the delivery of social structure, end of. And if he wanted to deliver a truly wonderful insight to the world, he could of told us that concealed oestrus without language is as useless as books without writing, so that the evolution of this kind of anatomy oriented toward human social nature, is proof that language ability was evolving in tandem. And of course we should note that our cousins in kind, the social insects, they too have become social automatons through an identical process of species inversion, whereby the latent potential of their precursors insect genome dug into itself to extract individuals that were reduced to the status of cellular units of social order by messing with their sexual roles. So that most honey bees in a hive are females, with one fertile female acting as the core of social power because she is foci of identity. While males are sidelined into the status of an appendage, and consequently suffer periodic slaughter. Evidently the basic sexual role mechanism has a nature that leaves it open to becoming a mechanism of such elaboration at a fundamental level of the evolutionary process, about which Darwin has nothing to say, but Atheist Science tells us where we should be looking, which is to the force of information that creates all living form. The role of sex in delivering social hierarchies delineating foci of power, has not escaped notice within academic literature : Sexuality and power Michel Foucault is not the first to say many of the things he argues. His conclusions often overlap with those produced by other theoretical approaches, including, amongst others, the interactionist and labelling theories. His historical conclusions also articulate closely with the empirical research of recent social historians, particularly those influenced by feminism and the radical sexual movements. But his speculation so far only seen in outline, in a methodological (and often polemical) essay rather than in a series of detailed studies point to what I believe to be the correct questions even if he does not provide all the right answers. And the central point is the one captured in the English title of his work : The History of Sexuality. The definite article is important, for what it suggests is that the modern notion of sexuality both the importance we assign to it, and the theoretical unification it implies is an historical construct of the past few hundred years. The fundamental question, as posed by Foucault, is how is it that in our society sex is seen not just as a means of biological reproduction nor a source of harmless pleasure, but, on the contrary, has come to be seen as the central part of our being, the privileged site in which the truth of ourselves is to be found ?

Foucaults recent work has been dominated by an explicit preoccupation with power, and in his History he argues that the apparatus of sexuality is of central importance in the modern play of power. His work at the same time marks a break with Conventional theorisations of power. Power is not unitary, it does not reside in the state, it cannot be reduced to class relations ; it is not something to hold or use. Power is, on the contrary, omnipresent, it is the intangible but forceful reality of social existence and of all social relations. Foucault is not interested in a grand theory of power, but in the concrete mechanisms and practices through which power is exercised. Power, that is to say, is not a single thing : it is relational, it is created in the relationships which sustain it. Although he is unwilling to specify in advance any privileged source of power, there nevertheless underlies his work what has been described as a philosophical monism, a conception of a will to power forever expanding and bursting forth in the form of a will to know. What Foucault is interested in is the complex of power-knowledge, the way in which power operates through the construction of particular knowledges. The French title of the first volume of his History sums up his preoccupation : La Volont de savoir, The will to know. (Sex, Politics and Society, Weeks, 1981, pp. 6 7.) This passage asks the question that we answer above when explaining that what Foucault calls an historical process, is in actual fact a biological, that is, a linguistic process spontaneously arising from the evolution of speech anatomy, as described above. This is a perfect example of how scientific ideas are realised in a nonscientific form, demonstrating precisely how complex knowledge arises in a false form that is impressive, by teasing out questions that are correctly formulated, but misinterpreted due to their being informed by the false pivot of individuality that sees the person as an end in themselves. Foucault was an individualist in this sense, no matter how good he was at mimicking the logic of organicism, rather as his fellow countryman Durkheim was. It is fascinating to see how he links sexuality to both knowledge and power, and hence power to knowledge. If only the tosser could of presented his ideas in a decent scientific form instead of the usual religious style bullshit : linguistic force generates knowledge which, in its purest form, constitutes the information of identity, the seat of which we know as power. Simple, that is all there is to it, no mystery, job done.

I When antisemitism isnt antisemitism because it is the truth My Atheist Science philosophy is full of remarks about the Jews as master race that would be attacked as virulently anti-Semitic in any situation that set my ideas before the public. As I work in isolation and never receive feedback on my ideas, because these sort of ideas are utterly taboo and there is no place for me to share them, no one has ever called me an antisemite, but they soon would if I found a public platform other than Scribd, one where I got feedback. But I am not anti-Semitic, racist, Islamophobic, homophobic, or any other kind of mindless hate mongering person. All I do is seek the absolute truth. If we lived in a free society this truth could be known and then Jews and all the rest of these identity diversions that plague our world, would vanish due to the irresistible force of such absolute knowledge. As linguistic force is the enemy of linguistic force, the only question is, who is the stronger, the world, or me ? So no worries about that then !

Meantime, I just dropped on a passage in a piece of Jewish propaganda dealing directly with antisemitism, in which the curious feature of my argument whereby we are all rendered into Jews, finds an approximate equivalence : Furthermore, the coalition seemed to have disregarded the fact that many of the lizard-people Icke had publicly named and shamed were not Jewish. I had felt a similar sense of bafflement when Gail at the ADL had told me that Bilderberg was a code word for Jews. (Again, very few of the Bilderbergers who had whisked past me into the gates of the Caesar Park were Jewish.) One would presume that this would pretty much disqualify them from being, by anyones reckoning, a Jewish conspiracy. Why did nobody consider this important enough to bring it up ? Surprisingly, the only group I discovered that had addressed this complex issue head-on was Combat 18, Britains fearsome neo-Nazi outfit. They recently published a fact-file entitled What Is ZOG ? It reads : ZOG is Zionist Occupied Government. Not all the controllers of ZOG are Jews. ZOG is Zionist because their agenda seeks to realize their conviction that they are the Chosen People. Their aim is to be the Masters of the World. So theres the answer. In the absence of statistical substantiation, you need to put words in inverted commas. The Jews are metaphors now. You no longer need to be Jewish to be a Jew. This is how things now stand : the Anti-Defamation League are searching for code words that have replaced the word Jew ; and for the anti-Semites the word Jew has become code for non-Jews who meet in secret rooms, just as the antiSemitic tracts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Protocols of Zion and Henry Fords The International Jew, for instance portrayed the Jews. (Them, Ronson, 2001, pp. 149 150.) So what might we suppose the fascist wing of global Judaism, the ADL, would discover to be a code word for anti-Semitism in my work ? The Superorganism perhaps. It is interesting to see how the meaning of words, especially those denoting social identity, come to the fore in the intense interplay dealing with the subject of Jews as covert masters, as shown in the above quote. But there is no such manipulation in my arguments, all is clear and above board. The crucial thing about hate agendas is that they set up an us and them scenario, so that antisemites are invariably of another religious order. In so far as there is such delineation to be discovered in my ideas it lies in the fact that I am an atheist, expressing an atheist account of existence. To the extent that I home in on one identity versus another, this is concerned with the core principles expressed in my Atheist Science philosophy, which recognises that the human animal is a superorganism. Thus my arguments are always concerned with structural issues, not ultimately being about me versus others. I say that none of us exist as individuals, and we are all Jews. Ultimately I deny the existence of all values, good and bad, and this is why I end up delivering the most searing conclusions, such as that which portrays Hitler as the greatest saviour of the Jews. This is an idea which is so obvious that we find it expressed in anti-Semitic rants, there was an example from a couple of months ago where a UKIP candidate said the Jews had hoodwinked the world into acting as their stooges by staging their victimisation in the last world war. This political idea carries the essence of the truth that we express plainly, and it is this act of carrying the essence of truth that constitutes anti-Semitic expression, where, by contrast, the

absolute truth carries no such hidden significance relating to the delineation of the speaker relative to the Jew. So that the absolute truth, irrespective of what it says, cannot be antiSemitic. This is because it has no hidden agenda and therefore the ideas it expresses belong as much to the Jews as they do to anyone else, only naturally, the Jews would not want the truth, and hence they would not want anyone else to have it either, because it certainly is not in their interest for people to know what a Jews is, and why Jews exist. The Jewish identity is a covert identity of power. It is certainly of some interest that true antisemites identify none Jews as Jews where there is a Zionist type agenda in evidence, although the passage provided in the quote we have taken above is too brief to tell us exactly what type of elites are being made into surrogate Jews. Ronson is only concerned to promote his pro-Jewish agenda so he makes no attempt to get at the subtleties of this subject, but we could have a go. Wikipedia has a page on ZOG so that was easy enough, it says this means the Jews control a country where the official government is a puppet regime. This is very close to our position in principle, only our explanation is scientific, as in biological, not political. There are still no more details, what we would like to see is the Christian nations identified as slaves of Judaism by virtue of their subjection to Christianity, but of course most antisemites are as likely to be far right Christian fanatics or Muslim looniessame difference. The combat 18 article is available but it does not say much more, its concern is essentially over the eradication of the white race by the black race, which it implicitly links to the Jewish master race programme. All of which is very close to what we recognise in a scientific manner, which goes to show how important antisemitism is to the Jews as master race, making it impossible for true knowledge relating to this subject to be given a public voice, largely thanks to Hitler. In short the constant remaking of the Hitler Taboo is ongoing. I often have the first inklings of a thought about how Hitler came to be the alter-hero of Jewish master race power, but the making so Hitler as a champion of Judaism in the one form that Judaism needed a champion at that time in history, is a tricky subject to get at. However, while continuing my run through my library last week I hit upon a suggestive line of enquiry regarding the way antisemitism became entwined in the ideology which took shape as Nazism This appears in chapter six, Nazism and the Occult Tradition, of The Occult Conspiracy by Michael Howard, 1989, where Howard describes Hitlers conversion to the cause of the German Workers Party, that had been founded in 1919 to promote racial superiority, German nationalism and anti-Semitism. (p. 124) We have a brief description of the origins of this political ideology, which origins are the central mystery as to how Judaism acted as a core of linguistic force delivering worldwide warfare that placed itself at its centre symbolically, and let rip, catapulting the Jewish master race to the pinnacle of their power as masters of the world, and handing them Israel at the centre of a globalised world. We can only assume that the general mix of ideas that pervades our world led to this result, as it repeatedly has throughout our history. We must assume that actual Jews have a role in this process, nurturing this outcome be inducing antisemitism in the host society, but putting your finger on that in any factual form is nye on impossible. Of course the ideas appearing in Villarreals Origin of Group Identity, 2009, offer food for thought on the dynamics of master race control of a slave biomass, courtesy of the role of viruses in evolution, but that is treated in another work yet to be posted. What we should never imagine, is that the person who becomes a stooge of the master race by taking on the appearance of a master race for themselves, ever knows what their true role is. A man like Hitler will of been beguiled by the idea of covert power, which is real, and he will of thought he was taking up the position of master himself and his fraternity, not

understanding that the Jewish identity is the one true identity of superorganic being, and any other master can only ever be a front for Judaism. The Jews as true inner identity of superorganic being need a representation, a face, and that is what all other identities of significance in the world actually are. Judaism is the one true constant. All other identities are one with this identity, and the impetus for their birth and existence is the attraction of occupying the seat of power which exists because Judaism exists, while no Jew can occupy this seat without negating the real power of identity that is captured by the culture of Judaism. All of which machinations are dictated by nature, no person has any part in creating society.

Chapter 1

Hoyle at Large

It is the first of September today, summer is over, autumn is coming, and both our English weather and our place on the surface of the planet know this, and affirm it by the changes they bring. Since starting this project a little over a week ago I have read the bulk of Hoyles short book, skipping the opening material, the relevance of which was contemporary with the time of writing. And, after proceeding to build up the material presented here, I have made a move to gather other material. Looking at Hoyles Ten Faces of the Universe yesterday, I noticed a passage that should be reproduced here, at the beginning of our work on Hoyle. It is important as a statement of the key idea informing my entire lifes direction, asserting an abiding thought that I have held in my mind since childhood that has made me the man I have been, as in someone who believes in the reality of true knowledge because of the power of science. This attitude of mind borne of experience allows me to present myself to a world that rejects this vile idea of absolute truth, so that I stand alone in my insistence that freedom can only be defined in terms of free access to true knowledge of reality as it is. We might seek to attack the concept of God the mathematician by arguing that mathematics is also a man-made attribute. But, to put debating points aside, there is much more to it than that. From the concepts of mathematical structure and elegance, a predictable quality emerges in the world. The story of the weak interaction, provides us with an example here. From the concepts of mathematical structure, it was found possible, some twenty years ago, to predict successfully the outcome of certain critical experiments that have since been performed, experiments that can in principle be performed by anybody, and which, when performed correctly, always give the same results. The veracity of the individual does not enter the matter at all, whereas it does when one is confronted by so-called revealed truths. Throughout the history of science, similar situations have occurred, so often, in fact, that we can be sure that real truths do exist, truths that are mathematical in form. Scientists always tackle their unsolved problems in the belief that such truths are there to be found, and so far they have never been disappointed. The only verifiable statements, verifiable by anybody, which can be made about the world are those which rest on these mathematical truths. Opposition to this point of view usually springs from the feeling that it somehow downgrades the importance of the individual. It is therefore of interest to notice that an unusual way can be found to reassert the importance of the individual, a way with a certain peculiar validity (Ten Faces, pp. 4 5.) Our interest concerns the key idea of absolute truth being real, and science being the means by which it is obtained. Hoyles emphasis upon mathematics as the language of truth is not to my liking because it is an alien language to me, and as I am the ultimate truth

speaker his emphasise on maths cannot be right. The secret here is to recognise that individuals do not exist, and as we can see from Hoyles argument he is striving to make his validation of truth something rooted in the individual as the existing reality. Which is a curious thing for us to conclude since he actually says right here that this focus upon mathematical truth negates the individual, because it makes everything subject to universal laws thereby denying any purposeful role for individuals in such a deterministic model of reality. Hoyles focus upon individuals as real, is almost certainly a subliminal attitude of mind borne of his cultural programming, something that can only be countered by a fully conscious realisation that individuals do not exist as factors to be treated as ends in any analysis of reality, and this idea we do not find expressed in Hoyles work, or anyone elses come to that. By making mathematics the language of absolute truth we make a biased assumption about the nature of truth and knowledge which conflates our idea of the individual with the reality of unbiased knowledge. This is a tricky idea to think about, I can hardly hold it in my mind. The point is that mathematics is a possession of individuals, it is not reality itself, and as such maths suffers from the same foibles as spoken language, in that it can be used for biological purposes to do with the control of knowledge, as we see all the time from the way abstruse maths is used to validate religious nonsense about indeterminism and unknowability. Therefore when we substitute mathematics for actual reality we infuse that reality with the usual bias of falsely perceived individuality. We do not need a technical mode of symbolisation to prove reality exists, the fact that we can manufacture myriad sophisticated things by understanding material reality proves the deterministic nature of reality so completely that we can assume, in conjunction with our concepts of reality arising from our technical expertise, that all things are part of a material reality and therefore can be known in an absolute sense, in principle, so that absolute truth is real, concerning all things. Which means that science is the means by which we know reality, and the only means by which knowledge of reality can be known as an absolute truth. Twice Hoyle emphasises the idea that anyone can verify science, but what on earth does he mean by this ? Only extremely privileged people can do scientific experiments, and the same applies to maths for most of us, since very few of us are taught this skill. So again he is taking the principles lying behind science and representing them in a bias manner, albeit unwittingly. He refers to the role of individuals being irrelevant where experimental proof is available, hence he speaks of anyone in principle, but there is no escaping the fact that the issue concerning absolute truth is all about political authority, and if we have to rely on technical proofs for the validation of absolute truths then this narrow containment of our knowledge forming abilities means that we are doomed to live in a world ruled by falsehood. For this reason we need Atheist Science, aimed directly at reaching beyond the nature of knowledge as a biological process, and toward the ideal of science as personified in the words of people like Hoyle. We need is to understand the nature of knowledge, and we want to do this in the most mundane manner that anyone who can speak English can easily understand, if they have half a mind to. We have discovered that the real problem behind accessing absolute truth has nothing to do with constraints on our mental capacity or the inscrutability of reality, but rather it concerns our nature as living entities and the role that knowledge plays within that biological context. So the problem is all about the control of knowledge by authority, and that is the end of it, find a way to circumvent political authority to allow knowledge to relate solely to reality and the universe of knowledge is there for the taking. But we were made by nature to be incapable of circumventing authority, so that is why we cannot achieve this much vaunted goal. What I actually liked about the above passage was this statement :

Throughout the history of science, similar situations have occurred, so often, in fact, that we can be sure that real truths do exist Upon closer inspection the example Hoyle is talking about is not very helpful, being far too technical. For me the same idea has always emanated from the myriad realities of our world that have accumulated over the centuries since our modern scientific age began, as already stated. This scientific material is seen in all sorts of things all around us, in our technology, and this screams at us that absolute truth exists everywhere, and that nothing exists that cannot be known according to a scientific method, in principle. That anyone can exist who does not instantly know this is too incredible for words, yet, the truth is that I am alone in this point of view as far as I can tell, and this is why seeing the above argument expressing this most fundamental of attitudes captured my interest. And of course my realisation that persons do not exist and knowledge has nothing to do with truth, explains the infuriating conundrum that I give voice to concerning the abject stupidity of people with regard to what truth. Hoyle does not have this insight into human nature, so he labours under the impression that knowledge is about truth, and this is why he mistakenly represents the deeply esoteric and inaccessible language of maths as the voice of absolute truth, which it clearly cannot be because I understand the logic of absolute truth simply from the evidence of scientific accomplishment. He may as well say that a telescope is a voice of truth, or the eyes even, for all that maths does is to perform an analytical task for the mind akin to that which our sensory tools and organs perform. Actual truth is a concept of reality and that is why we say that the proper definition of science is : the means by which we know reality. So we define science in terms of the knowledge it provides, not in terms of the technical methods it uses. The religious authorities who rule us have made sure that the official definition of science is useless to those who love absolute truth based upon reality, by ensuing that science is narrowly defined in technical terms. Hoyle is conforming to this corruption of science by letting maths stand as the representation of truth, whereas plain words will do just fine if only they are allowed to represent truth. In order for this to happen we must know the absolute truth about who and what we are as natural entities, and that is what Atheist Science is all about. Hoyles argument meanwhile is very close to our own, but not being informed by a deliberate intention to oppose authority which is the cause of the problem of our failure to know the truth, Hoyle simply does not know where to begin, and nor does anyone else that I have ever come across, so he is the best so far, notwithstanding how far off the truth he is. His intention towards the absolute truth does seem to be genuine however, and that is an important matter to discern. Although I am never certain of this in anyone given that everyone fails to home in on the Jews as the master race, and all humanity as the slaves of Judaism, for this is the bullet that must be bitten by anyone who would speak of the absolute truth. This is why the absolute truth is so unspeakable, because of where it leads us. But this statement about the Jews is not itself the absolute truth, this is more general. The absolute truth is that humans are a species of mammalian superorganism, and individuals do not therefore exist as beings in their own right, so that the Jews are merely the specific case of this general reality, the mode of existence of the moment. But this is an all important fact, for it is this specific truth that is the cause of all our problems, whereby the eradication of Judaism, of religion, is the solution to all our problems, as long as that eradication is done through a conscious awareness of what we are dealing with and what we want to do by way of moving ourselves beyond religion, and toward living according to our own intentions. Though when I say this I cannot imagine how this could possibly be achieved, and that is why religion persists.

Monday, 02 September 2013 So today a second item by Hoyle arrived, and a proper odd job this is. Cosmic Life Force : The Power of Life Across the Universe, 1988, which does not have the subtitle on the title page, only on the dust jacket, this item presents the idea that the fundamental particles of life swarm throughout the universe awaiting fertile seeding grounds such as our planet, where life proceeds to mature towards an intelligent stage recreating that which gave rise to it in an act of wilful, conscious creation. Or that is the impression I got of this book from a cursory skipping across the pages front and rear. I like this bloke, he is unusual in his antiauthoritarian stance, he does seem to oppose convention, he even berates Darwinism and says some intriguing things about Darwinism in this book, so I do not want to do what I ordinarily do by hammering the man as an idiot. But it would take a closer examination of his argument to discover if I can find any real basis for arguing that life was created by an intelligent being in what he says, as this is what he seems to be saying empathically in his closing paragraph : The Creator has been given many shapes and names in the diverse cultures throughout the world. He has been called Jehovah, Brahma, Allah, Father in Heaven, God, in different religions, but the underlying concept has been the same. The general belief that is common to all religions is that the Universe, particularly the world of life, was created by a being of incomprehensibly magnified human-type intelligence. It would be fair to say that the overwhelming majority of humans who have ever lived on this planet would have instinctively accepted this point of view in some form, totally and without reservation. In view of the thesis of this book, it would seem to be almost in the nature of our genes to be able to evolve a consciousness of precisely this kind, almost as if we are creatures destined to perceive the truth relating to our origins in an instinctive way. (Cosmic Life-Force, p. 144.) Sounds arse about face to me, we have an special kind of intelligence which we then see as the ultimate attribute of the universe, same old rubbish. Our intelligence is no different to that of any other creature. Its biological function is to create a state of deception within us, that is called consciousness, and that is why we end up with a sense of high authority ruling over us. This passage flies in the face of all that he argues for by way of the uncompromising scientific attitude, before this he derides the rationalist rejection of an intelligence creating life as stubborn ignorance, without any logical justification. Which means he condemns my natural, scientifically aligned attitude. The suggestion that we instinctively perceive the true nature of ourselves, to adjust his terminology, is favourable to our idea that we come to be religious in order to create the superorganism, that is the human being that we are part of. But this more sophisticated, science based description of our instinctive sense of our real nature is very different from what he is saying, which is basically a total validation of the Biblical nonsense verbatim ! So on we go with this fellow, he really is a strange kettle of fish. There is something appealing in the simple explanation of our remarkable intelligence in terms of a fruition of its originating source, such a model conforms with life as we know it on earth, in a narrow sense applying to each species. But there are various problems with taking this to be anything more than an appealing idea, that would require a proper reading of his arguments to see if he has taken us any way along the road of making this fanciful thought into anything more. If we are the fruit of such a creative intelligence then we should be the creators in our own right, or a stage leading onto the full blossoming of the creator. All of

which is too Biblical for comfort. Besides which, we have a rock solid model of human nature based upon the idea that humans are superorganisms and the religious idea is the linguistic identity programme that linguistic force generates to create that human being which we know as God. This idea is perfect and beyond question as far as I can see. And there are certain things about Hoyle that suggest caution when thinking about the kind of mind he had. Firstly he was a Cambridge man, and they are worse than Oxford for the conformity to religion. And this collaboration with an Asian whose name suggests he is a Sikh, looks very seventies hippy rebellion, but toward mysticism not science. Reading Rosnays Macroscope today, which is worthy of making into a second section of this book as it is a wonderful compliment to Hoyles remarkable ideas on the Thing, I reached a point where he expresses ideas that are very close to our own : One may wonder how goods and services can constitute a flow of energy. In fact material goodsproductsare the result of transformations involving energy, information, and raw materials. They can be considered informed matter, matter that has received a particular form or that has been informed as the result of mans activity. Matter is condensed energy ; information is a form of potential energy. Goods (including foodstuffs) and services are therefore equal to a flow of energy. To each item of goods there is attached an energy cost, say in kilocalories. The feedback of energy in the form of work can be expressed easily in kilocalories expended per hour of work or in some other appropriate unit. (Macroscope, pp. 18 19.) This is so well suited to our mantra of linguistic force projecting authority into social space, where it condenses into social structure thereby forming the fabric of a living superorganism, that it is an incredible statement to come upon, adding fine detail to our rather philosophically reasoned social model of human biological nature. My notes upon reading this passage expressed a criticism of Rosnays complete failure to grasp the real nature of the subject, thus he fails to realise that in this scenario the human animal is the superorganism and the individuals acting within the economic feedback loop he describes in terms of energy are therefore part of the raw material of which the human is composed, such that the economic portion of the human process that he singles out for this logical treatment is merely deals with the concrete material of the superorganisms exoskeletal framework, which the organic living material organises and occupies in the process of transforming matter into a living form, through the informing process arsing from the flow of linguistic force that proceeds spontaneously from the action of genetic force in creating an animal formed about a core of linguistic anatomy. What is so nice about the idea of informed matter is that it solves a nagging problem I have had ever since I came up with the idea that linguistic force generates all social form, and form that constitutes a living animal, a superorganism. Clearly the material creations of our world are not biological to our eyes, we call them artificial, yet I mean them to be understood as biological because of their real nature perceived through the macroscope of corporate being, that arises from our awareness of human biological nature being corporate, and this nature being realised in a naturally formed superorganism. I stick to this principle because my unifying conception of human nature forces me to do so, and other creatures create inanimate structures as virtual extensions of themselves, corals, snails, bees, and so I am happy to apply this reasoning to our own species. But Rosnays neat explanation of how artificial products and activities can be seen as part of one organic whole because they have received the impress of information making them expressions of an energy flow, this is

perfect, because it relates the life force of information to these inanimate attributes of human existence. To speak of matter as condensed energy and information as latent potential energy is to make these two fundamental attributes of life perfectly attuned to our corporate social model of humans. We have always regarded the linguistic anatomy of human somatic form as a latent potential which linguistic expression projects into social space, where the energy this action contains condenses out into structural form of all kinds, most importantly of an informational kind, as language, knowledge, and culture, acting upon the objects of linguistic force, as in persons. This social formation process arises from the latent potential of genetic linguistic anatomy, venting the material fabric of social form through the activity of interacting persons, to lay down it landscape of social mass. Exquisite !! This along with Hoyles work, is the only post cleansing organicist reasoning I have ever come across in a form that presents new ideas about human life based on science, that accepts the organicist logic applied to humans. Both inevitably fall short of the real goal, which would otherwise of got them into impossible terrain, clashing with the taboo against criticising the Jews, put in place by the incredible work of Hitler, which derived its inspiration from the subversion of science by Darwin, that misdirected the flow of linguistic force into political structures causing the Nazi ideology to arise from Darwins principle promoting the natural selection of the fittest. We can see just how vital Hitler was to the survival of the Jewish superorganism when we read works like these by Hoyle and Rosnay, and this is why the linguistic dynamics of Jewish identity programming that delivers our social structure in all its complexities, created Hitler through the flow of linguistic force being channelled via the control of knowledge away from the truth of our corporate nature. An important aside in this technical description of the dynamics of the human superorganism is found in a detail of great interest. Rosnay places the activity of individuals within the flow of organic energy that animates the living being of the human animal, that we have as a superorganism, so that he gives work a central role in the feedback of energy. This is extremely important to our understanding of how individuals are bound into the superorganic fabric by linguistic force, through the linguistic identity programme that this force generates to produce a social structure that contains the identity programme that gives the social structure its form, this is the structural-information-energy feedback loop of superorganic being. A dynamic loop that makes the product of linguistic force and the social structure one and the same thing, existing as a complex system, with people embedded within it as an integral feature of the system. This integration arises from the need for sustenance being linked to conformity with the unifying identity message through work. Work is formalised labour that supplies all necessities through the machinery of the social structure, according to the individuals perspective that is, and channels energy to the human animal existing as a living superorganism, these are necessities that cannot otherwise be accessed by anyone alienated from the message. Put simply, the need for work forces us to conform to the message because if we do not conform we will not get work, and without work we starve, or we become outlaws, outcasts from the message that is. And the message is constructed to deliver this outcome, to allow a good life within, and no life without. And from this principle the whole edifice of the state has arisen, with its Domesday like model of possession and control of all means of livelihood, maintained by devising an exploitative hierarchical structure making levels of privilege bring obedience to the message dictating the structure, and all arsing from linguistic force that is delivered by the anatomy of somatic form. In addition to which it is worth noting that a complexity of identities, that we see most obviously as multiculturalism today, allows a host of identity programmes to deliver zones of inclusion under the umbrella of one unifying message, which is how we end up with a master

identity like Judaism and major subidentities like Islam and Christianity, with many minor identities all contained under one structural mandate. This dispersion of inclusion across a range of identities is necessary for a central identity to rule a supersized biomass leading to one global superorganism, the driving force of which is the central concern of Hoyles reasoning that causes him to talk of a Thing pushing people toward global unification. This explains why work is so important, and such a burden, it is the physical means of controlling us in obedience to a core authority that exists on the basis of information in the form of knowledge of identity. The fact that Rosnay makes work part of the feedback loop of energy reinforces the mistake we have already noted in Rosnays understanding of his subject. For what he means by this is that energy is involved in the making of human products, and through the work involved in this manufacturing process, a feedback loop of energy exists that sustains social form. But this separates the workers from the products, a bit like separating the oxygen delivered by the blood cells from the cells which exist to deliver energy to the body. Whereas the workers and the manufactured products are one biological process evolved to deliver energy to the human superorganism, just as the blood cells and the oxygen form a unitary system evolved to perform the same function of delivering energy at the somatic level of anatomy. Which suggests that the products of work are akin to oxygen, acting as a catalyst in the social process, continually being produced, consumed, discarded, and reproduced, all the while animating the workers who have come to live in one great, worldwide consumer society. If Rosnay had been able to conceive of the idea of a macroscope as he describes it, but on a true basis, then he would of seen this unity of function between persons and products for himself. But because he does not understand that the real conceptual macroscope consists in simply shifting from the false pivot of the individual to the true pivot of the superorganism, he sees no more through his faulty device than anyone else ever saw. With regard to the multiplicity of identities appearing under one overarching identity, noted above, we find some general principles deriving from Rosnays systemic method that he equates to the macroscope. Under the subheading of Growth and variety, we have this : Variety and complexity are closely allied. Variety, however, is one of the conditions for the stability of a system. In fact homeostasis can be established and maintained only when there is a large variety of controls. (Rosnay, p. 87.) The superorganism is the system, Judaism is the identity of the system to be preserved by homeostasis, and that requires multiculturalism to achieve this end, according to the systemic method of analysis employed by Rosnay to understand complex systems. This gives us a nice example of how the application of Rosnays technical approach to a sociologically organicist model of human society as a whole entity can show us how to make our conceptual ideas more scientific, allowing us to work backwards from scientific concepts to scientific methods and facts. Which then allows us to explain how ideas that sound conspiratorial when we speak conceptually of science being subverted by Darwinism to protect religion, can be made technically rigorous by applying systemic methods that show this social process to be one of linguistic force generating a self organising social system seeking homeostasis about a core identity, in accordance with universal principles. There was a nice detail about the Jewish culture developing as an exclusive culture, as a master race that is, in a book that arrived a couple of days ago, today being Saturday, 07 September 2013, which described how religious regulations were devised to define who the

Jews were, as distinct from the gentiles. This account refers to things like food taboos but the basic principle still applies in the form of secular law, and continues to perform the same functional task of integrating the biomass of the superorganism by making everyone act to a common pattern of behaviour : The development of all the ritual and other restrictions on feeding thus strengthened the genetic unification of the Jewish people and its genetic separation from other peoples. (The Evolution of Man and Society, Darlington, 1969, p. 184 5.) Darlington says in a note that it was its role in defining the social body that made the law the key point of dispute when the Jewish slave identity of Christianity was being formed, indicating that this extension of the master body required a refined set of laws to give rise to a new hierarchical order of Jew, existing at a lower level of authority and power within the one Jewish superorganism. Darlingtons genetic argument is unappealing, but I did not know what form his ideas took until I got hold of his book. He of course does not treat humans as superorganisms, hence his pathetic emphasis upon genetics. His idea is that mating practices are at the root of human evolution because they differed between cultures, so they empowered one culture relative to another, driving the dynamic of competitive social evolution. This is why he is discussing the Jews in this way here, in terms of genetic refinement. This is pure, Darwinian based, political nonsense. But the Jews are important and do need to be accounted for, and the influence of linguistic force through law is just the place to look. Hence we are happy to note this emphasis upon this fact found in an idiotic book, since as truth speakers we can only ever expect to find close approximations to our ideas in peripheral works of variegated kinds. By reducing conformity to law to a scenario involving being outcast from the message we can see how Darlingtons reasoning conforms to this correct scientific logic, even though his use of this true observation is biased towards the false ideas of Darwinism, and hence religion. Tuesday, 10 September 2013 Another amazing item came through the door today, Bionomics : The Inevitability of Capitalism by Michael Rothschild, 1990, is a fascinating title that holds out some promise of interesting material for our study. The book opens with some fabulous material on the nature of information as the essence of life, which subject he then transposes to human society : Stripped to its core, a living organism is nothing more than the packet of information recorded in its genes. And yet, if the very essence of life is information, one has to wonder why a column of numbers or a line of words isnt alive. (p. 1) I wonder if he is going to try and explain this daft, but, from our point of view, intriguing question ; intriguing to us because we know the answer. An implicit quality of information is that it is being used, being read, in other words information is only information during the time when it is being read, at all other times it is potential information, or dormant information. This makes information like energy locked in coal say, where the energy is freely available, but unless it is used, it is just an arrangement of elements within a geological deposit. And so it is with information. The undeciphered languages of the world are not information because they cannot be read any longer, although some information can be gleaned from them by the creatures that are evolved to react to such information as part of their biological life processes because they are objects of linguistic force. Genes in a forensic

sample are not alive, so genetic information is not synonymous with being alive, and symbolic communication is just as much indicative of life as genetic information, by definition. Symbolic script is therefore just as much alive as genetic code from a true perspective on human nature. The preface is essential reading. Rothschild wants to employ the analogical mode, and he actually uses the word macroscope, which Rosnay indicates lends itself to the use of analogies because the systemic approach contrasts with the analytic method that homes in on ever finer details. Rosnay is not in the index however. Meanwhile Rothschild goes out of his way to distance himself from any kind of sociological organicism by saying that this train of thought means culture does not emanate from the mind, but from the genes. Whereas bionomics holds that economic development, and the social change flowing from it, is not shaped by a societys genes, but by its accumulated technical knowledge. (p. xiii) The degree of stupidity indicated by this statement beggars belief, it reminds us of Hoyles observations on the tortured way that the simplest of truths had to be coaxed into the open when it finally became accepted that humans were animals. Hoyle indicated that this was because other factors inhibited the expression of commonsense, namely Biblical dogma. The same thing applies with Rothschild of course, and it is still religious demands that make this barefaced idiocy compulsory. The point is of course that technical knowledge must be a direct product of human genes as surely as a dogs bark must be a product of this animals genetic attributes. Humans no more choose to make aeroplanes than dogs choose to chase balls, in both cases these animals are entirely incapable of doing other than they do, which means what they do is entirely programmed by their genes. The fact that the genetic programming sets humans up to create a living being in the form of a superorganism explains the extension which this friend of religion and enemy of truth uses to define a disjunction between humans and nature, as per usual, that we Atheist Scientists are here to tear down. Yet Rothschild wants to walk a tightrope between religion and reality, for when he comes to parts of his argument that require an emphasis upon our given social nature, he hammers the fact home. He says that our capacity to cooperate may well be our most powerful adaptive trait. (p. 114) But he sets this thought within a religious pap that makes cooperation something inherently positive, even though all our peculiar evils like war, rape, murder and slavery, are by far and away more indicative of our cooperative nature than the empathetic traits that he wishes to link to our sociality. Although my first thoughts were to connect this work with Rosnay, hence my insertion of this notice of its arrival here, after making the above comments I find its overall sentiment to be very in keeping with Bloom. Rothschild uses the organicist logic quite openly as if it really is real, as Bloom does, yet he makes sure he does not use it scientifically, by rendering humans natural entities, as Bloom also does in the end. Blooms Lucifer Principle followed five years later, so this work might of influenced Bloom but not the other way around there is no mention of Rosnay or Rothschild in Blooms index or his bibliography.

I Humans are animals, certainly, but what is the human animal ! Wednesday, 04 September 2013 Three works by Hoyle arrived yesterday but I hit a brick wall at the dole office and decided to spend the rest of the day downing fine ale, hence a delay in giving a snapshot on these items. The Small World of Fred Hoyle : An Autobiography, with no date anywhere, that may be 1975, seems very quaint but it has no

obvious contribution to make to our project. Next we have a slim volume containing several lectures, this is Man in the Universe, 1966. A quick dip reveals some interesting material, he displays a rare awareness of the naivety displayed in the normal idea of science as an intellectually free enterprise, evoking what we would call the war of religion against science, though he does not reach this conclusion himself : And so if we do not presume God to scan, then what of man ? A great deal of progress has been made since Popes day in understanding the nature of man. We now look back in something like astonishment on what was perhaps the most important step, not because it represented something incredibly subtle or profound, but because it was so obvious. It is astonishing because it was found so difficult, and yet it could hardly have been easier. I am referring to the discovery of the nineteenth century, the discovery of Darwin and Wallace, that man is an animal. One would think the most casual glance at the world would suffice to convince everybody of this. You do not need to be an anatomical expert to perceive that the skeletal structure of a man is strikingly similar to that of an ape. Yet it was necessary for the nineteenth century to go into incredible detail in order to convince itself that this was so. To the twentiethcentury mind, Darwins book The Origin of Species is a fantastic exercise in the obvious. Yet without it the nineteenth century would not have believed the obvious. Plainly other factors besides the issue of man as an animal entered the argument. Human beings are not so stupid that they cannot perceive the obvious when they have no strong incentive to believe otherwise. Plainly the strong incentive in this case was the Bible. Acceptance of man as an animal implied that one must not go on believing implicitly in everything that was said in the Bible, for the Bible asserted that man had been placed by God above the animals. It was because of this that it was necessary to drive the case home with relentless logic ; and the outcome has been that very many of us no longer do believe implicitly in the Bible. The issue was not merely a scientific one. It implied a profound social readjustment throughout Western civilization. What I said at the outset concerning the meaning of God could not have been said at all in the early nineteenth century. I am not referring here to the danger of religious persecution, but to the fact that the human mind was inhibited against such thoughts. The brain had been so conditioned in childhood that it was incapable of entertaining certain thoughts, in this case the fallibility of the Bible. I mention all of this not by way of attacking religion but to raise what seems to me an important question. How far are we inhibited against certain obvious thought patterns today ? How far does our childhood training prevent us from seeing the obvious ? Was the nineteenth century the very last period in human history when people suffered from such blind prejudices that the obvious could not be seen ? Clearly not, I would say ; an affirmative answer would surely be a manifest case of special pleading. Hence I conclude that there must be some perfectly straightforward big truths around us which we are all too stupid to see. (Man in the Universe, pp. 18 19.) On first impressions this is excellent, he may not take us precisely where we want to be with his observations on institutionalised ignorance, but he certainly lays the groundwork for our ideas arguing against the existence of science today, and he too has Darwin in his sights when speaking thus. This description of Darwinism as an exercise in the obvious is full of the imputation that this was a fraud worked out by the ruling theocracy to get it passed the cusp of scientific discovery that was threatening the annihilation of Judaism. But as we enter deeper into the argument and play around within it in order to understand the mindset

that Hoyle had, we find the simple flaw in what he is saying that is the root cause of his total failure to promote science, and instead to become just another gatekeeper serving absolute theocracy by corrupting science. That man is an animal is true, and it is indeed obvious, so it is well worth commenting upon the fact that this fact took a knowledge revolution of the most staggering kind to make it part of public knowledge. But all that happened courtesy of Darwinism, is that the problem was shifted from one illusion of divine sacredness, to another of natural exaltedness. So now we know that humans are animals, we need to know what the human animal is ! And this is a very tricky question because it already has a presumed answer, right from the off, and it is this presumed answer, that the individual person is the human animal, that Darwin took for his starting point when manufacturing his individual centred idea of natural selection working around the most fit individual. Hoyle poses the delightful question about big truths going unseen, and he does this with potential unknown truths in mind, and in Man and Materialism he reveals the one big truth that matters, almost reveals it that is, he reveals its shadow under the name Thing. But his stance remains fixed on the idea that humans are persons, even if they are commandeered by this Thing existing in its own right. It is interesting to find his ideas leading us to this realisation that when finally admitting that humans were animals like any other animal, human sanctity was preserved by keeping the person as the animal, which of course we have always realised by speaking of the need to preserve the false pivot of individuality, but this discussion of the situation by Hoyle brings us to a neat way of expressing this fact in terms the question : What is the human animal ? Thus we see that both Rosnay and Hoyle help us develop our Atheist Science ideas because they are both dealing with the same general idea of a society as a unified entity that is more than the sum of the parts. Next we have Our Place in the Cosmos : The Unfinished Revolution, written in collaboration with Wickramasinghe, 1993, and this really hits the spot as regards the sham of science in the modern world. I have never seen anything like this before, once again the man is incredible, and right where it counts concerning the imposition of Darwinism, though of course he still fails to get the true significance of this situation that he is so full of.

PROLOGUE
The popular belief is that the Copernican Revolution and the inquisition of Galileo arc things of the past. Human societies, it is claimed, have progressed beyond the stage when such outrages could happen again. In this book we show that the Copernican Revolution is far from over, and that society has not improved since the sixteenth century in any important respect. If anything the situation may have got worse, with the successes of the Industrial Revolution conferring upon human beings a degree of arrogance not seen before. The dogma has shifted from an Earth-centred Universe to the equally unlikely idea that life, which is the most complex and amazingly intricate phenomenon in the entire cosmos, must be centred on the Earth. The new dogma has Judeo-Christian roots, but today its custodians are scientists rather than the high priests of the Church. Our capacity to probe the Universe around us, to ask and discuss questions concerning origins (always to ask, sometimes to answer), sets us apart from all other creatures that inhabit our planet. This remarkable capacity, or intelligence as we prefer to call it, may be seen as the end product of a long history, a history that according to the thesis of this book must have predated the formation of the Earth

some 4500 million years ago. For close upon 4000 million years, terrestrial life meandered along in a seemingly mindless way. Starting from microscopic singlecelled creatures, it built up to become more and more complex, more and more sophisticated and diverse, through long periods of geological time, until at last a species emerged that was endowed with the capacity to look back on the very processes that created it. We are all members of that uniquely privileged species. How did this whole process come about ? Did it arise through a sequence of random events here on the Earth, or was it instigated from outside the Earth, from space, and is it even possible that it might have been driven by the agency of an external cosmic intelligence ? These are some of the questions we shall address in later chapters of this book. The orthodox explanation of these facts, which is attributed to Charles Darwin and a long succession of his disciples, is well known. In its modern extended form, Darwinian theory asserts that the earliest living cell was assembled through a purely mechanistic shuffling of the basic building blocks of life, and that subsequent mistakes of copying (mutations) and occasional doublings of genes, together with a continual sieving out of the unfit in relation to every terrestrial environment, led to the products of evolution that are seen today. All this is taught nowadays as though it embodied proven unquestionable facts, but in reality it is little more than dogma, dogma that has come to be fossilized in our educational system. A great deal of this dogma has turned out in recent years to be inconsistent with the real world. Yet the theory dies hard. This unfortunate situation has arisen through a sustained campaign of propaganda on the part of biologists, and by a blind eye being turned to every fact to emerge in later years that appeared to go against the theory. Several distinguished physicists have questioned the basic premises of this essentially pre-Copernican, earthbound theory and attempted to point the way towards a cosmic view of life. Among them are figures of no less stature than Kelvin, Helmholtz and Arrhenius, but all their protestations have come to naught in the face of the unrelenting propaganda of the Darwinian front. In addition to the conflict with Darwinism, the idea of terrestrial life being influenced by the external Universe runs counter to a longestablished belief in the Christian Church. (Our Place, pp. 1 2.) This remarkable passage continues the theme we found above, denying that science is really liberated from religious oppression. Such a radical refutation of natural selection coming from within science is a very rare statement to see, and although it falls way short of the mark of true science it is still impressive for this reason, save for the fact that this intellectual radicalism is used to justify a crazy religious idea in scientific guise, as in a creative intelligence making the universe. I love the way he calls scientists priests of a sacred dogma, exactly as we do. The reference to Darwinism becoming fossilised in our education system is interesting because the core treatise of Man and Materialism makes much of this process of fossilising knowledge causing civilisation to stop progressing, and thus to decay, so this is a nod to his theory of knowledge as the key to understanding human nature. Saturday, 07 September 2013 Today The Intelligent Universe, 1983, arrived. A large book full of illustrations, it is published in a populist format. This was definitely worth adding to our collection of Hoyle books as it has a couple of useful pointers on his views. Firstly he gives us a strangely simplistic idea of the nature of universal intelligence that is totally anthropomorphic in the sense of its deliberate intentionality :

Animal life on Earth has suffered much from the depredations of man. The variety of animal life is less today than it was a hundred years ago, and a hundred years hence it is likely to become still more restricted, as man drives down the rest. If a dominant animal were in some absolute sense the best, you might argue that it was just bad luck on the others, the drive towards improvement having unfortunately made them obsolete. But there is no absolute sense, because the potential of apparently inferior animals may still remain to be revealed. So it was for the early mammals, our distant ancestors, in the days of the dinosaurs. If the dinosaurs had eliminated all mammals, the eventual potential of man would have gone unrealized. It would be likewise if a temporarily dominant form of cosmic life were able to colonize the whole of the galaxy. One form would eventually become supreme, and all eggs would then be in one basket, not necessarily the best basket ultimately, nor the best eggs. No controlling intelligence in the galaxy would therefore permit the first life-form that managed to attain a particular level of technology to go on from there to eliminate the rest. (Intelligent Universe, p. 155) This weird mode of reasoning is indistinguishable from the very worst kind of religious thinking, all bound up with a sense of self and utterly bereft of any rational content, although it pretends to be nothing but rational by referring to factual knowledge of a scientific kind. Humans are merely the superorganic form of mammals, so there is no human potential being expressed in humans, our attributes express the potential of mammalian anatomy, and this superorganic potential would always be expressed by any anatomical form given enough time. He is personalising the whole approach to understanding the nature of life and evolution, and despite his constant disparagement of natural selection, as in Darwinism, his ideas are shot through with Darwinian logic ! This is revolting stuff and it helps us explain why despite having the best vision of humans as superorganisms, expressed in Man and Materialism, he had no idea that humans were superorganisms, and hence his vision come to nought. Then we get a very plain, full statement, on his justification for thinking in terms of their being a ruling intelligence. This is perhaps the nastiest thing we have seen in his work, it gives us a gut wrenching sense of Hoyle as a Cambridge priest working science in the service of religion. We did see these thoughts in his other work Cosmic Life-Force, but here we see them again, that religious people all take a universal intelligence for granted, and this is their God, but while he says this will not do because he is a scientist, he entertains the idea because we do not know it is not true and therefore as scientists we cannot dismiss it. This robotic attitude to truth and falsity is totally contrived, it treats verbal statements as valid in themselves as if knowledge were about truth for the sake of persons. He does not see that knowledge is a social product, a biological feature of our species that delivers a flow of information that creates the superorganism by organising us to a common religious identity programme, this being why we cannot have the truth and even nowadays we find ourselves led down blind alleys when the correct path is plain to see, if some Thing were not misdirecting us. There are many people, especially those of religious persuasion, for whom the existence of a larger-scale intelligence than ourselves is simply taken as a matter of axiom, to be accepted without any need for discussion. For me, this is not an acceptable position. Nor do I take the opposite position as axiomatic as many scientists do. One must begin in my view with an open mind ; we simply do not know

the answer to such a profound issue in the first instance, and only by determining as many facts as possible from observation and experiment, and by then making reasoned deductions from the facts, can one ever know. If this procedure leads one eventually to a firm conclusion, well and good, but if no conclusion emergesas may well be the case for such a far-reaching questionone must remain uncertain, never knowing. To many this may seem a harsh outlook lacking all dependence on faith. This is not really true, however. It is just that my kind of faith is different. My faith is that observations of the world around us allied to our reasoning powers can lead to answers to properly formulated questions, whereas I do not believe that correct answers can be obtained by instinct, or by passionately wanting such-and-such an outlook to be true. It seems to me that faith in the usual sense is rather like a toehold on a slippery slope, safe only if one does not move. Admittedly, this way of thinking may lead one into what at the end of the day may look like a long detour made in order to achieve a rather short journey, but so be it ! Here in this chapter I shall take the view that, if we are to hope for an answer to the present profound question of whether there is a large-scale intelligence abroad in the Universe, then of necessity we must appeal for it to the most profound aspects of our knowledge, to the microworld which sets the rules for the behaviour of all physical matter. (Intelligent Universe, pp. 189 - 190.) So, as we have indicated, this rubbish treats religious ideas as if they were all about knowledge and truth, when they are nothing of the kind. It is the job of scientists to explain what religion is as a natural phenomenon, not to treat what religion says as if it were some kind of emergent scientific theory to be investigated. Religious ideas are part of the natural environment, they are not observations on the natural environment. Not to realise this is a gross error that can only denote someone being dedicated to religion, and antagonistic to science. And this in a man who is a radical promoter of science and a clear atheist, although I have not seen this word crop up. He does not have the manner of a philosopher, his ideas are very layman like, and the more we read the more we see that the fabulous material he throws up in Man and Materialism is nothing more than a fluke arising from his willingness to say anything, so that in this case he just happened to hit the mark. But it did no one any good because his random theorising in an unconstrained manner meant that he had no idea of the brilliance of his own ideas when he saw human collectivity as a Thing existing in its own right, taking possession of individuals. For him this was a travesty of nature denying people their sacred gifts as human beings ! In the above passage he plays up to the religious by bothering to talk about faith. He rightly indicates that questions can only be asked about properly formulated questions, which ought to have been followed by the statement that the question whether an intelligence ruled the universe was not such a question. Indeed, even human society is not ruled by anything that can be called an intelligence. The actual truth is, that intelligence does not exist at all, in the sense of a guiding consciousness acting as a central part of life. He is a real stick in the mud, bogged down in the religious mindset of human divinity. Yet he apparently has no idea this is so. What he calls intelligence we would identify as linguistic force, the influence of which is accumulated over time to give a linguistic identity programme which equates to a genome. Which would mean that the genome is a controlling intelligence creating the living form, if we are to say that human intelligence is real. Clearly this is ridiculous because what defines intelligence is the power of wilful control, and the core of Hoyles Thing thesis is that we are controlled, not controlling. Although the implication of his argument is that we have

the capacity to control our existence and we should do so, something we avoid saying in Atheist Science by admitting that our ideas are descriptive of reality, not political formulations for a social strategy. The most recent addition to my library that I have taken notice of here, Bionomics, begins by making a comparison between genes and social organisation, based upon the uniform idea of information acting at both the biological and the social level. Although again we find ourselves dealing with an author who trespasses upon the truth in order to subvert while preserving human sacredness.

Chapter 2

The Books Origins and Social Context

Hoyles Man and Materialism is part of a series of what I would take to be fairly lame works ordinarily, the list of titles shows a heavy bias towards religion, and as to the rest, it is mainly an exercise in sentimentalism, as in Can Nations Learn to Learn ? (Seems to of been planned but not published under this title.) and The Meeting of Love and Knowledge. Just pathetic drivel to go by these titles. It would appear to be a propaganda exercise arising from the Jewish military victory over the world that was at this time moving into its smothering phase, to judge from the short description of what this World Perspectives series was supposed to mean. But what we have in Hoyles eccentric ideas of the nature of man and society is a fabulously rational summary of the truly scientific nature of sociological organicism, and we get this little gem of a treatise from him because this series aimed to employ the most responsible of contemporary thinkers. : represents the world community of ideas in a universe of discourse, emphasising the principle of unity in mankind, of permanence within change. (p. v)
WORLD PERSPECTIVES

Hoyle essay is very much concerned with the subject of an emerging global society seen as a regrettable, but inevitable development, which he was therefore concerned to explain the inevitability of, and to offer some thoughts on how to alleviate the miseries of the impending doom that we today are in the thick of. All of which is supposed to deliver a modern doctrine of man. As ever the conspiracy of the elite against the masses, that we identify antisemitism because the Jews are the focus of this conspiracy, is not a conspiracy at all. People make conscious efforts moving in the direction which the force at the root of these developments takes us, but these are instinctive expressions of human corporate nature shaped by linguistic force that programmes individual consciousness. So while we speak of works as propaganda, this is not what they really are, we are being individualistic, as in political, when we describe things in this purposeful manner. What we find in this World Perspectives series then, is a shift toward a propaganda of globalisation, which is the ongoing identity programme of Judaism expressing human biological corporate nature, acting under the new conditions of global society made physically real with the state of Israel established as its core ideal territory, that all of the world must now be made to act in homage towards. Within this picture we have the aberration of Hoyles actually true vision of human biological nature, approximately set out. This demonstrates how unconscious the creation of the propaganda that rules us actually is, the propaganda that is the One message of identity that gives what Hoyle calls the Thing, its form. Hoyle opens his account with a preamble on the nature of materialism and its relation to modern social conditions, specifically relating to Russian Communism, since this political ideology was often characterised as materialistic, hence its overtly atheist stance on religion. Hoyle then, as a scientist, is presenting the argument for materialism as distinguished from

contemporary political abuses that were developed in order to exploit science for political ends, rather as Nazism was based upon Darwinism and sociological organicism. These extreme political creeds exploiting scientific rationalism necessarily pervert what is already a perversion of true science enacted to protect Judaism, as in religion, and they inevitably allow the theocracy to present science in the worst possible light. Which is of course why Judaism causes these perverse political creeds to come into existence as part of its management of knowledge that is always seeking to protect the core identity, the One message, as Judaism.

I Hoyle To get an impression of who Hoyle was I have run a search on the main book site and obtained several thousand hits. Running through a few titles we see that Hoyle was indeed an astronomer, and he evidently had a considerable interest in the nature of life as part of the universal process. A couple of titles indicating this interest are Intelligent Universe : A New View of Creation and Evolution, 1983, and Cosmic Life-force, written in collaboration with Chandra Wickramasinghe, 1988. We can see that Hoyle was a prolific man of ideas and that his writing was very much concerned to make sense of humans within the universe, as natural features of the universe. It does appear from the titles however that he was overly concerned to project human qualities onto the universe, rather than reducing human qualities to the natural expressions of nature, so that he calls the universe intelligent rather than emphasising the mechanistic nature of humans as biological entities, made in accordance with universal laws of energy and matter. Thursday, 29 August 2013 As my study of his work has proceeded with sampling of the text and the transcription of my reading notes, plus the addition of further commentary, I have finally been inspired to round up a clutch of Hoyles works, eight of which I ordered today : Ten Faces of the Universe Cosmic Life-force Of men and galaxies Our Place In The Cosmos: The Unfinished Revolution Man in the universe (Bampton lectures in America) Intelligent Universe: A New View of Creation and Evolution The Small World of Fred Hoyle Encounter with the Future A very enticing title was Origin of Universe & Religion (Anshen transdisciplinary lectureships in art, science, and the philosophy of culture), about which I found these

comments : From the dust jacket : this is Sir Freds controversial giant comet theory about the origins and continuing development of the universe. World-renowned astrophysicist and cosmologist, Sir Fred Hoyle, presents his fascinating and controversial giant comet theory on the origins and continuing development of the universe. For those who enjoy being challenged by new and often provocative ideas, this is an ideal book . . . Sir Fred Hoyle is an uninhibited fountain of new ideas, arguing in this book that the great epochal events and myths of history were caused by cometary showers. In this book Hoyle sets forth his ideas with charm and humour. One may not always agree, but one cannot but be thoroughly stimulated. -Walter Sullivan Which decided me against buying a copy. This clutch of books cost about 35 and was cheap enough to grab all that showed any possibility of having any bearing on what we are doing in this examination of Hoyles organicist sociology, such as it is. I also finally got around to running a web search and this told me that he was linked to Cambridge, so we cannot expect anything much from him in terms of real scientific work, real atheism that is. Ten Faces was the most expensive at 10, and the most interesting for our purposes as it includes a suggestion that for our own sake civilisation needs to collapse, the logic of which is found in his identification of cyclical collapse as being at the heart of human social evolution. Collapse being offered as a positive solution to our modern difficulties in which population plays a leading part, this invokes the idea of social cleansing as underpinning human advancement. All that is missing is the recognition that this idea is the very essence of the Jewish cultural identity programme. And now I have also ordered Conflict in the Cosmos : Fred Hoyles Life in Science, by Simon Mitton, 2005, which was nice and cheap. Also available was The Scientific Legacy of Fred Hoyle, edited by Douglas Gough, 2005, not so cheap ; Fred Hoyles Universe by Jane Gregory, also 2005 ; A Journey with Fred Hoyle, second edition, by Chandra Wickramasinghe, 2013, first edition being 2005, all of which Ill skip for the moment. The general impression gained from this quick rustle up of works on Hoyle is that he was an independent spirit, always going his own way and unconstrained by any pressure that might arise from critics of any sort. This goes some way towards affirming the impression made by reading his Man and Materialism with its ultimate suggestion that society is a superorganism, put in our words. This willingness to go his own way is borne out by this unique book telling the truth about human nature as it so obviously would be told by a free science of biology. And he was a critic of Darwinism we are told. But more than anything else, we are left struggling with the difficulty that despite getting every detail of the argument right, Hoyle completely failed to put the jigsaw puzzle together in a sane manner, leaving us feeling almost certain that the one thing constraining him was the taboo against the idea that humans are a superorganism. The problem comes across so clearly that we cannot help but wonder if he tried to get around the taboo by speaking the truth and then denying it, as we discuss here, simply in order to be able to speak the truth in some form. However, without putting names to objects, as in identifying the Jews as the master race carried forward on waves of cyclical social cleaning, if there was such an attempt to speak the truth against the oppression of religion, he failed miserably We atheist scientists can only derive the truth from what he says because we know the truth already, as to a person who can read Egyptian hieroglyphs the symbols of ancient Egypt pose no barrier to understanding, but to all others,

forget it. So it is with what Hoyle offers. The truth is there, but only to those who know it already, for the rest they can but read on in bemused fascination, at best, without the aid of a translator, such as myself. But did Hoyle know the import of this own ideas ? Well that is what we hope to gain some insight into by examining all the books we bought today. But I must admit, I doubt it very much. Such is the force of the idea that we exist as individuals, as ends in ourselves, that we are the human being, each and everyone of us, that even a man of his independent minded bent and intelligence, could not reach past this imposition upon our brains.

II Knowing it all Although Hoyle does not come at the subject headon, by saying that humans are superorganisms and individuals do not exist, his actual practical conclusion on where we are and how we should respond, and what the knowledge of our predicament does for us, is very much where we find ourselves led by our own Atheist Science philosophising. As it happens I am reviewing My Idea now, 30/08/2013, and I am at a passage I wrote two years ago, where, after discussing the idea of the great man linked to the idea of civilisation, I indicate the kind of ideal world that my ideas of living for ourselves instead of the superorganism we evolved to serve, suggest we should be living in : The idea of living in a world where feral human superorganisms are still living according to unfettered cultural programmes that express linguistic force dramatically rather than verbally, must appear horrendous to us all. But it represents real tolerance, real multiculturalism, based on true knowledge of human nature. Once Judaism has completed its mission of homogenising the entire planet and boosted its population to a hundred billion and spread the concrete jungle everywhere, what then ? This planet is all there is, going extraterrestrial is not a viable option. Total submission to Judaism will mean the end of war, one world government, one lawmaybe. But what then ? Will this condition not be just as much the end of our way of doing things as surely as if we made a conscious decision to stop in Europe and let the rest of the world be as it was five centuries ago ? In the first case the end game is forced upon us, in our scenario we make a choice to keep the planet rich, to have modern alongside ancient. The truth is that we have no choice, nature is in charge and we just do as we must. But with the aid of modern science and the idea of the superorganism to the fore we can know what that must is, and understand why things have been as they have, and why they will be as they will be. In other words we are providing exactly the knowledge that Fred Hoyle calls for and suggests he too is offering when he says humans are controlled by a Thing. The basic dynamic of smash and mend, homogenise and organise, must continue to be the way our world changes and moves toward an ever more empowered state of development. Thus if we imagine one world unified and a population of thirty billion say, then the next solution will be all out nuclear warfare, decimating the global biomass, but, as ever, the core of Judaism will be preserved along with all the benefits of technology. The Jews will resurface and reorganise, and so the one world already established on a crude level, will re-emerge in a more complex form. And that is how the future of the unified world will be, must be indeed, there is no other possibility ; you will see, in five centuries time read this,

and see if I am not right. It is the story that is being told about the ancient world in the programmes we are talking about above, the rise of Greece, its unification and implosion. This process is reminiscent of what the cosmologist tells us about the manufacture of elements in stellar furnaces by undergoing rounds of condensation followed by an explosion, followed by incorporation through condensation, with each cycle producing more complex base elements from which to weave a more amazing product. This is how the human social matrix works too. And as it happens it was Hoyle that first told us that we are made of star dust, and he also created the term big bang for the start of the universe. I have just added the comments about Hoyle, but this passage on the grim future we face because we are parts of a superorganism that drives us to grow, are very much in keeping with the drift of Hoyles arguments in Man and Materialism. Therefore in this book by Hoyle we do have some kind of statement that fully affirms all that we say in Atheist Science, which tells us that Hoyle did know what we know about the true nature of human nature, in terms of the dynamics if not exactly in materialistic terms. Discovering a link between his work in cosmology and the ideas he expressed in his social philosophy is very nice, this is seemingly where he got the logic of creative processes from to apply to the largescale human condition. This in turn indicates why he does not arrive at the same perfectly materialist place that we do despite his great knowledge as a professional scientist, because he began from the false pivot of individuality and never made it to the true pivot of corporate being existing at the superorganic level, as a real biological condition applying to life in general and humans in particular. We achieve this because we are looking specifically for it by seeking to rid our world of religion and by discovering real science. As we have said many times before it is our focus upon atheism that has always laid the foundation for our true scientific outlook, something that no philosopher or thinker of any kind has ever set out to do before, to my knowledge. No one has ever begun in the manner of Descartes with the barest of principles : there is no God, so what is there ? The upshot of this new knowledge that a man like Hoyle did try and tell the truth to the world, indicates that we live in a world ruled by religion because the people who obey that rule by serving it, do want existence to be as it is, they do not want the truth. And they show this all the time by resisting those who would speak the truth, people like Hoyle and myself, and setting up complicated fake foe in the guise of truth speakers that they can spit their venom at without engaging in a real debate about the truth, that they know must not be spoken of, thus our most strident scientific voices are those of gatekeepers for religion, men like Darwin and Dawkins. All in all then, the discovery of Hoyles work on the human condition, which is so close to the scientific reality is a useful aid in the development of our own ideas on how society works. As we will see, the special prompt he gives us is to realise that when admitting we are animals under Darwins influence this changed nothing, except the basis of collective deception, still leaving the next question, What then is the human animal ? I think it was in Gregorys account of Hoyle that I was reading on Amazon yesterday, 29/08/2013, that I saw a passage discussing his ideas expressed in A Decade of Decision, where he suggested forcing a million people to go from Britain to the Caribbean to reduce the population, whereupon a reviewer described his diversion into areas he knew nothing about as flawed. And when we read this kind of flagrantly idiotic idea we cannot help but agree, which is so tragic when we get to grips with the very real, solid reasoning, that informed Hoyles wild solutions. This idiocy seriously undermines our efforts to use his brilliant

reasoning on human nature to back up our accurate scientific reasoning taking us in the same explanatory direction. And of course we have seen all this before, with the work of men like Herbert Spencer bringing the idea of the social organism into disrepute, with their facile employment of the analogical method to develop an organicist logic rooted in a crass structural comparison between somatic anatomy and that of the social body. Sunday, 15 September 2013 Finally the shit has hit the fan, the great social era defining my life is over, well and truly over. My philosophy writing days look to be in serious jeopardy. The state has struggled for many years to nail this life-on-the-dole nirvana, and at last it has cracked it. On Friday, after a rough time over the last few weeks since leaving the Work Programme last month, I got a new adviser and she laid down the new rules for a thirty five hour week of job hunting, with the prospect of two months work experience coming up ! Ha, I am fifty eight on Thursday and this is what things have come to, if only I had got to sixty before this happened, that use to the escape age, I think. Meantime the last two books by Hoyle arrived a couple of days ago and I just wanted to note their arrival. Both are slim volumes and neither struck me in any particular way when I glanced at them. These are Of Men and Galaxies and Encounter with the Future. In the latter book, page xiii, there is a nod to sociological organicism in the introduction to the series of books that this work appears in, but it has no real depth, and it is followed on page xvii with the most extreme declaration of individualism a person can make : For man, unlike a machine, is an organism existing as an end in itself. He is the system on which causal explanations are based and to which they have to return ; he is a historically existent whole, a four-dimensional entity, and not merely an abstraction from which statements about phenomena are deducible under the guise of eternity. No statement could be more anti science applied to humans, or more religious in its invective. The organicist reference was an oft noted one by a Christian freak from the middle ages, so this does not bode well for any further radical observations by Hoyle. So far, without having examined any of these books in detail it seems that Hoyles sociological organicism promoting society as a Thing was a pure one off, with few connections to his wider theories about the nature of life. One idea I have never heard before and that I really like is provided by Hoyle, and is central to his concept of the nature of life being dispersed throughout the universe. This view of life causes him to speak of a life centred on the earth point of view, that takes the place of the earth centred view of our place in the universe. I have never seen modern science as being fundamentally flawed in this way, though the idea that science is flawed in some such way is central to my Atheist Science idea. My idea is that in dropping the geocentric model of the cosmos the human centred bias was replaced by another model of humans as individuals, which did make life the new domain of interest to be fought over, that is biology became the focus of subversion replacing that of astronomy. In order to adopt Hoyles stance on this we would need to focus our attention on the nature of life, in which we have no interest from an Atheist Science point of view since the existence of life is not in dispute, our focus of attention is upon the nature of humans as living entities, and the bias foci of interpretation here is the view that humans are individuals rather superorganisms. So Hoyle offers us a new alternative pivot of observation, different to the one that interests us, and as such of no use in getting to the real issue that false pivots exist to serve, as in creating false foci of knowledge to serve as the basis for social authority. But the fact that he adopts this method of indicating that science is still warped by other ideas, is definitely worth noting.

Chapter 3

Hoyles Scientific Naturalism

In his preamble Hoyle proceeds to set out what scientific naturalism actually is, and he provides a very good statement to this effect, the logic of which he then applies to the war of religion against truth, to give the context of this debate its true form :

Preamble
WHAT is a materialist ? In the popular view I suppose a materialist is a pretty unpleasant person who gobbles babies for breakfast. This is a view I do not agree with. I am a materialist and I havent gobbled any babies, yet. Nor has materialism anything to do with Soviet Communism. It is true that Communists profess a crude style of materialism, but this has small similarity with the deeper materialism of the Western world. The essence of materialism lies in a refusal to separate Man and his environment into the mutually exclusive categories of spiritual and material. Man is regarded as belonging to the Universe, not necessarily insignificantly, as a star or a galaxy belongs to the Universe. Star, galaxy, man, are all expressions of the structure of the Universe. No attempt is made to introduce the notions of value or importance. A star is not necessarily more important than a man, or vice versa. Star and man are in the same boat (if the phrase be permitted) ; they are both expressions of the same inner laws. This point of view lies at the base of the present book, although it enters explicitly only in the final chapter. It is urged by the opponents of materialism that while it has been found possible to understand in some detail how stars behave, no one has so far been able to understand with real precision how men behave. Instead of admitting this as proof that stars and men belong to rootedly different categories, the materialist points out that a star is a much simpler structure than a man, so it is no wonder that we know more about the inside of a star than we know about the inside of our own heads. The materialist cannot remain content with this, however. He will only score a complete victory over his opponents if he is able to show that the behavior of Man can indeed be understood with precision, thereby destroying the case against him. The present volume contains my own attempt on this problem. Let me say at once that I shall be surprised if the reader finds the attempt wholly successful ; the problems are too difficult for any writer to hold more than partial success as an ambition. Now why is the problem so difficult ? In mathematical terms, because human behavior is controlled by an interlocking system of nonlinear feedback loops. A word of explanation is needed. Consider an investor buying and selling shares on the Stock Exchange. So long as the number of shares involved is not too large our investors activities are linear. That is to say, the sums of money concerned in purchases and sales are in simple proportion to the numbers of shares that are bought and sold. But this is not so

if the number of shares is very large. The selling or buying in this case disturbs the market itself, and the sums of money are not in direct proportion to the numbers of shares involved. The investors activities now possess feedback ; his financial dealings are no longer linear. It is far beyond present-day resources to take full and accurate account of all the feedback effects that occur in human society. Every sociological, economic, or political discussion must of necessity be an oversimplification of the complete problem. A crucial question always arises whenever a conclusion is reached in such discussions : Would the same conclusion have been reached if there had been no oversimplification ? Evidently no conclusion is of any value unless the answer to this question is affirmativeindeed if the answer is not affirmative the conclusion is pernicious nonsense ! But in the absence of a nonsimplified solution how can we know whether the answer is affirmative or not ? Herein lies the dilemma of all social studies. Although the dilemma is very awkward, a complete pessimism is not justified. Conclusions can, for instance, be subjected to the acid test of experience. This would be a sovereign receipt if testing by experience were always possiblebut a government cannot delay a decision on foreign policy until after the events with which the policy is concerned are over and done with ! This circumstance frequently leads to the use of an empirical analogy, the logic being this : 1. Present conditions are similar to the conditions that occurred on a certain occasion in the past. 2. Such-and-such an outcome actually occurred in the former case. 3. The same outcome will follow in the present case. No mathematician will need warning of the dangers in this argument. Past and present conditions are never exactly identical, and even very small differences can (the problem being nonlinear) cause severe divergences in the outcome. This I believe to be the cause of the frequent mistakes made by politicians the world overand indeed by all who are concerned in any way with predicting the course of human events. Predicting by analogy contains many pitfalls. The next possibility lies in limiting the scope of our inquiry. Suppose we consider only the fate of groups of men, not of individuals. Then simplifications may be expected, in much the way that problems in physics become comparatively simple when statistical averaging over a large number of particles can be introduced. We must not be too greedy in our studies or too egocentric. To begin with at any rate, we must limit ourselves to human communities in the large and must eschew the what-isgoing-to-happen-to-me mentality. We can gain further statistical simplicity, as Sir Charles Darwin has pointed out in The Next Million Years, if we content ourselves with long-term trends, if we do not attempt to predict day-by-day changes or even year-by-year changes in human society. There is indeed some reason to believe that short-term changes usually arise from chance fluctuations (noise to the physicist) and are inherently unpredictable. Here then is the general method followed in the present book. We shall be concerned with communities in the large, we shall be concerned only with long-term trends (the century being a typical time scale), and we shall employ empirical tests whenever possible. The historical record is very important in this connection. History, once the chance fluctuations referred to above have been stripped out of it, is a

veritable storehouse of empirical evidence concerning human behavior. No discussion of Man can be attempted without history. Hence the account in Chapter IV. Following this plan, we find that some of the matters that in our day-to-day life we regard as of great importance become relegated to insignificance compared with other problems of long-term urgency. The layout of the book is this : Chapters I-III Day-to-day problems whose importance is probably much exaggerated. Chapter IV The historical record. Chapters V-X The detailed arguments for my conclusions. Chapters XI-XIV The problems that I believe to be of long-term importance. The reader will not find any single simple thread in chapters V-X. Rather does the discussion range widely afield as indeed it must if the interlocking factors that control human destiny are to be at all understood. Mans evolution is a compound of many threads. Any argument that sought to reduce it to a single strand would be too gross an oversimplification. FRED HOYLE (Man and Materialism, pp. ix xiii.) Hoyles statement on materialism read very well an hour ago, upon scanning and posting herein I find a more carful reading picks up the faults, as when he places humans in the universe in a manner denoting total equality between all things, yet manages to insert a get out clause for the religious overseers when saying we are placed in nature but not necessarily insignificantly. Most disheartening, and a clue as to all those dodgy sounding titles that we mention above that seem to interpret the universe in terms of our spiritual nature, as in our intelligence, rather than interpreting our intelligence as a flow of knowledge delivering structure, just like any other information in existence does. I completely missed this nuance when I read it on the page and it is not surprising when I examine it more closely now, for after inserting this prevarication on our status as natural entities he then says that materialism allows no attributions of value or importance, which is the exact opposite of saying that we may not be insignificant, for that means that we may indeed be of significance in the universe. Our miraculous abilities are certainly worthy of being pondered upon as a quality of existence, telling us something about existence, but if the levelling principle is solid then whatever our qualities speak of, the whole of nature, at any point, must also speak of too. So it seems that we are meant to wonder if our special abilities are not indicative of the ultimate qualities of universal existence, and this is the kind of idea we might expect to come under the heading of an Intelligent Universe. What is wrong with all of this, is that our model of humans as superorganisms in which individuals do not exist erases all need for any such self glorifying reasoning, and therefore our model is the one that meets the criteria of a true materialism as defined by Hoyle in the above, no less. Therefore there is no excuse for his flamboyant ideas about the nature of the universe, it can all be kept very simple. We must next take issue with Hoyles setting the problem of understanding humans into the realms of future expectations, thus missing entirely the true reason for the immediate difficulty which is the lack of freedom in our society, as defined by free access to true knowledge of reality as it is. We also see that he has no quarrel with the idea that the individual is the human being, even though we will find at the close of his preamble that his plan of attack within the text is to dismiss the individual as an irrelevance and to consider human action in its collective mode only ! So he acts correctly, but speaks of his actions

wrongly, which is really quite bizarre. Why not follow through and make the correct method inform the description of the concept that this method allows us to understand the workings of ? Clearly the only explanation for such a failure is the social pressure to refrain from taking this natural step. I am utterly incapable of doing maths, but I can easily understand a logical proposition such as the one described regarding linear versus complex systems. His example strikes me as wholly bias towards justifying the inviolable individuality of the individual, which is certainly what his scenario of a loss of linearity in society relies upon. If there is no such thing as an individual, if the only thing that exists is the social form, then all that he is saying about the behaviour of individuals becomes a nonsense. So he has selected a model to validate a previously skewed assumption, namely the individuality of the human being realised in the person. We would counter this bias by referring to the somatic body that is composed of cells, which are equally individualistic and dependant upon a feedback dynamic as people in a social setting, but which still realises a unified end through the fact that the individuality of the units is made inherently subservient to the whole being via their unification under one somatic identity. From dipping into his text the other day I already know that his account describes the way that individuals are drawn into acting in accordance with one another through the unifying influence of knowledge, from which a Thing arises. These opening preliminaries therefore contradict the argument that appears in the book, helping us understand why despite working according to a true method, he fails to realise a true conclusion in the form of a proper account of what the human being is. Next we come to the beauty of his idea. After having perversely acknowledged the official religious position that the person is the human being, and having brought forward the idea of simplification as an aid to partial analysis, he finally introduces the correct idea of simplification to use as a method for analysing social dynamics. This is what we want. So his final solution is to treat humans in the collective condition only, and to treat of human actions on a timescale suitably linked to this approach. In other words you regard the human animal as a superorganism, in both physical and temporal terms ! Perfect. And so he tells us that this perfect method is to be what informs the argument in this book, and that is why I was so awe struck by the contents I found myself reading a couple of days ago, and why we are about to embark upon a close study of this work, the best I have seen on the true biological nature of humans in the social condition. His concluding statement above is sadly, cringingly sycophantic, entirely wrong, illogical, and contrary to all the principles of materialism as realised via the art of creating real knowledge through science.

Chapter 4

The Build-up
In light of the above plan I was not expecting to discover anything significant for us in the first few chapters of Man and Materialism, but given the importance of the book I wanted to skim through them to be sure, and there is something in chapter three, The Intangible Aspects, ostensibly dealing with Communism, that is worth examining : It will be recalled that the main aim of the chapter is to discuss the allpervasive influence of communism. What has just been said shows that the identification of this influence is not quite so easy as might at first sight be thought. And this I think agrees with ones general feeling. The widespread dread of Communism is not a precisely formulated argument ; it is a largely unformed, unanalyzed impression that in some subtle sinister way our society is being threatened, right through to its innermost fabric. Each one of us I think is coming to feel that all individuality is being hammered out of our lives. More and more as each year passes, we are being required to live as automatons, not as humans. Individual freedom is being lost and it is being lost rapidly. Even a decade or two ago individual expression was much more widespread than it is today, while conditions at the beginning of the present century seem, in this respect, an unattainable ideal. That this ill-defined feeling arises from something that possesses reality is I am sure correct. But whether it arises from Communism and from the communists appears doubtful to me. I suspect that the whole matter lies on a different level. It lies in a very deep-rooted conflict between the interests of the individual and the interests of the community of which he is a member. To brush off as communist infiltration something that is developing inexorably within modem civilization at this deep level is in my view a most serious mistake, since we are scarcely likely to find the solution to what I am convinced is a crucial social problem if we insist on looking in the wrong place. It is easy to see how the confusion with Communism has arisen. The suppression of individuality is a matter of deliberate policy in communist countries. Out of this we have come to associate lack of individual freedom with Communism. When we find in our own communities that free individual expression is passing away, we then somewhat naturally tend to think that our troubles are being caused by the designs of the communists. I would be happy if this were indeed the case, since the situation might then be fairly easy to put to rights. But I fear that the basic problem has nothing at all to do with Communism. It is true that the communists arc worse afflicted than we are but the problem would still be with us, I think, even if communist beliefs had never been heard of. The problem already lies within ourselves. It seems to me that whether Man sinks back to barbarism and possibly to extinction, or whether he rises to heights far beyond what we have at present achieved, depends in a large measure on whether we succeedwe of this generation in understanding and solving the problems that are inherent in the relation of

individual and community. Never before have both the dangers and the potential rewards been so great. There can never have been a time when so much depended on the actions of a single generation. For those who like excitement and decision, today is the time to be alive. The next step to be taken is clear from what has just been said. It is necessary to amplify the whole matter of the relation of man to the society in which he lives. Unfortunately the very statement of the problem, let alone its solution, turns out to be a project of considerable difficulty. An attempt on it must nevertheless be made. At this stage we shall drop the Communist issue. All that I feel I can usefully say on this has already been said. I must confess that I regard the above discussion as being largely introductory to what is to follow. Now that we have struck a problem that seems capable of leading us to a more significant level of discussion it is important that we should fasten on to it and follow it through to the end. (Ibid., pp. 22 24.) We have several decidedly extraordinary observations in the above, we have the misdirection provided by an enemy that would be our oppressor hiding the true form of our oppressive enemy, as in Judaism, which oppresses us through Christianity and Capitalism, and Communism come to that, when we live under this regime. Then we have the very real fact of the freedom once enjoyed, recalled with affection from before the two great acts of cleansing that were induced by linguistic force to eradicate freedom and return us to a state of mindless slavery to Judaism. Thus he speaks as one who can feel the darkness closing in that has brought us to a state of bleak oppression, that we later generations have been born into and only know as freedom today ; except I was born at the tail end of this fading light, which tainted my mind and caused me to become a final whimper of what was once more akin to true freedom. All of this process of transforming the constitution of the European portion of the Jewish slave biomass to water down the love of freedom, by replacing the living units with ones that associate freedom with a strongly held religious identity, is what twentieth century world history was all about. And this century is about solidifying the work of transformation that was initiated in the last century, hence we see the efforts of the government to impose Sikh schools on traditional English villages and such like, recently in the news, as discussed in my currently ongoing work My Idea. Then we have the recognition that following a false lead is the final folly which steals the last gasp of energy of a doomed people, even as he provides us with this misdirection by believing in science as being free and independent of religion, a deception that has brought us to the sorry mess we are in now, in the second decade of the twenty-first century of the Jewish slave state of Christendom. His description of how misdirection is enacted against us by our Jewish masters is accurate, and operates today through Russia still, and China, Iraq, and North Korea, to name the most prominent Jewish enclaves of antithesis. There always has to be overt enemies to make the covert oppression of our world seem like freedom by false comparison, that is to say by making comparisons on a false basis due to misconceiving the whole nature of who and what we are. If our comparisons were based solely on free access to true knowledge then it would be immediately obvious that having Communism forced upon you is no different to having Christianity insinuated into you, the result is the same in both cases. And this is why we have the contrast between overt oppression in some Jewish states like Russia, China, and North Korea, and apparent freedom in other Jewish states like those of Europe and America. Hoyle of course is as oblivious to this as everyone else because he has not figured out the

reality of human corporate biological nature, which means that all humans within one society have one and the same identity, no matter how they perceive themselves individually. Yet although he fails to discern the real nature of the problem he does recognise that it stems from something deeper, which he identifies this with the true source of the issue, which is the status of individuals as nonexistent units of superorganic being. He does still mange to fall for the myopic sense of the present being of critical importance, despite telling us that in his plan of discovery about human nature he will be setting aside the immediate for the extended timeframe, applying a macroscopic point of view. This is disappointingly weakminded of him. That said, it is nice to see the way he makes the sense of immediate importance a special reason to seek out a true understanding of what the nature of human life is really all about. I do feel that the answers that atheist science has come up with that have completely resolved the issue, do hold the keys to resolving all human problems. Except for the fact that our unbiased answer tells us that the knowledge we have is unknowable, as discussed in other works. So it is an answer that we cannot use, even though it is the correct answer. What this means is that we find Hoyle once again taking the stance of a soothing priest addressing the masses, always offering positive comfort by suppressing the truth, even when he is actually describing this very process of manipulative deception in terms of not doing deceiving ourselves !

I Perspective We have seen how he wanted a deep time perspective, so chapter four, The Historical Record, is about how he sees this starting from an evolutionary perspective. Here he plods along in the scientists footsteps, and hence goes severely awry. He uses the Darwinian model of chance to describe how humans fell out of the trees and landed on their very awkward feet. Idiot. Humans were as predestined to evolve as a social expression of mammalian form as bats were as an aerial form, and whales as an aquatic form. That is why humans evolved, because of the dynamics of living matter. He is right that we need to have this biological knowledge of ourselves in order to progress the argument he has set out to tackle, but the answer he accepts is a false one, that seriously undermine his efforts, which is precisely why this false model was developed by the theocracy through the agency of Darwin. On page thirty he identifies the cave painting of tens of thousands of years ago with a special class of priest-artist, rather as we have done elsewhere, especially when we speak of how these caves served as religious centres of social power where homosexuals might of been the priests. Living a secluded life separate from the main biomass of sexually reproductive individuals forming the main body of the human superorganisms that the queers producing these works expressing linguistic force in the shape of knowledge captured in a visual form would of suited a behavioural caste such as homosexuals would inevitably constitute in such prehistoric societies. This special detached group connected to the main body by special knowledge that was vital to the existence of the main body, will of constituted the small core of a social brain, supposedly possessing control over the spirits of the animals that these hunter gathers lived off. Thus a priesthood evolved about a foci of practical knowledge that became the basis of elite power, exactly as is done today in the form of science, the modern equivalent of the practical skills of the ancient hunter. Homosexuals enter this picture because homosexuality is real and must of evolved to enable a priesthood to develop on the basis of linguistic force, to empower the superorganism, so we would expect

homosexuals to perform this role because of the aspect of separation from the main body of people that is suggested by cave art lends itself to a distinct kind of people who would of been drawn to seek out that kind of secret space, and upon doing so would also be likely to discover the means of farming the masses in a parasitic manner as the Jews do today on a global scale, also through the control of knowledge focused upon themselves that has become the way of social life for all humanity. All of Hoyles reasoning on this historical material is like that in the example we have just noted, superficial. He gives us a potted history of human evolution in which there are a couple points worth noting for their relevance to the views informing his reasoning in this work. He says : The resources available to mankind are determined by the combination of two factors : knowledge and the potentiality of the environment. (p. 30) He applies this principle to the extinction of cultures which failed to develop suitable knowledge and were replaced by others who did. This is perfect for our idea of linguistic force which appears in the form of knowledge that creates all social form. It is also the key principle that Hoyle employs to develop his entire argument about human existence. Next we find an observation indicating his views on the nature of religion. Magic rites were of importance, but they moved on from the hunting mythology of cave painters to the annual cycle of fertility embodied in birth, death, and rebirth : Since the existence of the goddess could not be established observationally, the next step in the distorted reasoning of these people was to choose a human to represent the goddess (p. 33) This interprets religion as an aspect of individual life, whereby religion has a practical function helping people make sense of their world by embodying ideas about reality, but where the result is flawed in terms of its representation of reality as it is. This simplistic, concocted view, is all about preserving the idea of the individual as an end in themselves and people as the creators of their own world. It is pure drivel calculated to act as a myth sustaining the worldview that rules our world today under the auspices of Judaism. Which is not to say that Hoyle knew this, as it is the universal programming pumped into our insect brains from the core foci of linguistic force preserved in the state structure that exists to preserve society, in accordance with the identity at its core, which is Judaism.

Page 34 Here we find a curious explanation of warfare arising from the development of agriculture on too primitive a basis that forced people to adopt a nomadic lifestyle as land was continuously exhausted : Eventually, however, no more land was left to spread into, and then the trouble started. Men began to fight amongst themselves for land. Archaeological evidence shows that whereas in the early stages of the new economy there was no preoccupation with weapons of war, ultimately the manufacture of weapons became of prime importance.

Humans have always engaged in conflict with their neighbours because it is in the nature of the human animal being a superorganism that occupies a territory as a feature of its extended form, with superorganisms being forced to compete with each other for space to provide a territory to supply the resources for their extended life form to subsist upon.

Page 35 We find a very suggestive observation on the next page : In this seething unrest we see something of the spirit of modern times. It is true that our modern tribes are more populous than those of five thousand years ago, and that today we fight with airplanes and bombs instead of with stone axes, but the tendency for mankind to split itself into rival warring packs is the same. The tendency to fight, murder, and massacre over issues that cannot matter very much in the long run is the same. The road from the stone axe to the hydrogen bomb is a long one. The first step, the step without which civilization would probably never have got under way, was an outcome of geography. It lay in the astonishing fertility of the lower valleys of several great riversthe Euphrates, Tigris, Nile, Indus, and Yellow rivers. The precious element contained in this passage consists of the idea that the biggest issues of our lives cannot matter very much in the long run. For this concerns the fact that we do not exist as ends in ourselves and this madness is done to us, not by us, it is done to us by what Hoyle will soon be calling the Thing That the issues we fight over are meaningless in themselves tells us what the nature of war is, just as the absurdity and falseness of religious ideas, as precious as they are in biological terms, tells us what the real nature of religion is, as in physiological superorganically speaking. The existence of false knowledge as being of major importance and the existence of eternal warfare over nothing, tells us that individuals do not constitute the object of these behaviours, but rather the superorganism does, hence the mindlessness of these activities indicates that they manifest the physiology of the living superorganism, which is all the while directed toward organising the human biomass of which it is composed into forming an integrated body, united under the influence of One core identity derived from our linguistic anatomy. Hoyle has no idea of the gem of wisdom he has spouted here, hence it is imbedded amongst other intellectual dross wherein we see this claim repeated that it was geographical, as in Darwinian, constraints that propelled human social evolution, when in reality our social evolution is written into our genetic makeup that has been repeatedly expressed across the planet, something noted by Paul von Lilienfeld in his work on the social organism during the latter half of the nineteenth century. A multiple origination of civilisations that Hoyle rather oddly seems oblivious to, to judge from his Western (Jewish) centred view of human existence on this planet. His list of rivers suggests otherwise, yet it appears to mean that he considers the civilisations that arose around these alluvial plains were all of a piece, which they were not as far as I know. And what about the Central American civilisations formed without any input from Europe ?

Page 36 Here Hoyle expatiates upon the establishment of a priestly elite based upon the existence of religious myth linked to the control of economic resources. These were societies ruled by priest-kings in which religion and politics were one and the same thing. His description of the way religion led to this result gives religion a very mundane nature, borne of the circumstances that people find themselves in rather than arising for a specific purpose having to do with the biological corporate nature of the human animal. Thus he uses the same facts that we would, but a different pivot of interpretation that has the individual as the end of human existence, being drawn into social arrangements because this is the way that individuals are best served in the long run, even though people may not know it they find themselves being drawn into compliance with best practice by developing a willing obedience to authority through religious beliefs. This being why religion, economics, and politics, end up being closely bound up with one another. All of which is a highly contrived model concocted after the fact to serve the priestly agenda. This method is exactly that used by Darwin to fabricate his religious model of evolution called natural selection ; as if there could be any other kind !

Page 37 This page describes how the ongoing process of religious domination became a negative influence upon social life as the need to preserve authority by preserving religious dogma tended to stultify practical developments, so that : A movement that had started as a thanksgiving for the bounty of the Earth had ended by controlling the whole society. These arguments capture the essence of what is very important about the role of religion and knowledge in society that is of so much interest to us in our Atheist Science work. We seek to make sense of this eternal issue of abusive inequality, so that we explain how this works today, whereas Hoyle is intent on making the present transcend all this nastiness, thus implying that it is not a feature of our biological nature, and we are able to determine how our society works for ourselves ! In other words his core idea is political not scientific.

Page 38 He offers a bizarre after the event interpretation, so that with the benefit of hindsight he explains the abusive accumulation of wealth serving the best interests of the dispossessed and the exploited poor : Equal shares all around would probably have produced a collapse in a few centuries, whereas the activities of the divine establishments enabled the whole system to last Interpreting what we experience as bad aspects of life in a positive manner is just what we want of a scientific sociology, we do it all the time by dismissing the individual as nonexistent and making all aspects of human life serve the being of the human animal as a superorganism. But Hoyles model of the human social system existing on a grand scale has the principle of the individual imposed upon it. If the social system is taken as a given then

these effects must be interpreted as a necessary aspect of the systems existence from the outset, and therefore as being all about the system and nothing to do with the individuals one way or another. Which would mean that the system is the only truly existing object, but this conclusion, as we can clearly see from his wilfully devious reasoning, is not going to be forthcoming. This shows up Hoyles truly priestly character most sharply. Cl early we will be getting nothing from this man as a deliberate offering of actual scientific truth. He also accounts for the development of knowledge along the same fortuitous lines, rather than according to a biological imperative having to do with the growth of the superorganism through the expression of a flux of linguistic force creating social form.

Page 40 Now we come to what turns out to be a surprisingly interesting question, posed in connection with the reason why the first civilisation collapsed : Why should the addition to knowledge have stopped after such a fair beginning ? The reason Hoyle asks this question about social collapse in a form that places knowledge at the centre of the subject is that he has developed the idea that knowledge is the be all and end all of what makes humans special, and he is right, though he has no actual idea of why this is, or what knowledge is, or what humans are come to that. But since we do know what humans are and what knowledge is, this question proves to be a nice one for us to answer, one we have answered before, elsewhere, in the course of outlining our Atheist Science philosophy. This interesting question why modern society did not arise 7,000 years ago is only answerable in conformity to reality as it has occurred once we know what humans are, and hence what society and knowledge are too, since knowledge does not exist to gratify individuals, but to perform a biological function central to the formation of the living human animal. He notes the tendency to stagnate due to knowledge being bound up with social authority, but he has no idea what this means for human evolution, but this is knowledge performing its natural role as an expression of linguistic anatomy by acting at the social level of organisation which creates a stable living social form. We recognise that what makes Jewish civilisation so special is the sophisticated manner in which the master race is able to farm its host biomass. We see the result in our own world now in the shape of Capitalism that strives to destroy our culture in order to gain from the process of remaking it, like ploughing the land for replanting. We hate this, as indicated by the resistance seen across the country to development by the not in my backyard brigade, and the widespread anxiety about the ceaseless flood of aliens into our country, which our masters meanwhile are determined to force ahead at pace by whatever means can be found. The process of destruction meanwhile goes on, and will do until our culture is no more, as we are powerless against this treatment by an alien master race that is the culture behind the capitalist system, as Jews have always been. This is why Israel became one the most powerful nations on earth the instant it was formed, the only nation ever to be formed from a mere idea that is the core identity of an alien master race whose interests are at the core of our slave culture. Hence the reason why our culture has no value to the elite that rule us, even though they are supposed to be of our culture. This tragic tale, from a personal point of view, explains the power of our modern world that is not constrained by that very difficulty of becoming fossilised that Hoyle rightly

identifies as being at the heart of what causes great civilisations to decay and vanish. Under the subversive, all powerful influence of the Jews, our social structure remains open as they act as parasites causing us to act in their best interest, which makes our social world operate to a maximal degree of resource exploitation. Which is not so much about the wider environment as it is about the social world serving as an environment to be exploited, something I complain about so much as this has been the cause of the social fabric of our society being destroyed during my lifetime. This openness allowing society to remain flexible has had to be balanced by a constraint upon knowledge that arises through the subversive control of what reaches the public domain as accepted science. This subverts the science whose advance towards absolute truth in a subverted form equates to the advance that so impresses Hoyle and makes him believe in the new dispensation of the modern era, all of which subversive control occurs in order to allow the master race to remain in existence. A process that is organised through the effort to control knowledge where the power of control is in the hands of a religiously affiliated intellectual elite and the institutions that exist to preserve this powerbase in the priests hands. As stated, it may appear that we owe a debt of gratitude to the Jews for being an agent of flexibility allowing our world to adapt continuously, but it really is not the case. We must think of the Jews as a parasitic form of organ in the sense of the virus discussed in Villarreals Origin of Group Identity. This parasite acts like a brain causing the host to exist for the parasites benefit. The Jews keep us alive to serve them, and if they cure the problems of fossilisation that cause civilisations to die due to a failure to adapt to changing conditions, this parasitic brain also causes the problem in the first place by forcing us to breed exponentially and spread as far as we can. Ultimately this is why the extraordinary tragedy of worldwide warfare was used to preserve religion, and why Darwinism has been created to allow science to exist in a sterile form where truth of reality could not be allowed to come into contact with knowledge of identity that Hoyle indicates must always exist at the core of civilisation. We have seen how Hoyle reviews historical events and interprets them with the benefit hindsight to suit the ruling political agenda. This is how the role of science has also been interpreted by a man like Stephen Gould who coined the idea of twin magisteria to describe the separate modes of knowing that is science and religion. This does indeed describe the condition that has been engineered by the subversion of knowledge, but it is not the true state of the matter. Interestingly enough the mission statement of the people organising the World Perspective books within which this one by Hoyle is included, speaks of change within constancy : represents the world community of ideas in a universe of discourse, emphasising the principle of unity in mankind, of permanence within change. (p. v)
WORLD PERSPECTIVES

The italics are mine, highlighting the point we have just made.

Page 41 He continues to examine why ancient civilization failed to advance toward the modern knowledge that we have. This concerned the tendency of an established elite to preserve the knowledge upon which their authority depended. We see the same thing today with scientists, as biologists protect Darwinism with the zeal and stubbornness of a religious fanatic or bigot, men like Hoyle do this ! But why do these results ensue ? Because the

individual is not the reason why knowledge exists, therefore knowledge is not meant to be true, it is only meant to be official. Hence individuals asserting they know the truth are dismissed as expressing an opinion, because truth can only be accepted via an authoritative establishment. Knowledge is only required to serve the function for which linguistic ability evolved to create it, which is why religion has been preserved at all cost and is being forced upon the modern biomass once again, by the state whose structure of power has been populated by religious fanatics, the only people who are motivated to perform the role in this society and who have the backing to do it.

Pages 42 - 43 After deliberating upon the failure of the ancient world to adapt he glibly asserts that : Fortunately when the next great opportunity came the same mistake was not repeated. This would be everyones view in our society, and it is an incredible experience to see through this illusion to realise that in fact the exact same mistake has indeed been made ! Only it does not appear to us ordinarily because we are still in the expanding phase of knowledge accretion and our biological form does not mean us to see past official representations of reality. The benefits arising from the increasing knowledge of reality are accommodated by the deception faking science where necessary to give this impression of freedom and advance whereby, in fact, the seeds of fossilisation are already firmly set in place to ensure that Judaism is preserved as it has to be because our Thing is identified with Judaism. Judaism has incorporated a linguistic programme dealing with both collapse and fossilisation to ensure that Judaism alone exists as an identity for the superorganism, where fossilisation equals stability focused on Judaism and collapse equals the cleansing of all none Jewish serving cultures. The re-imposition of religion upon us that is increasingly taking effect at the present time, is how Judaism has stabilised its efforts over the last few centuries to get a grip on the new scientific method of discovering materially empowering knowledge. In the end stagnation will set in, in five centuries maybe, and then society will decay and the Jews alone will survive, along with their slave extensions of course, and then a new round of expansion will arise associated with new knowledge, perhaps linked to extra planetary exploration by then. It is amusing to think how often we hear talk of the increasingly secular world these days, but we have long heard this refrain, it is supposedly seen in the opening up of churches to homosexuals and the like, but this is meaningless because in the end religion is burgeoning as the state moves heaven and earth to drag aliens into Britain and to provide for their primitive religious needs in anyway possible, most notably through religious schools. Hoyle : It is interesting to follow the Mesopotamian civilization just a little further. We have already seen how this civilization became fossilized, and how ultimately it became disrupted by some untoward occurrence. Now once a civilization begins to disintegrate, disintegration feeds on itself. Men fight amongst themselves instead of engaging in productive activities ; farmers can no longer work peaceably in the fields ; and plunder seems the surest way to survival. The activities of civilized Man are so related to the social organization, the whole machinery of which is so complicated, that disruption beyond a certain point leads to utter chaos ; chaos on a vastly greater scale than could ever have occurred to Man in his older nomadic

existence, or in the early days of the agricultural economy, or even in the tribal state. This instability is a rooted property of civilization. Let us continue these abstract considerations by inquiring into the outcome of a wholesale disruption of civilization. We ask : what ultimate losses are caused by such a disintegration ? Certainly the natural advantages of the environment are not lost : the valleys of the Euphrates and Tigris were just as fertile after the first breakdown of Mesopotamian civilization as they were before. So a decline of resources could occur only if knowledge was lost. Here we reach perhaps the most important determining factor in Mans evolution : knowledge is more durable than a social organization. A social organization may be utterly smashed, but the tendency is for the knowledge that has been won to survive. The reason for this is clear : it is very hard to originate a really new idea ; in contrast, it is comparatively easy to copy something new ; even a slight hint is a great help to making a new step. Now when a civilization collapses, enough knowledge usually survives to make it easy for subsequent generations to rediscover anything that at first sight may seem to have been lost. It was in such a way that in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries A.D. our modern civilization was able to acquire the learning of the ancient world so readily. The above remarks lead us to a crucial proposition : so long as a civilization does not collapse through a worsening of the environment, collapse does not lead to any important ultimate reduction of resources. In other words, the disintegration of a civilization leads to a reduction of population and to the destruction of a social organization, and that is all. We return now to the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates. The collapse of the first civilization produced a reduction of population and it smashed the old temple economy, but it did not produce any lasting destruction of resources. It follows that the opportunity was presented for a re-expansion back to the former level of population. (pp. 42 43) This is an important passage both because it justifies his main idea that knowledge is the key to understanding human progress, rather than any social behaviours inherent in individuals, as sociologists and historians always have it, and his line of argument also ties in very nicely with the ideas we have developed elsewhere on the creation of the Jewish master race through the existence of a testing social environment that induced a culture to come into existence that was specifically prompted by this challenge to get into step with a cultural cycle that tended to eradicate culture and cause civilisation to start over. In other words the natural cycle Hoyle describes invites a culture to arise in response, one that makes this special quality of knowledge preservation upon which civilisation is based the essence of its identity, and thus we have the Jews. We have seen previously how the essence of the Jewish culture is one of survival and rebirth, as set out in Josef Kasteins History and Destiny of the Jews, 1933, that we have discussed elsewhere. Towards the end of this book Hoyle introduces a superbly conceived principle of free coupling (p. 91), whereby the social structure can be freely transformed without the individuals changing hardly at all. And it is the incorporation of this genetically established principle of free coupling that makes the individual a unit of superorganic being through the power of language, this being what language evolved to do, that the Jewish cultural programme is perfectly adapted to because it is this mechanism that produced the Jewish master identity programme. There are two sides to this adaptation. The religious creed is rigidly fixed, in writing, the technology of literature being the key to this massively empowered mode of garnering linguistic force, and in addition the Jews are set apart from the

main cultural body they are part of, which allows them to ride the inevitable cyclical process that dooms every other culture to extinction. This longevity empowering principle is so empowering that it induces a culture of power to evolve to become everything the Jews are both famous and infamous for. But at its root is this process that Hoyle focuses his attention upon at this point, as in the evolutionary advance of humans via the creation of knowledge, which is really the accumulation of linguistic force in a informational form that equates to a material or structural form. Not only this, but towards the end of the work he makes the point that this free coupling is responsible for the Thing taking command of individuals and forcing them to serve it as an end in itself, most notably in the drive towards one global society that we are powerless to resist. We are of course saying that the Jews are the embodiment of this Thing. So he has all the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle of human nature but he does not put them together in a coherent form that would of course require identifying the Jews as the cultural personification of this biological process, as we have long recognised the Jews to be. We get a strong impression of a man who knows the truth but dare not counter the taboo and therefore speaks the truth approximately, only to deny it directly, as the only means of getting it said. However, in the end he does seem oblivious to the real nature of religion, so we cannot be sure that he was aware of the obvious idea that the Jews had a special relationship with these dynamics that gave them their unique cultural longevity and their special place in history and contemporary global politics, for good or ill. It is hard to imagine that he did not know all this, his account of human corporate nature made real in society is so good, but he hides it well if he did. Hoyles emphasising the value of knowledge surviving social collapse is useful, but awry in its explanation. This is because he is not thinking about his subject properly. He is thinking of knowledge as practical, factual truth, delivering power over the environment and such like. Whereas knowledge exists to deliver power over individuals for the sake of the Thing, as his argument actually suggests, if he did but know it. When we read his description of the special attribute of knowledge as something that can outlast the disappearance of a major culture, what we have in mind more than anything, is the preservation of false knowledge, that which is epitomised by religion. For it is this knowledge that constitutes the all important identity of the social group, and it is this that Jews preserve above all else in the characteristic social fabric. And the offshoots of Judaism that have been constituted on the same basis of empowerment through a new identity linked to Judaism via an umbilical chord of identity, but let go to act as a slave body carrying Jews around the globe as a parasitic master core of identity farming the newly spawned extensions of itself, also benefit from the special attributes of longevity possessed by the master identity of Judaism, because that is in the nature of the human superorganic animal that linguistic anatomy evolved to create. Knowledge is distinct from social organization itself, that is the key point, and that explains why the Jewish master race has taken the form it has, that of obtaining power through a unique longevity which is not linked directly to the exercise of political power, so that while the Babylonians, Greeks, and even the Romans come and go, the Jews remain persistently present and unchanged to a remarkable degree, but one that this kind of reasoning on Hoyles part makes sense of. What is special about the slave identities of Judaism, is that they are made in the image of Judaism yet one step removed from the master, so that the slaves can act as political entities with real power, while still having a Jewish identity. And it is this dispersal of the attributes of Judaism through a hierarchy of social structure that makes the global Jewish society so powerful today. But still the principles that Hoyle mentions regarding the constancy of individual intelligence and disposition persists, and indeed this account we are presenting now explains why this should be so, even now, because still

religion must be retained so that the Jews that we all exist for because they are the core of the living superorganism, can remain in existence. The best description of this curious phenomenon whereby society becomes staggeringly rich in knowledge but people remain eternally moronic is this principle of Hoyles called free coupling, that allows social change in conjunction with individual constancy to continue to an unlimited degree, seemingly. Monday, 23 September 2013 The weather was fabulous yesterday and after finishing putting my kitchen back together after changing the combination boiler last week I snatched an hour in the greenhouse with Rosnay, where I noticed a passage on the laws of energy distribution that might add some solid principles to the reason why human superorganic anatomy always takes a macro triadic form. Discussing the law of optimum yield Rosnay says : An interesting approach to the law of optimum yield can be made on the ground of information. (Rosnay, p. 105) Rosnay uses the idea of coupling processes that link information to the flow of energy through energy driven systems. Increasing the information increases the available energy up to a maximum point where the law of diminishing returns kicks in. Thus he says that : in all coupled processes, maximum power is best obtained when the ration of forces is equivalent to 1:2. (Ibid., p. 106) This is just the kind of dynamic principle that would account for triadic macro physiology in human superorganisms, as the social hierarchy based upon variations on one social identity allows the required ratio to be maintained across a wider extension of physical biomass. This is why Judaism as a master identity had to spawn two major denominations of itself in order to become a global superorganism, as it has indeed done via the slave identities of Christianity and Islam. Clearly this process of identity formation would occur spontaneously under the pressure to create appropriate information routines to serve this purpose, for that is what our linguistic anatomy does by projecting authority into social space in the form of culture and social structure, which constitutes the being of the living superorganism. ___ From the way Hoyle talks we are caused to think about immortal knowledge in terms of technological advance, but in reality what the Jews carried with them in the manner of the ark of the covenant is the secret of how to form a civilisation, and that was the secret at the heart of their culture. It was the mastery of this knowledge that put the Jews in the position to eventually create slave identities modelled on themselves, delivering a global political order made in their own image. The Romans were of this Jewish kind in structural details, but they did not have the Jewish identity, this refinement was to come from the Roman enslavement to the Jewish cause, acting as a degrading agency of social fabric setting the scene for the rise of a true Jewish slave culture in Christian form, and thereafter in the shape of Islam. The Jews could do this because their culture had embodied the cyclical process of superorganic growth by incorporating the knowledge of how to build a complex social order in the manner Hoyle alludes to. Of course the Jews themselves, as persons, did nothing, this was all accomplished by nature evolving human linguistic anatomy.

The actual reason that Europe was able to recover the ancient wisdom Hoyle refers to is because the Jewish political order rendered into a slave form, as in Christianity, had preserved the core of the political order of a civilised state, so that the material Hoyle refers to, most of which had been lost, was recovered because the method of handling knowledge had been preserved, most particularly the art of writing books which is so fundamental to Judaism. So it was the preservation of Jewish identity in a slave form that allowed this recovery to happen, and Hoyle ought to of recognised this instead of giving us his weak account of a very powerful idea. Note, Tuesday, 27 August 2013, can use ideas from Taschdjian on latent potential and action defining an entity, as a mathematical statement on the reality of the Thing as that which commands humans to create itself. Through the excellent skills of a librarian at my local library I recently obtained a copy of an interesting essay that I began reading this morning, Heredity as Communication by E. Taschdjian, 1955. The British Library had been unable to supply this, but my man found it online and sent me the link so I could take it for free from an obscure Italian resource that I had not been able to locate, brilliant work. (A couple of weeks later it turned up and they phoned me to collect it !) The essay is technical and handles some fairly abstruse ideas, but one of these seemed most inviting to me as offering a physical description of the material process underpinning the cyclical dynamic of social decay under the influence of knowledge tending to induce creative growth, only to become fossilised and bring about decay as described by Hoyle. Taschdjians contribution consists of the idea that under information theory things qualify for existence only by performing actions : ESSENTIALS OF COMMUNICATION THEORY. We explain the world around us in terms of actions, whether they be actions of organisms, atoms or electrons. We cannot conceive that something is or has being without acting. An act may be defined as anything which makes a difference. The category of Act is the fundamental category in all philosophies, whether they be scholastic or materialistic, modern or ancient, western or eastern. Perhaps nobody realized this better than the German philosopher and mathematician Leibniz, when he learned that the Chinese philosophy of the Yi-King is based on the two principles of Ying and Yang (synonyms : heaven and Earth, Male and Female) which correspond closely to the scholastic categories of Act and Potentiality . It was in his attempt to find a mathematical expression for these two fundamental categories, Act and Non-Act (or Potentiality), that he invented the dyadic system of numbers in which he represented Act by 1 and Non-Act by 0 and built up the whole system of integers by various combinations of these two symbols (Heredity as Communication, pp. 63 64.) As we have said, Hoyle is quite clear that the Thing/Superorganism takes command of people and forces them to move relentlessly towards one global society, and nothing we do can resist this directive ; so that he, optimistically, or more likely forlornly, says that we should take charge of this process of unification and determine what form this inevitable end product will take. Here then we can see that the superorganism meets the requirement of having an effect that is specific to itself, that belongs to it and nothing else, and therefore gives it the attribute of existence as a being existing in its own right, a rather important thing to pin down in the context of what has proved a very tricky idea to promote in such solid terms.

In addition we are put in mind of our own mode of reasoning whereby we always speak of the somatic human form culminating from a genetic process of biological evolution such that the individual constitutes a latent potential of human biological corporate nature, which is expressed by emitting linguistic force through speech, that crystallises into the superorganism that the human animal is. Thus we talk of a latent potential that is released in an accumulative fashion over the course of time, to deliver social evolution in the form we call progress. This explains much of the conundrum Hoyle wrestles with in this work where he tries to account for the miraculous flowering of modern civilisation. Something we may pick up on from Taschdjians principles of information theory, is that the more units that exist the greater the creative potential arising from their combination, which makes me wonder if there is a mathematical equation hidden in his reasoning that would relate to the projection of linguistic force as a flow of information creating a specific biological form, as in a superorganism, in a direct, logarithmic relationship to the mass and its complexity of structural combination. I cannot answer this question, but it appeals to me intuitively because of the way Taschdjian brings the idea of potentiality being released into the theory of information in such a way that the flow of information is related to the creative material result arising therefrom, through the realisation of a given informations potential. In summary, the somatic human form is a unit of genetic potential relative to the end for which that form evolved, which is the superorganism, which is realised by the release of latent genetic potential that accumulates over time in proportion to the mass of complexity of the combination that the Thing is able to bring about through its influence upon the individuals it is composed of. The superorganism is therefore a clear entity existing in its own right, which means that the units it is composed of cannot also be ends themselves, which is really where Hoyles whole argument leads, though he dare not take it that far himself. We can readily see how Taschdjians ideas on information, energy and material creation, are very close to the manner in which Rosnay handles the link between information and energy leading to formulas setting limits on growth that are so important to his ecological take on the broader subject of sociological organism, that we have discerned as a possible explanation for the triadic macro physiology of human superorganisms.

Page 45 Without population control, the onset of the disruptive phase of civilization cannot be prevented merely by the extension of resources, although of course the moment of disintegration can be postponed thereby. Thus we anticipate a second collapse of civilization. This indeed occurred. What then, we may ask, was to prevent the whole cycle being repeated once again ? What was to stop a new scramble for leadership, a rising population ultimately overloading the economy, a search abroad for new resources ; warfare plus economic instability leading to a further collapse ; a new period of reorganization and expansion ? What indeed was to prevent this cycle from being repeated endlessly ? Apparently there was very little to prevent it, since in point of fact the history of the three thousand years before Christ in Mesopotamia and the Near East is simply a history of the repetitions of this cycle. And in this, at last, we reach the most characteristic feature of civilization, the tendency to fall into a cyclic progression of integration and disintegration.

This section presents the Near East as a crucible of civilisation under evolutionary pressure driving cultures toward a resolution of the cycle of development and collapse, as we have been saying ourselves. The additional point of interest in his reasoning is the focus upon population as the nub of the problem, because the eventual solution, namely the Jewish culture, carried an imperative that was contrary to the practice of the entire ancient world, as in the law against infanticide that has become the key to our enslavement to Judaism in the modern world. This more than anything else reveals the true nature of Jewish culture as a parasitic culture evolved to manage a host biomass in the manner Villarreal describes in his Origin of Group Identity, in relation to the role of viruses in driving the evolution of complex somatic life forms developmentally, but to serve the parasites purposes. As hosts we only become powerful because we are a vehicle for our masters, the Jews, and this is why we never advance as individuals, we never attain utopia no matter how powerful and knowledgeable we become, because all our efforts only exist to empower the tiny elite consisting of the Jewish core body of superorganic being. Combing this variety of observations with the theoretical principles provided by Taschdjian gives an ever more rounded and rational model of the human superorganism as it exists today, as a global being that has realised the latent potential of the genetically evolved human somatic form by giving rise to the linguistically generated Jewish cultural programme.

Chapter 5

The Argument

Chapter 5 The Significance of Industrialism Page 51 It might seem as if the spread of industrialism has reduced the human individual to a cipher This veers toward the idea of the nonexistence of the individual, but in a way that presumes that this is abnormal because in reality the individual is a valid end in themselves. This continues to contradict the materialist principles that he laid out with the idea of treating humans as natural entities, having no special significance from a scientific point of view.

Page 53 Vastly oversimplifies the nature of modern conditions by equating modern mass production to a state of individual loss of worth that had destroyed the old craft traditions. I myself certainly see work in such terms, but that does not mean he is right to argue that this is real from a scientific point of view. To my mind drudgery must of begun long ago, who mined all the ore in the first ages of metal ? As long as people have an intimate connection with their work they do feel a sense of worth, but the fact is that much of what people have had to do under civilised conditions has surely been about drudgery for the majority of people, hence the slave system of old and the capitalist system of today, with both keeping the lower order ground down to the barest minimum of reward for the worst, unskilled work. This attitude continues to show his bias toward the person and away from the scientific model that recognises that the individual is but the cellular unit of a higher being.

Page 63 Our minds are fossilised in the ancient pattern. So they are, but why are they ? The answer is that we do not exist and hence our rationality is a myth. Instead of reaping the rich rewards that could conceivably have fallen to our lot, we are apparently determined to fritter our good fortune away. Indeed, but why is this the case ? Because . . . we do not exist as ends in ourselves, the Thing directs our actions by placing a culture, the Jews, in the vanguard of human

development, so that the resulting social dynamic forces us all to serve this master identity mindlessly, which itself operates according to a mindless imperative to drive us to exploit everything to maximum effect realised in the most basic terms of life, as in growth via consumption. This mindlessness is the product of that which Hoyle himself speaks about when he says that the Thing has taken control of us and we are powerless to resist it. He is right, but he fails to realise a materialist conception of what this arrangement is, such as we provide in our Atheist Science philosophy.

Page 64 I think we must try and understand how we came to hold our present ideas. And we must question whether it is we who control these ideas or whether it is the ideas that control us. Bravo ! Now we are getting somewhere, potentially. But still we know he is not meaning to say what we really want these sentiments to mean, as he is really implying that we have the ability to be charge, and we should be. So he is not seeing this state of affairs as natural and exactly as they are supposed to be, according to how nature made us to be. Thus his argument is political, not scientific. It is the usual idea of dysfunction in human affairs that represents humans as being outside of nature, and existing in a state of imperfection that can be improved. No, we are, like everything else in nature, perfect. This illusion of imperfection is a feature of the Jewish slave identity programme that wants to accommodate us to our miserable state arising from our abject slavery by feeding us the line that we are at fault and we can do better, by leaving us hope that it will only get better, and so far this trick has done the job, for a millennia or two at least ! Meanwhile our lot has got relentlessly worse as our insect nature has become ever more dominant, and our empowerment as individuals as sunk ever lower into oblivion because the superorganism has become ever more massive and all pervasive. Chapter 6 The Thing Now there is a nice title ! Given what he means by it. Pages 65 - 67

VI.
The Thing
THE HISTORICAL survey of Chapter IV raises an outstanding problem. Why has Mankind effloresced in such an amazing fashion during the last six or seven thousand years ? What lies behind the astonishing development from primitive barbarism to modern civilization ? Only reasons of the utmost cogency can, I believe, provide an explanation of Mans extraordinary upsurge. If this be granted, then we can surely argue that the same forces that have produced the upsurge must still persist today ; and that any worth-while understanding of our modem life must make a full concession to these forces. It seems well-nigh certain that the self-same dynamic qualities that have driven mankind in the past will

continue to drive him in the future. Clearly then if we can discover from our examination of the past just where the driving power came from, we shall have gone far toward understanding how human society is likely to change in the future. Since we are quite evidently being swept along by an extremely powerful current it is important to understand where the current derives its force from, and where it is flowing to. Let me come instantly to where I believe the real solution to be : in the accumulation of knowledge. The clue to the matter was contained in a remark already made in Chapter IV when we said that knowledge is more durable than a civilization. Knowledge has two qualities that make its importance pre-eminent. It is both durable and cumulative. The nature of knowledge is not simple. Knowledge does not consist of just a vast library of textbooks. A library is a symbol, a symbol that people exist who can write the books it contains, that people can read the books with understanding, and that people want to read the books. When these essential factors no longer exist, the formal aspect of knowledge as exemplified in the library becomes a meaningless symbol. The great library of Alexandria was a meaningless symbol to the invading Mohammedans. They burnt it. Knowledge is much better described as an organizational state of society. I think that at first sight we do not realize how deep this organization goes. Even the most gifted individual carries in his head only a fragment of the total of all knowledge. Yet consider how perfectly the contributions of a myriad of individuals are matched together, so perfectly that the structure of knowledge forms one harmonious whole, symbolized indeed in our great libraries. The word structure here is not inapt, for rather as atoms build themselves into material substances so knowledge is a structure built out of ourselves as the units. At this stage it is necessary to introduce the idea that a structure is something more than the units out of which it is built. A fine building is something more than the pile of bricks out of which it is constructed. If you do not believe this then try the following experiment for yourself. First find out what your house is worth. Then knock it carefully to pieces and see whether you can get as much money for the bits. When we buy a house we pay not only for the materials but also for the structural element. The same is true of every manufactured article. In a similar way knowledge is something more than the individuals whose aggregation together is the essence of knowledge. In my view it is just here that the clue to the control of human affairs lies. It is this structural element, this something more, that drives us along. The question as to what allowed the astounding rise of modern civilisation is of the utmost interest, and he rightly says that to get an answer needs a considerable degree of penetrating insight into ourselves. He then begins to use the terminology of force that we are always keen to find informing ideas on evolution. But he is not reaching for the idea of natural force, but rather something more discursive in its nature, rather than scientifically precise, like physical force that exists in its own right and can be measured as a force. Linguistic force is not a physical force like gravity or magnetism, it is a mode of the force of information that relates to the essence of living forms. Living forms harness natural physical forces, the forces of matter, but they can only do this via the organisational force of information. Thus we have a force associated exclusively with the organisation of living matter, and this is the force of information which animates living matter, allowing it to act and therefore meet the condition set out by Taschdjian that says the living being is an object.

Notwithstanding his undoubted misconception of the idea of force in nature he does treat the idea as we would, in that he recognises that forces are by their nature constant, and as such any force acting on human social evolution in the past must be doing so in the present, and must continue to do so forever more. This sentiment is exactly fitted to a physical force, but nonetheless we can be certain that he is not intending us to think of an abstract force such as that of information or language, as we in fact do. Recognising that such a force exists, it must be a force equating to our biological nature, and this creative force can only come from our physical attributes of linguistic behaviour. But this he is completely blind to in this precise form, although he does provide all the relevant pieces here and there in this text for understanding all that we understand. He says that the organisation of society must be something preordained in our physical nature, and that this fact is epitomised by our power of speech, but he never weaves these straightforward facts into a simple image of reality such as that which we insist upon all the time. On page sixty six we find he has approached so close to the true answer to the important questions he addresses, but yet skims right by when he says knowledge, when he should of said language. This is the difference between a naturalistic/scientific explanation and a religious/political explanation which is all the difference in the world, the difference between truth and falsity. In terms of his special attributes of knowledge, its durable and accumulative nature as applied in this context, this makes knowledge identical to genetic information seen as a code for living form, that survives the passing of each generational representative of that form. And this exact coincidence of the essence of genetic and linguistic information is very much to our benefit in our efforts to assert the corporate biological nature of humans, that are in fact superorganisms not persons. His thoughts on a library as a symbol of individual lives interacting with knowledge is way off the true course he should be following. The Moslems did not burn the library because it was meaningless, they burnt it because all knowledge is meaningless, because for knowledge to be meaningful its object would have to be a purposeful individual, and such creatures do not exist. Knowledge is a linguistic programme delivering superorganic form, and the Muslims form was a new programme freshly created to deliver a slave extension of Judaism, which required an uncompromising attitude toward all other linguistic identity programmes, which put the sublime knowledge of the ancients in jeopardy, as it will put modern knowledge in the same plight in the future, one day, you see if it doesnt. Of course it already has, as the Christian world has destroyed scientific knowledge by subverting it and causing it to flow into the sands of time uselessly, through the vent of Darwinism, in order to allow the identity of Judaism to flow ever onwards. The following passage on the nature of knowledge relative to people is one of the best sections of his work for our purposes, it carries the sentiment of sociological organicism more fully than most of the other portions that evince the ideas we seek to record and celebrate in this study of Hoyle on man and materialism. In fact it is only in making this observation now that I sense the real meaning of this title, which I had not paid any heed to at all previously. Suddenly I get it, he is discussing the nature of man from a materialist perspective, from a scientific perspective that treats man as a part of nature and nothing more. Right ! Well this blindness on my part may seem stupid to you, but the contents of the book are not spelt out in the title and he does not introduce those contents in this way. I thought he was saying that he was a materialist and he was going to treat of humans according to a materialistic outlook, but this still left me thinking that he was discussing humans in their relation to the philosophical outlook of materialism, not humans in literally materialistic terms. This is because to me materialism is a philosophical attitude, and all the way through,

despite liking his definition of materialism in relation to humans, I have found his delivery has been seriously lacking. But just now it suddenly came across in what he was saying, that he was treating humans themselves as if they were part of nature, this is what leaps out at us from the following : knowledge is a structure built out of ourselves as the units. In a similar way knowledge is something more than the individuals whose aggregation together is the essence of knowledge. In my view it is just here that the clue to the control of human affairs lies. It is this structural element, this something more, that drives us along. Finally, the really scientific force of his reasoning is striking home. This is wonderful, and there is more of a like kind to come, but it never realises its promise. That is what we are here for, to help it along ! How would I of wanted to name a book in which it was my objective to treat of humans as a strictly scientific subject, as we now take it Hoyle means to tell us he is doing in this work by using this title ? I should more likely of called the book by the culminating essence of the idea arising from the argument it contains, The Thing, exactly as I have done here, and then I may of made my intention to treat humans as part of nature explicit by adding a subtitle : The Real Human Animal. The Thing is in truth the subject of his account, such that I feel somewhat vindicated in saying this after admitting that his title threw me off completely, because his title does not give us any sense of being about to tell us what humans are as natural entities, which is in fact what he does by formulating this idea of an overarching entity taking control of us, called the Thing. Of course I would not of been so obtuse as to use a name like the Thing, I would take my readers straight to the leading idea presented in the book : The Human Superorganism. This should of been Hoyles title then, and the only reason it was not seems to be because of the taboo that prevents anyone from saying such things. Where he says : Knowledge is much better described as an organizational state of society. we again find a sentiment that at least touches our view that linguistic force generates a linguistic programme that equates to knowledge, which organises individuals into forming a living superorganism. But his manner of developing these ideas is very stunted and difficult to relate to our model that is crafted to be fulsome in its materialistic conception and plainly understandable, whatever degree of rejection that understanding of what we are saying might induce. consider how perfectly the contributions of a myriad of individuals are matched together, so perfectly that the structure of knowledge forms one harmonious whole, symbolized indeed in our great libraries. The word structure here is not inapt, for rather as atoms build themselves into material substances so knowledge is a structure built out of ourselves as the units.

Breaking down this statement into its constituent parts allows us to examine it more closely to see what kind of sense we can make of his meaning. Imagine if he gave us a proper length book on these ideas, it is enough to make us wonder if there is anything of this sort in his main publications. This business about the libraries acting as symbols clutters the passage up, and this : knowledge is a structure built out of ourselves as the units. as appealing as it is, is too tenuous a statement to allow us to do very much with other than translating it directly into our own Atheist Science ideas. This is all very tantalizing material though, and a sheer delight to read for all its limitations, way better than anything else I have ever seen, so good as a description of the human animal as a superorganism that it is unique in its degree of extension away from all other work written that I know of. It still does not really make sense does it ? We are units of knowledge, no, its nonsense. But the idea is so right, it is the constraint imposed upon him that we can feel causes these sublime ideas to emerge as vague mumblings. We often say that we are objects of linguistic force, because we are the material entities that language evolved to act upon, and this kind of idea is more attuned to the notion of ourselves as units of knowledge, this we would like to think is the kind of idea Hoyle had in mind when he spoke like this. In short then, knowledge is the programme created by linguistic force, that delivers social form. Knowledge is therefore a biological phenomenon created by nature, to perform the biological function of creating superorganic form, as genes are created by the force of information to perform the function of creating the living forms that each genome relates to. Saying that knowledge is a structure built out of ourselves seems to be an arse about face way of saying that knowledge is a linguistic identity programme that organises individuals to create an organised social state a superorganism. My notes made when I read this the day before yesterday say The most perfect statement ever. So it makes a fine impression on one whose mind is predisposed to see humans in this light already, but as the above analysis indicates, when examined more closely the holes appear larger than the substance carrying them because he is so loose in his reasoning and he keeps acting illogically by putting the person before the Thing, even though he knows the Thing leads the person, as stated later on, and it is this part of his argument that should be accounting for this fact of individual subservience to knowledge, in detail. And this, though both simple and commonplace, is perfect, bearing in mind he is talking about humans living in society here : At this stage it is necessary to introduce the idea that a structure is something more than the units out of which it is built. A structure is more than the sum of its elementary parts because the parts are not ends in themselves, but rather, in the case of life, they are elements created by biological evolution to bring a higher state of order into being a superorganism in the human case. To repeat, because it is exquisite : In a similar way knowledge is something more than the individuals whose aggregation together is the essence of knowledge. In my view it is just here that the

clue to the control of human affairs lies. It is this structural element, this something more, that drives us along. We know we do not agree that he should be talking about knowledge here, because it is confusing to do so. But it is not entirely wrong, as long we make sure we know what knowledge is supposed to be within the whole material arrangement that is humanity ; knowledge being the linguistic identity programme giving form to the living human animal. The aggregation of people is the essence of knowledge. We see once again that we have a conflation of individuality with the dynamics of individual nonexistence, which makes a mess of these nearly profound statements of real truth. We speak of linguistic force projecting authority into social space, where it condenses as language and hence culture, and social form. From this basic social dynamic the latent potential of linguistic force can accumulate, and in this sense the accumulation over generations can be seen most especially in the guise of knowledge which could then be spoken of in the terms Hoyle uses here, whereby the aggregation of people over generations is the essence of what accumulates as an immortal essence of humanity, as knowledge. His argument is far too brief for the job it is supposed to do, but again, we must imagine that this was deliberate because of the delicacy of the argument, it being the truth and all. So let us home in a little closer on a detail : It is this structural element, this something more, that drives us along. According to our Atheist Science model based upon the idea of human biological nature creating the human animal as a superorganism by organising individual behaviour, this statement by Hoyle means that linguistic force generates a linguistic identity programme that organises individuals to build social structure which constitutes the anatomy of the living human superorganism, that future generations of individuals then live within, and hence act in response to this structure that Hoyle then identifies as a driving force. A religious identity is a manifestation of this kind of linguistically generated structure, and the economic arrangements of a society are likewise, which all individuals act in obedience to, the religious structure having dispersed into a secular form of law in recent times, forms an obvious structure directing all our actions. Thursday, 26 September 2013 Last night BBC 2 had a programme called Science Britannica presented by a young fanatical scientist called Brian Cox, who is all the rage at the moment. I could not watch this propaganda drivel, the man is so full of the bullshit of religious propaganda that he is the worst of the worst. While I could not watch the programme I did snatch a few glimpses, and there were a few beauties, at one point he was handling the original hand written draft of Newtons work ! How good is that ? Fabulous. An early snippet seemed to be about an eighteenth century scientist who set up the Royal Society, Cavendish I think it was, and his work on water. Cavendish believed water to be one pure substance even though his experiments showed it to be composed of two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen. The presenter concluded, arse about face style, as per the religious propaganda that subverts all science, that this man, although he did not think like a scientist, still acted like a great scientist by performing experiments successfully ! No, no, no !! You damned idiot. The exact opposite is what makes a person a scientist, as in having a solid belief in the natural world as the sole authority for truth, and its accessibility being available via science alone. As Coxs point proved, any competent swine can perform experiments. The reason that science had to be given this form of clay feet, rooted in practical activities, is that this definition of science allowed religion to continue in a world ruled by scientific

knowledge. But this mechanism inevitably meant that science could not exist as a free mode of understanding reality in its own right, but that instead science must always be the handmaiden of religion as the ruling authority in society, exactly as science has continued to be to this day. ___

Pages 68 - 70 At no stage are we more emotionally aware of the importance of structure than in the step from the single living cell to the structure built out of cells. The basic cellular component of a human is no more remarkable in itself than the basic component of a turnip. It is in the human structure that the remarkable features lie. But the building process does not end with the human structure, for in the development of knowledge we have a superstructure built out of humans themselves as the units. Other animals also possess superstructures. The most singular are to be found among the insects, notably ants and bees. Birds too show a considerable organized mass activity. If we except Man, the organization of mammals scarcely approaches that which has been achieved by insects or by birds. But Man has outstripped all others in the complexity of his organization, and in this lies his strength and dominance. Humans taken singly as individuals would scarcely constitute a serious threat to other animals. Humans co-operating together are overwhelming. Now I imagine that the sociologist and historian will probably wish to quarrel with what I have said. Not with the existence of a formidable human superstructure, but with my identification of the superstructure with knowledge rather than with the social aspects of human behavior. It is undoubted that there are other features of the human superstructure, features of a social naturerights of property, marriage customs, religions, racial temperaments, culture patterns, and the like. It is customary for these social factors to be thought of outstanding importance, and for knowledge to be regarded as subsidiary. In my view this is a correct expression of our personal wishes and prejudices, of what on an emotional basis we would like to believe. But I do not think that it represents an objective assessment of the situation. Rather does it seem to me that so far as human destiny is concerned the personal factors matter scarcely at all. The control of the trend of major events belongs to knowledge. However much we may dislike this conclusion, I am sure that none other will stand up to rational test (i.e., will yield correct predictions about the future course of events). In my opinion the reason why social studies have so far had little influence on human affairs, as compared with the physical sciences for instance, is that most social studies are simply on the wrong track. In being concerned with the wishes and desires of people they are chasing a will-o-the-wisp. We shall come nearer a correct assessment of the situation if we concentrate on the textbooks in our library. This issue is so crucial that it is worth discussing arguments for it at some length. Bluntly, I fail to see any very great difference between the social conventions of our modern civilization and those of primitive barbaric peoples. In matters of ethics primitive peoples are not inferior to those who live in the centres of modern civilization. Cells are all of a like kind, it is their structural combinations that constitute the secret of their splendid innovations. Humans then become as cellular units of a higher kind of

organism by virtue of their linguistic anatomys creation of knowledge. This is close enough to our own position, it reminds us of our term sentient brick used to describe the individual as a brick designed by evolution to build a social architecture, a brick that carries within it the capacity to be programmed to place itself in this dynamic form of architecture by means of the product of linguistic force that its somatic structure generates, which appears as knowledge, the driving element of human existence that Hoyle speaks of here. If he reduced this process into a natural form he would of cracked the whole problem, by making individuals nothing more than units evolved to create a human being in the form of a superorganism. Here then we have a truly wonderful statement that simply hangs in the air and takes us nowhere, which is very tragic. This is as good as knowledge gets before I came along, as far as I know. His next paragraph has a pleasing sense of comparative sociology about, being set at the biological level of animal nature whereby he rightly identifies the fact that animals becoming cellular units of higher being is a regular feature of animal evolution. Though sadly he fails to generalise this point into a principle of evolution revealing a latent potential of life that was bound to be expressed in mammals, and is expressed by humans, who should not be excused in the manner he suggests, but rather humans should be singled out at this point as the obvious mammalian representative of this inevitable aspect of evolution in life. If he had generalised this insight his next observation on humans could of been put into the resulting context whereby the human could be seen as a mammalian equivalent of the ant, and just as the ant represents an amazing expression of superorganic evolution, so when it comes to the much more inherently powerful mammalian form, we get a stupendously powerful and impressive superorganic display in the shape of humans, thus explaining human planetary dominance in matter of fact, scientific terms. But Hoyle does nothing with all his magnificent reasoning on this point, he is like a man who builds a palace only to let it fall into decay unused. It is not humans cooperating that makes them powerful, it is the evolution of a mammalian superorganic species that makes for such global dominance, essentially because of the sheer size of the human somatic unit compared to creatures like ants and termites, which themselves create extended ecological and symbiotic influences astounding for their individual size, as they shape ecosystems to become the territories that often go with superorganic form. His next point is excellent, as he builds up to a justification of knowledge as the key factor in human life he exploits the reality of individual nonexistence to make his point, even though he does not make this state of personal nonexistence an avowed principle of his reasoning. He says that we are inclined by personal experience to place immediate features of our social world to the fore, and our intellectuals build their explanation of life upon this naive, simplistic basis. The problem here is that by failing to understand this mode of behaving according to a rigorous principle he fails to understand that this failure is not a failure at all, but rather it is the essential process of knowledge control that ensures we nonexistent individuals will continue to play our part in the physiology of the superorganism by feeling as if our part is indeed ours, when in fact it is nothing of the sought because we do not even exist. So even as he makes this most excellent point, he does so in a manner that is shot through with the corruption of knowledge control, and as such bereft of any scientific content in its own right, only possessing such content for us because we already know what is correct. As regards human destiny the personal factors matter little, how good is that ! Superb. And then he gives us this exquisite sentence :

The control of the trend of major events belongs to knowledge. If only he reduced these brilliant insights to fundamental principles based upon an understanding of human biological nature as being corporate, he would then of anticipated the true science of humanity that comes into being at my hands, and not before. His statement about knowledge driving human affairs is correct as far as it goes, but he fails to develop its significance by chasing knowledge back to its biological roots, located in the genetic evolution of linguistic anatomy that we identify by speaking of linguistic force. So that we would replace the world knowledge with the phrase linguistic force in this sentence, and that would be perfect. As it is Hoyles failure to complete the logical routine does what such failures always do by serving as a miss that is as good as a mile. No matter how close his reasoning approaches to the truth of reality as it is, he fails to get there, and thus he leaves us on the wrong side of the chasm, as ignorant as if we got all our knowledge straight from the Bible, because it leaves the old order of knowledge in place. He condemns this old order in terms of sociology as a failed academic discipline, but he treats the failure as an error, whereas, as we noted above, such failures are the product of immense effort, they are not a fluke or a mistake. The political order of the world relies upon such failure, more to the point the continuing existence of the human animal relies upon this process of knowledge control that preserves the core authority, as in identity, at the heart of the living human being, which identity is of course Judaism. Saturday, 28 September 2013 To my amazement I find myself in possession of yet another book applying sociological organicism to society, albeit reluctantly in this case. Yesterday I started reading Bionomics : The Inevitability of Capitalism by Michael Rothschild, 1990, in which the author seeks to apply the biological metaphor to economics, while stressing there is no truth in this comparison beyond its metaphorical use ! This chimes with Hoyles bizarre use of a wonderful organicist logic to explain the human condition, that also fails to follow through in a logical, scientific manner, even though Hoyle is a professional scientist noted for his ability to take scientific logic into virgin territory. As with Hoyle then, Rothschild, while being at pains to distance himself from anything approximating to overt sociological organicism, cannot avoid offering us some delightful observations of a sociologically organicist nature because that is the model he is using to understand human society. Accordingly I spotted this section which is very reminiscent of Rosnays ecologically oriented use of the organicist approach to understanding human society : The Second Law of Thermodynamics, better known as entropy, says that order tends to give way to disorder. Organization dissolves into randomness. Given this inescapable reality, the only way to maintain any order at all is by recycling disorganized components into organized arrangements, maintaining a kind of temporary reprieve from disorder. On this planet at least, DNA and DNA alone manages to buck the universal trend toward disorder. Organisms are subject to entropy. But the bodies of living things are not lifes essence. Organisms are merely temporary wrappings of tissue created by DNA solely for the purpose of supporting its own self-copying process. As living beings, we tend to think of ourselves as the end purpose of all the biological activity that sustains us. But this is not so. We humansand all other forms of lifeare merely biochemical vehicles through which DNA maintains its immortality. From the moment of conception, each

of us is doomed. Our bodies decay, but our living essencethe information that defines uscopies itself across the generations into the future. It is ironical that we think of the hills and mountains as permanent and life as temporary, when just the opposite is true. The only enduring order is found in lifes information. Much the same can be said of nongenetic information, otherwise known as human knowledge. Although human knowledge cannot copy itself, it can be copied. And once copied, a piece of information has a far better chance of surviving into the future to be copied again. In an age of photocopy machines, floppy disks, paperback books, videocassettes, and fax machines, we have lost all sense of how essential information copying is to modern life. But without cheap, easy, and accurate copying of complex information, society as we know it would not exist. (Bionomics, p. 4) I only meant to take the first paragraph but by the time you have scanned a page and turned it into text taking all the good material that is there is irresistible. The point about the first paragraph is that it provides a force based explanation for the existence of the Jewish master identity based upon the process of social cleansing, whereby the Jews act as a parasitic organ of superorganic being that induces social destruction in order to continually remake society so that it always exists in a form suited to Jewish purposes, because Judaism alone is evolved to survive these continual rounds of devastation, a process we have often discussed. While examining a book last night as part of my own constant shelf clearing process to keep the flood of books at bay, I found myself reading an account of the Nazis take on the Jewish attributes of survival in relation to this ongoing Jewish centred process of social cleansing :

Race
Left thus, Hitlers domestic critique of Imperial Germany would constitute an attack on classic liberalism such as might easily have been found in many nationalist conservative or indeed socialist writers, not only in Germany but in most other capitalist countries. Hitler, however, linked his nationalist antiliberalism with antiSemitism, a politically potent if logically unnecessary combination. Germans grew alienated from their society, he argued, because that society was increasingly directed by aliens within it, the Jews. Jews for Hitler were not simply a metaphor for the evils of modern industrialism, but a real political force indeed a nation, even if nonterritorial. Hitler admitted, at the end of his life at least, that the Jewish race was more a political label than a genetic reality. But, he argued, a modern Jewish community, nurtured by centuries of persecution, did exist and form a separate people, incorrigibly inassimilable into other nations. Even if every modern Jew probably had at least a little original Jewish blood, greatly mixed to be sure, the real bond among the Jewish people was the characteristic mental make-up of [the Jews] race which renders him impervious to the processes of assimilation . . . proof of the superiority of the mind over the flesh. According to Hitler, the Jew, belonging to his own nation, lived as a parasite inside the national societies of others. He flourished by disintegrating other nations from within. Under Jewish inspiration, the host nation was poisoned from both sides of the political spectrum. On the Right, the Jews were the masters and propagators of that international finance capitalism that depersonalized ownership and work. On the Left, Jews were the inventors and propagators of Marxism, which exploited worker discontent to create class war. Thus,

the seemingly opposite Jewish forces combined to disintegrate the national unity of their hosts. Hitler used the Bolshevik revolution as his primary example. Marxism and finance capitalism, he argued, had combined to destroy the czarist state. Bolshevism, led by Jewish intellectuals and agitators, was merely the prelude to Jewish financial domination. Hitler eventually came to argue that Stalin, by defeating Trotsky and resurrecting Russian nationalism, had robbed the Jews of their victory. In any event, as the Jews had behaved in Russia, Hitler argued, so they behaved in every state whose internal weakness presented them with an opportunity. It had been Russias turn in 1917 and Germanys in 1918. As a nation ripe for disintegration, Weimar Germany had been increasingly dominated by Jewish power using money, the press, leftist parties and trade unions, and, if necessary, terror. Alien capital had relentlessly penetrated Weimars economy, and class conflict had intensified. Weimar democracy had prevented any strong government that might have brought the aliens under national control. Meanwhile, Weimars foreign policy aimed at placating France for Hitler a sure sign of German debility. (The German Problem Reconsidered, Calleo, 1978, pp. 91 93.) This passage nicely relates the correct scientific interpretation of Jewish culture, as based upon a proper understanding of human biological nature being corporate, whereby the human animal is understood to be a superorganism. But because this correct portrayal of Judaisms nature, that Calleo dismisses as an unnecessary adjunct to understanding the overall political conditions in societythus continuing the culpable blindness of the intellectual classes on the nature of human biological naturewas not presented by intellectuals, in a simple, rational manner, and was instead left to politicians like Hitler to misrepresent in political terms, we end up having this scientific truth being linked to monstrous actions, making the actual truth taboo, and thus protecting the Jewish master race from the host they parasitise, making Hitler a servant of Judaism. This process comes about because the host has been given a Jewish identity all of their own, the Christian identity in this case, making the host resist the truth in a manner that serves Judaism by subverting science, and yet, because the host body does not call itself Jewish, even though it is, its social machinery is commandeered to attack the Jews as aliens. Leading to this amazing process whereby no matter what humans do they are forced to institute a social cleansing process acting upon themselves, that smashes society and leaves the Jews intact, to resurface as fresh as a morning daisy, ready to begin a new round of exploitation all over again ! Exactly as history has revealed with the passing of the decades since the Nazis emerged as the saviours of the Jews. Rothschild asserts that DNA is the only information medium on earth that can act as a replicating system, but with a true idea of the nature of humans as superorganisms, which removes the idea of knowledge from its erroneous placement amongst individuals, we see that language does exactly the same thing, as indicated by Hitlers analysis of the Jewish phenomenon of eternal remaking to overcome inevitable social decay, which is validated by the Jews own self analysis, as described in works like that by Kastein, History and Destiny of the Jews, 1933, that we have used previously to illustrate the way the Jews make the survival of social collapse the essence of what makes them special. So we have various ways of seeing the same phenomenon, the scientific, the personal, and the antagonistic. All three agree on the details, but each takes a very different form in its presentation. This is how linguistic force plays out within the social fabric that is the living being of the human

superorganism, where these different modes of knowledge act as elements of a linguistic identity programme creating a living structure. As we continue reading the section taken from Rothschild we find a remarkably delightful affirmation of Hoyles central point about knowledge being a driving force impelling human collective action to follow a globalising path, in that Rothschild emphasises the exact same point of longevity applying to knowledge above all else, in common with DNA. We could not ask for anything better than this to confirm our Atheist Science principle of linguistic force generating all social form by projecting authority into social space through the use of language, to create a linguistic identity programme that is Knowledge, as described by Hoyle and Rothschild. Making knowledge the essence of the human animal, the human superorganism, where knowledge can be reduced to linguistic force as the essence of human biological corporate nature, emanating from the genetically evolved anatomy of speech. The final point that we present above from Hoyle, on the comparison between our modern world and that of pre-civilised societies is excellent, but again it hangs there in space unconnected to any scientific model explaining this continuity of irrationality at the heart of society, irrespective of however much a societys knowledge of reality advances. Sunday, 29 September 2013 Again while picking books at random from the shelves to see if I can ditch any of them in the bin I found myself reading a rather remarkable essay last night. Human Cultural Evolution and its Relation to Organic Evolution of Insect Societies by Alfred Emerson, appears in Social Change in Developing Areas : A Reinterpretation of Evolutionary Theory, 1965. Obviously this is a prime subject for us to be interested in as devotees of sociological organicism, but this exceptional essay has some additional elements that make it of particular interest in this discussion of Hoyle, into which has entered the related ideas of Rosnay, Bloom, whom we referred to briefly above, and now Rothschild. The point being that Emerson uses the same kind of terms that we find in Rosnays work treating human society according to the new ideas of information theory, so that we find Emerson talking about the common factor seen in a drive towards homeostasis that is found in all life systems : Homeostasis may be defined as the self-regulation of optimal conditions for maintenance and continuation. (Social Change in Developing Areas, p. 54) Naturally as a professional scientist working in an absolute theocracy Emerson makes every effort to avoid being scientific and to stick to the religious agenda, but he does it in such a subtle manner while espousing a radically organicist continuity between insect and human societies that we could almost forget his treachery sometimes. In terms of Hoyle, as supported by Rothschild, we can see how this statement on self regulation towards maximum exploitation of energy relates to the idea of knowledge as a driving force, causing social form to arise via a process whose roots lie beyond the conscious will of individuals. These ideas on Emersons part derive from his studies of insect societies, which are of course complex and hierarchical, but not subject to the bias interpretation that colours all ideas on the workings of human society, and therefore require a dispassionate mode of interpretation that leads inevitably to ideas of self organisation at the social level of life, which in turn invites a conceptual transfer of ideas from insects to humans. ___

Two books arrived yesterday, 30/08/2013, and I would like to take notice of them. The Macroscope : A New World Scientific System by Jol de Rosnay, 1979, first published in French in 1975, is utterly amazing for its organicist leanings, as seen in its mode of expression, although sadly it bears all the signs of being a very shallow organicism, merely colouring the usual political mentality. In this it is akin to Hoyles outlook, and thus worth mentioning here. Next we have Essais sur la Mcanique Sociale by Lon Winiarski, 1967, first published in 1898. From an unusual internet source, that of an amateur offering using mechanical translations of the kind I have posted myself, we learn this is a collection of essays, one being in Italian. The crude translation shows some fascinating ideas about force, where the individual is regarded as a social molecule, yet despite these promising organicist expressions, the main thrust of the argument aims to locate the directive force squarely within each individual, so that we have selfish forces inducing social structure to form, which sounds like it is all about competition, would you believe ! Which, thinking of what I read in Rothschild yesterday (28/09/2013), harks back to Smiths Wealth of Nations that made individual desire the basis of all economic activity. As usual then, when we do have anything like a scientific effort to understand humans, it is always done from the viewpoint of preserving the individual. I was examining the third book to arrive yesterday just a few hours ago, Hoyles Ten Faces of the Universe, 1977, and he refers to the pressure to shape knowledge so as to protect the precious idea of human individuality. On page five he says an unusual way can be found to reassert the importance of the individual, which is entirely the wrong response when we need him to understand that this desire to assert individuality is at the root of all the difficulties about how we live that so animated him. It is the usual spinelessness of these people, we never see anyone standing up against the taboos except in the form of raving madmen like Hitler, which is the exact opposite of helpful !

Pages 72 - 74 After this diversion I would like to go back to knowledge as a superstructure. What I have now to say is somewhat difficult to explain and may even be a little fantastic. It depends on the structure being something more than its parts. Suppose that each of the individual cells in our own bodies were to concern themselves with the problem of structure. They would notice that a human is compounded out of many of them. They would notice that an individual cell might die without impairing the general structure, that its place was often taken by a new cell. If moreover the cells were endowed with a conceit of themselves, they would surely argue that the totality of cells could not possess any consciousness that they themselves as individuals did not possess. And in this they would be entirely wrong, for the human possesses a consciousness that is not a consciousness possessed by individual cells. In short, the total human structure has properties that its individual components would not be immediately aware of. Now let us scale up this little fantasy. Instead of taking cells as the individuals we take humans as the individuals. Instead of taking a human as the structure, we take the superstructure compounded out of humans. Does this superstructure possess a power and a consciousness of which we as the individual components are at best only dimly aware ? I suspect that it does, and I suspect that it is this Thing that controls the destiny of the human species. In my view human history is not so much a history of individuals as a history of the growth of The Thing. A not too farfetched analogy is given by the cooling of a gas. To begin with the particles of the gas act as separate individuals, except that

occasionally one particle collides with another. This is the analogue of the early nomadic existence of Man. Then as the gas cools it happens that colliding particles do not always separate. They form together into little groups of which there may be a vast number in the whole gas. Here we have the beginning of a community existence, of the grouping of humans into small villages. Then with further cooling the small aggregations join together into drops of liquidnow we have the beginnings of an urban existence. Next the droplets mass together and a liquid is formed. The structure of the liquid is vastly more complicated than that of the original gas. The behavior of an individual is no longer independent of its neighbours, but it is not entirely controlled by them : a particle can move around, but it cannot move freely as it could when the material was gaseous. The last step occurs when with further cooling the liquid freezes, and a solid is formed. Now the particles can no longer move around at allthey become completely controlled by the structure of which they are members. In the liquid and solid states we have the analogues of the fluid and rigid forms of civilization. The rise of modern civilization in Europe and North America during the last two or three centuries has been of an essentially fluid character. A man was obliged to behave reasonably in an understood way toward his neighbours, but a fair measure of individual freedom was permitted. Other civilizations have evolved to the solid state. Roman civilization had become pretty solidified by the time of its collapse. Chinese civilization in modern times collapsed before Western civilization largely because of its solidified character. How fanciful is this ? I suspect not at all. Indeed I imagine that a good deal of the mathematical analysis that is applicable to the association of particles in solids, liquids, and gases may turn out to be also applicable to the association of humans. The enormous historic changes of the last few thousand years, and even of the last few hundred years, have very much the appearance of what physicists call a co-operative phenomenon. A co-operative phenomenon is one in which to begin with a number of individuals change themselves in some particular. This does not have much effect on the whole group. Then if the proportion of changed individuals continues to grow, a quite critical point is reached. So long as the proportion remains below the critical value the properties of the whole group are not much changed. But as soon as the critical value is exceeded the whole group suddenly switches to the new property. The essence of a co-operative phenomenon is that the change of group behavior is not gradual, it does not change slowly as the number of individuals changes. Instead there is a sudden change at the critical value. Sudden shifts of public opinion have all the hallmarks of a co-operative phenomenon. On a much larger canvas the sudden emergence of civilization during the last five thousand years, and in particular the enormous development of the last five hundred years, when measured against the several hundred thousand years in which man pursued his nomadic existence, seem only explicable as a cooperative phenomenon. We have here a very fine organicist analogy superb in fact ! And there we have it, the human being is an entity composed of individuals, made an end in itself because it possesses a consciousness that we individuals cannot begin to imagine. And this unimaginable consciousness is what really exists, and as such carries us along with it as the substance of a resulting Thing ! It is a bit tragic that he resorts to so vacant a term as this, but what else could he do ? He could scarcely of spoken the truth that we must think was really in his full view that the Thing is in fact a Superorganism. This portion of his work has it all, it offers everything that we offer in our Atheist Science, except the knitting together

of ideas into a coherent form. And this can only be because such a genuine portrayal is strictly forbidden by the social convention of taboo. The gas analogy is calculated to pamper to the false idea of the person as the human being drawn into a social order which, in this context, is downright ignorant. It fails to recognise the inner qualities of the constituent particles that apply in both gaseous and human cases, that mean the end result communal life from human association and water from condensation, are both latent potentials of the respective units, such that these results of combination do not appear magically under the fluke of coagulation, but inevitably as a product of ongoing conditions and the inherent attributes of the units, the human unit being a vast, complicated organic machine, built to form social structures. In the above passage it is notable that Hoyle mindlessly adheres to the idea that individuals are humans, as when he describes a superstructure compounded out of humans. So that he most definitely does not make the logical transition to the negation of the individuals status as human which is implicit in his own argument that tells us this status must be transferred to the Thing that he so nicely envisages as real in this exposition on human social nature. The idea of a kernel of change causing a total transformation can be linked to our arguments on the nature of homosexuality as a genetically evolved priestly caste giving rise to cave painting culture which set in train the changes that allowed hierarchical forming type cultures to evolve, and led to the Jews as a kernel of transformation able to unify the entire human biomass (See My Idea.). This catalytic idea is fine, but it presupposes certain qualities in the transformed substance and this he stubbornly steers well away from because it can only mean asserting a human biological corporate nature. This idea also prompts us to think of current social conditions in which Islam is being forced upon us relentlessly, making us wonder whether English society will reach a critical point where it suddenly finds it flips into being an Islamic society, as must of occurred to societies in the past when they became Islamic or Christian, under the impress of the ruling elite of course, of exactly the kind we are enduring now. It makes one shudder to think of such a horror, but I fear it is where our masters are taking us by acting in obedience to the driving force of our corporate nature, and our enslavement to Judaism that we have been most assiduous to enhance over the course of recent history. This is the price we pay for having been the greatest modern power on earth, for a spell, by forcibly spreading the Jewish slave identity all around the globe. Chapter 7 A Biological Paradox Resolved He closes this chapter with an attempt to deal with the general nature of superorganicism : Pages 78 81 Human history is an amazing story because it is a story of the gradual development of a structure built out of individuals, not through a change in the individuals themselves. A gas condenses into a liquid not through any change in the individual particles but through a developing interrelation of one particle with another. This I think is just what has happened to the human species. The change from the savage of a hundred thousand years ago to the writing of the Beethoven Sonatas is a consequence of the development of The Thing.

There is a sense in which the orthodox ideas of natural selection may be said to survive the present interpretation (although the purely genetical theory of change does not survive). It can be said that the potentiality for the building of a superstructure out of human units must lie within the units themselves. But this argument does not seem to me to have any useful application. We might as well say that human behavior is a manifestation of the properties of electrons, protons, and neutrons ; and that the study of biology is really a side branch of fundamental physics. It seems that a quite insufficient allowance has been made for structures built out of animal units. The human example shows how enormously important structure can be. It also shows that the development of a structure need not be an outcome of comprehensive genetical changes ; a structure once it begins to control a species can apparently develop in its own right. It is now time to say a little more about our repeated statement that a structure is something more than the units of which it is composed. We can gain a further insight into this by returning to our analogy of gases and liquids. The structural property that constitutes the liquid state is not the unique property of any one type of particlethere are a multitude of different substances all of which can form liquids. There are a multitude of cases where the structural property is the same, but the individual units are different. In a like manner there are many animals that possess superstructureswe have already mentioned bees and ants as notable cases. The upshot of these remarks is that the structure built out of humans is not necessarily a uniquely human phenomenon. If other animals were to become controlled by The Thing, then I think it quite likely that the power and dominance that today we associate only with the human species would also become associated with other species. I could imagine that other species of mammals might become quite good at mathematics if they once got The Thing behind them. And I imagine that the views of birds on the subject of aerodynamics might be worth hearing. It may be wondered why humanity has become organized into a formidable superstructure. Was this a matter of accident, or does the human unit possess properties that are specially suited to The Thing ? Both, I think. Mans very slow start, his million years or so of food-gathering near the limits of survival would seem to confirm the lack of inevitability of human history. On the other hand, I do not think it can be denied that the human unit is well adapted to the formation of a superstructure. This is shown by the development of language. The establishment of effective communication between one individual and another undoubtedly represented the first step in the development of The Thing. The vital importance of communication has been much emphasized in recent years. But at a deeper level the inherent structure of the human brain supplies the key to the matter. The design of the human brain, although not apparently differing in principle from the brains of other animals, is specially suited to the establishment of a superstructure. This is so crucial a point that it is worth while considering in detail in a separate chapter. Human change has occurred in a structure composed of human individuals, but not by genetic change. Exactly a new order of biological information has therefore come into play as in language. The material we have here is infuriating. First of we squirm with delight at the free and easy manner in which Hoyle invokes a perfect idea of the human individual as a unit of a higher order of organic being. He even tackles the shift from genes to human behaviour in a semi valid sense, but he stubbornly refrains from seeking a natural continuity moving from the genetic to the social domains. Thus he goes out of his way to plunge into the most facile

description of social life being the product of physics, jumping two orders of physical reality in a deliberate effort to leapfrog the one level that he is supposed to be commenting upon, as in the social level mediated by language, which derives from the genetic evolution of human somatic form. It is as if he is chocking upon the word language, because he reaches right up to the very point where the only word that could possibly come into anyones mind who had gone so far in their quest to understand human life, is language, without it so much as being hinted at. He is clearly straining himself not to think about what language is, in order not to treat language as a form of information that controls humans. He skips onward to the product of language, to make knowledge the be all and end all of his whole idea of humans as the subjects of an extended order of existence, but he never once seeks to trace the origin and nature of knowledge back to it genetic roots. This of course at a time when information theory was starting to make an impact on ideas about how social life was formed, as we saw above regarding the essay by Emerson from 1965, just a few years after Hoyle produced this essay. Change in gas solid or primitive civilised arrangements involves a release of latent potential and is therefore not change in a real or absolute sense. The Thing Superorganism is what it has always been during its entire existence, ever since genetic evolution delivered human somatic form in its current guise. ____________________________ Then we have a real Whopper ! A real act of treachery against all that this man pretends to stand for, showing that he does get the point of all his ruminations, however he just will not follow that point honestly. The tendency to create a Thing must be a latent potential YES. But he declares this irrelevant in keeping with our egotistical values that he denounced earlier on. It beggars belief that he could bring himself to speak in such a mealymouthed way without biting his own tongue off. The implication is the usual one, evolution having provided the equipment for no other reason than to aid survival, it was now entirely in the hands of individuals to do what they may with it. This is too bad. _____________________ The next paragraph is sublime once again giving us a real Jekyll and Hyde exposition on this topic. The nature of structures built out of animals has been overlooked as these come to possess a being of their own they become ends in themselves. This is not quite right because the genetic constitution of these animals is evolved to impart this superorganic form as the true end of individual existence, which Hoyle will not permit himself to say, though he keeps beating all around the bush within which this idea is hidden. On page eighty we find a very odd statement. He recognises that human biological nature is one example of a type seen elsewhere as in ants and bees. He even speaks of how the power of Thingness i.e. the superorganic order of being, would make other creatures remarkable in their achievements just as we are ; as it makes bees, ants, and termites remarkable. But he then descends in fathoms to the most idiotic depths by projecting our mammalian experience of this high order of being directly onto other creatures, as if he were taking the piss out of himself. Perhaps to joke about what he had been saying, making this seem like part of his way of circumventing the taboo, one wonders ? _______________________________________ He then chooses to raise the vital question just broached and cast aside on the previous page. He says that humans being stuck at the feral stage for a million years belies the idea that we evolved for society. But this is a technical failure because our modern kind evolved in Africa less than 200,000 years ago and only began dispersing from there 100,000 years ago, so we are a species as fresh as peas from the pod, and what we are today is

therefore exactly what we have always been, only requiring the unfolding of our genetic potential. He then concedes that we are biologically evolved for creating social structure, thus entirely contradicting himself, as required by the political authorities ruling our world. His concession, what is more, hits the nail of those evolved qualities right on the head language ! Exactly. The nature of language he interprets falsely, in terms of individuals, as in serving interpersonal communication, instead of in terms of serving the structure the Thing that language actually creates by delivering a programme that is dispersed between individuals quite independently of any interest or desire on their part. They have no choice but to speak in order to live and in so doing they acquire the programme and become part of the Thing Superorganism. On page 81 we find a new device looms over us to undo all his good work by organicist sociology standards he presents the materialism of the brain rather than the dynamic of the force of language as the key to the Things existence. No ! ___

The above are my notes made when reading the book. Coming to this section now we see afresh that it is full of the most extraordinary comments, indicating that Hoyle had in his consciousness a full sense of human social life as a self existing entity, with a life of its own that we persons belong to. This of course is perfect as a state of mind, but the manner in which this concept plays out in the details of his discussion is so random in its expression derived alternately from false and true pivots of observation, that the result is chaos rather than the coherence this concept ought to of fostered. He just needed to make the full transition to a concept of the human animal as a superorganism and all would of fallen into place. He speaks of human history being the story of a structure built out of individuals, which is a curious halfway house between the scientific reality of the social body being a living organism, and the usual linguistic programming that gives us our personal sense of our place in this story. The we have this exasperating denial of human biological nature on the most facile basis that ignores the idea of levels of organisation that is clearly fundamental to the running of the entire universe, which is a subject of such immense importance to Hoyle. The point being that the great secret of understanding the building of order out of persons as units of superorganic being, must start by realising that this happens because of attributes that genetic evolution has created to make superorganic form a latent potential of individual form, that has to be expressed through the agency of individual lives. Yet he states this idea only to dismiss it !! Impossible stupidity. The next paragraph is so bizarre that it requires reproducing for the purpose of focusing our attention : It seems that a quite insufficient allowance has been made for structures built out of animal units. The human example shows how enormously important structure can be. It also shows that the development of a structure need not be an outcome of comprehensive genetical changes ; a structure once it begins to control a species can apparently develop in its own right. Having dismissed the idea of structures being built out of units in a self organising fashion derived from the attributes of the units, he sets up the resulting structure as a self organising entity in its own right. This exerts the usual religious ploy of detachment from reality by setting something loose as a divine object made according to its own conception,

no method could be more irrational or antithetical to science. How does the human example show that a structure need not be the product of genetic changes, how ? Is the man a raving lunatic, who could possibly envisage such an idea ? Does he not see that humans have distinct attributes compared to other animals, not least of which is the power of speech that generates the false knowledge we live by, which observation is so fundamental to his own ideas ? This is possibly the worst fragment of his whole charade of science, presented here in the most exquisite pretence of sociological organicism. The man just will not step over the line, but it is quite remarkable how close he comes to teetering over it. The conflation of excellence with idiocy continues as we read on, such that the name of Ouspensky pops into our consciousness as one who made hay with the idea of human society on a comparative level with other creatures, of which we approve, while taking the idea to such extremes as to make us cringe at the resulting observations possessing a character too bad for words, just as Hoyle does in the above. I have never seen this most important observation that human corporate nature is a general biological essence before, that humans express as mammals, which is what Hoyle unwittingly asserts when speaking of the fact that our special gifts are not ours, but rather they are inherent in the power of life. But the way he spins this idea into a notion of other animal attributes being expressed suggests this is all about intelligence, hence he speaks of birds expatiating upon aerodynamics if they should happen to form a superorganism, which totally misapplies the ideas he is handling. This error is logically akin to realising that advanced life must exist on planets throughout space, and then asserting that this means that advanced life forms had visited earth as a logical consequence of this fact. Many people do make this moronic mistake, but Hoyle would blast them, as would I, for displaying such inexcusable ignorance of a subject so partially represented. But here Hoyle shows us that he is happy to revel in exactly this kind of ignorance borne of half-baked ideas, when off the beaten track of his own specialism. The point is that human attributes are not personal, so that intelligence is not the true nature of the human animals attributes. Rather, forming a complex structure by means of linguistic information acting as a bonding agent, is the nature of our kind. Therefore we should not conflate the anatomy of a species with the kind of knowledge that a superorganism would produce. The relevance of the anatomy only goes so far as to determine the form of the basic social unit, from which point on the nature of the binding information is the same, be it pheromones or language, which is why most human knowledge is false rather than factual. All that being false means is that this information creates form, rather than representing form, so that being false is not a negative quality of information, indeed it is the very essence of information as the essence of life, which false information creates. The final paragraph that we have above continues the mixture of sublime and slime reasoning, he even chooses to expressly allow the question of human biological corporate nature to stand in a dualistic form, that both acknowledges it and denies it at one and the same time. This displays the usual stance of people that I have noted when I try to tell them about the idea that the human animal is a superorganism. They welcome the novelty of the idea as highly intriguing and therefore having something to it, while always insisting that the individual nonetheless exists exactly as they are said to exist, as the true embodiment of the human animal ! This is ignorance of the highest order, although universal, and here Hoyle displays it to perfection. He even acknowledges language as the personification of the idea that humans have a biological corporate nature, an idea he dismisses out of hand a few paragraphs back, yet he casts language aside without another mention by quickly shifting the ground to something impersonal, the anatomy of the human brain. So although he is dealing with the idea of

human biological corporate nature in the most forthright manner, he nonetheless is exerting all his ability to ensure that the idea he is promoting, is not in way promoted in the end. Is this not a most curious way to handle an idea ? A peculiarity that is of course all about the nature of this idea as absolute truth that can never be known. It makes you wonder how Hoyle came to develop the superb idea of the Thing as he did. It suggests that he lived in a social flux of ideas where this idea was abroad and was much discussed, for the aspects of the idea as he presents them are highly developed, but most of all the escape clauses from the correct use of these ideas are what more than anything suggests that long discussions over many years, with many different kinds of people, have shaped the presentation that we find in this most exceptional little book Man and Materialism. Chapter 8 What is the Mind ? There is an awful lot of irrelevant drivel about brain anatomy, clearly intended to divert us away from a scientific analysis of human social nature. Pages 86 87 It may be emphasized that the nervous system of an animal possesses some properties that are fixed and some that are variable. The distinction is easily made : the fixed part is determined by the distribution of nerve cells and nerve fibers at the birth of the animal, while the variable part arises from the changes (e.g., of synaptic thresholds) that accompany the continued operation of the nervous system. The fixed part requires a baby to grow up in a characteristically human way and not with the mentality of a dog. It is very likely the fixed part that determines the essentials of our thinking, what we call logic. The fixed part is probably also responsible for the basis of our social behavior. On the other hand it is the variable part that enables us to acquire the language and customs of the particular community into which we happen to be born. Those features of behavior that arise from the fixed part may conveniently be termed built in, or wired in, or instinctive properties, and those features that arise from subsequent neurological modifications may be called learned properties. Behavior in an adult animal is a complex mixture of the two. It may be asked : why bother with the variable properties ? Why should we not be equipped with built-in properties only ? The answer is, of course, that it is precisely the variable part of behavior that enables us to cope successfully with variations in our environment. If all our reactions were wired in we might be excellently adapted to one particular environment but favorable adaptation could immediately be destroyed by a sudden change of environment. Hence it is clear that the variable properties of the nervous system possess an important survival value. In this connection it may be noted that humans depend on learned properties more than any other animal. At this point in my presentation of this work I have been caused to pause and wonder why I should bother to laboriously work my way through all my notes and the relevant passages for the sake of examining such a flawed work as Man and Materialism. Is Hoyles material worth such an effort ? This passage makes me think not, it is pretty lame and the equivalent might be found in many other pieces of work that certainly cannot all be closely interrogated by me. But his work is special, is unique, and is worthy of our greatest attention, for all that it falls shy of where we want to be, everyone bar ourselves does that. Shifting

onward through my notes in search of reassurance, I soon hit the part where he introduces the idea of free coupling which I recall finding so wonderful when I read the book, and this has reaffirmed my belief in the exceptional value of this work for the purposes Atheist Science. ___ Finally we hit a statement that has some significance. We know that the trick whereby humans are made a part of nature that is separate from, that is independent of natural laws, is fixed at the boundary of language. And this artificial boundary is what Hoyle sets out to justify here by speaking of hardwired attributes, versus learned attributes that he means to imply are the origin of personal freedom. We breach this boundary by making genetically evolved anatomy generate a linguistic identity programme that is acquired in the manner of imprinting hence a programme, over which individuals have no control. This is the implication of Hoyles key idea of knowledge as a super-individual phenomenon creating social structure = Thing = Superorganism. Yet he works against this idea and toward the comforting views he previously, rightly, dismissed as bias. The treatment of learning as a device for responding to environmental challenges is too pathetic for words, albeit very common amongst the scientific fraternity of religious priests. Language is so powerful a tool, and produces such extraordinary effects, as in modern global society, that it is clearly the creation of this fabulous organic structure that genetically evolved language is all about, as proven by the actual product, namely false knowledge, typified by religion, but reaching its zenith in an all encompassing false science, as in Darwinism, or Ptolemaic astronomy of old. He gives us this excuse for the existence of flexible attributes that is nothing short of pathetic the old catch all aiding survival, which humans just happen to depend upon. Absurd ! Obviously our learning mode is way more sophisticated than this drivel says, it is the means by which a mammal is evolved to express the corporate nature seen in social insects, whom we see a likeness to ourselves in so readily. And we can be sure by this time that this man knows that language is about creating the human animal, the Thing. Hence we see a man cavorting with the taboo against self-knowledge, which is a most unique and special occurrence in the early phase of the post cleansing era, for his life will of begun in the precleansed phase of a partially open culture that was still extant. ___ What is Hoyle trying to do ? Faced with the idea that a living creature has a fixed and a flexible component to their being, how does he tackle this issue, and how should he of tackled it ? The distinction he makes is material, concerning physical structures, so that we have fixed physical structure and flexible physical structure coming together in an end result of living being. This is the exact opposite of the genuine scientific approach that we follow in Atheist Science, where we seek to find a continuity between a living form and its nature, which leads us to think in none material terms of information delivering energy by organising structure. Whether the structure is fixed or flexible is irrelevant, what matters is the unity of being. The validity of our approach might be simplistically illustrated by thinking of a car as a structure with fixed attributes like the engine, and flexible attributes like the steering. In Hoyles hands the form of the human is made separate from the use that form is put to , in the same manner that a cars use would be separated from its structure if we argued that the use of the steering bore no relationship to the structure of the car in the sense that the travel of the car in use, is not predetermined by the structure. Obviously the journeys a car makes are not built in at the factory, but its capacity to make journeys is, and likewise with the relationship between the hardwiring of the animal and its activity in life. We would think it idiotic to conflate a discussion of a cars day-to-day use with its manufacture, yet we have no qualms about doing this with humans. This is because religion teaches us that humans are free willed

entities. But the whole point of science it to remove any such illusion in order to discover what we really are as products of nature. It shows up how bias against science Hoyle is when we tease out these points here, even though his articulated persona is all about criticising others for their bias while pretending that he is free of such trite limitations. And of course in the second paragraph, having established his false premise, he sets about justifying it. Thus he makes our learning capacity, our flexibility, all about survival in the environment. Whereas, understanding that learning is really programming, it is clear that this flexibility, like that built into a car, is all about placing us in the dynamic environment we were manufactured to operate within, namely that of a living superorganism. Humans are obliged to be social, but what social nuance we express needs to be flexible because human biological corporate nature is about building a superorganism. And it is this flexibility that has allowed us to become slaves of Judaism in a manner that we experience as our very own special identity, thus allowing the Thing to drive us toward global extension exactly as Hoyle describes, without his discovering either why, or how this result comes about.

Page 88 Interestingly Hoyle takes up the old subject of the mind as a self existing thing independent of the body and claims to have proven it invalid by virtue of his materialist argument based upon brain function, wherein brain activity is made synonymous with the mind. As atheists we might expect to favour a denunciation of the independently existing mind idea, but in the context of Hoyles sociological organicism seeking to argue for knowledge as a super-individual phenomenon, while denying this same knowledge a material location of its own, as in being located within the Thing as a true being, we are obliged to go against him. Since we argue that linguistic force creates a linguistic identity programme that is written to the brains of individuals as the means of making them act as cellular units of superorganic being, we must see what is called mind as the sum total of all information existing in a superorganism at any given time, from which a tiny portion is fed to each individual, where, in conjunction with intimate variations of a personal and socially ephemeral nature, the individual comes to possess what can be called their mind, which mind is not really an entity existing in its own right therefore, and as such cannot be called a mind with any justification. As ever, the words that our acquired language obliges us to use are loaded with the subconscious bias of individual being, that forces us to experience a consciousness of reality based upon our personal existence as human beings existing in our own right, which it is the job of genuine science to see through, to see the reality of our nonexistence. Pages 90 92 I sometimes wonder if I am losing my capacity to think straight while reading Hoyle. I find myself condemning him for saying things that are anathema to our scientific reasoning, as immediately above where I curse him for taking a materialistic outlook rather than basing his ideas on an information based paradigm, and then I find the very next section I come to says exactly what I have been just saying he should of just said himself ! And here we go again ! In the pages we are concerned with now, we find him making out that fixed properties exist to affirm our animal identity and to give us our basic human attributes, while flexible attributes exist to allow us to be coupled to whatever social conditions apply at the point of our induction into life. We could not of said it better. And this is where he cooks up

the nice idea of free coupling, which is somewhat akin to the imprinting ideas famously associated with the work of Konrad Lorenz with farm animals and the like, which imprinted them on humans upon hatching, instead of the parents their hard wired free coupling interval was supposed to attach to them to, that behaviourists call imprinting. The important point Hoyle makes being that free coupling, that is akin to imprinting, that we prefer to call linguistic identity programming, is a one off process that cannot readily be redone at a later date. We will try and cut down on the amount we reproduce, but in this section we have an exquisite paragraph : It is just this initial free coupling that allows human society to change without the basic human units changing. It is just this free coupling that has allowed The Thing to gain its ascendancy over us. Yet I do not think that The Thing necessarily had much to do with the evolutionary development that led to our becoming equipped with free coupling. Even if we think of humans existing as single units, without any appreciable superstructure, the possession of a free coupling would have great biological survival value. (p. 91) Free coupling superb. Yet having given us this perfect insight he instantly denies it ! The man is infuriating. Free coupling allowed the Thing to rule us but we did not evolve our facility to support free coupling in order to create the Thing. In other words the human animal is not a superorganism because human evolution is oriented toward creating individuals existing as ends in themselves, who then find their evolved capacities being constantly and irresistibly perverted into forming a social body that denies them the individual status they evolved to possess ! This is an amazing set of summary statements. We cannot help wondering if all the while he is saying the correct thing so precisely, yet wrongly, in order to find a way to say it anyway he can, for those who may be able to understand his coded message. It is a fascinating thought, I have certainly never seen anything like this before, it is perfect, yet wrong, simply because it states what is correct only to deny it. As if we lived in a world where none were allowed to produce the true sum of 2 + 2 and one person decided to circumvent the taboo by saying that the idea that 2 + 2 = 4 is utter nonsense ! It is quite an experience to sit here in the garden on a bank holiday Monday, in my underpants, sweating in the hot sunshine, listening to the neighbours over the fence discussing the nature of existence according to science, while lifting these remarkable ideas from the page of an amazing book. Exactly the kind of idea to explain why libraries are burnt to the ground imagine if books like this existed in Alexandria, or a treatise proving that the earth went around the sun . . . yep that is why the library was burnt by the Moslem slaves of Judaism, and it will be why this will happen again if that is what it takes to keep Judaism alive, we can see that our world has no love of truth from the Darwinian subversion of the most precious knowledge of our age. Other animals also learn, but not to the degree that Man does. Our measure of adaptability is the greatest, and I think it is precisely because of this that The Thing has got hold of us, for the free coupling enables us to adapt ourselves to social situations that are not specifically humani.e., not dictated by the human wired-in properties. (p. 92)

Free coupling allows change to occur at a super human level without change occurring at the human level, so that we remain human, as that which possesses us becomes something other than human ! He is straining himself here to accommodate bias human sentiments. This section brings us as close as we can get to the nub of the issue concerning human biological nature and the way that our knowledge touting priests simply shun the obvious. Hoyle indicates that learning is a common attribute of life that therefore can be allotted a straightforward Darwinian function related to survival within a hostile environment. Then he notes that humans take this attribute to an exceptional degree of expression, notwithstanding that he has noted that some comparative social animals do exist. This is where the mere imposition of blind ignorance takes over the argument in a typically priestly fashion. We mentioned the work of the behaviourist school, as in Lorenz, who came to fame in the 1930s because of their work on animal imprinting, from which they devised a much despised psychological model of intelligence that was deemed ultra reductionist in its orientation, reductionism always being hated and despised by religions defenders. Atheist Science is as reductionist as can be, in that it says human individuals do not exist at all, reducing them entirely to cellular units of the true human animal form. You cannot get anymore reductionist than that, this is the absolute zero of the logic of human nature, behaviourists of course never went anywhere in this direction, they were just another shade of Jewish priest defending Judaism from science by feigning a scientific method. So Hoyle glibly equates human learning to that seen in geese, for example, which is nothing more than imprinting serving the function of attaching goslings to their mother, notwithstanding that he has just said that human flexibility is of a greatly more empowered kind. What we have here is Hoyle pushing up against the boundary of speech that he steadfastly refuses to cross, so that he treats human learning as if speech did not exist and lets it stand as a merely advanced form of the short-lived imprinting phase. This is incredibly stupid, but he can get away with it because it conforms to the taboo against treating language as the key to understanding that human biological nature is corporate and the human animal is a superorganism, which means that the exceptional learning capacity of humans has nothing to do with imprinting or survival, but is all about creating a mammalian form of superorganism. When we see this kind of effort being employed to the expression of the simple truth, we come face to face with the difficulty that truth has always had in competing with religion. A post I sent to a site on the internet yesterday ran thus : We now look back in something like astonishment on what was perhaps the most important step, not because it represented something incredibly subtle or profound, but because it was so obvious. It is astonishing because it was found so difficult, and yet it could hardly have been easier. I am referring to the discovery of the nineteenth century, the discovery of Darwin and Wallace, that man is an animal. (Man in the Universe, Fred Hoyle, 1966, p. 18.) The problem with this great revelation is that it left one more giant leap for mankinds state of self knowledge to be complete. That was to ask what the human animal is ? Everyone has assumed that the human animal is the person, but this is not so, and when this is finally allowed to be known we will be as stunned that it was not obvious from the outset, as Hoyle indicates we are now by the revelation that we are animals ! We did not know we were animals because religion had suppressed this fact, and we still do not know that we individuals do not exist as ends in ourselves, and that the human animal is a superorganism, for the exact same reason, because religion

continues to rule our world ensuring that science cannot exist as a free enterprise seeking knowledge for its own sake. This can be seen in the emotional expressions of revulsion at the simple idea that the comparative nature of insect and human societies is identical. Language is therefore a flow of information creating the human animal, exactly as DNA creates somatic form, language creates superorganic form by organising somatic cells of superorganic being. Which explains why most human knowledge is false, as in religion, but also as in science, if we dare wrestle with this astounding fact, which we are forced to do once we understand the reality that human biological nature is corporate and individuals do not exist as ends in themselves. Posted to wordpress - 30/09/2013 14:46

And yet Hoyle personifies the problem we use him to illustrate here, the problem of an ingrained resistance to truth, that is infused into the social order as the living culture, which the above quote from Hoyle expressly sets out to denounce. He even argues that this same problem exists in his own time, causing people to resist his novel ideas on the dispersal of life throughout universal space. Although he sees this problem then, he does not attain a fundamental understanding of its nature allowing him to see how it acts upon himself. So that he manages to deal with this question of human biological corporate nature at length, and in detail, while constantly adhering to the cultural imposition that requires him to fly in the face of all reason as he himself has discovered it to be ! It really is a most remarkable example of the phenomenon of cultural imposition, for its complete demonstration of the subject by way of example delivered in the act of condemnation. Except not quite, because while he is denouncing cultural oppression in one book, we are finding his subservience to this oppression displayed in another book. Incidentally, posting that passage online nearly cost me my life yesterday, so to speak, since I only missed signing by a fraction because I was so preoccupied by writing it, and that would of meant no benefits for three months ! What the hell would I of done ? My life is already over, I can only see selling my house as the way forward, it is the end of an era of freedom such as we will not see again for a very long time, if ever. ___ Friday, 04 October 2013 This morning I was checking over a book with a view to ditching it and I examined a passage devoted to the examination of the power and nature of human language. Like Hoyle the author was an amateur commentator in this field, but he is interesting for having made Darwinism a central focus of his criticism of the day. Essays on Life Art and Science by Samuel Butler, 1908, has the essay Thought and Language that was first delivered as a speech in 1890. It concludes thus : You have all heard, says Sir William Hamilton, of the process of tunnelling through a sandbank. In this operation it is impossible to succeed unless every foot, nay, almost every inch of our progress be secured by an arch of masonry before we attempt the excavation of another. Now language is to the mind precisely what the arch is to the tunnel. The power of thinking and the power of excavation are not dependent on the words in the one case or on the mason work in the other ; but without these subsidiaries neither could be carried on beyond its rudimentary

commencement. Though, therefore, we allow that every movement forward in language must be determined by an antecedent movement forward in thought, still, unless thought be accompanied at each point of its evolutions by a corresponding evolution of language, its further development is arrested. Man has evolved an articulate language, whereas the lower animals seem to be without one. Man, therefore, has far outstripped them in reasoning faculty as well as in power of expression. This, however, does not bar the communications which the lower animals make to one another from possessing all the essential characteristics of language, and as a matter of fact, wherever we can follow them we find such communications effectuated by the aid of arbitrary symbols covenanted upon by the living beings that wish to communicate, and persistently associated with certain corresponding feelings, states of mind, or material objects. Human language is nothing more than this in principle, however much further the principle has been carried in our own case than in that of the lower animals. This being admitted, we should infer that the thought or reason on which the language of men and animals is alike founded differs as between men and brutes in degree but not in kind. More than this cannot be claimed on behalf of the lower animals, even by their most enthusiastic admirer. (Butler, pp. 232 233.) The relevance of the above to our discussion of Hoyles statements on the nature of language appears where Butler states that language is identical to communication throughout life, only differing in its power, not in its nature. This is precisely the point Hoyle makes, only in a different manner, when he says that the product of language, as in free coupling, simply serves to offer flexibility between living beings and the challenging environment, where all human language does as compared to other animals expression of free coupling, is to do it with greater effect. Here then we have two great popularisers of science working decades apart, both within the modern scientific era, both dealing with the same subject, and both entirely erroneously setting forth the nature of language as different in degree only. Whereas human language is vastly different to most animal communication, though it does have its counterpart in insect communication that exists to impart a common identity across a biomass in order to form a superorganism. But how curious is it to find ourselves making this criticism, since the usual stance we have to oppose is that which asserts that human language is a Rubicon, the crossing of which separates humans from animals ! It seems that we cannot win. However, Butler concludes his piece on language by indicating that human language is indeed something vastly different to anything possessed by animals, only here he closes his argument, thus avoiding having to deal with anything meaningful. So that we have a host of manoeuvres applied by all kinds of priests, who take up every possible position on the subject of language, all of whom make sure that whatever happens, they all support the core principle of human individuality, a false principle upon which social power is based through the machinations of religion, as in Judaism. The other point that we include as a by product of taking Butlers remarks, where he quotes from Hamilton, we might as well deal with as we are here by saying that the product of language is not reason, but rather it is a superorganic form enabled by a linguistic identity programme. Somewhat as Hoyles argument has indicated in places, where he has noted that the Thing may evolve while our individual development remains entirely static, except in so far as we are carried along by the Thing. Thus, today, despite staggering increases in the collective knowledge available, to do with physics, chemistry, life, cosmology and so on, we remain as stupendously moronic in our individual reasoning capacity as ever any of our

species were at any point in the entire history of our existence. We slavishly absorb and accept whatever we are told, be we the greatest thinkers of our day, or illiterate peasants. Saturday, 05 October 2013 As per my usual habit, a book I was checking over last night with a view to its possible redundancy, proved useful in relation to my current philosophical efforts. Coming back to the above written yesterday, to check it for coherence and content after a twenty four hour breathing space, I notice that the idea of words serving as arches supporting reason, equates to the more intellectually refined idea of language as an abstract phenomenon that we are about to consider courtesy of last nights casual perusing. The significance of this observation is that whether it is a simple analogy or a deeply esoteric form of philosophical writing, the message is always the same, always false, always bias, always facile, and always hell-bent on hiding truth while protecting fiction supporting social power, as in religion, which means Judaism. Butler even refers to language in animals as being uniformly based upon arbitrary symbols, which according to the work we are going to peek at now is the very essence of human language, thus indicating the common trend in all priestly productions on this topic. This sameness of the message harks back to earlier work where we noted that the great twentieth century philosopher of power, Adolf Hitler, expressly asserts this method as a principle of power in his Mein Kampf, and we are about to see the same principle being shown up for what it is in a famous novel. I acquired The Liars Tale : A History of Falsehood by Jeremy Campbell, 2001, sometime in the last year I would guess, but I had not found anything in it from previous perusals. Last night I glanced at chapter eighteen Language Made Me Do It, and found something of interest. The tone of this heading smacks of language as a force acting on individuals, which is very much to our liking, but as a historian Campbell is recounting the ideas of others rather than expounding ideas of his own. The relevant person here is Jacques Derrida, who led a movement based on the principle of arbitrariness in language that went by the typically disgusting philosophical term of deconstruction. It is all rubbish, but somehow these miscreants of reason manage to vomit forth the ultimate principles of reason in a haphazard and unidentified manner, so that we have deconstruction delivering the message that truth as well as falsehood are as dead as God, as extinct as humanism, as obsolete as the individual self. (p. 283 4) And then : all language is inherently untrustworthy, that it produces meaning rather than being produced by meaning, that it speaks us rather than we speaking it, not only absolving us from various kinds of plagiarism but also giving us the perfect alibi for mendacity : Language made me do it. (p. 284) We often love to assert that language owns us, we do not own language, because this is such an important principle arising from the revelation that human biological nature is corporate, so that the human animal is a superorganism, and the person does not exist. Here however we find the principle being extracted from the underlying logic of human biological corporate nature and used as an abstracted essence to help avoid discerning the truth of human nature, as usual. As ever then, the key to saying anything correct where our animal nature is conflated with the answer, is to ensure that the correct pivot of observation or interpretation, is used to deliver our reasoned conclusions, which means assuming that the human animal is a superorganism, not a person. Caught up in the sweeping refutation of all things relating to language quoted above, is the one thing we want to keep, so that, as the saying goes, this is

throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Such recklessness is no accident, it is another deliberate approach to knowledge control, where, if you can no longer resist, you attack, by taking up the arguments of your foe and magnifying them to absurd proportions, thus destroying them from within the confines of their own logic. This is undoubtedly the kind of mechanism that leads to the creation of taboos like that of the Hitler Taboo, which took a simple truth about the Jews being the master race and made it monstrous, thus ensuring that the truth would be made taboo and could pose no real threat to Jewish overlordship. If we make the shift to the true pivot of understanding human nature then we can make our ideas represent truth as it is in reality, as per the usual scientific method. So that language can deliver literal truth whereby reality, independent of human bias, is the authority determining the meaning of a symbolic, as in linguistic, representation. This of course is not the case ordinarily, and is not meant to be from a biological point of view, so that bias social authority means that humans are represented as persons, whereas the reality is that the human animal is a superorganism. Making reality as it is serve as the authority at the heart of social power ruling over us is however an ideal too far as things stand, though we might imagine that a science of the future could achieve this ultimate goal of human existence. Science is after all a young medium of cultural flux, and it may require the establishment of a uniform global society as per Jewish identity programming before this latent potential of absolute truth can emerge as a flux of human identity. Language then, generates meaning by starting from a bias focus of biological being, that is the physical reality of the social body within which language is produced. This natural product of language that we can call its meaning if we so wish, is in functional, in biological terms, it is the identity of the human animal which exists as a superorganism composed of individuals, who share the resultant identity through the subliminal process of accepting the linguistic meaning imbued into the language they speak. This meaning/identity being something over which people have no control whatsoever, not from the outset of our existence, nor at this time of great development and advancement in the form that language and its product takes. As things stand, because meaning has always been delivered in a form serving the biological function of human corporate nature, if we do wish to state the truth we must interpret the natural meaning of language that creates the human form. This, as we have often pointed out, must destroy that living form, and that is why the taboo against doing this is found to be so strong, as seen in this very work of Hoyles that we are examining in detail now, and seeking to interpret, where we see that as close as he comes to discerning the truth, he always shies well away from stating the absolute truth in a clear form. Whereby the sole requirement of linguistic forces biological function is maintained, that is falsity is preserved, the individual is allowed to retain their false status of being human in their own right, that is the core meaning of the language that animates us today. Chapter nineteen, A Certain Kind of Madness, has some passages that are also worth taking note of while we are here. It begins by saying that the Greek sophists said that presenting falsehood in the guise of truth, was a key to power (p. 285) Which instantly reminds us of all that we say about the manner in which the Jewish absolute theocracy has retained its power in the modern scientific age by subverting the key science of life, that was bursting forth and threatening to impact upon our knowledge of ourselves if it were allowed to exist in a true form. Hence Darwinism is the greatest science ever created, supposedly, precisely because it needs this extravagant accolade because it is not science at all, but rather the ultimate enemy of science, as in official science appearing in the guise of true science. Nice to know the old skills have not become entirely redundant eh ! Campbell then raises the spectre of Orwells 1984 to introduce the idea of the most awful regimes being defined by their having only one idea in view : to persist !! I want to

swear here, but I will keep it clean. What the hell does this cretin think religion is, what Judaism is, if it is not the personification of this idea of survival at all cost ? Crickey, is not the desire to survive, to persist at all cost, the very essence of Judaism, and is this not what Judaism has indeed achieved in grand style ? Orwells parable is about power. The ruling elite has one and only one goal : to stay on top. Ideology is a mere device, a rational underpinning to the desire to hold onto power. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were alike in using the philosophy of their regimes as a prop to the job security of the leaders. The point, for totalitarian systems, is to use the ruling doctrines to pre-empt the emergence of ideas that might destabilize the status quo. Power is able to create truth, as it creates a fictional past, by rewriting history. That is the function of Orwells Ministry of Truth, which exists to decide what is true and what is false. One person alone, by himself, is unequipped to do so. Like Wittgenstein, Orwellian society mistrusts the accuracy of personal memory. That makes it possible to play fast and loose with memory, hoodwink it with fake documents and consign the genuine ones to oblivion. In any case, the truth is always mediated through human consciousness, and the principles which determine human consciousness are quite other than truth. This is the pragmatic theory of truth taken to bizarre extremes. Big Brother, the omnipresent but unseen master of Oceania, sees to it that whatever serves his purposes and secures his total ascendancy is truth. It is one of the most characteristic and destructive developments of our own society, wrote Erich Fromm in an essay on Orwells novel, that man, becoming more and more of an instrument, transforms reality more and more into something relative to his own interests and functions. (Campbell, p. 286) We could say that what we have here is yet another term for the human superorganism to add to Hoyles Thing, as in Orwells Big Brother, and so the story of sociological organicism marches ever onward, never acknowledged for what it really, untouched by, and indeed untouchable for science, but ever present nonetheless Sunday, 06 October 2013 And, while our minds are on the subject, here is another alternative acknowledgment of the reality of the human superorganism, this time captured in a phrase rather than a name, that cropped up this afternoon as I read a bit more of Rothschild :

ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING

Without

many minds chipping away at the same problem, sustained technical progress is virtually impossible. A group solves a problem that would overwhelm a Newton or an Einstein. Through the medium of written symbols, our individual mental powers are melded into organized intelligence. The evolutionary advantage conferred upon humanity by the brains ability to read finds its ultimate expression in the problem-solving power of intelligent organizations. In short, our species has come to dominate the planet because a unique feature of our brains allows us to form intelligent organizations. Logically, if an organization can be said to have intelligence, then it ought to behave like an intelligent organism ; it ought to learn from experience. In the business world, an intelligent firm should show improving performance as it accumulates experience in producing its products. Just like Edward Tolmans mazerunning rats, intelligent firms ought to demonstrate clear learning curves.

(Bionomics, p. 165) The phrase we single out as being equivalent to Hoyles Thing, is Intelligent Organisation, because from this idea Rothschild identifies the corporate being coming into existence in the shape of a business corporation that has its roots in human biological corporate nature that makes humans linguistic, giving them a brain that allows them to form intelligent organisations. Though of course his representation of human nature and its implications is no more sane than the religious freaks representation of the same phenomenon in the being of God, whereby, in particular, we find him justifying this idea through the narrowly bizarre window of written communication. We can find his justification for this idiocy in his previous musing on the nature of human communication, where he takes a novel approach to the linguistic boundary separating humans from nature by narrowing it down to the production of a written form of communication. He does this because the idea of communication in animals had watered down the argument for human uniqueness fostered on the basis of speech alone ; although as we already show above courtesy of Butler, this illusion of uniqueness based upon linguistic communication had been rejected early within the modern era of scientific theorising. There is a sense in which the above provides a neat denial of the existence of the individual, where Rothschild indicates that any number of plodders working together on the creation of knowledge can do what not even the greatest intellectually empowered individuals could ever hope to achieve. His entanglement with this topic of knowledge creation conflated with the generation of corporate being, nicely equates to both Hoyles culminating ideas on the Thing being created by virtue of knowledges super individual longevity, and our idea of linguistic force creating superorganic form. Our Atheist Science mantra runs thus : linguistic force organises individuals via the projection of authority occurring in the form of a linguistic identity programme, that causes individuals to form a living superorganism. This linguistic identity programme is in essence knowledge, and here Rothschild speaks of individual mental power being melded into organised intelligence, which is as close to saying the same thing as we say, as we could ever hope to come. Obviously he does not admit the implication of reasoning in this way because he is part of the political order generating the linguistic identity programme as his role in the physiology of the superorganism. When he says the brains special attributes generate corporate forms, as in businesses, this only needs reformulating ever so slightly, in terms of what this special power is, and he would be saying that language generates corporate form, which is true. Monday, 07 October 2013 It may be that I am getting carried away with this hunt for pseudonyms for the real human being, as in the superorganism, but this mornings rooting about amongst my bookcase for redundant works has, to my attuned mind, thrown up another evocation of the corporate nature of our kind. The word here is Insect : I spoke earlier of insects. The word has not simply a pejorative meaning. Indeed we must admire the organizing ability of the ant, the bee, and the termite. The ant, writes Michelet, is openly and fervently republican. But is the ants republic the one we want ? In it, instead of free co-operation, there is established an automatic co-ordination between indistinguishable individuals, passively reacting to certain stimuli. The human race too is capable of practising (though so far less perfectly) this sort of solidarity. But it is endowed with a differential element, generally called psychological, whose scope modern science has limited without succeeding in eliminating it. From this element we derive our pride in our humanity,

and it is important to find out whether the pressure of numbers is going to lead us to get rid of it as a useless accessory, as an obstacle to a collective achievement which we would agree to regard as superior to our own development. The curse of a perfect organization is that it functions just as well (or even better) in a world devoid of all meaning. J. H. Fabre succeeded in making some processionary caterpillars go round in a circle for a week by placing the first caterpillar behind the last. It is frightening to read about this experiment. Are not we ourselves already close to repeating it ? Mankind in the second half of the twentieth century is made up of two groups of antsone group following the American ant, the other group following the Soviet antwhich will soon be going round in a vicious circle, since the Soviet ant has started following the American ant (unless the reverse is the case). One of these days we might find ourselves engaged despite ourselves in that terrifying metamorphosis which Kafka has described. His story tells of the transformation of a man into a centipede. At first the change is almost imperceptible : the man feels nothing but a slight stiffness in his hindquarters. But in the end the exman finds himself equipped with a considerable number of little waving legs which go in the direction they decide without consulting him. This theme must be characteristic of our times, since Ionesco has treated it again in Rhinoceros. This time the change is into a horned animal. But the metaphor does not matter. Let us simply note this fact : our poets, our visionaries, are haunted by the fear of a regressive evolution of mankind. I can easily imagine a reader of the year 2000 exhuming my book and saying : This is funny ! The author thought we were going to turn into insects ! Once he had been transformed, and also adjusted to this transformation, man would cease to be aware of it. Or else he would consider himself superior, on account of his better social organization, and be surprised to find his rise regarded as a fall. There, you may say, there is an irreducible difference of viewpoints. But it is the viewpoint of the man in question which matters. A slave who enjoys his slavery is not a slave. To accept this argument, one would have to be convinced first of all that the human insect will complete his metamorphosis. I refuse to believe that he will. He will struggle free at the last moment, like a man on the point of being caught by the frost. (Fabre-Luce, pp. 52 53.) This is from Men or Insects ? : A Study of Population Problems by Alfred FabreLuce, 1964, first published in French in 1962. This work can be related to our main focus of interest in Hoyle in a very specific manner, because the author here is driven by a particular concern about population growth, as was Hoyle. This work can also be linked to another item that has attracted our attention while examining Hoyle, as in Rosnays Macroscope, as this was also from a Frenchman. It seems that the French tradition of favouring a sociologically organicist outlook has been preserved, due to the literature taking this tack during the period when the idea of the social organism ruled forming part of their cultural heritage no doubt, and as such being more readily available to modern readers than it is to us comparatively deprived English speaking slaves of Judaism. I would say this is something to be jealous of except that from the very origins of sociological organicism traceable to SaintSimon and beyond, and onward to the likes of Rene Worms at the opposite end of this ideas existence, we have no genuine expression of the biological corporate nature of humans. Fabre-Luce is no exception as he seeks to assert the supremacy of self willed individuality set to triumph over the mindless enslavement of humanity to some ever present urge toward social coalescence in which the individual would become insect like, and nonexistent, a condition that we assert is the norm. We can easily see how this idea tallies perfectly with

Hoyles concern with the Thing that takes command of humanity and drives us toward global uniformity, like it or not. The other thing I like about the above passage is the mention of the slave who loves being a slave not being a slave, as this is a direct, though too stunted reference, to the exact condition that we assert makes the nonexistent individual the mindless slave of a greater being. Here the point put forward is that the conscious individual defines the true end of human nature by virtue of their consciousness, so that if they are enslaved to a condition they love, as in being a Christian enslaved to a false idea that makes them a slave of Judaism, then they cannot be a slave because they love their subjection, and slavery is the antithesis of pleasure. But we do not accept this utterly bias, self serving priestcraft. When talking of insects, and seeing the slave ant serving the slave maker ant, commentators freely call it a slave despite the obvious fact that the slave knows no better than to serve its master as if it were its own kind, and is therefore blissfully content in its ignorance of its true condition. Yet we are incapable of achieving this detachment concerning ourselves, unless that is, we are atheists who wish to understand the extreme vileness of religion, as we do. It is nonetheless a fact that our world, in its subjection to religion, is operated on the basis of this false premise of a slave who loves slavery not being slave, and this is so because it precisely expresses our biological corporate nature that makes us nonexistent beings, as nature has made it to work by making us want to be slaves. Somewhat like Douglas Adams pig in The Restaurant at the End of the Universe that had been bred to talk, and to want to be eaten, so that it could reassure diners that eating meat was OK. So many ways are open to us to wallow in a representation of our true nature, the only thing we are not allowed, is the actual truth ! Which is the only thing I damn well want !! Wednesday, 09 October 2013 Another reference to the slave condition of individuals came my way yesterday : As the Earl of Harrowby said on the same platform, The slave who does not feel his chains is indeed a slave. (Roads to Ruin, Turner, 1950, p. 72.) This remark was made at a meeting held in 1848 as part of the shorter hours campaign for shop workers. It seems that while agitation was afoot to improve working conditions the workers themselves were not terribly active in the movement, hence the above remark. From our point of view it offers another example of how this idea of unwittingness in the human condition often crops up, and how it is used to express the human condition, as here, and by ourselves, and how it is opposed by deceitful words asserting the supremacy of individual consciousness, as with Fabre-Luce. In the same vein as Harrowbys observation we denounce the devotee of religion as a slave despite the fact that they love their religion more than anything in existence, and we explain this condition on the basis that individuals do not exist other than as units of corporate being. We bother ourselves about this state of affairs because in order for the world to be populated by such slaves, we who are not slaves by virtue of an attachment to religion must be deprived of our freedom to know the truth about what we are, which requires ongoing abuse by our rulers, through warfare and the subversion of knowledge, hence the interminable war of religion against truth that is the central theme of our Atheist Science. 09/10/2013 10:59 The Over-Individual. And another invocation of the Thing pops into view, this time due to searching for a title in a book I was examining last night, which led me to search for work by Wilbur Urban, so now I am reading an essay entitled The Nature of the Community, published in The Philosophical Review, November 1919. This essay is worth

mentioning because Urban does deal with the organicist view of society, and offers some refutation of the outright rejections of this position that he identifies. But we will examine this no further as we just needed to record, in passing, this further example of a way of naming the Thing. We broke away from Campbell in order to consider alternative ways in which thinkers had portrayed human corporate nature in indirect forms, and we should now return to Campbell to conclude our discussion of his contribution, as the passage we take from his work on the nature of lying, is exquisite. It shows that Orwell wrote a brilliant satire on life as it really is, which again shows us this same phenomenon of approaching as close as possible to truth without speaking it, that we have just been concerned to highlight courtesy of Hoyles ideas on human subservience to a super-individual entity that he calls the Thing. And of course Campbell offers us the exact same example, for in this passage he follows the official formula making the bogey men of history the miscreants, implying that our world is mercifully free of this kind of oppression from within. Whereas nothing could be further from the truth, as religion, Judaism indeed, is clearly the template for all, and any such historical figureheads, that are used for the purpose of misdirecting our consciousness of reality away from this hidden bogey man within our social order. I have mentioned it before, but this is a good time to say it again. My atheist ideas culminating in the revelations of Atheist Science, revealing the absolute truth of human nature, are unlike anything that can be found in the public domain, yet, as much of my work demonstrates in its search for such ideas in the public forum, these ideas are constantly bubbling up from underneath in many different guises. It has been said to me before, that I ought to present my difficult ideas in satirical form, and here we get an indication of how such a presentation might look, in Orwells work. I cannot think like this however, it is not me, and by thinking about Orwell, whom I may of read when I was a teenager, or did I ? Was it Brave New World that I read ? Cant remember. Anyway, while the essence of reality is imparted by a satirical work, to those in the know, it misses the whole point of my reasoning, which is scientific in its nature and intended to make the real plainly visible. I love truth, I just want a science of humanity, that is all, screw the artful representations, that is dross to me when all is said and done, just more of the same old same old bullshit that is part of the religious deception reducing us to the status of insects, that I know we are, thanks to my own efforts, but which I for one would like not to be. And what a miserable stinking world we live in as a consequence of this blindness, who in their right mind would want to live in a world such as that which we live in ? It is, if we but open our eyes to its reality, horrific, when it could be wonderful if we just allowed ourselves to know the truth about out own nature. In a manner of speaking Hoyle is trying to get us to take up this position, but sadly he does not get to grips with the difficulties of the subject, so that in the end we get nowhere, which is what priestcraft always intends, as part of its effort to maintain the status quo : the survival of the master at all costs.

Page 93 Here he talks about the Thing imposing an alien identity upon us, which causes us to feel bad. But this idea is scarcely better than religions intuitive take on the same feeling which renders the Thing as God. He just does not get it. The subjection to the Thing is natural, and it is something we are evolved to need, which is why we have religion, which to most of us is the most precious thing in our lives, if we have it in our lives. So the fact that the imposition of alienation upon us does make us squirm, does not mean that we are not

meant to be imposed upon in this way. What he needs to do here is to think back a couple of pages to where he recognises that free coupling is a one-off affair, so that we love to be imprinted, but thereafter we want the imprinting to remain true, and it is this failure of modern imprinting that was being reworked, because the Christian slave identity of Judaism had been disturbed and needed reforming, which has now been done by introducing Islam to stabilise our enslavement to Judaism. So that the simplistic manner in which he understands these things is useless as a scientific explanation, except to such as ourselves who already know what all these things mean. Chapter 9 The Relationship of Individual and Community He treats us to a long account of how we are programmed into social conformity and the individual has no relative value against the collective. Walter Bagehots idea of any rules being better than none comes to mind here. Hoyle says that individuals have no right to oppose established norms, which justifies fascism through religious programming, as we have it. In early times the quantity of government is much more important than its quality. What you want is a comprehensive rule binding men together, making them do much the same things, telling them what to expect of each otherfashioning them alike, and keeping them so. What this rule is does not matter so much. A good rule is better than a bad one, but any rule is better than none (Physics and Politics, Bagehot, 1872, p. 25.) Reading this nugget of golden wisdom from Bagehot we can easily take it to mean that rules are needed in the same way that any constructive aspect of human endeavour is needed, conforming to the idea that we are responsible for the existence of these rules, that we create them, and we improve them, thus making society, and improving society. However, the reality is that these rules and the social form linked to them is created spontaneously as the behavioural expression of linguistic anatomy, just as a birds wings create the behaviour of flight extended into flight patterns, such as those of emigrating birds lasting over the generations. This reality is reflected in our talk of linguistic force projecting authority into interpersonal space thereby creating social space, which becomes established through the accumulation of a linguistic identity programme that carries Bagehots rules, that causes social form to come into existence as a living superorganism. ___ There are some excellent passages in this chapter : Pages 96 99. The object of the present discussion is not, however, to stress the relative quality of the notion of beauty, but to bring out the relative nature of nearly all our social conventions. Every community has its own rules of behavior. Perhaps it may sound a little cynical, but I suspect that if a particular action happens to fit in with the rules of our own community we describe it as a right, or a moral, or a just action ; and the other way round if the rules are violated : then we say that the action is wrong, unjust, or evil. This means that a moral code is something relative to the community in question. It also means that a discussion based on moral issues is scarcely likely to be

successful in settling an argument between different communities with different rules of behaviora conclusion amply borne out by the facts of history. These views are also supported by many current examples. It will be sufficient to consider a few of the more interesting illustrations. Patriotism is an obvious case of relativity of outlook : the Englishman fights for England because he feels that it is right for him to do so ; and the Russian fights for the U.S.S.R. on a like basis. The origin of such beliefs lies, of course, in social learning. Indeed if the Russian and the Englishman were called on to fight each other, each would seek to justify himself with precisely the claim that his own society possesses the virtues of goodness and that the opposing society was corrupt and evil. A demand for factual proof would in each case lead, not to proof, but to irritation. To me this shows Hoyle at his absolute best, here he freely expatiates in exactly the manner of my own mind, and in total disregard for social convention ; save for his being apologetic about his plain honesty. We can see how this accords with Bagehots sentiments expressed in a previous age, showing a continuing strain of free thinking in the English temperament, that I have riven through my own being, a cultural acquisition that is hopefully not entirely lost to our culture even yet, though I rarely see it truly displayed these days. What has never been asserted by anyone, save for myself, is the true meaning of these eternal features of human social life, verifying the nonexistence of the individual, whose sole function is to serve the superorganism they are part of, as proven by the veracity of these rare observations. Continuing to expatiate upon the vagaries of social custom we get this : On occasions this would seem to be understood by lawyers. Lawyers show notable insight in preferring to base practical justice on precedent, instead of trying to build a logical legal system. Justice requires offenses against certain canons of social behavior to be punished. Since the canons of behavior are often of a quite arbitrary character it is clear that no sound procedure other than precedent can be found. If it be asked why an offense against an arbitrary code of behavior should be punishable at all, the answer is that a community must organize itself on some set of rules, which however relative their character must be obeyed if a fair degree of harmony is to be achieved. It is immaterial whether a community chooses to drive its automobiles on the right or the left side of the highway, but it must choose one side or the other ! The essence of the matter is not which rules we adopt, but that having arrived at a particular set of rules we should stick to them in order that social cohesion be maintained. An individual who finds distasteful the rules of the community in which he happens to live should forthwith quit that community and seek some other where the rules are more to his liking. If he does not do so, and if he insists on breaking the rules that seem to him objectionable, then he will only have himself to blame if punishment ensues. His closing remarks are most aptly applied to myself, and needless to say I do not care for such rebukes, not from his pen nor from others who have made the same observation directly. I consider my authority to be above that of all others, or any number thereof, and this is precisely for the reasons Hoyle sets out here, that rules are arbitrary, and thus they must be fixed by whoever has power, and hence they must be despised by all right thinking people in a free society. Such views have led me to being an anarchist at heart, though knowing anarchy is unworkable I favour a moderated notion of such political ideas, I am indeed the ultimate individual and individualist, which is why I alone, having discovered the truth as to why freedom does not exist in our freedom loving society, say why : because there

is no such thing as an individual. Meanwhile we see that Hoyle denies the rights of individuals to exist as authorities in their own right, but he does so on the basis of their individuality ! How crazy is that. He does this by suggesting they take their individuality elsewhere, as if the urge to be an individual could be found satisfied in any human society, when his argument has just proven this can never be so. The only way for an individual to be free in society is for them to be fully accommodated to their social programming, a fact we see recognised by sociologists when they say that we are under an immense weight of oppression, which, like that of the atmosphere on our skin, we do not feel, unless, and until, we decide to push against it, which, in the case of social mores, I have always done, relentlessly. To avoid confusion I should just say regarding the above comments on my individualistic views, that this describes my natural outlook as I have known it from childhood onwards, which I carry within me still, even though I now know that these political ideals are illusions imprinted to my brain as part of my Jewish slave programming. So that my scientific ideas about my true nature and identity overrule these personal ideas that continue to inform my day by day attitude to life, overrule that is in terms of what I take to be the facts of who and what I am in reality. This is dualistic aspect of my self is reflected in parts of my argument that talk of unknowable knowledge, recognising that the truth of human biological corporate nature can never be known as publically acknowledged truth because that would negate the linguistic force that makes the human animal a superorganism, as it would make us true individuals, which is something that our somatic being does not have the capacity to be, anymore than a fish desiring to leave the water and strut about on land could do so without becoming something other than a fish. Can we evolve into actual individuals ? It does not look like it, I am sad to say. In the comments of Fabre-Luce declaring that our individuality can triumph over our impulse toward insect like lifestyles, we see this truth denied, but here we tell the truth as it is, once again showing that this knowledge is unknowable as public knowledge. My solution of this problem of being alienated within society has involved following the hippy dropout formula I learnt in the sixties and seventies, enabled by the benefits system which recent changes have finally completed the dismantling of, threatening to throw me into destitution, or at least forcing me to sell up and venture forth into the wide world, to find somewhere to curl up and die as comfortably as I may. So that dropout culture does allow one to be in society, but out of it at the same time, which amounts to what Hoyle recommends, but more subtly, and we might wonder how far it will be possible to extricate oneself from the oppressive aspect of society in the future as technological society becomes ever more possessive of each individual. Continuing his discussion of the relationship between the individual and the Thing, the community, or society that is, we find a naive expression of faith in science creeps into his argument as he discusses the : strength with which we hold the arbitrary conventions of our own group. In contrast the conventions of science and mathematics are adopted entirely without emotion ; they are viewed simply as conveniences that can be changed at any time. (p. 101) This is the supreme cultural mirage of what is called Western civilisation. We call this idea of detachment in science a cultural mirage because it projects a figment of collective consciousness reaching over the whole of our culture, to the extent of forming the very essence of all that our culture stands for. It is this supposed purity in the search for truth

that defines our society as free, exactly as we Atheist Scientists assert should indeed be the case, that free access to true knowledge of reality as it is, can be the only real basis of a true definition of freedom. This is so for the very reasons we have just been discussing courtesy of Hoyle, where he indicates that cultural ideas are nothing more than conventions which everyone takes to be true according to their own upbringing. Thus freedom means as many different things as their are religious beliefs, unless all religious beliefs are tolerated, then everyone is free, except atheists, this being the current delusion that informs our cultural dogma today. But the validity of this multicultural dogma of tolerance for all on a equal basis, clearly rests upon this initial principle of freedom for truth seekers whose ideas might oppose any, and all, religious ideas. And therein lies the reason why a means had to be found to subvert science by creating a false science backed by authority, which appears in the shape of Darwinism. And this, as we can see, Hoyle completely fails to comprehend, of even to suspect, apparently. Friday, 11 October 2013 The impending sense of doom I am feeling at the moment with my world being torn down by the politicians destruction of the benefits system that my whole life has depended upon, is making my current search for books to throw out start to fill my recycling bin, as I get ready for the inevitable move into the void. One book sat beside me is lined up to go but the above comment on Hoyles ignorance of the subversion of truth even in science, made me think of a note referring me to a passage in Bertrand Russell Speaks His Mind, 1960, which sets forth a transcript of a television series, the interviewer was Woodrow Wyatt, who was a Labour M. P. :

WYATT

You attach enormous importance to this question of the role of the individual. Why have you attached so much importance to it ?
RUSSELL

Because all the important human advances that we know of since historical times began have been due to individuals of whom the majority faced virulent public opposition.
WYATT

Do you think that fear of public opinion has stopped many people from doing good and sensible things ?
RUSSELL

Yes, it has a very profound effect, especially in times of excitement when theres a great deal of mass hysteria about. A great many people are terrified of going against mass hysteria with the result that bad things triumph where they shouldnt.
WYATT

Do you think that applies to scientists and artists ?

RUSSELL

Yes, I think so. I think scientists have the prerogative that they are sometimes able to prove that theyre right ; but artists cant prove that they are right. An artist can only hope that other people will think so ; so I think the artist is in a greater difficulty than the scientist. But the scientist in the modem world undoubtedly is in difficulty, because he may make discoveries that are inconvenient to the government and in that case hell get into trouble.
WYATT

Oh, do you think he couldnt get away with it in the Western world ?
RUSSELL

He might or might not. It would depend partly upon his eminence, partly upon the degree of proof that he had, and partly upon the degree of inconvenience that it would cause to the administration.
WYATT

Well, what about people who are in a sense thinkers and not strictly either artists or scientists devising practical things ?
RUSSELL

Well, of course that depends. A great many thinkers do take care not to express in any public way opinions which will bring them obloquy.
WYATT

What about people outside those categories ?

RUSSELL

Take a very notable case which happened in America after the First World War. There were two men, Sacco and Vanzetti, who were accused of murder. The evidence was quite inadequate, and after theyd been condemned a small body of people was appointed to look into the evidence. Among them was the President of Harvard and he and the others judged that the men were guilty and they were executed. I think everybody who looked into the evidence at all impartially thought that it was not such as should have lead to a condemnation.
WYATT

Even the President of Harvard, you mean, knew that they were not guilty ?
RUSSELL

I think he must have known. I cannot say, because I cannot read his soul. But I think he must have known.

WYATT

And it was only public opinion ?

RUSSELL

Yes.
WYATT

Now we are getting very close to this whole topic of the amount of liberty that the individual ought to sacrifice in order to have an orderly society. What do you say about that ?
RUSSELL

Well, I do think that the preservation of social order is essential. You must have, if you can, a world in which people dont steal, in which they dont kill each other, and so forth, and to some degree you secure that internally by means of the police, I think those sorts of limitations on liberty are quite necessary, especially in a very crowded community. Take, for example, the rule of the road. When I was young there were no motorcars about ; you could drive about as you liked ; you didnt have to bother. Now there is a very elaborate code which you have to obey and if you do not, it will cause a great deal of trouble both to yourself and other people. That is because there is more crowding in the world in general, and I think certain national liberties which in the past were immensely valued have become harmful, just as it would be if you had no rule of the road.
WYATT

Do you think any new limitations on liberty are needed ?

RUSSELL

Yes, certainly. Limitations on national liberty are needed and there are some things that are absurd. The arguments that socialists used in favour of nationalizing natural resources have now become arguments in favour of internationalizing natural resources. The most obvious example is oil. Its a little absurd that a very small territory which happens to have a great deal of oil on its territory should be the sole possessor of that oil.
WYATT

Do you think liberties need expanding ?

RUSSELL

Well, liberties need enlarging in a mental sphere and, if anything, diminishing in what I call the possessive sphere. (pp. 134 137.)

This is quite a nice discussion that relates to our present thoughts on Hoyle very well. Russell talks about famous people giving opinions that shy away from speaking the truth when it involves treading where serious trouble awaits, and that is exactly what we are in effect providing an example of with our examination of Hoyles ideas on the nature of human society as a Thing. Russell casts the menacing ogre in the abstract form of public opinion, which invokes the attitude of individuals, amassed into the shape of a crowd mentality, even though he goes on to talk about the clash between scientific knowledge and political power. So there is a lot more to be said about what is really behind these social dynamics serving to control the flow of knowledge. The above is not exactly dealing with our concerns, when Russell throws in a so called example of the lack of freedom of expression it is a very poor one for our purposes, it being of a highly mundane nature more akin to corruption in political office than the sweeping phenomenon of social oppression acting across all society at a subliminal level, making the elite the masters over a slave biomass, which is the kind of broad sweep we would want any philosopher of worth to be revealing. And again, when dealing with the massively important philosophical question of individual versus state, Russell plumps for a totally pathetic level of meaning concerning menial aspects of social level dynamics, when he should of grappled with the essence of the subject impacting upon the freedom to have true knowledge of reality, which we do not have in this society because the human animal is a superorganism and individuals do not exist as ends in themselves. This is why I was happy to put this book in the bin ! Russell, he is a pathetic hero, all show and no substance as a radical philosopher, an atheist philosopher indeed, no, he is a rat in disguise ; hardly surprising given as toddler he had his photo taken sitting on Queen Victorias lap ! You do not get anymore establishment that Russell. In short then, Russells political drivel entirely vindicates Hoyles philosophical duplicity, as both these men, operating as priests at about the same time, are taking the part of front men for freedom, who are really acting as deceivers pretending to deal with freedom as something they cherish and fight for, while in reality they are a crucial element by means of which freedom is denied in a covert absolute theocracy such as ours, because they are Gatekeepers for the theocracy, suppressing a search for truth by imitating such a search. As I have often described before, my encounters with young scientists have shown me that they are, if anything, more fanatically emotional about Darwinism than any religious freaks are about their belief in God. The case of Edward Wilson upon his publication of Sociobiology in 1975, provides an infamous example of the way in which so called scientists act emotionally in an extreme manner, when science approaches the taboo against revealing human biological nature. All of which shows that, in keeping with the idea that there is no such thing as an individual, scientists are religious priests in another guise, exactly as the social structure of absolute theocracy intends them to be. Hoyles allusion to science being above the usual politicking is so matter-of-fact that it only becomes of significance because we home in on it as being of importance, the discussion proceeds on its merry way to delve further into the social nature of humans which says the individual does not exist. Thus he gives some consideration to the deep-seated manner in which we experience an overwhelming desire to be thought well of by our fellow creatures. (p. 102), which chimes with Russells ideas quoted just now : the driving force comes not from outside but from within. Nor does it seem that our desire for the approval of our fellows, our desire to fit in, is a learned response. We have apparently to do with a wired-in property of the brain. It is on this basis that all

social behaviourism seems to be built ; it is indeed this wired-in property that has made Man into a social animal. (p. 102) What do we make of this then ? Hoyle used the contrasting ideas of wired and learnt behaviour when talking about the brain, as we saw above, but it follows that anything wiredin is by definition genetically determined. Which means that he is saying that we are made into social animals by our genes, a simple, irrefutable truth, that is not stated simply here, and which I have never seen stated anywhere, by anyone, ever. Saying this is the ultimate sin in our absolute Jewish theocracy. Which explains why Hoyle does not say this directly, and why he contradicts this idea constantly, and never follows up on the logic of this idea, which can only mean that the human animal is a superorganism and the individual does not exist as, that is to say, does not constitute, an animal. Hoyle goes to the trouble of describing how a person made to feel outcast in their own society might go to the extreme of relocating to another society and reintegrating themselves in order to feel at home somewhere. My notes, dated 26/8/13, mention the tragic case of a fourteen years old girl who hung herself a fortnight previously after suffering bullying on Ask.com, which really tells us just how intense the urge to be accepted can be. An interesting aside on this question can be raised by discussing this tragedy in this context of personal nonexistence, because while we wince at the tragedy of a person who reacts like this to social pressure, what really throws most of us is the motivation of the people who psychopathically encourage such reactions. Being this cruel is extremely commonplace, hence bullying is universal, and the interesting thing is that while we can readily think of our social needs as explaining the tragic urge to destroy oneself when under pressure from others, we never hear the negative behaviour that causes this reaction being described as equally a product of our social nature. But that is exactly what it is, and the reason we do not hear it described as social, but rather psychopathic, has to do with the presentation of behaviour at the cultural level that constitutes part of the mores of our society, that are arbitrarily constructed over time by the priests that rule us by means of these mores, always in conformity to the Jewish slave identity, hence the moral overtones always titrated out into good and evil partitions. Further on, under page 141, we discuss the work of Simmel dealing with the idea of conflict as a positive aspect of social life. 11/10/2013 18:16 Here is something unusual that is worth recording in relation to our interest in the science of human nature as it is understood to be superorganic. This is taken from an article called Here I Go, Here I Go, Here I Go ! on Methodological Collectivism and the 1994 World Cup, by Martin Tyrrell, published in Philosophy Now, Issue 11, Winter 1994/95 : Several commentators on nationalism, have likened it to religion for, like religion, it is full of priests and prophets ; shrines and sacraments ; hymns and prayers ; saints and sinners. And, like all the best deities, the nation proper, when it is not being anthropomorphised into John Bulls, Uncle Sams and Mariannes, is conveniently abstract. Though nations are everywhere in the news, in history books they are also nowhere. No-one has ever seen a nation and no-one would even be too sure what to look out for. As Walter Bagehot said, we know what a nation is except when somebody asks us. The best any of his twentieth century successors have come up with is that the nation is an imagined community. Aside from times of war or international trade negotiations, it is in things like football that the nation is at its most imaginable. . . . .

A few years ago, Margaret Thatcher told a generation raised on sociology that there was no such thing as Society, only individuals. In some quarters, the reaction was a little like that of children indignant on learning the truth about Father Christmas, but it was also close to that of Tories impatient on hearing the truth about nations. For, if truth be told, the nation is no more real than society. Society is just Sixties-speak for nation and both are about as real as the Easter Bunny. The reality or otherwise of conceptions like nation and society is what motivates the debate between methodological individualists and methodological collectivists in the social sciences. For collectivists, entities like nations, classes and genders (sic) have, in some sense, a real existence over and above the lives and minds of the individuals who comprise them. For individualists, however, no social scientific explanation can legitimately appeal to entities above and beyond individuals simply because there are no such entities. To a methodological individualist, a collective category is merely a term of convenience for a lot of individuals, it is neither supra-individual nor qualitatively distinct from its membership. No whole is ever more than the sum of its parts and there is no collectivism that cannot ultimately be reduced to anthropomorphism. To understand a football team, whatever name its called (Sweden, Arsenal, A bunch of prats) entails studying its individual players and the way in which they co-ordinate their individual performances to produce an effective division of labour. The name in itself explains nothing, even if it is the name of a political unit. Names like Brazil or Argentina applied to football teams falsely imply some kind of transhistorical continuity. Take Italy. The Italian team that played so well in the World Cups of the 1930s and the one that played with no small amount of mediocrity just before I sat down to write are two entirely different teams. Deep down, surely even the sports commentator reminding us that Italy is playing as well as it did in those halcyon days of Mussolini and the corporate state must know that this is so. There is no overlap of personnel between Italy now and Italy then ; pace the television soap opera Santa Barbara, the part of Italy is now being played by completely different footballers compared with the 1930s and, in about twelve years time, they will all be different again. The 1994 Italian World Cup squad merely occupies the same space as its 1934 counterpart. They do not even wear the same kind of clothes and the style of play has also changed. True, both sides represent Italy, but what is Italy ? Italy the people is no more constant than Italy the football team and the same is true of Italy the political unit. Italy, whether it is invading Ethiopia or singing some embarrassing song on Eurovision is, in the end, individual people performing individual acts. Though this years final was between Italy and Brazil, it was not, as many commentators insisted on saying, a rematch of the 1970 final. Any continuity between the two teams of then and the two teams of now is purely nominal ; any rivalry, purely superstitious. If four musicians decided to call themselves The Beatles and released an album under that name, they would be sued in every court in the Western world, clear proof that music brings out an appreciation of philosophical niceties not known in sport. All of this is the kind of talk no collectivist likes to hear but it is also talk to which no collectivist has much of an answer. In principle, all that is required is to show conclusively that the differences between collectives and individuals are not just a matter of numbers ; that the collective is a thing in its own right, over and above its members ; a thing in itself. In practice, however, it is unlikely that a proof of this kind will ever be had. No methodology suggests itself whereby we might access this strange, supra-individual concept and study it in the abstract. In the end, collectivists,

like individualists, study groups in the same way, with reference to some sample of the individuals that comprise them. However researchers might style themselves methodological individualists or collectivists all social scientific research adopts a methodology that is implicitly individualistic. To learn about any collective a nation, a political party, a football team we must first learn about its individual members, gradually building up some impression of the overall group through the accumulation of lots of data on an adequate number of individuals. An opinion survey, for example, works by putting an identical question to a large number of people and then summing the responses to find out which kinds of response predominate. The same is true of semi-structured interviews or even television vox pops for, in the end, these are really just small scale opinion surveys. The wholes that emerge from this kind of research are, quite literally, the sum of their parts. That is all they are and all theyll ever be. Faced with all this, year after year, century after century, academic seminar after academic seminar, the collectivists have gotten more and more modest in their claims until they are scarcely collectivists at all. Those glory, glory days of Collectivism United are over. The scarves sag, the whistles wheeze, one last outsize banana droops. Its all gone very quiet over there ! (pp. 44 46.) Cor! how annoying, I wish I had replied to this back when I bought the magazine from my local newsagent. Trouble is this item was published five years before I had my revelation opening the vista of truth telling me the reality that there is no such thing as an individual person, because the human animal is a superorganism. Never mind, they do say it is never too late, so here goes. First off this magazine is an incredibly politically correct organ of a deeply conservative mouthpiece, as in Cambridge University, of the absolute Jewish theocracy ruling our society with an iron fist, so that finding a piece of ultra rightwing religious trashreasoning like this within it, is not at all surprising. Our interest lies in the chosen subject, which sets out to directly refute, in totally uncompromising terms, the hard scientific facts of the reality of human biological nature. This directness is a rare thing indeed, and as such of immense interest to us atheist scientists. Notice that the single most infamous remark of that singularly evil bitch, Thatcher, asserting that there is no such thing as society, is defended with the sublime arrogance of one who knows he is speaking to the devout, and need face no criticism. But, we may plough on in order to sample a rare expansion of this facile travesty of reason and truth. The most eye-catching declaration is this statement : No whole is ever more than the sum of its parts and there is no collectivism that cannot ultimately be reduced to anthropomorphism. That wholes consisting of parts existing for the sake of the whole, by definition constitute more than the sum of the parts is axiomatic, to say other wise is to use words as if they were more real than reality. Obviously this is what fascism does as a matter of course, and it is what the power of speech evolved to enable, in order to allow linguistic force to project authority into social space in the form of a linguistic identity programme, that organises individuals into forming a living animal about which they have no knowledge of its true nature, or their own nature relative to it. Which means that fascism is the natural human condition, which no one could ever possibly doubt. This blunt, arrogant remark, is the individual in action as a functional unit that nature made them to be, in that Tyrrell is simply stating that reality is as it is taken to be, which is

how we are supposed to take life to be at all times, as given by the social authority controlling knowledge. Science looks beyond appearances however, and when applied to humans it does not take all that is seen as given, but as in all other cases, science wants to know what lies behind appearances. Tyrrells observation that all wholes can only ever be the sum of their parts and no more, regarding humans, takes the human form at face value, as a given. But humans have qualities that show that the individual is evolved to combine with other individuals to form an organised biomass, as in the power of speech, which in turn produces behaviours like football that display the true nature of the individual as a unit of corporate being. So that football is an organised behaviour created by linguistic force, a manifestation of social structure that constitutes superorganic anatomy belonging to the human animal, not the individual. Football is a feature of the human animal that is not found in the individual, for if it were then football would found in all human populations ever to of existed. Tyrrell puts the cart before the horse, inverting reality by adopting a false pivot of observation, which method of knowledge creation uses the power of language to create reality, exactly as language is supposed to do. And being published places this false knowledge in a powerful setting where the inversion of reality displays the manner in which false knowledge is made better than truth, through the power of social authority that it creates as the core of superorganic being. When he says that any pretence toward sociological organicism is anthropomorphic, what he means is that such ideas invariably portray the collective being as if it were a person in its own right. Which is true, but that is because any such votaries of true ideas are always priests serving the absolute theocracy by taking the role of antagonistic thinker, which allows Tyrrell to attack them in this way, as per usual with the gatekeepers who provide false science and ideology that always conforms to the requirements of the one authority, somewhat as Russells remarks indicate above, once we have drawn out their deeper meaning. He tells us that understanding a football team entails studying its individual players and the way in which they co-ordinate their individual performances to produce an effective division of labour. Boy, what to say to this ? It is too pathetic to waste effort on, I mean why a football team, who cares ? But, in principle, the scientific refutation of this unsubstantiated claim would be to point out that all football teams can be understood down to their minutest details merely by knowing any one football team, because all conform to a fixed pattern, because each is a whole in which the individuals composing it have no existence in their own right, as demonstrated by his own argument, which he merely chooses to invert the meaning of. If individual failed to conform to the needs of the whole football being they would be ejected from the team, if they insisted upon using a cricket bat to play the ball for example, proving that the football-being exists independently of any individuals who play football. This fools argument reminds me of the conversation I had a couple of Christmases ago with a conspiracy theorist who blithely inverted every statement I made with total disregard for reason, relying on the fact that our personal authority was equal, and there was nothing to stop him saying whatever he liked. Thus when I said there is no such thing as a brick existing as an end in itself because the house was the end for which the bricks it was composed of existed, he replied that there is no such thing as a house, only the individual bricks existed as ends in themselves. There is a lesson in such debates, as unpleasant as they are to experience, as they bring out the true nature of language as a force that possesses individuals, and creates authority by unifying them under a common identity-idea, which shows that individuals do not exist as ends in themselves. Tyrrell is exploiting this power of linguistic force here, and we are told :

Martin Tyrrell has a PhD in social psychology and currently works in applied mathematics. And nothing can be more antagonistic to a science of human nature than psychology, which is the science of the individual seen as an end in themselves. So his professional status makes perfect sense, indicating that he is acting under the auspices of a corrupt science to tout his garbage ideas, utterly unjustified, merely blurted out. He concludes that individualism has triumphed and its opponents have been silenced, and he is dead right there. But that is because there is no such thing as an individual and the core of power in society is religion, which has been preserved as all opposing ideas have been erased from society, not, as he implies, because the freely engaged argument has been won in an open and honest contest, nothing could be further from this. So what we have here is a boastful triumph of fascism over freedom, cast in terms of a refutation of sociological organicism. Saturday, 12 October 2013 Reviewing my commentary the next day, I think we might just deal with Tyrrells assertion that nations do not exist by stating what nations are as natural entities expressing human biological nature. Firstly, nations are known to us as political entities, social structures with very precise, definite physical attributes, that come into existence as part of a natural social process generated by linguistic force acting over thousands of years, as per our principle that linguistic force creates all social form. The attributes of nations are defined by law, indicating that nations are highly sophisticated products of linguistic force, a natural force that creates all social structure as part of the anatomy of the living human animal. As we have noted here and there, the nation is the elemental, or segmental unit, of the Jewish superorganism. From the development of the basic unit of superorganic being in the legally constructed form of a nation, the basis is laid for the growth of the Jewish superorganism as a global entity formed of such units, like a house built of bricks shaped for the purpose. And with the establishment of Israel last century we see the essence of this linguistic process personified, for it is by turning the entire surface of the planet into a patchwork of nation states that the scene was set to establish, out of thin air, or hot air, we might say, the nation state of Israel. This being the key piece within the global system of nation states. So, in short, the nation is a segmental unit of a global human anatomy, its attributes are clear, they are physical, we know exactly what to look for when seeking to identify a state, and it is as material and real as any artifact created by linguistic force through agency of human somatic form. The nation state is of course a biological phenomenon created by nature, and as such it is both as real and as unreal as any living entity. We take the meaning of unreal from Tyrrells use of the idea, to mean that a nation is like any living thing in only being real when it is extant, or alive, for that would seem to be what he means by virtue of his idea of the nonexistent nature of a nation due to its lack of temporally fixed attributes. It is interesting that the enemy of true science uses the exact same principle of a denial of existence as genuine science finds itself obliged to use when countering established false knowledge masquerading as science, only where science applies its logic to the individual, the priest applies it to the human animal, as in the corporate being composed of individuals. This is reminiscent of so much priestcraft that works by simply inverting reality, as when Christians make death the beginning of life, or the threat of taking people away from Christianity is treated as the theft of their soul, as in the identity of the individual, when this snatching of the soul is exactly what the Jewish slave identity has done in the first place !

His discussion of Italy as being no more than the individuals it is composed of is interesting for the relevance it has to an aspect of life that is so important to me in my world, due to the way I perceive my English society to be dying as it is being transformed into an Islamic religious state, imperceptibly enough for no one to notice the loss of their English soul until it is too late, which, although we are at an early stage, it already is, because the structure leading to this horrendous outcome is firmly established and has nothing to counter its end result. Which is in fact a very precise example of the Thing driving us toward a global outcome that we can do nothing about, taken from real life, happening now, that is the central idea in Hoyles Man and Materialism. I always say you cannot be English and Muslim, that the presence of millions of Muslims who are English represents the death of Englishness. Only this week we had the appearance on Newsnight of the English Defence League leader Tommy Robinson, this name being an alias he uses, following his resignation from the organisation that he founded, because the EDL had become infested with too many rightwing fanatics. Jeremy Paxman asked him if you could be English and Muslim and he said yes, you can be. So much for this organisation as a defence of Englishness ! But the man is a Christian, he is a typical product of the Jewish slave identity implant that creates antisemitism and which created the Jewish safety mechanism of Nazism. The man is no intellectual, and he has no real idea what he is talking about, he is merely displaying the programming that has been written to his brain. Although, saying that, I was impressed by his considerable knowledge of the enemy, as in Islam, showing that he has great familiarity with his subject, which is of course the tragedy our Englishness today. Who wants to know about such a vile culture as Islam, or to find themselves having to know who the political exponents of this disgusting culture in our country are ? The real question here is all about the identity programme written to a persons brain. When Tyrrell denounces the idea of Italy as nonexistent because it is a figment of the imagination, he serves Judaism well, naturally, otherwise he would not have a public voice. But ideas like this are impossible to argue against unless you have a model of human collective being to refer to, and Tyrrell points out that there is no such model, which is true, thanks to Hitler, aided by many other people working within the universities of the world to destroy this genuine knowledge of human biological nature. In the future Englishness will be defined by being Muslim, as surely as national identity in the Middle East slave nations of Judaism is today, so my idea that you cannot be English and Muslim will be turned on its head, making me wrong and Tyrrell right. This is undeniable. Such transformations are the stuff of human history. But I value the qualities of Englishness that it has been my privilege to grow up with, which are the same ephemeral cultural qualities of intellectual freedom vested in the individual that we might associate with ancient Greece, short lived, but ever so precious. And I assert that these qualities of freedom of thought based on the independent authority of reality and the independence of the individual, are the hallmark of Englishness, and that if we become Muslim then Englishness will no longer exist, only the name will survive as a skin occupied by a parasitic body, that of the Jews in Islamic form. Naturally we could not expect a working class Tommy Robinson to come out with such sophisticated ideas about what the struggle he is engaged in is all about. So the argument Tyrrell puts forward on the most contrived basis of selected, superficial interpretations, is shown to be false on the wider, more sophisticated basis of understanding what humans really are, rather than trying to refute his argument on his own terms. Yes corporate entities are composed of individuals whose constitution can change over time, causing the corporate form to alter beyond all recognition. But this does not prove that all corporate bodies are none existent, so the only real entity remaining is the individual,

this is working backwards toward absurdity. The true direction of understanding is that which works from the lesser corporate body to the greater, so that recognising that the nation does not exist in any ultimate sense does not mean falling back upon the person as the ultimate end of human existence, for the substance of their identity is even more of a mirage than that of a nation. Rather it means moving on to that body which exists beyond the nation, and that is the actual living superorganism, which is composed of nations in the same way that nations are composed of individuals. This truth is what all intellectuals are dead set on resisting of course, even men like Hoyle, who only pretended to reveal this truth, having obeyed the sanction against tempting obloquy that Russell identifies, and that Russell obeyed himself. And because these leaders of freethought in the end conform to the taboo against freedom of expression, the field is left wide-open for lesser individuals like Tyrrell to spout off arrogantly as we see above, about how the true voices of science have been expunged from existence. And that is why we live in a slave society today that is doomed to lose the true meaning of Englishness, and to give way to the vile nature of Jewish slavedom, as typified by Islam today. Sunday, 13 October 2013 Robinson just appeared on the BBC 1 religious propaganda slot Sunday Morning Live, where he displayed a considerable knowledge of his subject, as in Islam as an enemy of English society. The poor bastard lives in Luton which has a population of 30,000 Muslims ! What a nightmare, I wince whenever I see a Muslim in my little English town, and it is a rare sight, mercifully. He is a lot more tolerant of them than I am, but he and I are very different kinds of people, he calls himself a voice of the working-class, I call myself an atheist philosopher. They had a git appear via video from Demos, Jamie Bartlett, who said surveys showed that the vast majority of people think Muslims are an extremely important part of our society who are most welcome here. Sadly this could well be true, and there could be no greater proof than this mass acquiescence to Islam that individuals are slaves of Judaism and not individuals in their own right, for this view of Islam is a travesty making individuals servile contributors to the destruction of our own precious freedom loving culture. But this is what we must expect to be seen on the ground when an identity is undergoing the misery of being eaten from the inside out, in the manner indicated in Tyrrells discussion of the nonexistence of nation states and other such illusions of corporate being. Robinson described how a Muslim approached him in the street during the making of a documentary and then, wrapping his arms around himself, said that Islam was like an anaconda that was going to squeeze this country. This is exactly the meaning of what was said to me in London in the seventies when some young people I now take to of been Muslims, told me that my society was decadent. These aliens are speaking the truth in terms of the decay of our Jewish slave identity and the cure lying in the ingress of Islam, and while the likes of Robinson know it, and squeal in agony, we remain powerless against the force of human biological corporate nature driving the domination of Islam as the slave identity of Judaism, toward global domination. Having taken so much of Tyrrells article we should mention the final paragraph that has no great substance for our purposes, but allows the author to be fully represented. His triumphalism in denouncing collectivists I would imagine is inspired by the death of socialism engineered under Thatcher, with the crushing of the unions and the end of Labour as a socialist party. Plus the global communist enterprise was on the wane by this time. But what this outcome really signifies is the plan written into the Jewish identity which always ensured that socialism was an ephemeral political strategy acting as a mechanism for readjusting the absolute authority of religion to the radically new physical conditions of industrialisation. So that the return to a conservative order identical to that which has existed for millennia was always guaranteed, which is why we now find ourselves in every personal

sense, as backward today as any culture on earth has ever been. We have acquired all the advantages of immense knowledge, empowering our physical being without impacting upon our mental condition as individuals, one jot. So that we are still as able to be religious, as ever we were. This result does not arise from our needs as individuals, but from the needs of Jewish master identity, which is the engine delivering the linguistic force of human biological corporate nature that drives all humans to form one superorganism, that Hoyle recognises as the Thing. There was an unpleasant case in the news this week of a Muslim family murdered in Birmingham, it sounds as if the house was set alight in a racist attack. The father, a doctor, was working in a hospital in Northern Ireland, and he was shown on TV saying all kinds of insane things inspired expressing his deeply primitive Islamic religion, as he sat there looking like he had just been dragged out of a tent in Afghanistan, from the garb he was wearing. It was disgusting to see a man who is a doctor in our society presenting himself as so primitive and ignorant, and his two dead sons were shown in their Islamic slave garb, and described as devout slaves of Islamic obscenity. So there we have it, we have all the benefits of knowledge, without any of the intelligence that you would think was a necessary corollary of its command. As Hoyle noted, these primitives take our gifts of power while dismissing our values, what he did not say is that thereafter we let them smother us in our own land and replace our values from within, as we have empowered them to take over the machinery of social power created under the auspices of our freedom loving society. This take over from within is enabled by the presence of Judaism acting as the universal factor operating in all societies, expressed in the power of linguistic force that makes laws guaranteeing this end result on the back of the horror of war and Nazism. This is how insect like we individuals are, and Islam is undoubtedly the most perfect way to nurture this insectivorous mentality while preserving the valuable traits of intelligence suited to insect activities, which is just what the slave maker rulers require of their hosts. This is why the Englishness that I have known is being eaten out from within, leaving the territorially defined identity of Englishness to be transformed into something else, albeit something it has been before, as a refreshed slave identity of Judaism. In the reconstituting of Englishness for Judaism then, not only is the new localised identity of true Englishness consumed by Islam, but the decayed slave identity of Christianity is cropped, and allowed to thrive again on the back of the Islamic infusion. 12/10/2013 12:42 Here is a remarkable find : Discovering the Truth within falsehood : the non-reductive atheism of Ludwig Feuerbach, by Colin M. Harper, published in Philosophy Now, Issue 17, Spring 1997, from which we extract the following fabulous pieces : Copernicus had demonstrated that whilst it appears that the Sun revolves around the Earth, the reality is in fact the opposite ; the Earth revolves around the Sun. Immanuel Kant had argued that although it appears that in knowing an object our concepts are formed by that object, the reverse is in fact true ; namely, that the objects conform to our concepts, our minds actively giving form to the world of our experience. In The Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach argues that religion reveals the true essence of human beings, but in an alienated form as the abstraction of the highest qualities of human nature : God. Feuerbach sought to correct an inversion in theology which was similar to that corrected by Copernicus in astronomy : Feuerbach insisted that God does not create man, rather man creates God. This is Feuerbachs Copernican Revolution in which what had previously been thought to be the case is shown to be the direct opposite of the true reality.

The first, positive, part of The Essence of Christianity consists of a demonstration that aspects of religion correspond to certain ineradicable features in the nature of human beings. The second part is a critical examination of those aspects of religion which are perversions or pure illusion. The first section seeks to articulate the true nature of religion as a veiled anthropology ; the second seeks to discredit theology as the ideology of religion, as attempting to justify insupportable claims on the basis of a misunderstanding of the nature of religion. Feuerbach argues that the divine essence and the human essence are really identical ; religion creates a split within human beings and the highest qualities of human nature are projected into an imaginary realm and onto an imaginary being supposed to exist apart from man. For Feuerbach, the absolute Being, the God of man, is his own nature and the riches which properly belong to it are squandered in being attributed to an imaginary other. (Harper, p. 28) This is the best approximation to my Atheist Science philosophy I have ever seen, as with the previous article from Philosophy Now. Although I bought them years before I twigged to the true biological nature of humans and hence our superorganic animal status, I must of perused the articles, but without having anymore insight into their significance than anyone else would of had without the benefit of this scientific revelation. I became aware of Feuerbach as an early nineteenth century atheist philosophy of great note over a decade ago, whereupon I bought a copy of his Essence, but I never found anything of any worth in it, and no wonder from Harpers description of the manner of dealing with the problem of linguistically inverted reality. But with the benefit of this description we find that Feuerbach did actually detect the true scientific essence of religion, only failing in the development of a true scientific anthropology based upon the understanding that humans are superorganisms, not persons, wherein the nub of his reasoning about inverted meaning should of led him to a consideration of language and its product, as in knowledge, and therefore religion, as a biological attribute of human life. So that the inversion of reality is a linguistic process whereby individuals are enfolded into the corporate being of the living human animal, where inverted reality, as in religion, is what language actually exists to deliver to individuals to give them a common identity within the being of the superorganism they belong to. I am intrigued to see the comment on Kant having dealt with the question of what language produces in terms of knowledge of reality, or otherwise, I do have Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics but I have never found anything useful in it, so where does reference apply to ? In the above passage we find our key principle of alternative pivots of observation contrasting the individual versus the superorganism as absolute alternative realities, from which to understand all things in terms of human existence, that we always explain in terms of the alternative pivots of geocentric versus heliocentric models of the universe as the prior equivalent modes of deception versus truth, being expressly employed to illustrate the true nature of religion relative to a proper understanding of what religion is, and what humans are, which justifies the reputation of Feuerbach as a great atheist philosopher, of sorts. The idea presented here of what is universally accepted as true being the inverse of reality, immediately links to what we have seen in Tyrrells argument above, which seeks to reinstate the commonly accepted view that we have seen Feuerbachs ideas refuted. This really shows how two foci of observation of reality from which to make interpretations delivering knowledge representing reality as it is, can operate antagonistically in the

production of social authority based on what passes for knowledge of reality. Harper indicates that Feuerbach is looking at the super individual qualities of humans as that which religion relates to, as being the really existing attributes of human beings, so that the divine essence and the human essence are really identical. This is excruciatingly good because it in effect says that the human animal perceived as a superorganism is what the name God refers to. Except it does not say this at all. It says this to us because we know this to be true, but it is not what Feuerbach says, or what Harper has him say. As ever, we get so close to the Thing, but we never actually get there, so that it always remains possible for the priests to recover the situation, as we see from Tyrrells piece. But how exquisite is this discussion of Feuerbach ? Too good for words ! The title suggesting that a true representation of reality lies within any well established falsehood, is a perfect invocation of central idea of Atheist Science in that it indicates that language creates a living form that is real, by creating an image to take shape in a form that individuals can relate to, which can then be interpreted by a sufficiently sophisticated analysis to reveal what the true form lying behind the linguistic image really is. Feuerbach says the true form is humanity itself, he even reaches for the idea that we dismiss in this work, concerning the idea that the human species is a whole entity akin to a being, which comes close to recognising the true form, which is the superorganic being of the real human animal. The last two paragraphs of the above quote warrant closer examination, as the last one invokes Hoyles Thing when it talks about the projection of ideas onto an imaginary being detached from humans. And this line about God being man in his own nature is superbly phrased, in that we only need a slight adjustment to get it right : God is the name we unwittingly give to the superorganism by virtue of our linguistic identity programming, that causes us to create this being in the name of Judaism. But the previous paragraph describing a dual dimension to Feuerbachs argument reveals the usual flaw, that of reasoning from the false pivot of individuality, which clearly is the root of Feuerbachs reasoning. Hence he adopts the usual Jewish idea of malignity in normal human affairs. That there is a misunderstanding of the nature of religion is too true, but Feuerbachs argument does nothing to dispel that misunderstanding or to provide anything like its true counterpart. And as a result we close with this idea of squandering the real bounty of our human nature by making it appear to be something sublime tragically invested in an alien being, where that sublimity is actually our very own nature. No, not true, just the usual priestly bullshit playing to the bias of egotistical self glorification, as Hoyle has it. Yet, I would like to think that if we could live with a true understanding of our biological corporate nature, then this global world empowered by modern science might indeed be able to live up to this ideal of Feuerbachs, albeit he did not correctly identify its true nature. This is a snippet from Feuerbach : Man has his highest being, his God, in himself ; not in himself as an individual, but in his essential nature, his species. (George Eliot, Bullett, 1947, p. 236.) I love this line, it comes very close to invoking Hoyles Thing, and our Atheist Science idea that the human animal is a superorganism, so that the individual does not exist, which is to say, they are not an animal in their own right. Copernicus could claim scientific knowledge as the basis for the distinction between the appearances of the movements of the Sun and planets in relation to one another

and the reality of that movement, but there is no equivalent in theology. We have no knowledge of God beyond his appearance or the supposed revelation of his essence. (Harper, p. 29) This statement is of course not true, cannot be true, for the whole point is that we prove God does not exist by showing what God is. That Harper could make such an elementary error right in the midst of describing how Feuerbach showed what God is, tells us just how far away from any remotely valid sense in which this goal was reached by Feuerbach, on the basis of Harpers understanding of him at least. What did Harper think it meant to say that God was an image of human nature ? He appears to think this meant nothing beyond the image itself as a religious statement, so that he does not infer from this observation a deeper significance that relates scientific knowledge of humans to the religious misrepresentation Feuerbach asserts. In other words he fails to think that there is a biological human nature, even though it is impossible for any species to exist without a biological nature defined by its mode of existence. On the face of it this is a most peculiar degree of obtuseness, showing a determination to remain blind to anything beyond the fiction created by words at all cost, something which is certainly borne out by the way Harper concludes his article. But it is the official scientific position that humans do not have a biological nature, because the person is the animal and they vary too much, as do their cultures, so Harper is only being a good little robot like all other intellectuals.

For Feuerbach, religion has its origin in the nature of human beings as species-beings. By this he means that human beings are not just conscious of themselves, they are also conscious of being members of a species, of belonging to a universal group. Human individuals are finite as individuals, but infinite as members of the human species as a whole. For example, the mortality of the individual is matched by the immortality of the species. The perfections which really belong to man as a self-conscious member of the human species are treated in religion as if they belonged to another being rather than man. This misattribution enriches God and impoverishes man in direct proportion. The more perfect God is seen to be, the more imperfect man appears ; the more loving, holy and good we consider God, the more selfish, sinful and bad man looks by contrast. This is, however, a false contrast. Religion in general sees God as being wholly other than man, whereas in fact the human essence and the divine essence are the same. The supposed omnipotence of God, for example, actually refers to the power of the human species as a whole which greatly transcends the power of any given individual human being. What is impossible for one person, is possible for all. Although he had many criticisms of Hegel, Feuerbach was developing further a tradition to which Hegel belonged. Hegels religious thought is in some respects the philosophical expression of certain currents within Christian mysticism. In this tradition the distinction between the human and divine was not seen as absolute ; there was not thought to be an unbridgeable gulf between man and God. Hegel understood human history as the return of God to himself, but with a full self-consciousness which he didnt possess in the beginning. For Hegel, it is God who alienates Himself in nature and returns to Himself through human beings. History is the story of the self-overcoming of the alienation of God ; God is the true actor in history, man the means of his action. For Hegel, God is real and human beings are comparatively unreal ; God is the substance and human beings are a property of that substance.

Human beings are dependent on a more ultimate reality as the appearance of that reality in the finite world. They are part of and inseparable from that divine reality. (Harper, pp. 29 30) Bearing in mind our previous fascination with names or phrases equating to Hoyles Thing, we can see that Feuerbachs Species Beings provides us with a nice example from the early days of the modern era of sociological organicism. And of course this passage perfectly demonstrates how the name God equates to the superorganism, which is t he first idea to pop into my head all those years ago when the idea that the human animal is a superorganism hit me. However, Harpers explanation of the insight this carries tells us that all of Feuerbachs ideas are limited to what people are conscious of, even though the entire impetus of his reasoning relies upon a sense of subliminal information directing human consciousness ! Which is therefore the exact opposite of consciousness, except for the sense in which the linguistic image of human nature projected onto a fictitious being is what people are consciously aware of. Which suggests the idea of the gatekeeper that we keep going on about, as a person who fills consciousness with ideas that make truth unavailable to consciousness, by filling the space where a particular idea might go if consciousness were allowed to follow its natural course unimpeded and without misdirection. So that despite its implicit relevance to the ideas he espouses, Feuerbachs ideas never invoke the idea of a subliminal message arising from this illusory object, which tells us that he was always intent on portraying this object as a pure fiction, not a reality misconceived, exactly as we have just seen Harper indicates he was intent upon. So we can see that as wonderful as all this reasoning is for our Atheist Science purposes, it is all done firmly within the parameters of religious requirements, simply by adhering to the strict principle of the false pivot of observation resting upon the individual as the human being. We should note that this misdirection of consciousness is what language exists to create, and as such the creation of false mages of human superorganic nature is not misdirection at all, it is exactly what language is evolved to do. It is why religion thrives still, despite science, such as it is, and almost certainly will survive and rule over us for as long as our species persists. We have been put in mind of the origins of linguistic force arising in the anatomy of speech consisting of the neurological machinery generating what is called universal grammar, that forces people to speak as an expression of their biological corporate nature, projecting linguistic force into social space, a social space that is created by the same act of projection, through the delivery of a linguistic identity programme arising out of this linguistic behaviour. This linguistic form accumulates into an ever burgeoning social structure over an extended period of time, which constitutes the superorganism that we are finding has a myriad of names, all false, exactly as they should be according to the dictates of our biological linguistic nature. We raise this idea below by way of Lotzes ideas on the manner in which language evolves, which helps us fill out our ideas on the way linguistic force generates knowledge to act as a programme organising individuals into forming social structure. And of course all the bold claims that we make about the rise of Judaism as a master race and Nazism as a defence mechanism of Judaism, rest upon this idea of linguistic force generating these outcomes, these social forms arising at the behest of human mental anatomy. And that is where Lotzes sweet little hint as to the manner in which knowledge is accreted just as language is accreted, by way of its spontaneous use filtered through the living biomass of people acting as a selection sieve for ideas, which become fixed thereby, as they accumulate into a culture, a process that gives shape and direction to what actual ideas take on a solid form and deliver what we experience as society and history.

It is not wonderful that the tendency to simplification of accidence should be widely prevalent. Indeed, on a superficial view, we might naturally wonder that this tendency is not more conspicuously operative than is in fact the case. For even ones mother tongue obviously must require to be learnt ; and nobody learns his mother tongue so perfectly as never to make any grammatical mistake. In a language with a great variety of conjugations and declensions, mistakes of grammar mostly consist in assimilating the inflexion of the less common words to the more familiar types. We might therefore expect that, between forgetfulness and the instinct for consistency, the rarer conjugations and declensions would always rapidly drop out of use, and that all inflexional languages would in a few generations approach perceptibly nearer to the ideal state in which the same grammatical relation should always be denoted by the same change in the form of a word. But in all matters of language the influence of tradition is extremely powerful. The mistakes or intentional innovations in grammar made by individuals are for the most part condemned by the community at large, and only few of them come to affect the general language. Probably most English children have sometimes said mouses or speaked, but these regularized forms do not appear in the speech of even illiterate adults. So the tendency to grammatical simplification in languages is usually slow in its working, unless it happens to be stimulated by some special cause. (The Making of English, Bradley, 1904, pp. 18 19.) What we have here is a nice summary of how linguistic force creates the orderly complexity of language as we know it, quite without any intention derived from individuals acting in the process. Thus the process of language creation controls individuals, not the other way around. And the point we are seeking to make above, courtesy of Lotze, is that the exact same case applies in relation to knowledge as an naturally accumulated product of language, so that knowledge is in effect a figurative mode of language. Which explains why abstract forms of knowledge arise and dominate our world, as in religions, which determine the artful form of our institutions, institutions which are always identical, in all societies, everywhere, in all times, in their general, functional form, only varying, exactly as language itself does, in their abstract specifics. Having safely misdirected us onto the image of the species rather than the human animal correctly perceived as the superorganism, Feuerbach is free to expound upon the true nature of the superorganism compared to individuals in such a way that he rightly compares false religion to a true anthropology, but, as we say, this is all done in a securely false manner by ensuring that from the outset the false pivot of individuality acts as the point of interpretation. And we can see that this is precisely how the immensely powerful Jewish identity programme will of been fabricated by those who created it unwittingly simply by acting as units of a generational flow of linguistic force. Which in turn tells us that all people who offer a public commentary today are adding to that effort, unwittingly filtering the linguistic flux and accumulating only that which serves Judaism by becoming fixed as knowledge, whoever they are, be they Feuerbach, Harper, Hitler or Hoyle. The idea of omnipotence applying to God, which really belongs to the species, is very close to a true sociological statement, only requiring that the superorganism be identified as the true human being, not the abstract species, which is not a whole being in any sense of the word, anymore than any other species is a whole being. This definition of wholeness is actually pretty nasty for it sneaks past our interrogating minds because it has a vague sense of validity, until we finally find ourselves getting a firm grip upon it almost by chance, as when we bother to note that a species is not a being, for if it were this would apply to any species,

which obviously has the sneaky value of dismissing the actual biological nature of humans as a species, which is corporate, and causes the individual to be nonexistent. But even as this deception is infused into the text, we find a true sociologically organicist sentiment inserted with the observation that the attribute of omnipotence applies to the being that is identified with God, which is a quality that applies to no individuals, as Hoyle noted when he said what many can achieve no Einstein could, and what Tyrrell denied throughout his fascist religious diatribe in philosophical guise. The paragraph on Hegel is largely nothing, but it concludes thus : For Hegel, God is real and human beings are comparatively unreal ; God is the substance and human beings are a property of that substance. Human beings are dependent on a more ultimate reality as the appearance of that reality in the finite world. They are part of and inseparable from that divine reality. which, if we substitute superorganism for God and living being for substance, gives us this : For Hegel, the Superorganism is real and human beings are comparatively unreal ; the Superorganism is the living being and human beings are a property of that living being. Human beings are dependent on a more ultimate reality as the appearance of that reality in the finite world. They are part of and inseparable from that Superorganic reality. And we could scarcely improve upon this as a scientific statement, though it could do with being expressed more neatly. So when he says that humans are dependent on a more ultimate reality as the appearance of that reality in the finite world , I take it he means that our existence as physical beings in the ordinary world of experience makes us dependant upon the only thing that is truly real, the superorganism, because we are finite relative to this being that we are therefore part of. Which sentiments are very nice and expressed more powerfully than we ever manage to achieve by sticking to our strictly scientific take on these matters. Religion is not something which can be, or should be, simply outgrown. Philosophers who say that it is conceive history in terms of the highly dubious metaphor of the development of an individual human being from infancy through childhood to adulthood. At the same time they speak of religion as if it were as transhistorical, uniform and ubiquitous an evil as the devil was previously thought to be. Religion is treated as if it were a bogeyman from the nights of the childhood of the human race which still haunts us. When a theory of religion as immaturity addresses the question of the origin of religion at all, it is often implied that religion is an attempt by certain individuals to cunningly deceive others with illusions. This is a wholly inadequate account and also incompatible with seeing it as the natural perspective of a child. Such atheism fails to discriminate between different religions, the development of religious ideas, their complex interlocking histories and their social origins and background. Religion as it exists as the object of such atheistic attack is itself an illusory object of criticism ; such thinking deals in abstractions as great as those against which it directs its futile attacks and it remains simply the mirror image of religion conceived in the terms of penny catechisms. The philosophical criticism of religious ideas has not, and will never, of itself lead to the demise of religion. The bald exhortation to Just Say No to the opium of the people

has proved to be as ineffective against religion as similar campaigns against more mundane intoxications. The atheism of Karl Marx was heavily influenced by that of Feuerbach, but Marx saw more clearly that religion is an expression of the alienations of human life, not their cause. For Marx, the scientific view was precisely that which understood the nature and genesis of religion, not merely the view that competed with religious views. For Marx, the end of religion could therefore only come about through the overthrow of the social conditions which foster religion. Religions do not simply provide alternative accounts of the world which rival some purported scientific account ; they dont just consist of claims about what the world is, but also of claims about how the world could and ought to be. Thus Marx insisted that religion is both the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion has at least as much to do with what is not the case as with what is. To see it as no more than an explanatory theory to be discarded when it is thought to no longer fit the facts misses the point, just as much as seeing belief in Santa Claus as simply an attempt at a rational theory of where the presents on Christmas morning come from. (Harper, pp. 30 31) Here we find Harper displaying his priestly attributes as a defender of religion in an unabashed manner, and in the process we get an allusion to sociological organicism which delivers the usual admonition not to go there. He is right to say that religion is not a failure of humans to advance, because humans as he understands them to be never advance, since they do not exist. The likes of Dawkins and the New Atheist cohort who make the kind of criticisms Harper rightly rebukes are Gatekeepers of religion providing this kind of false criticisms, which then exist for the likes of Harper to attack in a valid manner, just as we noted Tyrrell was able to do courtesy of the knowledge Gatekeepers. Harpers attack on such atheism rightly says it is a mirror image of the religion it derides, but he does not understand the nature of this reflection, rooted in these two alternative views of religion both using the same false pivot of observation, the individual, because of course he uses the same false pivot himself ! The stuff about Marxs take on religion is not to our taste but we should take it because it carries a weak expression of the true idea that religion is not a means of representing the truth, which religious apologists of all kinds invariably say it is, which Harper is trying to make out that this is a flaw reserved for atheists ! As scientists we accept that religion is part of the human animals behavioural complex and hence we are not inclined to impose value judgements as part of our scientific analysis of religions existence or function, so we would never think in terms of what conditions would see the back of this vile feature of our kind. But as an imaginary exercise that we wish were a possibility we might agree that religion can only vanish if social conditions alter in a suitable manner, which would have to involve the rise of science as a way of knowing reality, that would be a complete departure from how science is defined now, under the regulation of an absolute theocracy. As ever where political power is concerned, we require the ruling power to give up its power in order for things to change, and this they never do. The divine has increasingly acquired a human face ; to the point where in Christianity it was thought to have acquired not only a human form, but a human body and the title Son of Man. No doubt if fish had gods, then these gods would have fins and gills and, as Rupert Brooke put it, in that heaven of all their wish, there would be no more land, say fish. The point however is that fish dont have gods. The existence of the religious illusion, the non-existence of our gods, indicates our uniqueness, not our

typicality ; it denotes our difference from other animal species, not our identity with them. (Harper, p. 31.) This closing thought is worth taking because it offers a view on what the existence of false knowledge is all about, and makes the assumption that it defines our uniqueness amongst animals. Whereas we would assert the exact opposite because, as Harper himself has shown by way of Feuerbach, these ideas are all reflections of falsity that do nothing more than invert falsity without altering it. False knowledge arises from the adoption of a false pivot of observation from which to weave all our ideas about reality, and the only way to avoid this falsity is to adopt a true pivot of observation. Once we do this, by beginning from the assumption that the human animal is a superorganism, we are able to understand that it is the existence of religion as the personification of human biological corporate nature, using language to create a false image for us to attach to as individuals, that we understand that The existence of the religious illusion, the non-existence of our gods, indicates our animality in common with all other creatures, our typicality as creatures subject to the life force of information that creates all living form, including that of our social life. To transpose his conclusion into a true statement, the existence of religion : denotes our identity with other animal species, not our difference from them. The existence of religion is the proof that we individuals do not exist, that the human animal is a superorganism, which once again makes the absolute truth a total inversion of all that passes for truth in the public domain. At a more fundamental level the existence of language is equally a proof of the same thing, but religion is the product of language that we see and experience, that can only be accounted for by understanding that language can only be an attribute of a superorganism. Colin Harper, we are told, teaches political philosophy in the University of Ulster at Jordanstown. ___ Tuesday, 15 October 2013 Here we have H. G. Wells and others, invoking ideas equating to Hoyles Thing :

THE PRESENT PHASE OF HUMAN ASSOCIATION

7 The Possibility of One Collective Human Mind and Will The progressive development of human inventions, the onset of power production and the present rapidly extending and unifying economic organization of mankind, are subjects that cannot be properly dealt with in a general review of Life ; they belong in part to general history and in part to descriptive economics. But here we may say a few words upon the subject of the development of that conscious unification of the human species which is now going on very rapidly. And again we face something quite unparalleled elsewhere in the entire realm of biology.

Other species of animal seem to have an individual conscious existence limited strictly to their individual experiences, but with the dawn of tradition the human mind began to extend itself in time and space beyond the individual range. The difference between the human mind and the mind of a chimpanzee is infinitely greater than the difference of the bodies or brains of the two ; it is as different as a bird is from a snake ; it moves in more dimensions. At present a human mind, fully developed by education and inquiry, reaches so far and so wide that individual experience is a mere point of departure for its tremendous ramifications. What it has of its very own is altogether dwarfed by what it has in common with other individuals of the species. Just so far as a human mind is well informed and soundly instructed, so far is it able to understand, that is to say to identify itself with, other well-informed and soundly instructed minds. By means of books, pictures, museums and the like, the species builds up the apparatus of a super-human memory. Imaginatively the individual now links himself with and secures the use of this continually increasing and continually more systematic and accessible super-memory. The human mind neither begins nor ends therefore with the abruptness of an animal mind. As it grows up, it takes to itself more or less completely the growing mental life of the race, adds a personal interpretation to it, gives it substance and application, and in due course fades out as an individuality, while continuing in its consequences as a contribution to the undying flood. From the point of view of the species, the consciousnesses of men are passing trains of thought and impulse. They are now as much part of a larger life as the perception of the sunlight on this sheet of paper and of the singing of a bird outside are parts of the life of the writer of this sentence. They are material and enrichment. It is not a metaphor, not an analogy ; it is a statement of fact that this larger comprehensive life is going on. In this work we have traced a long process of synthesis from the single cell to the multicellular organism and from the clenterate to the clomate. We have seen the interdependence of individuals in space increase with the development of colonial and gregarious forms and of individuals in time with the growing care and intimacy of parent for young. The higher forms of interdependence have involved great extensions of mental correlation. We have shown how human social economy is based almost entirely upon the mental modifications of the individual and how little it owes to instinct. This mental modification is steadily in the direction of the subordination of egotism and the suppression of extremes of uncorrelated individual activity. An inflation of the persona has gone on, so that the individual has become tribal, patriotic, loyal, or devotee. Homo sapiens accommodates this persona, by which he conducts his individual life, to wider and wider conceptions. The more intelligent and comprehensive mans picture of the universe has become, the more intolerable has become his concentration upon the individual life with its inevitable final rejection. No animal, it would seem, realizes death. Man does. He knows that before his individuality lies the probability of senility and the certainty of death. He has found two alternative lines of accommodation. The first is a belief in personal immortality, in the unendingness of his conscious self. After this life, we are told, comes the resurrectionand all necessary rejuvenescence. This idea is the essential consolation of several of the great religions of the world. We have already discussed its credibility. The second line of accommodation is the realization of his participation in a greater being with which he identifies himself. He escapes from his ego by this merger, and acquires an impersonal immortality in the association ; his identity dissolving into the greater identity. This is the essence of much religious mysticism,

and it is remarkable how closely the biological analysis of individuality brings us to the mystics. The individual, according to this second line of thought, saves himself by losing himself. But in the mystical teaching he loses himself in the Deity, and in the scientific interpretation of life he forgets himself as Tom, Dick, or Harry, and discovers himself as Man. The Buddhist treatment of the same necessity is to teach that the individual life is a painful delusion from which men escape by the conquest of individual desire. Western Mystic and Eastern Sage find a strong effect of endorsement in modern science and in the everyday teaching of practical morality. Both teach that self must be subordinated ; that self is a method and not an end. We have already, if this account of mental processes is sound, the gradual appearance of what we may call synthetic super-minds in the species Homo sapiens, into which individual consciousnesses tend to merge themselves. These superindividual organizations have taken the form of creeds, communities, cultures, churches, states, classes, and suchlike accumulations of mentality. They have grown and interacted in the history of the species very like the complexes of an individual human mind. They seem to have now under current conditions a ruling disposition to coalesce. They seem to be heading towards an ultimate unification into a collective human organism, whose knowledge and memory will be all science and all history, which will synthesize the pervading will to live and reproduce into a collective purpose of continuation and growth. Upon that creative organization of thought and will the continuing succession of conscious individual lives, drawing upon and adding to its resources, will go on. At the end of our vista of the progressive mental development of mankind stands the promise of Man, consciously controlling his own destinies and the destinies of all life upon this planet. But note these words we are using, seem and promise. This is no assured destiny for our kind. The great imperfect conflicting collectivities of to-day, swiftly as they have developed and wonderful as they are in comparison with all other animal life, may never become a unity. Man may prove unable to rid himself of the overdevelopment of war ; he may be hindered too long by the dull, the egoistic and the unimaginative, by the stupid, timid, and tradition-swayed majority, ever to achieve an effective unity. The dead weight of inferior population may overpower the constructive few. Or the incalculable run of climatic changes may turn harshly against him. Strange epidemics may arise too swift and deadly for his still very imperfect medical science to save him from extirpation. There is no certain assurance that rats and mice, dogs gone wild again, prowling cats, flies, and a multitudinous vermin may not presently bolt, hide, and swarm amidst the decaying ruins of his cities. Shoals of fish may dart in the shadowy encrusted wreckage of his last lost ships. We have no assurance that so Homo sapiens may not end. But such an end is hard to believe possible. (The Science of Life, by H. G. Wells, Julian Huxley & G. P. Wells, 1931, pp. 877 8) Wells opens this topic of human superorganic nature with fine sentiments, but politically attuned details. So that he talks about human unification being consciously driven, which obviously does not accord with Hoyles idea of the Thing. And he compounds this egregious adherence to political correctness over truth by saying that social unification in humans is like nothing else known in nature, despite already having tackled the question of how cellular life became complex ! Which is self evidently exactly the same basic life process of transmission of information. As he tackles the distinctiveness of the human mind

however Wells et al. do head in a similar direction to Hoyle in there idea of a mind accumulating over time to become a kind of super individual body of knowledge of all kinds. I feel like speaking only of Wells when commenting on this piece, I find it hard to think of his son and Huxley as the authors writing this passage, even though their names are equally identified with this very large book. Anyway, where they say the individual is able to benefit from the expanded mental accumulation, the inclination is to read individuality into this, but then we have a nice passage evoking the true nonexistent nature of individuals as humans beings, for of this personal experience they say it in due course fades out as an individuality, while continuing in its consequences as a contribution to the undying flood. The flood being that accumulation which carries humanity along and gave Hoyle his sense of knowledge as a burgeoning form, having an existence of its own that becomes the Thing. They have a neat way of identifying what we would straightforwardly call the nonexistence of the individual : From the point of view of the species, the consciousnesses of men are passing trains of thought and impulse. This does not dismiss the existence of individuals, it simply puts them in their proper place, giving them their true status as elementary features of a greater being. Where they talk about mental modification taking the place of instinct in human life, we need to extract the significance of this observation that we would express in terms of a linguistic identity programming individuals to form a human animal as a superorganism. These authors reason in this direction by talking about the suppression of the ego, as in the individual, and the inflation of the persona, which must equate to the unification of individuals into the common mindset under discussion. However they refrain from treating this outcome as an expression of human biological corporate nature which treats the human animal as a superorganism. Instead they make out that this loss of individuality is about some cockeyed enhancement of the individual through their access to the empowering persona of extended mental being. Making their ideas typical stuff in this regard, as in always falling back upon the individual as the only truly existing entity. That self is a method and not an end veers toward our constant assertion that individuals are not ends in themselves, but we are treated to this idea only after a presentation of the individual as the end of human existence that has devised religion to compensate for the awareness of personal death, which pains them so much. This is appalling stuff, most disgusting. So, as we found with Hoyle, these great priests of religion acting the part of freethinker, mix and match opposites to speak well of the sociological organicism which constitutes a true science of human nature, while always concluding with a rigidly religious idea of the individual as the human animal, having to put up with all these unaccountable facets of their existence. Continuing the disgusting theme we find a sermon-like drivel about a unifying consciousness in which all will be united arising for the first time out of nowhere, in a typical piece of nasty priestcraft. The truth being that Judaism is the beneficiary of this process which has been going on for as long as our species has existed, and which goes on remorselessly right now, acting on us. Hate it, resist it, but we cannot change it, just as Hoyle indicates. It is a very Wellsian conclusion, and as such full of the purposefulness of independent individuals of high intellectual calibre, that he, along with many of the literati of his era, so much believed in. Men Like Gods, 1923, is a prospect for the future playing out such a theme.

Wednesday, 16 October 2013 We are not going to get into this text to any extent, but I have just picked from a shelf Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War by W. Trotter, 1922, first published 1916, from which I would like to take the following as an example of evolutionary thinking applied to humans as a piece of sociological organicism : From the biological standpoint the probability of gregariousness being a primitive and fundamental quality in man seems to be considerable. As already pointed out, like the other great enlargement of the biological unit, but in a much more easily recognizable degree, it would appear to have the effect of enlarging the advantages of variation. Varieties not immediately favourable, varieties departing widely from the standard, varieties even unfavourable to the individual may be supposed to be given by it a chance of survival. Now the course of the development of man seems to present many features incompatible with its having proceeded amongst isolated individuals exposed to the unmodified action of natural selection. Changes so serious as the assumption of the upright posture, the reduction in the jaw and its musculature, the reduction in the acuity of smell and hearing, demand, if the species is to survive, either a delicacy of adjustment with the compensatingly developing intelligence so minute as to be almost inconceivable, or the existence of some kind of protective enclosure, however imperfect, in which the varying individuals were sheltered from the direct influence of natural selection. The existence of such a mechanism would compensate losses of physical strength in the individual by the greatly increased strength of the larger unit, of the unit, that is to say, upon which natural selection still acts unmodified. A realization, therefore, of this function of gregariousness relieves us from the necessity of supposing that the double variations of diminishing physical and increasing mental capacity always occurred pari passu. The case for the primitiveness of the social habit would seem to be still further strengthened by a consideration of such widely aberrant developments as speech and the aesthetic activities, but a discussion of them here would involve an unnecessary indulgence of biological speculation. (Trotter, pp. 22 23.) This is the most remarkable passage I have ever come across within the field of discussions about humans from a naturalistic point of view, as the above passage takes the most simple view of the human condition to assert that the human animal is a superorganism. Which, unfortunately, culminates in this obscurely presented statement : some kind of protective enclosure indicating that which Hoyle calls the Thing and we call a Superorganism, that the people of Trotters day will of been fully familiar with as the Social Organism. Sadly his reasoning is based upon the false science of natural selection as the driving force of evolution acting on the individual, so that he still manages to make the loss of individuality all about the development of the individual, even as he provides the most perfect logical statement on the reality that the human animal is a superorganism and the individual does not exist. This of course is why in the end his manner of expressing these ideas is obscure, and fails to be explicit in the way we wish it had been. Which goes to show how freedom in scientific thought never existed, and why in the end this well known truth about the corporate nature of humans was bound to erupt in the political form we call Nazism, which made this genuine scientific knowledge taboo in our time.

This passage takes a unique approach to human sociality in its attempt to make it arise from primitive biological origins, which is indeed the only possible scientific approach. It is delightful the way Trotter makes sense of the degraded attributes of individuals by relating their acquisition to a simultaneous acquisition of social attributes, causing individuals to form an ever more powerful social unit compensating for the loss of individual physical strength and sensual acuity, that most creatures are obliged to rely on for their survival. It is a pity that having broached the subject of language he decides it is too much to offer any thoughts on the nature of this physiological acquisition in relation to the ideas he presents here. For a modern attempt to reason about human nature that closely matches the general run of Trotters reasoning in its attempt to link modern social life with our earliest evolutionary history, we have the following : How did a diminutive ape with constrained mobility on the ground and no natural defensive weapons, but with a relatively large brain (slightly bigger on average then modern chimpanzees), manipulative hands, and an omnivorous digestive system, solve the problem of shifting to a terrestrial habitat, broadening its resource base, and, over time, greatly expanding its range ? Social organization group living was one key factor. In a patchy but relatively abundant woodland environment that was also replete with predators, competitors, and sometimes hostile groups of conspecifics, group foraging and collective defense/offense was the most costeffective strategy. There were immediate payoffs (synergies) for collective action that did not have to await the plodding pace of natural selection. (A number of theorists over the years have endorsed the group-defense model, including George Schaller, Alexander Kortlandt, John Pfeiffer, Richard Alexander, and others.) However, it is also likely that the earliest of these proto-hominid pioneers stayed close to the safety of the trees ; early australopithecines apparently had very powerful arm muscles (Wolpoff compares them to modern steel-workers), perhaps to compensate for the reduction of climbing ability with their hind limbs and feet. Note that the group-defense scenario does not assume male provisioning, monogamy, or other more radical innovations. It assumes only that the synergies derived from acting collectively foraging and reproducing as a group were both immediate and mutually beneficial. Moreover, the odds of survival were greatly enhanced. There may well have been group selection, but it was not based on altruism. It involved what the economists call collective goods, or public goods. And because these groups were formed around a nucleus of closely related males, individual selection, kin selection, and group selection would have been aligned and mutually reinforcing just as Darwin had supposed. Indeed, this anomalous form of social organization may have been a crucial pre-adaptation. (Natures Magic, Corning, 2003, p. 204.) Obviously the manner of expressing the importance of evolving into a superorganism is gross and disgusting to us real scientists of human nature, and we can see how this misrepresentation of these ideas has changed from the simple sincerity badly cramped by social pressure in Trotters time, to the all out convoluted mashing of reason opening the twenty first centurys excuse for scientific reasoning on human nature. He talks about this animal solving the problem of becoming human, and the social solution being one key factor, where as it is the entirety of the issue, because what we are talking about is the evolution of a mammalian superorganism, not a super-animal in individual form. And of course we see the old trash reasoning that treats social form as a tool serving individuals, so

that he speaks of super genetic evolution delivering rapid rewards that lesser animals have to wait aeons for under the flow of genetic information. It is all too bad, this is what has become of the anthropology that was so exquisite two centuries ago, but could not be allowed to persist. See how the man strains to make his naturalistic reasoning defend religion by advantages being made open to individual appreciation in real time, as in social goods, long before humans even came into existence ! So we have this talk of immediate and mutually beneficial acquisitions being due to social life. It is all such crap. That this rubbish serves religion will of course not be known to the author, who will, like any insect-like social being, think he is doing what is right, offering the best of ideas with sincerity, as Benn puts it. Trotter provides an account of exactly the same phenomenon that is vastly superior to this drivel, as he talks about the dissolution of individuality contained within a greater being, which neatly describes the way evolution allowed all the features of human somatic form to dissolve into a social space that constituted the human animal on a higher level, or synergy, to use this twat Cornings pet term. Thursday, 05 December 2013 Just putting the bibliography together and I no longer have Cornings book, it must of been consigned to the bin during the recent clearout which saw a couple of hundred books banished, the effect of this run through my library is evident in the works examined in this book, originally intended to be all about Hoyle and his Thing. The next section in Trotters book, following that taken above, is called Mental Characteristics of the Gregarious Animal, and it begins with an overview of contemporary ideas employing the sociologically organicist outlook, where we find an interesting remark concerning the impossibility of giving a complete review of this subject, which indicates the extent of interest in sociological organicism in his day, and the fact that a detailed examination would not be worthwhile because most writers have not seen in the idea anything to justify a fundamental examination of it. (p. 23) If we relate these remarks to those we saw in Tyrrells essay above, commenting on the total invalidity of collective ideas of human nature, which had consequently fallen out of favour, we can relate this to our own observations on how this process of knowledge transformation is the way superorganic physiology has erased science from society in order that we could remain enslaved to Judaism, because the human animal is a superorganism. Tyrrells presentation of current knowledge being superior to the formerly dominant ideas that we are unearthing here, is the official stance, so lets look at a delightful discussion of how this dishonest position manages to prevail over our world : People generally believe what they are told ; and, whatever cynics may say to the contrary, they are on the whole justified in this assurance. What our habitual associates say to us is almost always meant for the truth, and for all practical purposes almost always is the truth. Without such customary veracity, indeed, nothing would be gained by telling lies, just as thieves could not live if honesty were not the rule. But the habit of accepting what is said as truth, although confirmed by the experiences of adult life, originates in the much more deep-seated experiences of youth, and is guaranteed by the survival of the fittest. All properly educated children are brought up, and are rightly brought up, on the principle of unquestioning submission to authority, not only as regards actions, but also as regards opinions, and with the assurance that their teachers are well-informed and sincere. The doubter and reasoner of the nursery or the schoolroom, unless speedily cured of his vicious habit, is little likely to increase the sum of knowledge in his riper years ; nor is he much less

disqualified for fruitful enquiry if the insincerity and hypocrisy of his elders rather than any innate scepticism are responsible for his questioning attitude. Nor is it only the dictates of their parents and other teachers that the young must take on trust. Pari passu with the education of the schoolroom there goes on the still more efficacious education of the playground, the training of children by children in habits of deference to anonymous public opinion and blind acceptance of traditional standards. Even disobedience to law has its own laws, full of minute and exacting prescriptions, with which individual choice is not permitted to tamper. It may, indeed, be objected that obedience and belief are not the same thing ; and this is true so far as the advanced stages of mental development are concerned. But it is equally true that in the earlier stages they are almost indistinguishable, and that a training in either is a training in both. In after life a little, but only a little, more latitude of judgment is permitted. It seldom goes beyond the liberty of choosing what authority one is to follow. And here the first faint dawn of reasoned criticism may be discerned. For to assume that when two authorities disagree both cannot be right is to admit the first principle of all reasoning, the self-consistency of truth. And in canvassing the respective claims of two or more conflicting authorities, reason has another chance of being heard ; although here also the decision frequently falls to some other authority, not perhaps recognised as such, but none the less independent of, or even opposed to, reason ; as, for instance, when the Church of England is recommended to our allegiance on the ground that she follows a middle course, and that the middle course must be righta purely arbitrary assumption, no more true than that one or other of the opposite extremes must be right. But more often, perhaps, the determining influence is directly personal, and avowedly adopted for its personal value ; as when the conversion of John Henry Newman to Roman Catholicism was immediately followed by that of hundreds who had been waiting for a lead from their revered spiritual guide. And Newman himself had been brought, after long hesitation, to the final step of secession by a passage in which St. Augustine appeals with confidence to the united judgment of the whole world. Yet the slightest reflexion would have told him that the Catholic Church of St. Augustines time was but a small fraction of the earths population, and was controlled by a small minority of its own members. Nor if the most complete unanimity of dogmatic belief had then or at any other time been attained, would the worlds judgment have been secured against an appeal to posterity. If the principle of authority retains so much energy even among ourselves, and in minds familiar with the most arduous exercises of reason, what must have been its control over those relatively primitive communities whose beliefs are organised into a customary code and hallowed by an immemorial tradition ? Now, it is from such communities that the elements of all religious belief have been handed down, and with the belief the habit of unreasoning acceptance, which is the primary form of faith. So far the attitude of deference to authority has been referred to as if it were a simple and uniform state of mind. But in point of fact, it is a rather complex condition, involving three distinct elements that may be blended in varying proportions. There is, first, the belief that our informant is, to the best of his knowledge, telling the truth ; then the belief that this best is real knowledge ; and finally, if it is a practical question, the impulse to do as he tells us, in the conviction that what he tells us is right. In three words, we trust, we learn, and we obey. It seems probable that, historically speaking, the element here put, as logically it must be put,

last came first, and that trust and learning were evolved out of obedience. Nevertheless, for our purposes the order adopted will be found most convenient. In ordinary social intercourse, in business transactions, in the law-courts, in politics, in the organised pursuit of knowledge, these three kinds of confidence are sharply distinguished by all who have learned to think accurately ; as, indeed, they could not be confused without imminent danger to our lives and fortunes. It is one thing to believe in the sincerity of our friends, and quite another thing to accept their opinions ; it is possible, and with the most careful minds quite habitual, to accept as truthful their evidence about what they have heard or even seen without admitting that the real facts correspond to the story constructed out of the memory of their personal impressions. Again, although we are more ready to do what we are told when convinced that the command is right and based on correct information, we do not think that the relation can be reversed at will, and that to behave as if we believed our informant to be right can legitimately convince us against the evidence, or without evidence, that he is right. Nor, even if he should happen to be right, do we forthwith adopt all his speculative opinions on the nature of things without examination : we do not even feel bound to adopt as valid his reasonsif he gives anyfor the course of action enjoined. Still less do we admit a claim to superior authority on the ground that if it should happen to be justified our disobedience would be an act of criminal folly. (The History of English Rationalism, Vol. 1, Benn, 1906, pp. 16 19.) It really has all been said before hasnt it. That is the thought that passes through your mind when reading a clear statement on the nature of authority like this, and considering how long and hard one has had to work to realise this for oneself. But of course that is the secret of power through the control of knowledge, this wisdom is kept close to the chest of intellectuals while they present a lying face to the world as authority. And this is what language evolved to be able to do, to produce a consciousness of reality in whatever form was required to make the human animal live, as a superorganism. The following observations are worth closer inspection : to assume that when two authorities disagree both cannot be right is to admit the first principle of all reasoning, the self-consistency of truth. And in canvassing the respective claims of two or more conflicting authorities, reason has another chance of being heard This principle is what lies behind the primary principle of knowledge control, as taught to us by Adolf Hitler : there can only ever be One message. This is the basis of Jewish master race power in our world. Achieving this uniformity across all public expressions requires one mechanism : the establishment of a false pivot of observation from which to interpret all observations. Hence we always identify the practice of basing all comments upon the principle of the individual as the end of human existence, this being the false principle underpinning all ideas ever seen in public, as we constantly point out. For us of course what all this amounts to is an explanation for the subversion of science by Darwinism, so that science has become the handmaiden of religion by dint of corruption enabled by the inherent subservience of individuals to authority, because they are linguistic objects evolved to be organised by the pressure of linguistic force forming language and its extension into knowledge as the basis of authority. As with the above passage, we invariably find ourselves harking back to ideas of old in our pursuit of truth today, which is hardly surprising given our general thesis that we live in a world so recently cleansed of truth. One area where we find organicist logic is freely applied to social conditions today is in

economics, we see this clearly in the work I have open for reading right now, as in Rothschilds Bionomics, and it is evident in Rosnays Macroscope which extends economics to the biological domain beyond society, as in ecology. And here is another example of the application of biological principles from a modern text dealing with the economic aspect of society :

Retention Retention mechanisms for selected variations embody the third evolutionary process. Retention occurs when selected variations are preserved, duplicated, or otherwise reproduced so that the selected activities are repeated on future occasions or the selected structures appear again in future generations. As I argued in previous chapters, stability in the structure and activities of individual organizations has been a central focus of sociological theory, as well as organizational analysis. Classic social theory located stability either in socialized individuals who had internalized all they needed to know as inhabitants of social systems, or in structures of exteriority and constraint that severely limited individual discretion. Organization theorists have worked with a similar dichotomy, with some emphasizing individual commitment and organizational identity and others focusing on externalization and various forms of subtle control (Perrow, 1986). Granovetter (1985) argued for a more contingent position, in which local social relations embed people in networks that constrain but do not determine their behavior. Retained variations can be carried by individuals to the extent that members give up or suspend their individuality while engaged in organizational activities. I reviewed many of these processes in the previous chapters. Researchers have found, for example, that commitment, satisfaction, and other affective orientations to an organization are contingent upon job, work group, firm, and industry characteristics (Kalleberg and Griffin, 1978 ; Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990). Retained variations may be embedded in organizational structures. Documents and files embody past practices, specialization and standardization of roles limit members discretion, and centralization of authority and formalization of duties not only limit discretion but make them accountable to higher authorities. Finally, retention may be embedded in networks of social relations when members role responsibilities and trust bring about practices that reproduce organizational knowledge. Networks of relations with powerful institutional actors may provide a transformational shield for organizations, buffering them against selection pressures that would otherwise induce or provoke change (Miner et al., 1990). Successful transformations are not complete until the knowledge required for maintaining the new form is embedded in a community of practice. When the new form becomes a taken for granted aspect of everyday life in the organization, its legitimacy is assured. Organization cultures in which integration tendencies dominate will undoubtedly have an easier time completing transformations than those where differentiated or ambiguous strains are stronger, as I noted in Chapter 6. However, organizations where differentiated or ambiguous strains are strong probably generate more variations. They thus increase their chances of creating opportunities for change. The role of organizational culture in change raises the more general issue of what proportion of members are involved in the genesis of organizational transformation. (Organizations Evolving, Aldrich, 1999, pp. 174 175.)

What is being talked about here is the social structure that we say linguistic force generates, which, talked about in this manner of retention, or the fixing of linguistic force in superorganic form, suits our Atheist Science purposes very well. In the above we do of course have the usual toying with the relationship between individuals and the superorganism, where the only overt statement emphasises that individuals reign supreme, that is to say social forms constrain but do not determine their behavior. What we have here, in this organicist type of account, is the closest thing in existence to the application of the true scientific conception of human nature to humans, something we find nowhere else in science, not in anthropology or sociology, or anywhere else. Just imagine how things would sound if we actually had a true science of humanity. Not only would religion be destroyed, but the entire fabric of our capitalist driven world would be trashed along with it. For we could not stand hearing our world described in terms that entirely negate our personal existence, as it inevitably would, as we can see from the above which strives to find a place for our individuality within a scheme which clearly has no such place within it.

Chapter 6

Lotzes Microcosmos
The following is a long passage taken from volume two of Lotzes Microcosmos, 1885, requiring delineation from the bulk of this piece because of the length of the quote, which begins with a reflection on the role of religion as a bonding agent of society, moving quickly onto the rise of civilisation and the part played by language in that process. This material appears in a chapter called The Forces that Work in History, where a discussion of the nature of religion and language as social forces is to our liking :

I am compelled to regard with the same scruples a view which seeks to find the nidus of that primitive mental condition specially in the religious life, or in Gods presence in the devout consciousness of man. Certainly like-mindedness in religion is one of the most essential bonds upon which the union of a people can depend, and the greater the contrast between the faith of any people and that of their neighbours the more stubbornly often has such a nation kept itself uncontaminated. But we should not be justified in asserting that without the religious bond all other natural inducements to social life would only suffice at most to constitute a horde, not a nation. That language should have been the same for all mankind in primitive times is not made comprehensible, with regard either to its origin or its construction, by the supposition of unanimity of faith ; and we are equally in the dark as to what must have happened for a division of faith (due to unknown causes) to have led to a confusion of tongues, through which new and varying appellations were given to all those objects of common life which were not in intimate connection with the sphere of religious thought. It is easy to give the general answer, that there is nothing so separate and isolated in human life as not to be affected by religious belief and its peculiar character. But if one is not satisfied with the vague devotional thrill caused by this indefinite expression of a true thought, one sees what degrees and proportions there are in this connection of human things with divine. Neither in life nor in science is it possible, necessary, or desirable that true religion should strive to exhibit what is secularthe course of Nature and human freedom as the immediate shadow and reflection of what is divine ; that it should deny or grudge to these the comparative independence with which, by native strength in the first place, they produce their own special results. 3. We have yet to glance at a view, a favourite of modern times, in which the idea of a mysterious beginning of human civilisation approximates to the thought of natural development. The rationalistic fashion of explaining every coherent department in the whole frame of civilisation as constructed out of a multitude of separately insignificant accidents and inventions, having fallen into disfavour as a caricature of mechanical action, it has become customary to ascribe the forms of society, the growth of morality, the construction of language, and the coherence of religious belief, to organic development. Two points become prominent when we ask what meaning can here be assigned to this term organicfor which a long defence will have to be made if at the last day account has to be given for every idle word. In the first place, that which has an organic origin, being withdrawn from the region of conscious invention and free choice which belong to us as men, is supposed to grow necessarily out of the innate constitution of our mental being. And on the other hand, that also which is realized in the intercourse of different individuals as an advantage of civilisation in which they all participate, is held not to result from reciprocal action of which they are

conscious or which can be pointed out, but to be the immediate product of a mind that is common to them all. Now the rule within us of an unconscious necessity needs no demonstration. Each individual sensation in us bears witness to it, for we do not choose what the sensation shall be with which we respond to the external stimulus ; every feeling of harmony or discord which we experience is the involuntary expression of something that takes place in us without our comprehension or co-operation ; if a melody to which we are listening is broken off unfinished, we are driven to seek for its conclusion, not because we understand at all why the conclusion should be added, but because our soul, with uncomprehended power, struggles to emerge from the state of having begun some movement but not carried it out : and it must be in the same way that in the case of more complicated processes, causes of which we remain unconscious, arouse our efforts and guide them with sure and arbitrary power. Scientific research may perhaps some day succeed in clearing up these obscure processes ; but however much may be accomplished in this direction, the difficulties connected with the beginnings of human civilisation would not be lessened thereby. These difficulties are to be found in the fact, not that a coherent whole of mental life is developed in the individual soul, but that such developments occurring in different souls coincide to form a common intellectual possession. And it is plain that those who can find the explanation of this in the notion of organic origin, labour under a delusion. Let us look at language for instance. Each individual may be forced by an unconscious natural impulse to manifest his mental condition by definite sounds ; but this manifestation becomes language only through the comprehension and recognition of the hearer. Now capacity of excitation, structure of thought, and connection of ideas, may be as like as you will in members of the same tribe, but this harmony would never impel them to choose with mechanical uniformity the same sounds for the same ideas, and the same inflections to express the same relations. For the spoken word is the immediate reflection not of objects, which are the same for all, but of the impressions produced by these, which are different for different individuals. Indeed, in the same individual the same stimulus does not produce at all times the same impression, owing to his varying moods ; and language as it grew up would greet objects with ever varying names if the name once given did not blend so completely in our remembrance with the idea of the thing itself that later, even when we learn to know the thing from quite a different point of view, the name recurs to us as one of its most constant and important properties. And certainly also, with whatever solemn obscurity we may imagine the organic speech-impulse to operate, every sound must have been pronounced for the first time by some individual mouth with lips thick or thin. Originally it belonged to him only who had framed it ; it could only become common property when others divined its signification and repeated it with the same meaning. How this happens is shown in a general way by the ease with which children of very ordinary abilities master the materials of speech without express learning, and grow familiar with inflectional analogies. But the first origin of language still presents special and unsolved difficulties. If a great number of individuals with equal claims to consideration had simultaneously taken part in its formation, there would have been a variety of quite independent names for some ideas, and hence a superfluity which would only have been reduced by the subsequent necessity of reciprocal intelligibility. This did perhaps actually take place to a certain extent ; the heterogeneous store of roots which we find in languages may be the result of a mutual adoption and surrender of words formed independently by different men. The same simple idea seems to have been originally denoted by several distinct roots of different sound, which later (because the supply was in excess of the need) came severally to express the different shades of meaning attaching to the idea ; thus it happens that there are not connected series of words corresponding to connected series of

ideas in such a way as that, for instance, the names of colours should be more like one another than like the names of impressions of other kinds, or that the appellations of trees should have a greater etymological resemblance to one another than to the appellations of birds. This systemless incoherence of the material of language would indeed result if objects affected the linguistic imagination of a single individual not similarly, in as far as they were similar, but in a way varying according to accidental and varying conditions ; and we see that if language grew from the concurrent contributions of many persons, there must have been still more reason for this variety. It would have increased past all possibility of comprehension if (as we suggested above) the number of equally influential languagebuilders had been considerable. But there is no doubt that language did not spring into existence like the statutes of a suddenly formed society, but that it grew up gradually within a family, or clan, or tribe ; and that as one generation succeeded another in the natural course, the store of words already formed would be transmitted with the same authority as other traditional arrangements. The creative impulse soon dies out in any department when it finds patterns provided, by imitating which its wants may be satisfied. Therefore an existing word prevents others from springing up to express the same idea ; or if they do spring up, they disappear like the numerous words invented by children, which are lost when their mode of thought grows into harmony with that of adults. So it happened that only so great a variety survived as resulted from a process of mutual accommodation between the contributions of those families (not very numerous) who had been independent constructors of language. But in this way we reach merely a generally used store of words and not the grammatical construction of language. There are very many different rules for denoting different relations by compounding, blending, and modifying roots, and each of these modes, again, allows of course of an innumerable variety of applications. How among this abundance of possibilities a logical construction of language could have grown up is an enigma. Besides, one cannot believe that such a construction could be produced in short time and by few men ; but if we allow a long time, this does not make it easier to understand how amidst the succession of different generations and among a very numerous people, just one single plan of construction out of the many possible, should have gained universal recognition and mastery. One would conjecture that in such a long course of time very many varying attempts at construction would be made by many different persons, attempts which could hardly have been consolidated to the unity of one logical construction even by the compensatory process of mutual accommodation. But do we find this logical consistency existing throughout in the grammatical construction of language, or are there here too traces of a complex origin ? Do not most languages make simultaneous use of different kinds of construction, using rootmodifications together with prefixes and suffixes ? Are there not various forms of declension and conjugation having all the same meaning and value ? In this abundance of formsforms which in all developed languages are the last to experience the transforming influence of the principle which has come to be predominantwe may perhaps find survivals of constructions which were originally diverse. Is the superabundance of cases, of tenses, and of moods really to be ascribed to an inexpressibly delicate sensibility on the part of those with whom language originateda sensibility that from the very beginning and as it were at one stroke provided, with systematic completeness, for the expression of the finest shades of thoughtor can we not rather trace in these various forms the remains of originally diverse attempts at formation of language, whichattempts since they held their groundcame as a consequence of their superfluity to be used for the denotation of those fine shades of thought ? Recent progress in the investigation of language makes me feel more sure than I did formerly that many of the latter questions may be answered in the affirmative, and that many of the examples adduced may be really conclusive ; meanwhile what I have said here is said

not so much for its own sake as in order to explain what that is which we are seeking, and which a practised eye might perhaps really detect under other forms. And however it may be in the special case of language, our assertion will yet hold good in general. The origin of every mental possession held by men in common supposes a period in which by reciprocal appropriation, surrender, and accommodation, the contributions brought by individuals and resulting from an organic necessity of their nature, have become blended into one coherent whole. It is only individual living minds which are centres of action in the course of history ; every principle that is to be realized and to become a power must be first intensified in them to individual activity, and then, through a process of reciprocal action between them, become extended and generally recognised. How commonplace this remark isyet it almost seems as though through the unintelligent use of that comparison of organic origin we had come to think that, when language began, individual words fell ready made like snow-flakes from the atmosphere of a general consciousness upon the heads of individuals, or as if works of art, the results of national imagination, could arise like clouds in the sky and grow larger by the spontaneous addition of formless vapours. 4. But this organic view of history would banish from human life not only the mechanism of reciprocal action, but with it also every element of chance. Among the most choice accomplishments of the theory is the demonstration (post facto indeed) that events must necessarily have happened as they did, and that being logically consistent developments of the spirit of the age they could not have been prevented by any exercise of individual free will. Now certainly no individual power can make itself felt in history unless it knows how to subserve some prevailing motive of action, or is capable of in some way alleviating human suffering. But on the other hand, those mighty men who through inventive genius or obstinate constancy of will have had a decided influence upon the course of history, are by no means merely the offspring and outcome of their age. In most cases the general spirit of humanity, the organic evolution of which we extol, has produced no more than a feeling of present pressure, a yearning mood, or a devout desire for change. It has stated the problems, a solution of which was wanted ; but the fulfilment of these desires and the special mode of fulfilment are works the doing and desert of which belong to a few individuals. In other cases there has not even been this precedent sense of helpless want, but the heavy unintelligent opposition of the majority has been laboriously overcome by the successful mental effort of a few, who have thus given to that majority new aims of action. And finally, where individual strength has actually taken up the tasks of the age, there has perhaps seldom been an exact accomplishment of what the moment required, no more and no less ; in most cases there has been added much both of good and bad which, extremely effective in itself, yet went beyond the immediate need, or was altogether beside it. In innumerable cases the anticipated development has been interrupted ; the skilful calculation of far-seeing minds has often been perverted by some strong tide of feeling from its original purpose, and for long periods been used for artful ends. Modes of thought which under appropriate conditions were adopted by men of genius, have withstood progress for centuries with incredible tenacity. Forms of art worked out by great minds, but not of universal validity, have continued to maintain their predominance when they had become out of harmony with the altered dispositions of mankind ; and even in science inherited errors drag on like a slow disease. What we can thus observe now in history we would also claim as explanatory of its beginnings. It is of course true that all men had in early times similar capacities and wants, but all did not take an equal share in satisfying human impulses ; the germs of civilisation did not, like the upward growth of a young forest, shoot forth simultaneously over wide extents with organic necessity and regularity, but the wandering, incapable, uninventive impulse of the whole was indebted to

individual happy strokes of genius for its first distinct ideals and the first satisfactions which paved the way of its advance. Meanwhile this influence of persons no doubt varies in magnitude in different domains of human activity, and according to the divergent characters of different periods and the multiplicity of conditions on which may depend the action and reaction between individual force and the mass of mankind. It is dependence upon Nature which most universally rouses the inventive ingenuity of men, and the thoughts which here help them to obtain what is most necessary arise from such simple combinations of ordinary experiences that the elementary furniture which we find among the most different peoples weapons, implements, woven stuff, and ornamentsis easily intelligible as the production of a general instinct without any special invention by individuals. But all those higher and more refined aids which have led to a more productive command over Nature, are connected with the names of individual discoverers ; between its first beginnings and the period of universally diffused culture to which we are perhaps approaching, life has in this respect too had its age of heroes. And as in other departments so here also there is a gradual transition from one stage to the other. When any sphere of thought (as for instance Natural Science in the present day) has reached a grade of development which furnishes not only innumerable factual items of knowledge, but also general forms of investigation and clear indications of the regions in which answers to yet unsolved riddles must be sought, then the current of inquiry once set in motion produces in swift succession a multitude of useful inventions, which seem to spring from the general mind. This seems to be the case, because the multitude of individuals actively interested, and the vigorous action and reaction between them, throws into the background the particular contribution of each several person. Further, the general laws which science shows to be at the foundation of the vast commerce of modern times, are familiar to every one in their application to the simple relations of ordinary everyday life ; the ill results of acting in opposition to them are so obvious in the case of individuals, that a great number of slight modifications of a mans course of action are the immediate result of any unsuccessful attempt on his part to contravene them. Thus it seems that the whole system of our arrangements for the satisfaction of mens wants goes on improving progressively by its own inherent force, and without needing to be pioneered by the inventions of individuals. Nevertheless these laws, like all simple truths, become hard to trace when with increasing intercourse they have to be applied to a group of relations which are very numerous, and perhaps themselves either unknown or modifying one another after an unknown fashion. To have shown that these laws are valid, and how they are valid, even under such circumstances, is unquestionably a great achievement of science, and it has not been accomplished without help from the creative genius of individual persons. The arrangements of social and political life have also passed through the two stages of development which we are here distinguishing. The universal homogeneity of human nature and its wants no doubt lead in the first place with uninventive necessity to rules of intercourse which develop in the same way and succeed one another in the same order everywhere. But even if the purely indigenous development of a society could be left altogether to the organic interaction of its own individual forces, the political guidance of the society under difficult external conditions, and the choice of the right path at the right moment, would be always dependent upon the wisdom or folly of individual men. Hence it was that antiquity always set at the beginning of its political histories the name of some individual lawgiver, not that they might derive from the individual power of some master-mind, the first foundation of ordersince this indeed could of necessity only be developed by means of the reciprocal action of a numberbut that they might derive thence the first firm consolidation of that order, and such accommodation as had been arrived at, of difficulties occurring in the application of law to concrete cases. We scarcely need to add in conclusion, that though often ill-defined forms of enthusiasm seem to

be of obscure origin, yet this is not the case with religions, which never appear in history without some founder ; here too it falls to the concentrated strength of individual minds to satisfy wants which under similar circumstances are always alike among the homogeneous masses of mankind. The incalculableness with which, for human eyes at least, individual greatness influences history may seem to threaten the logical consistency of all historical development, and to reduce it to a continual fluctuation in different directions. Yet any personal power requires for its efficacy the receptivity of the masses ; the want of this or the presence of a hostile disposition prevents the working out both of all the good and of all the bad effects which a remarkable mind tends to produce, and prevents likewise the realization of all the good exclusively, or all the bad exclusively ; this is, of course, especially the case with respect to anything which is in opposition to the requirements of the hour, or foreign to them. The more active the reciprocal contact of men in society is, and the more intricate their exchange of thought, and the larger the bodies of men are among whom this contact and this exchange of thought prevail, the more are those circumstances changed by which the influence of individuals is conditioned. The scene of their possible action is certainly enlarged, but the probable magnitude of their influence is decreased with regard to all that is not a direct continuation or fulfilment of projects already begun and wants already felt. For it is only where this is the case that a man can reckon upon the collective strength of a public opinion and sentiment which has already taken into consideration all possible circumstances of life, and made up its mind about them somehow, and which is not likely to let itself be easily detached as it were from the soil to which it clings by so many roots, and carried away by the arbitrary will of a single individual into some new order of development. Thus as the ascendency of leading characters seems, even on an external view of history, to disappear as their number multiplies, there arises a general activity of stimulating and stimulated elements, resenting the appearance of organic growth. 5. Now the more the wholly incalculable disturbances caused by free individual minds are in the end outbalanced by the opposing invariableness of that human nature which always remains the same, and those conditions of earthly life which are always alike, the more are we entitled to inquire for universal laws to which the historical course of things is subordinated. The assumption of their existence is not incompatible with the idea of a plan by which history is guided. For though such a plan presupposes a unity of history, involving the condition that each member of the whole series can occur but once, and that no two are interchangeable, yet it may be that the above-mentioned similarity between all the subjects of human history, and the parallelism between the forces operating upon them, may produce resemblances between the course of one individual stage of development and another, while if we take the whole series we find that these resemblances are gradually repeated on higher and higher levels, and are thus really specially distinguished one from another. However, the attempt to mark out these resemblances according to general historical laws is very much impeded by the difficulty of determining the transforming influence which the peculiarity of each member of the series has on the course which we should expect to be taken by those events with which he is connected, if we were guided by the analogy of other examples. Hence, though history is so much extolled as the teacher of men, but little use is made by men of its teachings. Every age thinks that it must regard the peculiarities of its wants and its position as new conditions which abrogate the applicability of those general points of view that are due to the reflection of previous ages. And, indeed, many historical laws which have been spoken of are of very doubtful validity, and are hardly transferable from one period to another. They are often only applicable when all the conditions of the individual case from which they have been abstracted are restored ; and when that is done they cease to be laws, and become mere descriptions of that which has happened under certain circumstances, and

which we are by no means justified in expecting to happen again under similar circumstances. This inexactness appears in all cases in which people, without being able to go back to the separate effective elements of a complex event, attempt merely to discover the final outcome of the course of events, by a comparison of experiences in the gross ; the inexactness can only be avoided in these cases in the same way as in other cases. We want a Social Mechanics which can enlarge psychology beyond the boundaries of the individual, and teach us to know the course, the conditions, and the results of those actions and reactions which must take place between the inner states of many individuals, bound together by natural and social relations. Such a psychology would furnish us, for the first time, not with graphic pictures of individual stages of historic development and of the succession of the different stages, but with rules which would enable us to compute the future from the conditions of the present ; or to speak more exactly, not the future from the present, but a later past from an earlier past. For even in the construction of ideals it is best not to be exalted above measure ; we shall never bring any such mechanics to so great perfection as to be able by it to sway the future ; it will be enough if it enable us to explain the concatenation of past occurrences when they have occurred, and if with reference to the future it establish probabilities, action in accordance with which is wiser than any other course. Now it is natural that we should first seek to establish the rule of such universal laws within short periods, during which we may regard the whole sum of conditions upon which the course of events depends, and which we cannot analyse exhaustively, as an unknown factor which remains almost invariable. And here men think they have discovered that it is only where our view is bounded by a strictly limited horizon that the appearance of freedom and indefiniteness is presented to us ; that if in dealing with events, we take large numbers and wide surveys, we find that not only does the physical life of mankind proceed with well-established regularity in life and death, in the relative numbers of both sexes, and in the increase of population, but that also the manifestations of mental life are determined by universal laws, even to the number and nature of crimes committed in equal spaces of time. Not indeed by immutable laws ; for just as there is a slow change in the sum total of unknown circumstances by which events are conditioned, so also there is an alteration from time to time in the formula which expresses the law of their occurrence. There is nothing, however, to prevent our conceiving of these very alterations of laws as themselves subject to another and more comprehensive formula, since the changes of that sum total of conditions on which these laws depend are due almost entirely to the effects of those states of human society which themselves come and go according to law. If by the method of taking large numbers it has been made out at what age, on an average, great poets produce their greatest work, what is to hinder us from seeking to discover, not only how many remarkable men of every kind (expressed either in whole numbers or in decimals) appear in every century, but also how in the course of thousands of years this proportion alters according to some law ? We may easily imagine how in this way all kinds of formul may be arrived at, expressive of the acceleration and breadth and depth and colouring of the current of historical progress formul which if applied to particulars would be found to be utterly inexact, but which can yet claim to express the true law of history as freed from disturbing individual influences. Very closely connected with this way of regarding the matter is one of the very worst of all the views which banish freedom from historical development. That veneration of forms instead of contentitself one of the most dangerous errors to which our thought is liablewhich is vindicated by the view alluded to, could not be exaggerated in any more senseless way than by the final acceptance of a mere realization of statistic relations as the aim and the informing Idea of history. He who, following oriental Pantheism, believes not only that he encounters, as a matter of fact, in the order of the world, an eternal alternation of genesis and dissolution, but thinks that he may also regard this form of occurrence as being

itself the most profound meaning and the true secret of realityhe can at least give himself up with misty feelings of enthusiasm to the awful and exalted pleasure which the thought of such a course of events produces in us. He who after any other fashion believes that he finds in history nothing but the rule of an iron necessity, must hold that this is in itself full of meaning ; he seeks to find this meaning in some kind or other of justice, according to which the content and nature of any condition of things being what they are, allow and demand the effect which takes place. To such a concatenation in thought, the motives of which at least are reasonable, the mind may conceivably sacrifice the idea of its own freedom if it finds in this scheme no place for it. But on the other hand, it would be an instance of unparalleled perversity to see the guiding ideals of the order of the world in the establishment of regular numerical relations, or in the fact that events happen in accordance with such relations. And yet here I am not altogether beating the air, and my fear that even this attemptthe attempt to make us thus believe in such shadows in the cloud and nothing elsewill be essayed, is not quite without foundation. For we do actually meet, not infrequently, with what is the beginning of this very error. It is with some pride, and not without something of the thrill of awe which may accompany the discovery of an ultimate mystery, that people caricature careful investigations (the value of which we do not depreciate), declaring that the tale of yearly crime is paid by mankind with greater regularity than that of governmental imposts. It is plain that in saying this they think they have affirmed not a mere fact resulting from unknown conditions and changing as these change, but a fundamental law which with mysterious power can always find the means of its realization, and work itself out whatever may be the opposition of unfavourable circumstances. This erroneous view will indeed hardly be put forth as a doctrinal assertion concerning the meaning of history ; but it secretly disturbs just judgment in the matter by causing a confusion of thought, and this the more easily because it is not equally wrong with regard to all departments of events. For among those phenomena of human life which show such regularity in their recurrence, we may certainly regard some as being subordinate ends of the cosmic order, or merely means to the realization of higher ends, and that will hold of them, to a certain extent, which we denied to be of universal validity. Most of such phnomena, however, may be compared to the impeding friction which, though it is no part of the designed performance of a machine, must yet always bear a certain determinate proportion to the size of the machine as long as the work of this can only be accomplished by mechanical means. But it is worth while to investigate a little further the insignificance of the extent to which this additional determination does away with existing difficulties. The equality of numbers of the two sexes may certainly be reckoned among those arrangements of Nature in which we see means designed for the attainment of the higher ends of life. But as even the causes are unknown which in any particular case determine the sex of the child, so, much more, are those circumstances unknown which determine these causes (that lead to different effects in the different cases) in such a way as to obtain the unvarying gross result. The logical rule which directs us to anticipate that diverse possibilities, when there is no actual reason why one should occur more frequently than the others, will all be realized with equal frequency in the future, is no doubt for us a necessary subjective maxim and we have to regulate our belief in the probable future occurrence of these cases by this maxim, for the sake of practical ends ; but it contains no shadow of explanation concerning the mechanism of those conditions by which the equal frequency of two events is really brought about in the cases in which it happens. And we get no help from our general presupposition that the very possibility of all reaction is based upon an essential and inherent connection between all existing things. This presupposition does indeed provide us with a general formal reason for expecting that anything which happens in one part of the world will react in accordance with some law on every other part thereof ; butjust because it seems so

unquestionable that all things in the universe are connected with one another we only remain all the more at a loss to explain the particular and favoured connections which are closer and more effective between some portions of the world than between others, and upon the presence of which each individual determinate event must depend. It therefore continues quite obscure by what determinate arrangements mankind comes to form a complete whole of such a kind that a preponderance of one sex which has accidentally happened here, calls forth there, simultaneously or subsequently, a counterbalancing increase of the other sex, the external conditions of life being so very dissimilar, and we being entirely destitute of any idea of how the necessary action and reaction could take place. And yet not only does the fact exist, but we are doubtless justified in considering that in it (if in any case whatever) one of Natures ends is attainedan end for the fulfilment of which preordained means will not be wanting. The course of the spiritual life of society is still more obscure. We believe that from the number of actions of a particular kind observed in a certain period which has just elapsed, we can conclude to a certain number of similar actions in an immediately succeeding period of equal length, only because the sum total of natural and social conditions, upon which they depended in the former case, alter but slowly, and in short periods imperceptibly. But where such change occurs spasmodically, we do not expect that a forecast made in reliance upon the past will be applicable. Still this caution does not remove all difficulty. Even the modified statement would be fully justified only if we could regard the sum of unknown conditions as a compelling force which would itself command a definite result in a definite time ; which further, finding the total resistance opposed to it to hold always a similar relation to its own magnitude, would be capable of exercising in every unit of time one and the same fraction of its energy ; which could then moreover always make actual use of this capacity by ever seeking and finding, like the pressure of a compressed fluid, the points of non-resistance, wherever those may be ; and which finally, for every portion of the result already produced would lose a corresponding portion of its potential energy. Now in the case before us, how many of these conditions are given ? Let us take as an example offences against property. The evils of the existing distribution of goods in a society have active force only in as far as their pressure is felt. If then we make not poverty but the feeling of want our point of departure, can we say of this active force that there corresponds to it as its natural effect a certain number of thefts without any regard to the total amount of unlawful gain ? If it further happened that in a certain condition of civilisation, this power always encountered equal resistance, what would be the explanation of the fact that it always finds for its exercise the same number of favourable opportunities, and that these should always be presented to persons incapable of resisting them ? If, on the other hand, we suppose that there always occur a great many more opportunities than are taken advantage of, and that the numbers of those accessible to temptation are equally in excess of those who actually offend, it becomes only the more difficult to understand how the number of offences already committed can so restrict the number of those yet to come as to cause the attainment of a definite sum total. So the connection of events which produces uniformity in the numbers of such actions, is altogether unknown to us. Just as little are we satisfied by the numerous attempts to make the validity of such laws harmonize with individual freedom of will. If (as has been done) we regard the commission of a certain number of offences as an inevitable necessity imposed upon society, it does not help us at all to add that this necessity only necessitates the actions but does not predetermine the agents. If human freedom cannot get rid of the sum total of offences, the fact that the particular agents are not predetermined does not leave individuals freethe only

thing that still remains doubtful is, whose unfreedom will be taken advantage of next ? It has been said that if an insect were to creep over any part of the circumference of a circle drawn with chalk, it would see all round it nothing but irregularly distributed molecules of chalk, though for an eye that took these in all at once, from some distance, they would be arranged in the regular definite order of a circle. If these dots were beings endowed with souls, it might be imagined that taken separately they had scope for free choice of their position in the circle, while taken altogether they were bound to contribute to the formation of a predetermined outline. We reply that if an orderly arrangement of many elements actually exists (for the circle has been drawn), it is indeed easily intelligible that this arrangement can only be fully taken in from particular points of view. But the unorder of the elements when looked at from other points of view, is not by any means the same thing as the freedom of those elements. All those dots of chalk are perfectly fixed in such relations as are necessary for the structure of the whole ; they all lie in a narrow ring-shaped zone confined both internally and externally by a bounding line that has no breadth. How they are grouped within this zone is, as regards the form of the whole, to a certain extent indifferent, and it is just to the extent of this indifference that they are indeterminate. Now if the dots were living beings, this comparison would only teach the simple truth that they had freedom of action in those directions in which nothing had been fixed by general laws ; thus if it chanced that such a law required in any society a certain number of thefts, the agents would be free not with regard to their thievish resolutions, but with regard to whether for instance their thievish exploits should be accomplished on horseback or on foot. The dislike with which we hear of laws of psychic life, whilst we do not hesitate to regard bodily life as subordinate to its own laws, arises partly because we require too much from our own freedom of will, partly because we let ourselves be too much imposed upon by those laws. If we do not find ourselves involved in the declared struggle between freedom and necessity, we are by no means averse to regarding the actions of men as determined by circumstances ; in fact all expectation of good from education and all the work of history are based upon the conviction that the will may be influenced by growth of insight, by ennoblement of feeling, and by improvement of the external conditions of life. On the other side, a consideration of freedom itself would teach us that the very notion is repugnant to common sense if it does not include susceptibility to the worth of motives, and that the freedom of willing can by no means signify absolute capacity of carrying out what is willed either of the carrying it out in conflict with the obstructions of the external world, or of that other and internal carrying out by which the will suppresses the opposing movements of the passions. Therefore not only the possible objects of mens endeavours, not only an idea of the means to their attainment, are suggested to the mind by a number of stimuli involved in the culture of the individual and of society, but also that effective strength of the free will by which it withdraws itself from being determined by passionate impulses, is dependent upon the collective culture of society. Hence there would certainly be no irreconcilable contradiction between the assumption of freedom of will and the other assumption that the sum of active conditions which operate in any given state of society, hinder to a certain degree the effectiveness of all free action, and produce a pretty uniform amount of mere instinctive action. (Microcosmus, Lotze, pp. 182 201.) The mode of expression in this translation from the German is a bit laborious and hard to follow, but as long as we do not let ourselves get bogged down in the thickness of it we can skim off the required significance to serve our purpose. We can see immediately that this was written during an era when the idea of the human animal as a superorganism dominated the ideas about what humanity and its society is, known as it was at the time under the name

of the Social Organism. This is what makes this long passage worth having, and worth examining today. The first paragraph has something to say about the nature of language as revealed by the distribution of religion, and must relate to a prior discussion by the look of it, which I have not looked for. He denies any conflation of language with religion, which actually opposes our idea that linguistic force generates language which results in a linguistic identity programme personified in a refined religious form of knowledge. But merely raising the idea of a relationship is good. In the second paragraph he raises the topic of social life being derived from organic origins, and it is delightful the way he reasons that this idea means that a natural force directs the manner in which people form society so that there is no consciousness involved in the process : In the first place, that which has an organic origin, being withdrawn from the region of conscious invention and free choice which belong to us as men, is supposed to grow necessarily out of the innate constitution of our mental being. And on the other hand, that also which is realized in the intercourse of different individuals as an advantage of civilisation in which they all participate, is held not to result from reciprocal action of which they are conscious or which can be pointed out, but to be the immediate product of a mind that is common to them all. Which invokes the idea of a social mind, that readily equates to Hoyles idea of knowledge as a super individual formation decoupled form individuals, to accumulate in the form of a Thing which rules our world and forces us toward the ever greater creation of a global form, the ultimate end of the civilisation forming process. Unfortunately Lotze happily concedes that we are driven by subconscious impulses only to say that discovering the nature of such mental processes would do nothing to resolve the way a multitude of people come to hold a common mindset. Then he turns to language to validate this obviously erroneous view, which naturally serves the view that people are free agents. It is certainly excruciating trying to follow his argument about the origins of language. First he seems to want to make each individual a random source of words, then he reaches the conclusion that words once established possess an authority that means this creativity ends, as language becomes fixed, relatively speaking, relative to the individuals power to decide what words exist that is. His reasoning about the impossibility of language arising from a finely tuned cooperative effort appears to make, the correct conclusion, that language is a product of human biological nature and is not created by people, inevitable, though he does not round off his discussion with this neat conclusion. But what he does do, is conclude section three with a delightful statement as to the same creative social principle applying to the product of language, as he has just shown must apply to the existence of language itself. Meaning that as language becomes established on the basis of authority, by way of a biological process that is inherent to language as a physiological attribute, so the ideas carried by language in the form of accepted knowledge, are likewise nothing more or less than the same kind of social product as language, still arising from a physiological imperative, where knowledge accumulates over time compounded with authority. Now that really is such a delightful idea. Rather obscurely put, but to one who knows the truth, it can be found in these words. What it means is that knowledge is random, just as language is, it can take any form, it creates its own reason, and therefore has a biological function to do with creating social form. This is a fine statement for our routine assertion that linguistic force projects authority into social space where it accumulates as language and knowledge. Where knowledge basically constitutes a linguistic identity programme with a core of social power at its hub, resting above the existence of the

individual as an incumbent institution, only requiring consolidation into a social structure of elite power, which always takes shape in human society. But at the same time that he gives us this delightful impression of knowledge arising on the same basis as language itself, making knowledge into a kind of programme serving a communicative social bonding function, exactly as it is indeed, he wants to affirm the ultimate reality of the individual as the sole source of all this creativity. So he dismisses the true interpretation of his own excellent reasoning as fanciful musing upon words that appear miraculously. But words did appear from human somatic form unbidden by individual consciousness, just as knowledge does. He really does not like the organicist logic which his own reasoning validates so well. And he indicates the distasteful nature of organicism as a model that denies individuals any existence as active agents of self service, as he says the organicist model denies chance a role, making all things predetermined, having to be as they have been. But that is what science means, that all things are determined by causal processes, and the trick is to find out how this applies to humans. So we have here a good example of the ego of individuals written up as a highfaluting notion of human nature, which has no basis in reality. So the man is good, and bad, at the same time, as ever with these people. But notice that his denunciation of the lack of chance offered by organicist science applied to humans, highlights the fact that Darwins natural selection based upon chance, has the exact opposite implication, as it opens the way for human free will to exist. And this is why linguistic force gave rise to knowledge in the form of Darwins theory of evolution, and suppressed the organicist alternative, because what passed for science depends upon authority, not truth to reality. Here is me : obstinate constancy of will, or attitude, as I tend to think of as my special quality, which is a flaw in terms of everyday living, making it difficult to live in society. The wedge of drivel he slots in here could do with being excised, but it does at least have the value of bearing upon the slant in Hoyle which is all about this question of how social evolution proceeds. What Lotze is trying to do here is hold back the tide of reason contained in his own argument, in order to defend the precious idea of self made man. But it wont wash. He relies upon the commonly heard great man of history device, but he fails to consider that the flow of social development far outweighs the puny influence of any such figures, for social evolution goes in one direction only, just like any other natural process in the universe. Individuals do not create the flow if history, the flow of history selects the individuals who will be presented in history, as great. This is because the flow of history is in reality the flow of linguistic force, which is carried within social structure that this force accretes as the exoskeleton of the living superorganism, which, where great individuals are concerned, means powerful institutions that individuals are located within as if they were being placed in a driving seat located in a machine run by a programme, that the driver was only there to give a human face to, not to influence. What makes this happen is the evolution of social structure based upon the evolution of knowledge, exactly as he has already stated, which is an expression of linguistic force generated by mental anatomy, that weaves language into accepted ideas of how life should be. Institutions ensure that social developments can only ever take one form, and that is why we are ruled by Judaism today, underpinned by capitalism if you like, because that is where the linguistic force has led us, in keeping with the dictates of superorganic form that our brains anatomy evolved to deliver. It is true of course, as he says, that distinctive ideas must originate in the brains of individuals, but it is a well acknowledged fact that the greatest geniuses only achieve what they do by standing upon the shoulders of giants who have gone before them. Which fact entirely negates the attempt Lotze makes to raise the exceptional individual to the height of creator, or instigator of human social evolution. This simply will not do. The anatomy of

linguistic force impels these behaviours, and the achievements of individuals do nothing to determine the direction of change, which is always a foregone conclusion that acts of individual genius can have no effect on in the long run. For example, the discovery of the New World five centuries ago, are we saying that if Christopher Columbus had not made the discovery then it would even now of remained undiscovered ? Hardly ! Or to take a more tricky subject, the law of gravitation that certainly appears to of been the product of a unique genius in Sir Isaac Newton, would this of been unknown to this day if he had not existed ? No way ! He feuded like a regular moron with others who approached his genius and claimed to have got there before him in other departments, as in the invention of the calculus. So it is better to think in terms of great people as being the product of their times, not the creators of their times. Which only serves to affirm the principle that individuals do not exist, as ends in themselves, whoever they are, and that the only thing that does have a real existence in its own right is the sum of individual actions, the Thing, as Hoyle has it. A particularly interesting overview can be found in an amazingly powerful period of history, that can perhaps illustrate this question of an unstoppable direction to social evolution dictated by linguistic force, applying to the modern era. The demise of religion under the influence of modern ideas personified in science can be fixed to around 1800, for arguments sake. This led to the creation of alternative forms of religious expression, namely Communism and Nazism, early in the twentieth century, a creative process intimately linked to two world wars, which constitute acts of social cleansing related to periods of social turmoil and remaking. These two new effervescent religions soon vanished, leaving behind a radically transformed world in which Islam has reinvigorated religion as we have long known it, putting religion back where it was prior to the rise of science, leading to the curious end result in which the world has not been altered at all, making this whole period of which we speak one of change without change. Beyond superficial appearances that is, as societys structural dynamics remain animated by the same power vectors as of old, with Judaism and its two subidentities reigning supreme, but now on a global scale : The Fascist attempt in Italy and the National Socialist attempt in Germany fasten upon the nation as the basis of reconstruction. Appeal is made to the powerful sentiment of National Patriotism. All interests, employments, arts, professions, universities, and societies are co-ordinated under the National banner. The purity of the race is in Germany made the absolute aim. For Mussolini the National deed assumes divinity. The nation becomes in both Fascism and National Socialism the object of popular devotion ; and the supposed interest of the nation is made the sole standard for deciding what is good and evil. The Nationalist fever is excited to an ever higher pitch, in proportion to the depths of depression into which the nation had been sunk as the result of defeat, or of a failure to secure what it believed to be its rightful claims to a place in the world. In Italy, Fascism looks back to the ancient empire of Rome, with the Duce as the heir to the Caesars. In Germany, National Socialism unites two passions. Nationalism is the foe of all things international, while Socialism is the enemy of Capitalism, which, together with the Jews, it hates and blames for most contemporary ills. Fascism and National Socialism have had resounding immediate successes. They have both conquered the demon of unemployment. But neither has conquered the demon of war. In Germany, if not also in Italy, the solution of the unemployment problem has only been made possible by the immensity of the effort and work required in preparation for war. And the Nazi State must itself bear the principal responsibility for the present European conflict. Further, although it may be to some

extent truly claimed that both Fascism and National Socialism have formed a Society from which inequality on the old scale between members of the same race and nation has disappeared, the price, in Germany at least, is terrifying. The horror of the concentration camps, the terrible scourge of espionage and the Gestapo, and the ruthless regimentation of every department of national life, tell only too plainly that Freedom has vanished ! Communism and Fascism are not Europe. They represent a kind of equality and a kind of authority : but not the freedom and equality by which the real Europe is marked. At the same time we are forced to acknowledge that, by the very absoluteness of their demands, they fill a religious vacuum. They are, in fact, pseudo-religions. They are religions of the baser sort. They appeal to the lower side of mans nature, to class interest, to the instincts of blood or race, to the passions of the herd. But, with that great and acknowledged limitation, they superficially gratify the instinct for worship and sacrifice. They ask for unwavering devotion. And, failing the experience of a better religion, with a truer worship and a no less vigorous claim for the selfdedication of its followers, they have captured millions. Their hold cannot last. It is founded on a false doctrine of human nature. No religion can last which depends in the end on the Secret Police, the Propaganda Ministry, and repression and violence. But the fact that at present these schemes of reconstruction do fill the religious vacuum with passable success is one more illustration of the permanence of the religious need, one more sign of the human hunger for a true religion.

IV True religion and a true doctrine of man will be found to go together, I shall have more to say about the character of a true doctrine of man in a later chapter. But it is of great importance that we should appreciate at the start the immense influence, in contemporary life, of the dominant false doctrine of man, and the responsibility which it bears for so much of the confusion and despair of to-day. (Christianity and World Order, Bell, 1940, pp. 16 17.) This leading Christian of the day acknowledges that Communism and Fascism are religions filling the void where true religion has been destroyed, but he uses a variety of devices to argue that this is a tragedy that requires true religion to be revived. In reality all of these alternatives are all of a piece, there is no true disjunction to be found here, only an adjustment. This is something we have seen many times in history, whereby this regular social process of adjustment has even caused Judaism to evolve as a specially adapted cultural form, exploiting the cyclical demise of political order, as we often discuss in relation to social cleansing. This particular period from recent history presented the greatest acts of social cleansing ever, opening the way to the establishment of a Jewish state where none existed before, and the realisation of one global Jewish society. In terms of what we were saying previously, this historical period, so called, is explained very much in terms of great individuals, such as Marx, Lenin, Hitler, Churchill and the like. But it is as we say above, a physiological process giving expression to linguistic force, where everything was preordained, and could of been predicted if science had been allowed to exist, so it is not really history in the sense in which this priestly craft presents itself as an account of human affairs. Although had any such act of prediction been within the powers of humanity at this time, it would of inevitably altered the future so that the prediction would then of been wrong, as you have to wait for a disaster to happen in order to

prove that you can predict it ! Which of course is a catch twenty-two. But the preordained aspect can still be outlined, for it concerns the central question of religions existence, and whether or not religion can disappear and leave behind a thriving society without any religion. Bell indicates that this is not possible, for he says that these monstrous forms of religion erupted like pustules on a world that had lost its true religions. But, as we say, this result was inevitable because the true alternative was suppressed, as in science, which is practical truth. But science was more than suppressed, it was channelled into yet another pseudo religious form, as Darwinism, making its religious appeal in the cry survival of the fittest. A form of self glorification exactly akin to that found in Communism and Fascism of which Bell speaks, and also within any true religion, such as Judaism and its subidentity forms. Religion is an identity, and it inevitably carries an identifying mechanism, as bell describes when speaking of Communism and Fascism. This means a mechanism delineating us and them, and that is what the principle of survival of the fittest provides on the basis of Darwins natural selection, none of which is scientific, all of which is political, and therefore must be regarded as a pseudo religious ideology, since it has all the attributes of a religion, as in being false, being supportive of a priestly caste of exponents, and informing a swathe of society as to its beliefs, and such like. So, as we have always argued, the crucial point in all of this predictability of social outcomes, is the prevention of free expression, achieved by the control of knowledge allowing science to be malformed to a religious purpose. This is freedom going with the flow, contrasted with no freedom, where these two alternatives feel very different, but in the end are exactly the same, because it is a false freedom, a trick, that is made to satisfy us. So it was always inevitable that with the demise of religion a period of chaos would intervene, self destructive warfare would smash society, and from the ashes the phoenix that is Judaism would spread its wings and rise again over all, exactly as has happened. In effect Judaism does predict these outcomes, so the question is, if Judaism, written millennia ago, could do this, then why is it that modern science cannot detect this pattern in human social affairs ? And the answer is because science is not allowed to use the true principle of human superorganic being as the pivot from which to interpret all things human. Below we have a statement that approximately confirms the above argument relating to the conditions in Europe at this especially dramatic moment in history, when a complex social structure expressing strands of linguistic force colludes to protect the core expression contained in Judaism, involving much devastation as a result of divergent splits in the core identity, each acting in the guise of social authority, causing a split that had eventually to converge back to its starting point, somewhat as Calverton describes below : During periods of economic crisis and revolutionary turbulence, that social affinity of impulse, finding expression in the fantastic marriage of opposites of which society for ages has been constituted, breaks down, collapses, crumbles and, like the human body at the point of disintegration and decay, surrenders itself to a chaos in which all that held it together beforeits structural tensions, its cohesive compulsions, its cultural imperativesdisappear in the fire and smoke of strife. But once the strife is over, no matter what kind of social order arises from the ashes of the struggle, the human-all-too-human compulsion to cohesion returns, just as a body once sick acquires the rhythm of health after convalescence has begun. In Europe today, we are witnessing various aspects of that process. It is almost as if Europe had offered itself as a vast social laboratory in which the sociologist can test out his hypotheses and discover the principles and laws underlying social phenomena. In Spain, as this preface is being written, the breakdown has already

occurred, and the strife begun. In France the conflicts indicative of decay have already begun, although the strife is still a matter of the future. In England the decay has set in, although the cohesive compulsions are still in the ascendant. In Soviet Russia the cohesive compulsions are dominant, as they also are in the Fascist regimes of Germany and Italy, where the decay which preceded has been superseded by the regimented disciplines and social cohesives of totalitarian states. In Poland and all through Central Europe and the Balkan areas cohesion and chaos are at a stalemate ; in some territories breakdown has already occurred, in others it is imminent, and in still others it is a matter of the more distant future. In the Scandinavian countries, where the contradictions in capitalist economics have resulted in less disastrous consequences, the cohesive forces remain relatively unchallenged and unthreatened. (The Making of Society, Calverton, 1937, pp. ix x.) So the point being made is that a balance has always been struck in society to create the stable order that persists over time. And it is an intensification of the ongoing processes of maintaining a balance that creates disorder that still conforms to the established pattern, that can therefore only return to the previously established stable condition once steam has been blown off. But what we are talking about here, in human society, is a structure composed of knowledge borne of language. So it is the fracturing occurring within established knowledge, where the core principles of Judaism are manifest as short-lived false religions, as in Fascism and Communism, two opposite polarities both based on the same core principle of corporate being, as Judaism itself is, which after diverging coalesce, back into Judaism once again. But with the healing processes involving change, as in the ingress of Islam into Europe which moves the growth process onto a new plane, with the shift from state based conflict to global based conflict rooted in the core principles of Islam as a universal brotherhood, representing the perfection of the slave state of Judaism, or human biological corporate nature even. Calverton makes economics the be all and end all of these social processes, failing to apply the organicist outlook that he nonetheless shows a trace of in his mode of expression, which imitates Marxian ideology in this economic view of social dynamics. If he had understood that the human animal is a superorganism and the European states are the exoskeletal structure of the living being bearing a uniform Jewish identity, his interpretation would of been vastly different to the one given, but equally clear and simple to express, and this time he would of been able to describe the future exactly as it turned out, with science being hamstrung and religion returning to absolute authority in the only way it could, with the Jews being set on a pedestal and the Muslims being made the bedrock of global Judaism, as Christianity settled down and recovered its balance in the Western world, thanks to the infusion of Islam. This is what has happened, and it was all perfectly predictable, it was the only possible outcome of the disruptive social dynamics of the day, viewed from around the midpoint of the nineteenth century until the rebalancing was settled post second world war. Lotzes talk of laws of history is tedious, but it relates to Hoyles view that knowledge accumulated in such a way as to amount to an overbearing entity that drove us toward a unified global condition. The search for laws of social action never really takes hold of my imagination, but the basic principles of such an endeavour are set out by my scheme of superorganic being based upon the idea of linguistic force creating a linguistic identity programme, from which all social form is delivered to create a living human animal in the shape of a superorganism that is driven by linguistic force to grow to the maximum extent that circumstances will allow, hence the impetus toward globalisation is ever present. This growth impulse is what created the Jewish master race culture which is adapted to the capture

and concentration of this linguistic force, focused upon the people calling themselves Jews, which has led to all humanity becoming Jews by one name or another, by one linguistic identifier or another that is. This process will of been nurtured by the conditions prevailing in the region where Judaism arose amongst competing national entities, extending themselves outwards to create empires organised on the basis of trade, from whence the economic theme arises. When the Roman empire came into being the Jews were dispersed all over it :

The Jews in the Roman Empire My discussion in Part I focused on the first century AD. That was a time when Messianic ideas were rife among the Jews not only in Palestine, but throughout the Roman Empire, where the majority of the Jews were now living, forming what the Jews themselves called (in Greek) the Diaspora, the Dispersion. The Pax Romana under Augustus and his successors had created conditions favourable to economic progress throughout the Empire, and the prosperity of the Diaspora Jews was probably on the increase, as well as their numbers, especially in the Eastern cities and in Rome. (Jesus, Ellegrd, 1999, p. 164.) On the following page we are told that five to ten percent of the total population of the Roman Empire were Jews. Which is a fair kind of ratio for a master race to act as an organ of power within a superorganism, which clearly the Jews were, since, as we are often saying, the Romans, like the modern day Americans, were the slaves of the Jews, to put these matters into political speak. That is, the Roman empire was the slave biomass within which the Jews acted as the core focus of power, hence the rise of Christian identity based on the Jewish identity as a figure to be worshipped. From a biological point of view, regarding the human animal as a superorganism, the presence of a distinct core within the biomass, acting like a neural network garnering power, as in wealth, was clearly just what we would expect to see as civilisation taking on an extended form. And this would be just the time for this core to induce a subidentity of itself, as in Christianity. The point being, that the Jews did not need the Romans, so much as the Romans needed the Jews ! And this has always been the case throughout Western history, wherever pogroms or expulsions have denied a segment of the Jewish biomass a close association with this social neural network, economic decline due to social isolation has set in. King Ferdinand recognised that persecution of Jews and conversos would inevitably have adverse economic repercussions for the country. (The Inquisition, Baigent & Leigh, 1999, p. 77.) Over the page from this sentence we have a quote from a letter written by the Spanish king, indicating the loss of profit he expects to accrue from the attack upon his countrys portion of the Jewish master race. It is of the nature of the human animal that such cropping of the master race must occur periodically, as indeed must the wider social cleansing of the entire biomass if the master race is to remain master over extended periods of time. Obviously none of the parties to these events had any idea of the underlying realities that we describe here, all they knew were their own identities within the social matrix, and they acted their parts accordingly. But the results were always the same, and have continued to be so ever since, as they were for millennia previously. If this were not the case the overall stability of the Jewish identity could not of been sustained. By playing their diverse parts

each segment of the superorganism maintains a complex hierarchical structure that allows the marvellous social form that we know as Western civilisation to exist, and without this delineation into different expressions of one unified identity and its associated dynamics, human society could not exist. Society is what we are, when humans exist, society exists, no society, means no humans. Recovering an item from the waste bin we have this :

Is social stratification inevitable ? Could a society exist without some system of stratification ? This is a question that men in many different societies have asked, often hopefully, often wishing that the answer might be Yes. If our analysis is correct, if it is true that stratification is the product of differentiation and evaluation in society, then stratification can only be eliminated by changing one or another of these characteristics of society. It is hard to see how even a not too complex society could get along without a fairly large amount of social differentiation. Differentiated roles are the functionally efficient way for a society to meet its problems. Even if every member of a society were physically and psychologically fit to perform every specialized role and could be trained to do so, it would be enormously wasteful to engage in such training. And of course not every member does seem to be so fit, and there is not enough time to train a man to do all the several different things of which he is capable. Where knowledge and skill accumulate, as they do in human society, specialization and therefore differentiation seem inevitable. (Social Stratification, Barber, 1957, p. 12.) I do not like what this passage says, hence an hour ago I threw this book in the bin, but I do like the question it poses and the answer it gives, as in the inevitability of social differentiation negating any idea that individuals are ends in themselves, or could ever be. But of course he does not facilitate this scientific conclusion, on the contrary he expressly sets out to give a political interpretation of this biological fact, that allows a scientific observation to accommodate the religious principle that says the individual must be defined as an authority in their own right. As we say above, it is not just that stratification is inevitable, it is that society is inevitable, and that is because society is the human animal, and therefore a living organism created by nature. If Barbers observation is given its true scientific significance so that all social structure comes under its remit, not just the secular structure that his work seeks to confine itself to, so that the complexity of identity that we bring so much to the fore when talking about the Jews as master core identity, is then included in this undeniable observation that complex hierarchical differentiation between people is necessary for the human animal to exist, then we get a true science of society, nay, of humanity ! And this is why we have Jews in the first place, and Christians and Muslims too, that make for the dynamics of the Inquisition in Spain, and for our predicament today where we find Norway training Islamic jihadists to send to Africa to slaughter people in the most sick and depraved manner, while they are out doing their Saturday shopping in Kenyas capital city. Which brings thoughts of the Norwegian Christian terrorist who wreaked havoc in Norway a couple of years ago to mind, protesting as he was about the presence of Muslims in Europe. Not that anyone has brought up his name since this news broke yesterday, 18/10/2013, Anders Breivik, that was his name.

Barber makes the inevitability of social stratification due to the need for individuals to perform different roles for which not all individuals are fitted, which is the classic justification for extreme inequality, as we are always hearing, so that millions of pounds must be paid to bankers in order for banks to exist, for otherwise they could not compete for the best individuals who alone can run banks ! Well, that is the kind of trash reasoning that such books as Barbers validate, but the real reason for these obscene realities is biological, and due entirely to the fact that the human animal is a superorganism and individuals do not exist. This is why bankers must exist, as in obscenely paid persons must exist, and why Jews must exist, as in a culturally defined segment of a biomass able to act as a master race body facilitating the organisation of a massively extended biomass, incorporating an immense variety of cultural identities. What Christianity did was to extend the reach of the core biomass by extending the core master identity beyond the limits of the simple Jewish identity, which allowed the reach of the slave biomass to be integrated on a massive scale. Then Islam added the essential third tier to this anatomical arrangement, laying the foundations for a global superorganism which has just recently exploded into reality over the course of the last hundred years or so. Lotzes discussion of laws resulting in formulas describing social life in statistically verifiable ways that are true on the macroscale, remind us of Rosnays Macroscope applying this logic in a sociologically organicist manner in the 1970s, a book I read recently and have mentioned accordingly, and which I have it on my mind to give the same treatment as we are here giving to Man and Materialism. And Rothschilds Bionomics that I am currently reading, on hold until the sun comes back in spring, likewise applies the principle of laws of corporate being as a reality delivering economic development in a manner invoking a biological system. The same principles of regular order apply to Rosnay and Rothschild, as Lotze recognises when he talks about laws of history being implicit in the regularity that can be seen when society is viewed from a sufficiently broad perspective, through a conceptual macroscope. The title Microcosmos seems like the opposite of Macroscope in its frame of reference, which suggests some kind of symmetry of thought between Lotze and Rosnay, and here we are finding Lotze is searching his way toward the principle of the macroscope, where a logical approach to human affairs seeks to pull back from individual actions to the point where the individual disappears from view and only the patterns people make in concert can be seen to have any meaning. Where he says the veneration of forms instead of content pose a special offence against reason we can identify with the sentiment in terms of the false definition of science imposed in our absolute Jewish theocracy, which only allows science to be done via material realities to the exclusion of the essence of reality, that the manipulation of material forms allows science to discover, leading us to define science in terms of this essence by saying that science is the means by which reality is known, as determined b y testing the authority of material forms. Genuine science is not defined by the activity engaged in, but by the nature of an activitys product. The official argument says that anything claimed to be science should be verifiable by experimental means, which is fair enough. We can prove the human animal is a superorganism by conducting an experiment to see if persons can talk, for if they can the only possible scientific explanation for this anatomical attribute, is that they are cellular units of a superorganism !! Lotzes ensuing discussion gets difficult to follow, he seems to be referring to Buddhisms ideology of life cycles of immortality realised in rebirth, which is well adrift of any discussion of the meaning of history that he is teasing out. But we come back down to earth when he discusses the inevitability of crime and tries to make sense of this in terms of

the possibility of freewill. It is a curious way to think about the subject of good and evil and the responsibility of individuals for doing bad things. However this all becomes worth keeping and studying when he introduces the idea of an insects eye view as a simile for the limited perspective of the individual. When he speaks of pulling back to gather a view of the circle of chalk meant to stand for social arrangements that individuals take part in, seemingly of their own self determining volition, that a sufficiently objective view shows to be impossible because whatever freedom people have they cannot leave the circle, he invokes the macroscopic idea, giving us a perfect representation of the reality of the human condition, meaning that individuals do not exist, all there is, is the Circle, the Thing, the Superorganism. Looking at the following sentence then : How they are grouped within this zone is, as regards the form of the whole, to a certain extent indifferent, and it is just to the extent of this indifference that they are indeterminate. Giving us a nice acknowledgement of the true nature of individual freedom, as something bounded by a structure to which individuals belong, a social structure, within which they are programmed to think of themselves as being free, but where this only applies in so far as they have movement unconstrained by any laws. And of course the constraint imposed by actual laws is as nothing compared to the unspoken constraints arising from unwritten laws. So that when I said to my job centre adviser a couple of months ago that I could not just go off and do as I please by leaving the system, and he said I could, I meant I cannot set up my own little world, whereas he, being the obedient conformist he is, meant I could depart the benefits system by getting a job. Thus displaying the way this narrowness of definition works in life for those who conform, but not for those who rebel. Language is the substance of unwritten law, so that laws are simply a more established form of language, rather as we have been saying knowledge is. Next we have this awkwardly phrased, for our times, but excellent statement on the nature of freedom as an expression of superorganic, not individual will : Therefore not only the possible objects of mens endeavours, not only an idea of the means to their attainment, are suggested to the mind by a number of stimuli involved in the culture of the individual and of society, but also that effective strength of the free will by which it withdraws itself from being determined by passionate impulses, is dependent upon the collective culture of society. Hence there would certainly be no irreconcilable contradiction between the assumption of freedom of will and the other assumption that the sum of active conditions which operate in any given state of society, hinder to a certain degree the effectiveness of all free action, and produce a pretty uniform amount of mere instinctive action. All this blabber, this verbosity, when all he needs to say is that individuals are programmed to act in a uniform way by a linguistic identity programme identified with a living being that they are part of. A programme that includes a routine telling them to think that what they do is an expression of their own individual desires and intentions. This statement offers us a sense of Hoyles Thing, and no wonder that we should find it identified in so many philosophical works dealing with the relationship of people to society, for the Thing is real, it is the ever present human animal.

The other thing in Lotzes piece that we may as well comment on since we have taken the passage, is his selection of criminal acts as the unvarying phenomenon persisting over time so as to deny the possibility of human free will, because the statistical evidence proves that nothing alters the occurrence of crime, so there can be no element of decision making involved, there must instead be some underlying influence, a law of human behaviour. The trouble with using the persistence of crime is the diffuse nature of its role in the physiology of superorganic being. As a first stab at addressing such a question it would make more sense to ask why, come what may, all societies, be they open and free or deeply oppressive, always have a tiny elite who are all powerful, and possess all the wealth, while the great mass of people are degraded, poverty stricken, and powerless. So, why is it that there is always a small group of owners in any society ? This question is easy to answer, it answers itself, because it speaks of structure, and it tells us that human biological nature is corporate and the human animal arising from this nature is a superorganism. To focus on the idea of crime is to imply that there can be unnatural phenomena in human life, which is to make the individual the object of human existence, which guarantees that no true solution to the question asked will be forthcoming.

Chapter 7

Kants Allusion to the Thing

My awareness of Kants Idea for a Universal History, 1784, is due to taking Power and the Pursuit of Peace by Hinsley, 1963, from the shelf yesterday, 19/10/2013, but a search online provides plenty of materials on this essay, including the essay itself in various formats. It is only about twenty pages long and one commentator talks about it summarising ideas that Kant deals with more fully elsewhere, it having been written at the mature phase of his philosophical production. But we scarcely care what or who he is, all we care about is what he says as regards the true biological corporate nature of our kind. One thing that immediately struck me when glancing at the original essay a moment ago is a reference to humans defined as a species rather than as an animal, defined by their biological nature, something that we saw in Feuerbach, and condemned so roundly. Kants philosophyto emphasise only those aspects of it that are essential for his view of international politicsdrew a distinction between the mechanical and the teleological processes in history. Nature, the world of phenomena, was a purely mechanical system ; in order to understand its operation it was necessary to postulate an end, a purpose. The end could not be derived from the course of history, from empirical data, from nature itself, but only from the existence of reason and morality in man. As for the relationship between the two processesthat of nature on the one hand and, on the other, that in the realm of moral obligations which instructs men to pursue what seems to them right regardless of their reluctance to pursue it they must converge. The end was not derivable from nature, which had its own mechanical design ; but the design of nature, working in history, could work only to that end. On the other hand, it was not because men willingly used their reason to guide it there that it worked to that end. It did so because the very opposition which the mechanical process of nature set up to the dictates of the moral process forced irrational men to use their reason. The convergence of the design of nature and the dictates of the moral duty in man, that convergence arising from their conflict, was the essence of the novel unilinear concept of history as continuous progress towards an end which was expounded in his Idea for a Universal History. Men do not act like animals, merely according to instinct. They do not, on the other hand, act like rational citizens, according to an agreed and a conscious plan. It might thus seem impossible to find any plan or purpose in their history. But just as marriages and births, a matter of free will and apparently subject to no pattern, nevertheless occur according to stable natural laws, so what appears to be complicated and accidental in individuals may yet be understood as a steady, progressive, though slow, evolution of the original endowments of the entire species, in accordance with an end of nature which they work to promote but would care little for if they knew about it. And just as Kepler had discovered an unexpected way of subsuming the eccentric orbits of the planets to definite laws, and Newton had explained these laws by a general cause of nature, so we might one day find the laws and the end of nature, which governed the apparently senseless march of human events.

In Kants opinion they would be found to rest on certain inescapable principles. All natural faculties of a creature are destined to unfold themselves completely and according to an end. In man (as the only rational creature on earth) those natural faculties which aim at the use of reason shall be fully developed in the species, not in the individual. Reason did not develop instinctively. It required trials, experience and information in order to progress gradually from one level to the next. Nature, having set man a short term of life, thus required an endless procession of begettings . . . in order finally to push mankind to that level of development which is appropriate to the purpose of nature. And then again, because nature had given men reason and the freedom of will that rests upon reason, nature has intended man to develop everything which transcends the mechanical ordering of his animal existence entirely by himself . . . by his own reason and free of instinct. It was natures plan that man alone should have the credit for what he accomplished. Unless these assumptions were made it would be necessary to adopt the self-contradictory notions of an organ without use, a regulation without purpose, a nature without laws. Nature, which worked to an end in all other natural arrangements, would have to be suspected of childish play when it comes to manwould have to be thought of as purposeful in detail but purposeless as a whole. Since reason did not develop instinctively, it could further be assumed that nature pitted itself against man in order to force him to develop the reason it had given himto make his reason produce what it is capable of but would not of itself intend. The means which nature employed for this purpose was the antagonism of men in society. This antagonism, the cause of a lawful order of this society, was in its turn based on the asocial sociability or unsocial sociableness of men, that is their propensity to enter into a society, which propensity is, however, linked with a constant mutual resistance which threatens to dissolve this society. The state is the product of mans unlovely qualitieshis love of glory, power and possessionsbut it is only in the state that his better capacities can develop. It is constantly threatened by those unlovely qualities ; but it is this constant threat of nature that forces him to preserve and improve the state as the means of developing his better qualities and his use of reason. Thanks are due to nature for his quarrelsomeness, his enviously competitive vanity, his insatiable desire to possess or to rule, for without them all the excellent faculties of mankind would for ever remain undeveloped. Man wants concord but nature knows better . . . ; nature wants discord. Man wants to live . . . pleasurably but nature intends that he should raise himself out of lethargy . . . into work and trouble . . . in order to achieve, by his own efforts, the highest task she has set him. This process was at work in the relations between states as well as in the development of the state. In the international field, as in the relations between men in a society, nature has again used quarrelsomeness, in this case that of the great societies and states, as a means of discovering a condition of quiet and security through the very antagonism inevitable among them. Wars, the excessive and neverending preparation for wars, and the want which every state must feel even in the midst of peaceall these are means by which nature instigates attempts . . . which, after many many devastations, reversals and a very general exhaustion of the states resources, may accomplish what reason could have suggested to them without so much sad experience, namely : to leave the lawless state of savages and to enter into a union of states. . . . All wars are . . . so many attempts (not in the intention of men, but in the intention of nature) to bring about new relations between the states and to form new bodies by the break-up of the old states to the point where they cannot

maintain themselves alongside each other and must therefore suffer revolutions until finally, partly through the best possible arrangement of the civic constitution internally and partly through common agreement and legislation externally, there is created a state which, like a civic constitution, can maintain itself automatically . . . , a cosmo-political state of public security, a joining of the states. The end which nature forced men to achieve by these means was the establishment of a completely just civic society in which alone the faculties of men could be fully developed. It could be defined as a society possessing the greatest freedom and hence a very general antagonism of its members but also . . . the most precise determination and enforcement of the limit of this freedom so that it can coexist with the freedom of other societies. Indeed, the problem of the establishment of a perfect civic constitution depends upon the problem of a lawful external relationship of the states and cannot be solved without the latter. So long as the condition of unrestricted freedom existed between states there could be little use in, and little hope of, restricting that freedom by the achievement of the lawful civic constitution within the state. The history of mankind could be viewed on the whole as the realisation of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internallyand for this purpose also externallyperfect constitution . . . (Hinsley, pp. 72 75.) Passages make a first impression on us when we read them that is by no means bound to recur again, as such I always record what is of interest the first time I read anything, to make sure I capture the point of significance as it struck me when I thought the passage was worth reproducing. I failed to do this when taking the above, and first thing in the morning I am geared up to review, to check my own work, not to be creative. So where are we with this ? The end of the first paragraph is the point of interest : The end was not derivable from nature, which had its own mechanical design ; but the design of nature, working in history, could work only to that end. On the other hand, it was not because men willingly used their reason to guide it there that it worked to that end. It did so because the very opposition which the mechanical process of nature set up to the dictates of the moral process forced irrational men to use their reason. We may think that what is being discussed here is purpose, but purpose is a political term the creation of which was initiated by the primacy of the false idea of the individual as the end of human existence. All that exists is the biological nature of the human animal, which provides the end that human existence is directed towards, the end that human evolution was oriented toward when it created human somatic form, hence we say the superorganism is the true end of human existence and the individual does not exist as an end in themselves. Here Kant conflates these two issues of human nature and individual purpose in a clearly contrived effort to make individual purpose relevant, when he obviously recognised it was not, a more dishonest, priestly effort, could not be imagined. But he does concede that individuals do not exist and are obliged to do the bidding of nature, in a garbled manner, that makes people freely choose to be rational and moral because they cannot choose to do otherwise ! Which, as badly put as it is, is not entirely false. The logic of this reasoning is like a person robbing us by way of a threat of violence, whereupon we offer all our worldly goods willingly. But it is one thing to suggest that an action such as this occurring between two people leads us to freely act in order to meet a demand, but quite another to interpret human social behaviour formalised over millennia as a contrast between forceful nature and the arbitrary individual, resulting in an eternal decision making process,

this is a plainly disgusting pretence. When it comes to the formalisation of culture the individual is not in the picture, all that exists is a social process created by nature through the evolution of a talking mammal, which formulation individuals obey, on mass, thereby creating the human animal. The second paragraph says no more, but it is more conducive to our genuinely scientific outlook based upon a firm idea of human biological corporate nature, the end of which is the human animal, the superorganism. The next paragraph indicates more malevolence from Kant, whereby humans are made out to be irrational creatures that alone are rational ! How so ? Because the individual does not exist, and as such is irrational, whereas the social entity is real and contains the rationality of humans which is fed to individuals making them agents of rationality dictated by nature. Which rather suggests the idea that God laid out a plan for humans to follow in order to become successful, but a plan they had to earn the benefits of by acting morally ! You know, the usual Jewish shit. Clearly Kant had all the materials he needed to provide a true account of human animal nature, but he was determined not to do so, he used this knowledge to prevent it being known by the public, by delivering it in a subverted form, he wanted to set out a false idea fit for other priests to follow, this is what the creative priest does. It is an appalling contrivance to say that humans must be self made because nature had equipped them with the capacity for reason, and nature was always consistently operating toward a positive end in which all its actions made sense. The solution to this dilemma is to realise, as Kant evidently understood, that reason was not an attribute of individuals. In other words individuals were programmed by language and were only as rational as the programme that was written to their brains, so that reason is a political term based on the false premise that individuals are humans, so that reason does not exist at all as a real attribute of human nature. You may as well call the ordering of the elements in the periodical table reason, according to the scheme of human reason Kant proposed, as described by Hinsley. In effect then, Kant set nature up as the overbearing figure driving humans to be social against their inner desire to be independent authorities in their own right. Which indicates a force driving people to be social, that we are interested in here because of the work of Hoyle directly espousing the existence of society as a Thing. This shows us the significance of Hoyle as someone who was prepared to reach for a more substantial interpretation of all those social factors that many great thinkers had wrestled with, and wrote about down the ages of history. And we ourselves take this matter one step further than Hoyle because we are first and foremost atheists, hell-bent on seeking out reality and presenting it as it is, so that we take this urge to understand humans in terms of some higher force acting upon us, and show this is due to nature evolving a mammalian superorganism. Where Kant says men want joy but nature wants horror in order to oblige people to do what is best in the long run, by developing mans latent potential, we think of our explanation for one historical round of horror, the world wars and the Nazis, with their pogrom, and how this is made positive by Atheist Science recognising that the human animal is a superorganism bearing a Jewish identity, wherein individuals do not exist as ends, so that whatever misery individuals endure in this necessary physiological process, is irrelevant, as all that matters is that the Jews project to rule humanity should progress. Thus we have the same logic as Kant but a totally different explanation, Kant offers mindless drivel of the kind suited to a childs nursery, we offer solid ideas linked directly to hard facts, suited to an exclusively scientific conception of human existence. And of course what this disgusting priest does not tell us, is that religion is the core element in all this eternal devastation, even though religion is the obviously logical point of focus because it is the one thing that persists irrespective of whatever devastation occurs. As ever religion is left out of all attempts ever made to reason about the nature of society in

rational terms. And no wonder, for if Kant had tried to introduce religion into this scheme he would of been bound to recognise that the endless turmoil amongst states driving them toward one universal political order, could only possibly be about the imperative at the heart of Judaism telling the Jews to rule all mankind. He makes this turmoil about the objects of social form existing as ends in themselves, by modelling states upon the false premise applied to persons, as was often the case amongst philosophers of the period, whereas the true being here is the superorganism defined by Judaism, a fact no one has ever made public before me.

Chapter 8

The Thing Creates Law, as Law Creates the Thing

Continuing my clearance run through the book shelves, I now have Studies in History and Jurisprudence before me, by James Bryce, 1901, where we come to chapter four, based on an essay composed in 1885 :

THE ACTION OF CENTRIPETAL AND CENTRIFUGAL FORCES ON POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONS As every government and every constitution is the result of certain forces and tendencies which bring men together in an organized community, so every government and every constitution tends when formed to hold men together thenceforth, training them to direct their efforts to a common end and to sacrifice for that purpose a certain measure of the exercise of their individual wills. So strong is the aggregative tendency, that each community naturally goes on by a sort of law of nature to expand and draw in others, whether persons or groups, who have not previously belonged to it : nor is physical force the prime agent, for the great majority of mankind prefer some kind of political society, even one in whose management they have little or no share, to mere isolation. As this process of expansion and aggregation continues, the different political groups which it has called into being come necessarily in contact with one another. The weaker ones are overcome or peacefully absorbed by the stronger ones, and thus the number of groups is continually lessened. Where two communities of nearly equal strength encounter each other, each may for a time succeed in resisting the attraction of the other. But in this changeful world it almost always happens that sooner or later one becomes so much stronger that the other yields to it : and thus in course of time the number of detached communities, i.e. of groups each with its own centre of attraction, becomes very small, because the weak have been swallowed up by the strong. This is the general, though, as we shall see, not the universal course of events. There is also another force at work, which has at some moments in history developed great strength. I. HOW THE TENDENCIES TO AGGREGATION AND TO DISJUNCTION RESPECTIVELY AFFECT CONSTITUTIONS. Of the many analogies that have been remarked between Law in the Physical and Law in the Moral World, none is more familiar than that derived from the Newtonian astronomy, which shows us two forces always operative in our solar system. One force draws the planets towards the sun as the centre of the system, the other disposes them to fly off from it into space. So in politics, we may call the tendency which draws men or groups of men together into one organized community and keeps them there a Centripetal force, and that which makes men, or groups, break away and disperse, a Centrifugal. A political Constitution or frame of government, as

the complex totality of laws embodying the principles and rules whereby the community is organized, governed, and held together, is exposed to the action of both these forces. The centripetal force strengthens it, by inducing men (or groups of men) to maintain, and even to tighten, the bonds by which the members of the community are gathered into one organized body. The centrifugal assails it, by dragging men (or groups) apart, so that the bonds of connexion are strained, and possibly at last loosened or broken. That no community can be exempt from the former force is obvious. But neither can any wholly escape the latter. For every community has been built out of smaller groups, and the members of such groups have seldom quite lost the attraction which each had to its own particular centre, such attraction being of course dissociative as regards the other groups and their members. Moreover in no large community can there ever be a complete identity of views and wishes, of interests and feelings, between all the members. Many must have something to complain of, something which sets them against the rest and makes them desire to be, for some purposes, differently treated, or (in extreme cases) to be entirely separated. The existence of such a grievance constitutes a centre round which a group is formed, and this group is in so far an element of disjunction. Accordingly the history of every community and every constitution may be regarded as a struggle between the action of these two forces, that which draws together and that which pushes apart, that which unites and that which dissevers. (pp. 216 218.) The tone of Bryces logic here is very much in keeping with that of Kant noticed above, as in the talk of natural forces training people to form social structures. The idea of a consolidating force opposing a disintegrating force implicitly treats society as a biomass made up of matter possessing inherent properties causing it to form a social body via a dynamic requiring two opposing forces to be balanced. The force is question is of course our linguistic force, and it is most appropriate that its operation should be identified in the field of law, which is a product of this force acting to control individuals to form a superorganism. Thinking of society in the manner applied by both Kant and Bryce tallies with our idea of social cleansing operating to constantly remake the biomass so as to preserve the core identity of Judaism, and the dynamic expressed in Judaism is clearly what these two men are discussing, although they appear to know it not. It is interesting to see this social force related to universal forces identified by Newton, taking us outside our own frame of reference but making us wonder about the dualistic nature of the social force. Why should creative forces be dualistic ? Firstly, if it were otherwise then all mass would be either amassed or dispersed into oblivion. But this is an unsatisfactory answer that makes us think the dualism is a product of our bias point of reference concerning the universal process which makes us see things in these terms, leading us into an eternal array of impossible dualisms, not the least of which being that which Parmenides is famous for posing long ago, about the impossibility of something coming from nothing. If we use our own analysis of human nature we find that that Bryces model is flawed because where he sees a dualism we see a monism. The false perspective is due to splitting off individuals from existence in order to create an elite, whereas the true perspective we adopt negates this false idea by recognising the one true human being, the superorganism. Thus we show that all the philosophical angst of historical ages is part of the contrivance to control linguistic force in order to sustain an elite, based on an act of separation from the biomass in order to create structure. This is the cause of an apparent dualism, it is an internal process making for structure. This dualism is however contained within an overriding monism, something we recognise when we say there is only One

identity, that of Judaism, and all other identities are Jewish, even those that are most antagonistic to Judaism, such as Nazism. This is so because Judaism is the One identity possessing the key to universal creation in keeping with the one force of nature that unifies. All other identities seen in a Jewish superorganism represent structural expressions of Judaism, serving Judaism, and this is why a virulently anti Jewish identity is always a highly ephemeral thing associated with chaos, as in social cleansing, which always empowers Judaism in the long run. Although a permanent antagonism between the core and the biomass is necessary in order to maintain the structural distinction, and this is written into the identity, as in the Jews being identified with Christs death.

Chapter 9

Geographers Find the Thing Too

There is nevertheless one outstanding difference between the first urban epoch and our own. Ours is an age of a multitude of socially undirected technical advances, divorced from any other ends than the advancement of science and technology. We live in fact in an exploding universe of mechanical and electronic invention, whose parts are moving at a rapid pace ever further and further away from their human center, and from any rational, autonomous human purposes. This technological explosion has produced a similar explosion of the city itself : the city has burst open and scattered its complex organs and organizations over the entire landscape. The walled urban container indeed has not merely been broken open : it has also been largely demagnetized, with the result that we are witnessing a sort of devolution of urban power into a state of randomness and unpredictability. In short, our civilization is running out of control, overwhelmed by its own resources and opportunities, as well as its superabundant fecundity. The totalitarian states that seek ruthlessly to impose control are as much the victim of their clumsy brakes as the seemingly freer economies coasting downhill are at the mercy of their runaway vehicles. Just the opposite happened with the first great expansion of civilization : instead of an explosion of power, there was rather an implosion. The many diverse elements of the community hitherto scattered over a great valley system and occasionally into regions far beyond, were mobilized and packed together under pressure, behind the massive walls of the city. Even the gigantic forces of nature were brought under conscious human direction : tens of thousands of men moved into action as one machine under centralized command, building irrigation ditches, canals, urban mounds, ziggurats, temples, palaces, pyramids, on a scale hitherto inconceivable. As an immediate outcome of the new power mythology, the machine itself had been invented : long invisible to archaeologists because the substance of which it was composedhuman bodieshad been dismantled and decomposed. The city was the container that brought about this implosion, and through its very form held together the new forces, intensified their internal reactions, and raised the whole level of achievement. This implosion happened at the very moment that the area of intercourse was greatly enlarged, through raidings and tradings, through seizures and commandeerings, through migrations and enslavements, through tax-gatherings and the wholesale conscription of labor. Under pressure of one master institution, that of kingship, a multitude of diverse social particles, long separate and self-centred, if not mutually antagonistic, were brought together in a concentrated urban area. As with a gas, the very pressure of the molecules within that limited space produced more social collisions and interactions within a generation than would have occurred in many centuries if still isolated in their native habitats, without boundaries. Or to put it in more organic terms, little communal village cells, undifferentiated and uncomplicated, every part performing equally every function, turned into complex structures

organized on an axiate principle, with differentiated tissues and specialized organs, and with one part, the central nervous system, thinking for and directing the whole. (The City in History, Mumford, 1961, pp. 33 34.) Although Mumford uses an expressly mechanical mode of expression for his description of the way societys dynamic growth set forth, the randomness of the image provided has the hallmarks of an organic process occurring at the micro organic level of life. As with Bryce there is the same irresistible urge to present a model of rampant expansion contrasted with periodic collapse when describing society through the macroscope which sees the full form, rather than the individual persons of which the living being is composed. We also find the same sentiments expressed in Hoyles piece concerning the central idea of a Thing driving people against their will, and certainly beyond their control, where Mumford talks about a runaway process that even excuses the political excesses of oppression that we Westerners so disapprove of, yet are guilty of ourselves in our own way, by acting as guardians of a process of capitalism that in reality is nothing more than an accommodation of a Thing that we could not stop if we wanted to. And finally he concludes this selection with a delightfully sociologically organicist vision of complex human society. ___

A General Consideration of Freedom Defined in Terms of Free Access to Knowledge The following passage is taken from A History of Freedom of Thought by J. B. Bury, 1913 : whereas in the other cases the limitations affect the conduct of every one, restrictions on freedom of opinion affect only the comparatively small number who have any opinions, revolutionary or unconventional, to express. The truth is that no valid argument can be founded on the conception of natural rights, because it involves an untenable theory of the relations between society and its members. On the other hand, those who have the responsibility of governing a society can argue that it is as incumbent on them to prohibit the circulation of pernicious opinions as to prohibit any anti-social actions. They can argue that a man may do far more harm by propagating anti-social doctrines than by stealing his neighbours horse or making love to his neighbours wife. They are responsible for the welfare of the State, and if they are convinced that an opinion is dangerous, by menacing the political, religious, or moral assumptions on which the society is based, it is their duty to protect society against it, as against any other danger. The true answer to this argument for limiting freedom of thought will appear in due course. It was far from obvious. A long time was needed to arrive at the conclusion that coercion of opinion is a mistake, and only a part of the world is yet convinced. That conclusion, so far as I can judge, is the most important ever reached by men. It was the issue of a continuous struggle between authority and reasonthe subject of this volume. The word authority requires some comment. If you ask somebody how he knows something, he may say, I have it on good authority, or, I read it in a book, or, It is a matter of common knowledge, or, I learned it at school. Any of these replies means that he has accepted information from others, trusting in their knowledge, without verifying their statements or

thinking the matter out for himself. And the greater part of most mens knowledge and beliefs is of this kind, taken without verification from their parents, teachers, acquaintances, books, newspapers. When an English boy learns French, he takes the conjugations and the meanings of the words on the authority of his teacher or his grammar. The fact that in a certain place, marked on the map, there is a populous city called Calcutta, is for most people a fact accepted on authority. So is the existence of Napoleon or Julius Caesar. Familiar astronomical facts are known only in the same way, except by those who have studied astronomy. It is obvious that every ones knowledge would be very limited indeed, if we were not justified in accepting facts on the authority of others. But we are justified only under one condition. The facts which we can safely accept must be capable of demonstration or verification. The examples I have given belong to this class. The boy can verify when he goes to France or is able to read a French book that the facts which he took on authority are true. I am confronted every day with evidence which proves to me that, if I took the trouble, I could verify the existence of Calcutta for myself. I cannot convince myself in this way of the existence of Napoleon, but if I have doubts about it, a simple process of reasoning shows me that there are hosts of facts which are incompatible with his non-existence. I have no doubt that the earth is some 93 millions of miles distant from the sun, because all astronomers agree that it has been demonstrated, and their agreement is only explicable on the supposition that this has been demonstrated and that, if I took the trouble to work out the calculation, I should reach the same result. But all our mental furniture is not of this kind. The thoughts of the average man consist not only of facts open to verification, but also of many beliefs and opinions which he has accepted on authority and cannot verify or prove. Belief in the Trinity depends on the authority of the Church and is clearly of a different order from belief in the existence of Calcutta. We cannot go behind the authority and verify or prove it. If we accept it, we do so because we have such implicit faith in the authority that we credit its assertions though incapable of proof. The distinction may seem so obvious as to be hardly worth making. But it is important to be quite clear about it. The primitive man who had learned from his elders that there were bears in the hills and likewise evil spirits, soon verified the former statement by seeing a bear, but if he did not happen to meet an evil spirit, it did not occur to him, unless he was a prodigy, that there was a distinction between the two statements ; he would rather have argued, if he argued at all, that as his tribesmen were right about the bears they were sure to be right also about the spirits. In the Middle Ages a man who believed on authority that there is a city called Constantinople and that comets are portents signifying divine wrath, would not distinguish the nature of the evidence in the two cases. You may still sometimes hear arguments amounting to this : since I believe in Calcutta on authority, am I not entitled to believe in the Devil on authority ? Now people at all times have been commanded or expected or invited to accept on authority alonethe authority, for instance, of public opinion, or a Church, or a sacred bookdoctrines which are not proved or are not capable of proof. Most beliefs about nature and man, which were not founded on scientific observation, have served directly or indirectly religious and social interests, and hence they have been protected by force against the criticisms of persons who have the inconvenient habit of using their reason. Nobody minds if his neighbour disbelieves a demonstrable fact. If a sceptic denies that Napoleon existed, or that water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen, he causes amusement or ridicule. But if he denies doctrines which cannot

be demonstrated, such as the existence of a personal God or the immortality of the soul, he incurs serious disapprobation and at one time he might have been put to death. Our medival friend would have only been called a fool if he doubted the existence of Constantinople, but if he had questioned the significance of comets he might have got into trouble. It is possible that if he had been so mad as to deny the existence of Jerusalem he would not have escaped with ridicule, for Jerusalem is mentioned in the Bible. In the Middle Ages a large field was covered by beliefs which authority claimed to impose as true, and reason was warned off the ground. But reason cannot recognize arbitrary prohibitions or barriers, without being untrue to herself. The universe of experience is her province, and as its parts are all linked together and interdependent, it is impossible for her to recognize any territory on which she may not tread, or to surrender any of her rights to an authority whose credentials she has not examined and approved. The uncompromising assertion by reason of her absolute rights throughout the whole domain of thought is termed rationalism, and the slight stigma which is still attached to the word reflects the bitterness of the struggle between reason and the forces arrayed against her. The term is limited to the field of theology, because it was in that field that the self-assertion of reason was most violently and pertinaciously opposed. In the same way free thought, the refusal of thought to be controlled by any authority but its own, has a definitely theological reference. Throughout the conflict, authority has had great advantages. At any time the people who really care about reason have been a small minority, and probably will be so for a long time to come. Reasons only weapon has been argument. Authority has employed physical and moral violence, legal coercion and social displeasure. Sometimes she has attempted to use the sword of her adversary, thereby wounding herself. Indeed the weakest point in the strategical position of authority was that her champions, being human, could not help making use of reasoning processes and the result was that they were divided among themselves. This gave reason her chance. Operating, as it were, in the enemys camp and professedly in the enemys cause, she was preparing her own victory. (A History of Freedom of Thought, Bury, 1913, pp. 13 19.) We soon learn from the above that freedom has triumphed after many ages of struggle against religion (authority), and that even now we are amongst the privileged few, in that not everywhere are the principles of freedom of thought and expression recognised to be superior. This of course is what everyone believes, and everyone teaches. But it is not true, and the biggest insight into this comes from understanding that Darwinism was the platform of corruption in science that this twist away from oppression turned on. So we know that this book is not going to be an account of how freedom triumphs, but instead, it is going to be a statement on how the ruse was constructed that leaves us slaves today, in a far worse state than we have been for many an age, because now we have to endure this sickening pretence of freedom which is so convincing. We soon turn to a consideration of authority as being the essence of what passes for knowledge, and his description of how we all receive knowledge indicates that the mass of people act as a filter determining what will be knowledge, and what will not be. Exactly as we sought to make out above when saying that knowledge is simply a more substantial product of the process of language creation, whereby linguistic force generates social form by projecting authority into social space. All that distinguishes modern times from those of our first days of existence is the elaborate way that knowledge is produced today on the basis of authority. And herein we obtain a clue as to why genuinely true knowledge should become

so important to us, even though all our reasoning tells us that knowledge only exists to perform a biological function wherein false knowledge is that which is really required. Thus we see that the purpose of true knowledge, typified today by scientific knowledge that is created for its own sake, just to know the truth, serves as an adjunct to false knowledge by creating a foundation of authority. The use of absolute truth is seen in the creation of Darwinism on this basis, exploiting as it does the principle of seeking out truth for truths sake, while in actual fact not being true at all ! Which is exactly what is required if false knowledge is to continue to serve its biological function of creating a human animal as a superorganism, composed of individuals organised about a single foci of identity. How does he deal with the veracity of science ? He tells us that knowledge that clearly lies beyond our ability to verify, such as the distance to the sun, may be taken on trust because all astronomers confirm it is true ! Ha! Well aint that just swell. But therein lies the flaw in the scheme, one that this man skims over because he is part of the priestly programme that our Atheist Science has seen through. We have discussed this issue before, naturally, but the above gives us a nice simple statement to reflect on, applying to the exact subject we are interested in when thinking about how knowledge is controlled. Unanimity amongst scientists does not equate to a conspiracy when the knowledge they agree upon is patently false, but rather it is the case of a core authority taking command of the production of knowledge, a subject I use to write about at length some years ago, concerning the way that Darwinism was the validated product emerging from a struggle to suppress science, from which time onward this accepted science became authority that all professionals have been inducted into, to form a scientific priesthood. So the flaw of our dependence upon authority that he mentions as if it were nothing, is the key to our enslavement to power by way of false knowledge, and neither he nor anyone else aside from myself has ever revealed this fact. Agreement amongst scientists is explicable upon the basis of the control of knowledge, into which process academia inducts the chosen few, a process that is made explicable when we understand that there is no such thing as an individual, so that individual persons are made by nature to be thus inducted into a corporate body defined by one mental image, of which the academic case is one special example. It is rather amusing the way he concludes that reason infiltrated religion and brought about its triumph by that means, where the truth is that religion employed the methods of manufacturing reason to devise a fruit of reason to offer in the place of that which reason would of given, if it had existed, and religion could do this because it held the reigns of authority and in the end the only thing that determines what passes for knowledge, is authority, exactly as this cretin indicates. Thus faced with the challenge of reason, religion stopped resisting and went with the flow and gave people what they wanted, exactly as Aesops fable about the struggle between the wind and the sun to see who is stronger tells us we must do if we want to control people. This is the method that authority uses all the time.

Chapter 10

Back to Hoyle
Page 103 Slight hint that the Thing is really God, when he says our being a social animal is seen in our impulse toward conformity represented as divine command. Acting according to conscience is a gratuitous obedience to social convention. Conscience has often been described as an absolute God-given quality : there is a sense in which this statement is valid, for obedience to social convention would appear to be the special wired-in property that makes Man a social animal. I am clutching at straws a bit here to bring this idea into play, which I would so much like to of found voiced in Hoyles work ; but clearly didnt. It is an idea that I have never seen stated anywhere according to my recollection, yet it is such an obvious thought to have from the first moment that we think of the idea that society might be a social organism, a superorganism, or even a Thing ! ___ I love his discussion of alienation on page one hundred and five, it fits in with my personal life story perfectly. He also rightly perceives, on page one hundred and ten, that power falls to the dominant minority, though he does not realise that this is a product of the fact that individuals do not exist so that all that is required to dominate the entire biomass is to form a sufficiently united core of authority, and build a structure to serve as an engine house of power, and that is what the Jews do within civilised societies. But the idea that an organised few may rule a disorganised many is familiar enough. Chapter 10 The Evolution of Humanity Pages 114 - 115 How superorganisms compete and lead to advance by domination which logically leads to the evolution of a culture evolved to perform the specialised function of master race leading to the Jews and hence the slaves of Judaism that has delivered a global society based upon an individual plasticity that serves the one goal of preserving and empowering the master race. ___

This kind of idea is very much in keeping with the sociologically organicist theme found in Howard Blooms Lucifer Principle, 1995, which is the only book I know of to treat human society as a superorganism while calling it by that name. I will not reproduce whole passages from Hoyle, my notes recorded above give the implications of his words according to my ideas. Hoyle sets up the image of powerful societies expanding and imposing themselves on weaker societies, a familiar enough feature of history. He portrays this as a means whereby weaker societies can be enabled to advance as war serves to break up the conventions of the fossilised community, which fits Hoyles model, rather than expressing any logical principles derived from a scientific model of human biological corporate nature. He goes on to give a curiously nuanced view on the relationship between a dominant society exploiting a weak society, whereby the weaker, by acting passively, gets to preserve its culture while absorbing the information of power : So long as the weak community allows itself to be exploited in the commercial sense it is often allowed to proceed as it wills. And in this lies the ultimate downfall of the expanding community. For what the weak group does is to accept those features of the culture of the powerful group that relate to The Thing, but nothing else. Stated differently, the weak accept the technology of the strong but not their moral and ethical conventions. We can see this actually in operation in the world today. The coloured peoples are accepting wholeheartedly the white mans technology, but they are not accepting in any real degree the rest of the white mans culture. Indeed the white man is often actively despised for the rest of his culture. The expanding community thus sows the seeds of its own destruction. As it proceeds along the path toward fossilization it gives away the secrets of its own success to others. Sooner or later one of the weaker communities will chance on a social organization that serves the ends of The Thing even better than its master. This particular community then starts to expand and the cycle is repeated. It is a fascinating picture of cyclical social transformation that Hoyle paints for us, only as we have already come to understand, he has no solid principles rooted in a true conception of human biological nature guiding him in the clever interpretations of life as we see it. Today we find the deeply primitive cultures, personified in Islam, are not only becoming modern technologically, to some degree, they are being imported wholesale into our Western biomass causing our societies to be transformed, and this is because the masters who rule us are an alien element of our own being, specifically the Jews. But it must be understood that Christians are Jews just as much as Jews are, and this is the real secret behind these seemingly carless practices that allow dominant societies to come and go in a shifting pattern working across the biomass of the whole planet. Because the real masters are the Jews this process is a facet of social cleansing that we often discuss, that allows the Jews to farm the host biomass in such a way that everyone gets to experience advancement as they suffer exploitation, to caste these biological conditions in political language, which we ought not to do really because that gets us caught up in the ZOG trap noted above, but this is how people ordinarily speak of matters in which they are themselves involved. Although his explanations are all to cock, it is fascinating to see how his approach to a proper sociological view of human nature causes him to bring forth ideas that can only be explained by a proper sociologically organicist view of humans society, so that we see how the implications of true ideas lead us in the right direction, but never get us there when the wrong principles are allowed to skew the final interpretation. This is an important observation on the process of knowledge formation when we consider such topics as the

formation of the Hitler Taboo by Judaism, serving as a protective mechanism allowing Jewish master race authority to be preserved as knowledge of reality advances, by subverting truth in this subtle manner to produce false science, as in Darwinism, which in turn fuels the creation of the protective taboo in the hands of politicians.

Pages 116 - 117 Precisely it is the superorganism that evolves this happens by releasing the latent potential of human biological nature written into individual somatic form, delivering an ever increasingly empowered superorganism Thing. He gets it, but he doesnt get it. We discussed in an earlier chapter the operation of natural selection as it affects the biological development of the individual animal. There is also a natural selection of groups of individuals that proceeds quite independently of any change in the individual, and which can happen in a period that is much shorter than the time required to produce an appreciable change in the individual. This group evolution applies to all gregarious animals, and it applies with exceptional force to humans. Natural selection in the Darwinian sense refers to individuals in an environment perhaps plus an environment would be better. To apply our analogy we must therefore have groups of humanscommunitiesplus an environment. Now what is the environment that controls the evolution of Man in the group sense ? It is just The Thing, itself. Evolution takes place in such a way that The Thing extends its scope and its power. The Thing progresses. The human individual does not progress except insofar as he is a component of The Thing. History is not the record of the development of human individuals (as in our egoism we like to imagine), but of the development of The Thing. This development has been achieved by the rise and fall of a whole multitude of communities each of which has contributed in some degree. The use of war as a means of breaking up fossilized, overrigid communities is an essential feature of the process. So far, The Thing has been well served by war. Mars has had a high rank among the gods. This is a rather confused piece of reasoning in the vein of the previous sections that we have identified as mixed up. Firstly he wants to say that natural selection applies to societies, and for sure he does begin by saying that he intends to employ an analogical method here, a biological analogy. So this justifies his application of natural selection to social form without meaning that natural selection is really taking place. In other words there is a process of competition between societies that acts like natural selection, but is not really, because it is not a genetic process. But then he represents the environment as the Thing applying at the level of social evolution, such that he makes the Thing that which evolves at the behest of a simulated process of natural selection, while individuals remain as they were, contained within the Thing, the social environment that is, which carries them along through the process of transformation. The human individual does not progress except insofar as he is a component of The Thing. This is a fascinating account of human social life, all too cursory for the subject in hand, which really holds gems of incredible thought that cry out to be opened up to further elaboration, which sadly he never treats us to in any other work, because he was an

astronomer not a sociologist, more is the pity. But the sum total of his reasoning is confused because he never manages to distil the structure from the form, he fails to discern the true nature of individuals as nonexistent elements of an existing living being, despite all these fine assertions that tell us this is the real meaning of his ideas. He even gives us a passable hint as to the most important feature of superorganic physiology, regarding the process of social cleansing, which is indeed at the root of superorganic evolution via the release of the latent potential of genetically evolved human corporate nature, by singling out warfare as crucial to the process. Of course he fails to develop the simplistic idea of warfare facilitating social evolution by allowing a simulation of natural selection to take place between discrete social bodies, by grasping the really radical idea that in fact warfare is a process of internal physiology allowing an established superorganism to sustain itself via a process of constant remaking, that retains the parasitic authority intact by constantly cleansing that portion of the living biomass that inevitably loses its affiliation to the power which was only established through warfare in the first place. And it is this internal, physiological nature of warfare, that is the real secret of warfares endemic presence in human affairs. Obviously the Jewish slave identity programmes us to think in terms of good and evil so that warfare can be made an external, political response to attack, and this is why science is such a threat to religion because it threatens to interpret the Jewish slave identity programme, and it was precisely this danger that the misrepresentation of these dynamics by Hitler was calculated to prevent. But it is so fascinating to see these same areas of interest surface as this close approximation to a true model of human society is employed by Hoyle. This is why religion will not allow modern science to possess the truth, because handling this idea of society as a biological entity is so very dangerous to the religious establishment that rules our world, which is Jewish. Chapter 11 Crisis in the Modern World : The First Problem This is a funny old account. Here he broaches the idea of the impending global world once again. The explanation of endemic warfare as the mechanism of social evolution is made to explain the culmination of a global society in the light of the atomic bomb ! A most curious idea indeed, although we can understand the deep impression this devastating new weapon made on the mind of people living at the time of its use against the Japanese by the American slaves of Judaism. This weapon meant that natural selection could no longer sort out dominant societies, so the Thing now required that only one united global society should exist. An odd thought indeed. He is in effect speaking of the superorganism when he should be speaking of Judaism, which is the identity of the living human animal. But can we imagine him doing that ! We can be sure that he would of been hounded out of society if he had. I was about to sling The Small World of Fred Hoyle as biography is not my thing, and he does not say anything much in this small volume. But he does say that he switched from physics to astronomy on the back of the atom bomb affair, or I thought he did, I cannot find this passage just now so Ill return it to the bookshelves. This would explain why he makes so much of the arrival of this awesome weapon. We can see how his peculiar interpretation of the role of warfare in social evolution derives from his fixation on warfare as something which takes place between societies, leading him to make this fanciful assumption about why a unified world society was now inevitable. Knowing that warfare is in reality all about the organisation of internal structure,

even when we are dealing with prehistoric tribes, where the whole being would include interwarring tribes, their inter-warring activity being what defined the extent of the unified superorganism, as we can see from European history, which has always been characterised by warfare serving to hold European, as in Jewish society, together. This is hardly surprising once we distance ourselves from the ephemeral activity of actual warfare and recognise that the real consequences of warfare concern the formation of elaborate social structures to contain it. Hence it is said that the European Community was conceived as the means to ensure that war of the kind seen across Europe in the two world wars, could never happen again, but such reasoning begs the question really, as in how convenient this excuse is for the unwelcome integration that it means. On page one hundred and twenty one he discusses democracy in a delightful way, However our votes are cast at the next election we shall get very nearly the same thing, one or other of two identical twins. Quite ! But he flies in the face of all his own reasoning on human social life when he says, Who is to blame for this mockery of democracy ? Not the politicians but we ourselves. My notes read thus : I sympathise with his sentiments but as Atheist Science tells us, democracy is a tool serving religious fascism, because individuals do not exist, and that is the reason why voting changes nothing, we are always ruled by the same old lying pigs. He does not seem to learn anything real from all his brilliant theorising, because he refuses to treat humans as objects of nature rather than egotistical self-serving demigods. Chapter 13 Fossilisation : The Third Problem Envisaging the solution of the two great challenges facing humanity, that of war and poverty, by realising one unified global society that has stabilised population growth, Hoyle says this leaves the difficulty of fossilisation that prior to such a happy culmination had not posed a problem, because war had always ensured renewal whenever cultural stagnation set in. My notes offer a different take on this issue, that Hoyle does not consider :

Page 141 This problem is dealt with by realising that we have been living in a one power Jewish world for millennia, that maintains itself by constant internal restructuring through warfare, so we can look forward to constant warfare well into the future ! ___

And the proof of this is the global Islamic terrorism conducted unbeknownst to every one in the name of Judaism right now, since Islam is a Jewish subidentity, something that no one foresaw in the aftermath of the last world war that established the state of Israel. I flipped open a book this morning, 07/10/2013, called The Jewish Spectre by George Warner, 1905, discussing the invalidity of Zionism he says : It seems to you that money can do anything. But anyone who indulges in the fancies that the Zionist puts forth, that the Great Powers will guarantee such a state, should

remember what the guarantee of Armenia is worth, what the moral backing of Macedonia is worth, and then how little Europe cares for Jews as Jews. (p. 265) How wrong could anyone be ? America would rather drop nuclear weapons on itself than see Israel hurt in any way, and we British are no less servile to the purposes of Jews. Without grasping the point that the individual is not the human being, but rather the Thing is, Hoyle has no means of understanding the true nature of warfare as a healthy physiological process related to a living human animal bearing one Jewish identity. Our knowledge of this allows us to understand the positive nature of all warfare, that of the last world war and that of present global terrorism conducted in the name of a Jewish slave religion. We see how warfare amongst the peoples of the world constantly serves to protect the Jews from the biomass they exist within, while advancing their programme of continuing existence at all cost, which is of course the biological imperative of all life, that is written into the human animals superorganic constitution. We could almost see Warners observation as a pointer to the Jews to induce world war, and to make sure that it was directed by a man just like Hitler, since, as we know, this is what overcame the difficulty that is asserted as an insurmountable barrier in the above quote, written just over four decades before the establishment of Israel, guaranteed by the great powers ! Wednesday, 20 November 2013 Warfare is therefore not a negative activity that just happens to have beneficial consequences, as in preventing cultural stagnation. Durr! Warfare is an essential, positive social behaviour, vital to the health and wellbeing of the human animal, the superorganism. What Hoyle identifies negatively as fossilisation, really denotes the positive action of growth that could be likened to the process whereby reptiles slough off a skin to allow their scaly surface to reform at a newly extended limit. Looking at this subject the other way round we can make the tendency toward fossilisation take on its true positive form, by recognising that the analogy with moulting is more than just an analogy, for human societies do indeed moult regularly, that is to say they shed their identities to allow a new one to take shape. Last night, 19/11/2013, Newsnight had a piece on some doyen of the fashion world that must of popped off, I did not see the report, but as I was about to leave the room to perform my nightly ablutions ready for bed, an interesting justification was offered for the importance of fashion. The lady said that the first thing that is done when an incoming authority is established, is that the clothing is changed. So that when the communists (Jews) took over in China, gone were the pigtails and in came a uniform dress code. A nice observation, which in itself it tells us nothing, but properly interpreted it says a lot, and here we can see that it even ties in directly with the idea of sloughing off an outer skin to allow the living tissue to grow into a different mould. This idea explains why instead of banishing the hijab or alien clothing in general, the mark of ugly alien cultures being dragged by their millions into Europe now, are being encouraged by the state, to bring their skins of corporate identity with them, because the Master (Thing) wants to transform Europe into part of its global being. The adoption of new skins of corporate identity seen in the outbreak of tattooing meanwhile, is a sign of the indigenous population having been cut adrift from its core identity because of the internecine wars it has been subjected to in order to achieve precisely this goal, allowing the transformation of a stable cultural bloc obedient to Judaism, to grow toward a global world ruled by Judaism. Judaism remains Judaism, while all else changes, exactly as the human animal requires it should. Tuesday, 08 October 2013 My search for redundant books led me to Conflict by Georg Simmel, which seems to be a portion of his work selected for translation, rather than a whole

book. The Foreword says this book might well have borne also the sub-title : Essays on Social Organisation. For Simmel sees conflict as part of the dynamic by which some men are drawn together (p. 9). I was unable to find anything of note in this book because Simmel is totally committed to the false idea that humans are individuals. Even so I was pleased to come across a book that makes the idea of bad things positive, no matter how badly this is done, it is a rare example of this natural, as in scientific logic, applied to war :

The Sociological Nature of Conflict

CONFLICT AS SOCIATION
THE SOCIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE of conflict (Kampf) has in principle never been disputed. Conflict is admitted to cause or modify interest groups, unifications, organizations. On the other hand, it may sound paradoxical in the common view if one asks whether irrespective of any phenomena that result from conflict or that accompany it, it itself is a form of sociation. At first glance, this sounds like a rhetorical question. If every interaction among men is a sociation, conflictafter all one of the most vivid interactions, which, furthermore, cannot possibly be carried on by one individual alonemust certainly be considered as sociation. And in fact, dissociating factorshate, envy, need, desireare the causes of conflict ; it breaks out because of them. Conflict is thus designed to resolve divergent dualisms ; it is a way of achieving some kind of unity, even if it be through the annihilation of one of the conflicting parties. This is roughly parallel to the fact that it is the most violent symptom of a disease which represent the effort of the organism to free itself of disturbances and damages caused by them. But this phenomenon means much more than the trivial si vis pacem para bellum [if you want peace, prepare for war] ; it is something quite general, of which this maxim only describes a special case. Conflict itself resolves the tension between contrasts. The fact that it aims at peace is only one, an especially obvious, expression of its nature : the synthesis of elements that work both against and for one another. This nature appears more clearly when it is realized that both forms of relationthe antithetical and the convergentare fundamentally distinguished from the mere indifference of two or more individuals or groups. Whether it implies the rejection or the termination of sociation, indifference is purely negative. In contrast to such pure negativity, conflict contains something positive. Its positive and negative aspects, however, are integrated ; they can be separated conceptually, but not empirically. (Conflict, pp. 13 14)

It is of course a familiar argument that warfare is good for society in the eugenic sense of removing the unfit, but Simmels argument is more scientific in that it concerns itself with the idea of aiding the development of social structure, according to the introductory remarks at least. The central idea to grasp hold of from the above passage is that denoted by the contrived word sociation, which is evidently meant to cater to the idea that people are individuals who agree to associate for mutual benefit, rather than speaking of social behaviour implying something acting upon individuals in a manner over which they have no control, which idea must be avoided by official science because it is the truth. Saying this, we can see that the use of this word in the above making conflict a form of sociation conforms to our refrain that all behaviour is social, including war, rape, murder, robbery, terrorism, bullying, slavery, and so on. Because the reason for humans engaging in these

expressly human behaviours is that humans do not exist as ends in themselves, and these behaviours express the deep interdependence of individuals that means they must live their lives through one another, however that throughness is arrived. As we have explained when dealing with this topic, one of the most fundamental devices of the Jewish slave identity programme is the division of actions into good and evil by the application of bias meaning, this being why we end up with war denoted as bad, as in antisocial, but as good under special circumstances, as when we are defending ourselves from evil. Needless to say, Simmel goes nowhere near this degree of elaboration, he adheres strictly to the definitions provided by Jewish slave programming, only stretching the usual meanings slightly in order to play at being a sociologist, so that society has priests of this denomination to turn to for a fake science of sociology. In essence then, we would agree that war is a social behaviour, though in reality if individuals do not exist then all behaviour is social from a scientific point of view. The analogy of disease in relation to conflict is one we use because war is regarded as a social cleansing phenomenon, that serves to rid society of the disruptive portion of the biomass that is decaying in its identity affiliation to the master identity of Judaism, that has given the biomass is established slave identity. Simmel obviously has no such thoughts interfering with his mindless discussion of this topic. The other point we ought to pick up is the mention of negative behaviours, as in hate, envy, need, desire that we have already indicated can, like warfare, only be positive social behaviours, since there cannot be such a thing as a negative behaviour found under normal conditions, this bias idea is a product of linguistic identity programming, as we have just indicated above. The fact that Simmel invokes bad behaviours as the provocation of a culminating bad behaviour that returns activity to a balanced state, indicates that he is treating the individual as the subject here, rather than conceiving of society as some kind of whole entity. The very idea of badness versus goodness represents the penetration of religion into secular formulas pretending to be scientific. This sentence has a nice ring to it : Conflict itself resolves the tension between contrasts. This can be related to the social cleansing dynamic whereby we make the rule of Judaism induce anti-Semitism as a way of cleansing the slave biomass of accumulating tensions, to return society to a state of tranquillity under Judaism, as we are constantly describing. If we examine a book such as The Outlook for Religion by W. E. Orchard, 1917, which is full of passages bemoaning the end of religion and asking if it can survive in any form, and we relate this view to the present time when the domination of religion is probably greater than at any time in human history, we can understand that the secret to the positive answer to the fake anguish of Orchard, has been the use of war to devastate our society. A war that we supposedly won, but which has destroyed our English secular culture, gives a real sense of how war serves Judaisms plan to rule humanity as set out in the Bible, by devastating the societies Judaism rules, while always pretending the conflicts are about good societies fighting erupting evil that commandeers other societies, of which there is always an endless supply, for some mysterious reason : because of the existence of evil. Thursday, 21 November 2013 I reached The Twilight of Atheism by McGrath, 2004, on my bookshelves yesterday, this is an historically formulated piece of religious propaganda showing how religion has triumphed over atheism. Naturally this is just Judaism taking possession of history to suit its purposes, now the war has been won, but the war that won this battle was a conventional military war, a war of social cleansing, not the intellectual battle portrayed in this victory celebration by McGrath. ___

The final comments taken above are a little vague or too philosophical to be certain of their exact meaning, but within them there is the simple statement that conflict contains something positive, which again, is nice because it certainly evokes the idea of preserving the human superorganism in such a way that we are able to understand why warfare is synonymous to religion in the ubiquity of its presence amongst humans, in all times, and all places. As a general observation on this work by Simmel, we can say that the subject of conflict as a positive aspect of human social life really tests the alternative pivots of observation, because the contrast between the significance of this idea when employed under the influences of the false idea of human individuality, compared to the reality that the human animal is a superorganism, is as complete as the differences that would arise in astronomy when trying to understand the heavens according to a geocentric versus a heliocentric model of the heavens. Pages 146 147 Humanity as a whole is a living organism with properties that are not readily perceived by a consideration of individual components. I have sought to stress this very point in earlier chapters by referring to this large-scale organism as The Thing. It is high time that more study was devoted to the properties of The Thing. In this way it may eventually be possible to gain a far greater understanding of human affairs than we possess at present, and with understanding may come the measure of control that we are now so manifestly lacking. In the meantime some helpful things can be said. While it is certain that a clash between the interests of the individual and The Thing is more than likely to end in the victory of The Thing, it is important to realize that many features of our social organizations are of indifferent interest to The Thing. In such matters we possess a genuine freedom of choice, and there is no reason why the choice should not take such a form as to secure maximum concessions to the individual. An example may be of interest. We have seen that a clash exists between The Thing and our present desire to build a multipower world. The Thing demands a single-power world, and I think that whatever we do as individuals and whatever we want, it will be a single-power world that we shall ultimately get. But a single-power world is not the same thing as a world of cultural uniformity. In the Swiss Confederation the different cantons act together for purposes of defense and national finance, but they differ greatly in their internal domestic organizations and even in their languages. In a like manner we can imagine a single-power world in the economic and military sense, but not in the cultural sense. There seems no reason why a culturally diversified world should not persist, and why cultural differences should not play a big part in the avoidance of international fossilization. In short it is important that in the future we should separate clearly those things that we must do from those that we need not do. The necessity for a singlepower world is overriding but the necessity for a world of conformity is not. The more picturesque differences of custom the better, even within what we regard today as a single nation. This is a culminating section of Hoyles Man and Materialism, as is plain to see, from its bold assertion of the super individual nature of the humanity. The only snag here is that this representation of the human animal is not unique, it had long been asserted that humanity

formed a whole being, which makes the conception of humanity akin to the definition of species. This harks back to the old argument stemming from the roots of anthropology when it was questioned whether or not humanity had one point of origin, and thus constituted one species. The argument was put to bed by men like James Prichard in his Researches into the Physical History of Man, 1813, in which chapter three is entitled Inquiry whether all mankind are of one race or stock. As such this seemingly sociologically organicist slant from Hoyle is in reality not all that it seems to be, it is more ducking and diving, but it certainly looks good. This habit of overshooting the true being is seen in the idea of the earth as an organism, or other unities, God as creator of the universe is a similar example of overshooting as a way of missing reality, the one thing that no one has ever suggested is the idea of a human organism based on Judaism, the one unity that would actually be correct ! And of course this issue of Judaism is crucial in respect to the idea Hoyle puts forward in the above passage, whereby cultural diversity is allowed despite political unity, because Judaism will not tolerate any competition for the ruling identitythere can only be oneall must be Jews, or nothing. Although of course Jews are a covert master race, whereby natures trick is to allow people to be Jews by another name, this is how evolution works from viruses up, by creating the ruling somatic identity at the level of information. Hoyles idea of a happy world of freedom under one ruling authority is a highly simplistic view, borne of a total failure to understand his subject, put forward on the assertion of having an exceptional understanding of his subject ! Which is intensely frustrating because he is certainly closer than anyone else in his general line of reasoning, that moves away from individual existence toward a ruling corporate being. The reason Muslims have been brought into Europe was to allow the progress of unification to proceed under the master identity of Judaism, along with all the other religious identities that have been imported in numbers, Hindu, Sikh and so on. Whereby Hoyles plan for diversity is realised, but in a strictly religious, Jewish friendly form, mimicking the cultural diversity which in reality has been selectively exterminated, to allow Judaism to remain the basis of global power. This is not a political action, it is a biological process based on the dynamics of linguistic force. If Judaism did not have the power to direct human affairs at the corporate level then the corporate level would not of reached the present degree of unification that it has, based as it is upon the triadic identity of Judaism. In other words the only way that globalisation can occur is through this eternal process of social cleansing through the combined action of dissolving war, and resetting law, always focused upon the selective nurturing of Jewish friendly religious identity. It is this Jewish point of focus that allows the nation states of the world to always know what laws to pass, and how to organise their political actions, even though no actual individuals have any idea that this is what they are doing, they are guided toward this unity of mind by the various identities that possess them, that are always Jewish at the root of their being. Any apparent success of Switzerland in permitting true cultural diversity within political unity, is too localised to represent the real nature of the corporate dynamic that lies behind the process of globalisation under Judaism, which derives from human biological corporate nature, expressed through the power of linguistic force that creates all social form. In other words, any apparent freedom in this example is an illusion.

My notes for this passage read thus : Humanity as a whole is an organism Thing is an organism. Finally he blurts it out in a limited and confused fashion, but it is getting there ! Humanity is not an organism ridiculous. The human species is a species of superorganic mammal that appears as a superorganism, you cannot therefore say that humanity is a superorganism, that is plainly

nonsense, it confuses two distinct ideas humanity as a type of animal, and the animal as it is as a physical entity, as a thing indeed. To say that humanity is a superorganism is therefore like saying the mammalian superorganism is a superorganism a meaningless statement that arises here because Hoyle refuses to bite the bullet and dismiss the individual outright, by recognising the reality that our species is a superorganic species, and therefore the human animal as a physical, living form, is a superorganism. 147 Tragically his grand example backfires because of his failure to understand our real nature, meaning that Jews are the master race and the One world has to be uniformly made to serve the Jews ambition to rule all humanity. If he knew this he could recommend that we resist religion, as I do, but then, like him, I recognise that we are powerless to resist the Thing embodied in Jewish form, the Nazis teach us that, and Darwinism seen as the subversion of modern science, shows just how futile any desire for freedom really is, sadly. Except the illusion of freedom, which is in fact what human life is all about, this is what language exists to deliver to the individual, to make the individual a unit of superorganic being.

Page 149 Hoyles thinking leads him naturally toward a consideration of what an ideal society would consist of, as in a utopia. Continuing his theme he introduces the idea of a living dynamic which deals with the problem of fossilisation, that he has identified as the ultimate threat to human wellbeing. Thus he concludes that a feedback process would be the basis of the ideal society. This sets aside the nature of an ideal, and instead asserts the necessity of orderliness based upon the regular removal of undesirable inconsistencies. This tallies with a fundamental principle of human nature related to the formation of social order, whereby it is often realised that any order is better than none, with a better order always being more desirable than a less ordered state ; though we can see the flipside of this idea coming under consideration in Fabre-Lucres piece above, where he talks about the natural proclivity that humans have for sustaining an insect like social lifestyle that threatens to reduce us to the status of insect like automatons. Hoyles thoughts on the future prospects of human happiness in society, drew the usual acerbic response from me : Utopia realised in reality through a stabilising feedback loop, is precisely the trick captured by Judaism to ensure that eternal social cleansing decimates everything but itself hence the longevity of Jews and the rise of their slave extensions Christianity and Islam. If only Hoyle had grasped this why didnt he ? Because he did not have the major inconsistency of religion before his minds eye, as I have. He was always prepared to treat religion as just another facet of life, which it absolutely is not. Chapter 14 The Religious Impulse in Man Pages 150 151 The failure of his reasoning reaches its climax as he handles the most important subject of language, and explains it in terms of a tool serving individual ends having to do with personal expression. Rather than as a biological process whose function is to organise individuals into forming a social structure where the precise expression of ideas is utterly irrelevant, as long as expression there is. The delivery of a consistent, uniform, indelible

message is all that matters its rational, or factual content, is of minimal concern to the human animal that requires language in order for it to exist as a living being, as a Thing. Hoyle presents language as a way of labelling ideas, which he says leads to more confusion over religion than in any other aspect of communication. This he attributes to the penchant religious people have for displacing a question, which means replacing one obscure label with another instead of offering a material explanation grounding the label in reality. My notes on this argument show that Hoyles treatment follows the usual priestly atheist pattern of making out that religion is a deleterious phenomenon of one kind or another, here it is being treated as a linguistic kind of stupidity or error. But, as with religion itself, this endless linguistic displacement avoiding being pinned down, is precisely what language is for, in order that a superorganic identity can be produced in the form of false knowledge, as in religion, which constitutes a linguistic identity programme that can then be implanted into the brains of the cellular units of superorganic being US. Pages 154 155 Hoyle links religion to a sense of purpose rooted in the individual as the object of existence. We have often said that the Jewish master race give humanity its purpose of ruling the world by incorporating all humans into the Jewish superorganism, within which the Jews are the living core, as proven by the Christian devotion to Israel, matched by a like kind of devotion in Islam, which has Jerusalem as a holy city. So religion does carry a purpose linked to the real directive biological force of human biological corporate nature that created the Jews, as it creates all social form. Hoyle senses reality, but makes no sense of it. His identification of humans with the universe is a linguistically generated image of the real object of human existence that he calls the Thing, and Jews call God, and is in reality the human animal as superorganism. He naively envisages a new, more rational religion, while the Thing goes about is merry way decimating European society to draw in tens of millions of deeply primitive aliens who, as he said, have accepted our modern technology while retaining a deep fixation on their cultural ways. Thus the Thing, as he says, wins all ways, and carries on acting in obedience to its own purpose.

Page 157 He proves that God does not exist by showing that God is the universe wrong, the linguistic symbol God represents the superorganism. Nice to see the basic principles of proving God does not exist being employed though, even if the method is presented in this flawed way, and the answer given is incorrect !

Conclusion
A remarkable book that peters out rather unremarkably with a whimper, rather a bang. Shame. Hoyle was not a sociologist, he was an astronomer, and as such his novel treatment of human nature and the nature of human society, would be dismissed as the amateurish ramblings of a famous academic stepping outside his field. For us however, this transgression provides the best treatise on human sociology I have ever seen, in terms of its capture of the real scientific essence of the subject. This is a remarkable thing worth a moments thought. The significant thing about me as regards my amateurish success at realising the aim of all philosophy, attaining the pinnacle of human endeavour, singlehandedly, is likewise my attitude. From the clutch of books I bought relating to Hoyle nothing much captured my first examination, but last night, 19/11/2013, I spotted a delightful observation on Hoyles attitude of mind which makes him one with me in respect of singlemindedness, and self reliance of thought : Frontiers of Astronomy merely speculates on element synthesis in supernovas. In the period 1958-1960, Hoyle and Fowler created the astrophysical theory needed to understand synthesis. Their working methods can hardly have been more different. Fowler started any new problem by carefully reading all the literature, looking for clues to a solution. Hoyle made a point of reading the current literature but not the older papers ; this sometimes led to sharp criticisms that he ignored the work of others. When the two were together, Fowler would listen to a blackboard lecture as Hoyle tried to work out a problem from first principles. Sooner or later, he would get stuck and they would terminate the conversation. Within a day or two, however, Hoyle would have found a solution, not by reading back issues of Astrophysical Journal in the library, but through his own pen-and-ink efforts. His fiercely independent streak would not allow him to rely on the prior results of others. (Conflict in the Cosmos, Simon Mitton, 2005, p. 241.) And in our world, independence of mind makes all the difference. There is some peculiar material in his autobiography where he talks about the disadvantages of coming from a privileged home, in terms of being educated, because everything is laid out for your future. I am going from memory after reading this a week or so back. But one remark caught my attention for it was a great revelation to me, drawn from my own experience of going to college. I went to college because I had a nagging question about why religion existed and what humans were, so I decided that I wanted to study anthropology. The course was rubbish and I left at the beginning of the second year to become a hippy dropout. But as the years went by, and now that I have grasped that intellectuals and academics of all kinds have not the slightest interest in knowledge, in truth that is, but are only interested in knowledge as a possession, just as a tradesman would be possessive of the skills that earn them a living, so I think back to the student life and recognise that people do not go to university because they are interested in knowledge, but because they are looking for status and privilege, which is derived from getting a degree that grants access to higher status positions. I find this fact soul destroying, and it explains everything about the disgusting state of our world, but that is a personal attitude, most people would not see it, just as I was amazed to discover that university was about obtaining privilege, not learning. Boy am I an idiot or what ! Hoyle has a passage where he refers to the privileged youth going to university in order to get a good job, and how this means that people are going to university for the wrong

reasons, which struck a definite chord with my ideas on this subject. Unfortunately I cannot locate anything I have captured from his Small World of Fred Hoyle, there is no index or chapter heading, and I just cannot recover the couple of fragments I have obviously read last week. But once again we see how his attitude is, just like mine, is all about wanting real knowledge, which means wanting truth, and this desire for actual truth is such a rare thing in an individual, and it is not what the system of knowledge organisation in society is about. ___ A little backup : Monks recalls the moment he first realized what was wrong with the corporation. Lodged in a motel room in a small town where he had stopped for the night during an early-1970s election campaign, he awoke with a start in the middle of the night, his eyes aflame with irritation. When he got up to look out the window, he was shocked by what he sawmounds of white foam floating down the river on whose banks the motel was perched. Monks went back to sleep and the next morning asked a clerk what had happened during the night. Well, look, the clerk told him, every night the paper company sends the stuff down the river. . . . Dont you understand, thats how we get rid of the effluent from the paper mills. Monks knew a lot of people in the townthe mayor, the people who worked in the mills, the mill owners. And, he says, I knew that there wasnt a person in there who wanted to have the river polluted, not a person. And yet here were living in a world where its happening every night. Monks realized at that moment, he says, that the corporation, an institution to which he had devoted his life, was in fact a doom machine. The difficulty with the corporate entity, he now believes, is that it has a dynamic that doesnt take into account the concerns of flesh-and-blood human people who form the world in which it exists; that in our search for wealth and for prosperity, we created a thing thats going to destroy us. Ray Anderson, another highly successful businessman, agrees with Monks. He describes the corporation as a present day instrument of destruction because of its compulsion to externalize any cost that its unwary or uncaring public will allow it to externalize. Like Monks, Anderson, founder and chairman of Interface, Inc., the worlds largest commercial carpet manufacturer, had a late-career epiphany about the institution to which he had devoted his life. Until that moment, he says, he never gave a thought to what we were taking from the earth or doing to the earth in the making of our products. Today, he believes, the notion that we can take and take and take and take, waste and waste, and waste and waste, without consequences is driving the biosphere to destruction. (The Corporation, Bakan, 2004, pp. 70 71.) An account like this backs up Hoyles thinking in a delightful way. We see the corporation identified by the exact same term, as thing, created in precisely the same unwitting, unstoppable manner, as the cumulative effect of myriad human actions taking place within a structure that has become autonomous in accordance with dynamics that are built into itself, giving it a life of its own, independent of human will. What we do not have in the above is any deeper conceptual idea of what this phenomenon is all about. Hoyles Man and Materialism is all about this deeper insight into the social process of Thingness, as we might call it, this sense of something unbidden arising from human endeavour that, so the story goes, only seeks to provide for the innocent wants of individuals.

Recently I wrote a letter to my MP about a planning issue, in which I employed the idea of a global force directing these developments in such a way that the government acted like the corporation portrayed above. So that it overrode the peoples desires because it was obliged to meet the demands of corporate business embodied in the globalised world, that we are all familiar with in terms of the argument about bankers pay and corporate tax avoidance, where we are always being told that businesses will move their business elsewhere if the government does not create a friendly regime for them to operate in. The dynamic is the same, this is Thingness, but no one ever recognises it as such, because religion will not allow us to do so, even if our biological corporate nature would.

I Hoyles Thing as Secular Object of Human Consciousness To conclude we can take a passage that actually provides a discussion of the real proof that God does not exist, into which we can slot Hoyles idea of the Thing as a secular manifestation of the human consciousness of the divine object, that this passage makes central to its reasoning about what God is in reality. The intention of the author is not to prove God does not exist, quite the opposite, but he does handle the proper material for presenting such a proof, by making the supreme subject of religion from a questioning point of view, an atheist point of view indeed, not a question of whether or not God exists, but what God is ? And yet, while thus claiming the limit not to go fully into a subject which would certainly require far more space than is here at my disposal for its adequate treatment, I shall approach the contrast we are now to consider by recalling a peculiarity which I have already mentioned as attaching to religious experiences ; namely, that there is often demanded a proof of the existence of its object, and by saying something about this demand, its meaning, its justification, and the response which may be made to it. I have already called attention to the circumstance that Religion is a subjective, not an objective term ; that is, it describes a certain attitude of ours, not the nature of the object towards which we adopt this attitude. This circumstance may perhaps be thought to encourage the attempt now so common to approach Religion from the subjective side. But this method of approach will not save us from the necessity of facing the difficulty raised by the demand for a proof of the existence of its object. For, so far as Religion is or involves a kind of consciousness, it must be the consciousness of something, of an object ; and ultimately our only evidence of the existence of anything must lie in our consciousness of it, or in our consciousness of something in which its existence is involved. Thus the religious consciousness is sufficient evidence of the existence of its object, just as the aesthetic consciousness is sufficient evidence of the existence of Beauty ; and so far as we mean by God no more than the object of the religious consciousness, the existence of God is not really doubtful at all. The possibility of illusion no more constitutes a difficulty here than anywhere else. Ultimately our only evidence of the existence of light is that we see it ; when the optic nerve is stimulated by a blow, we see stars, as it is called ; but we could not describe this experience as resembling the perception of light without assuming that the real perception of light is something with which we are acquainted. There is a genuine difficulty, well worth

discussion, which might be raised at this point, as to the principle of the distinction which we draw between the real and the illusory, or, as it may be otherwise put, as to what it is that the real and the illusory experience have in common. This difficulty, however, I do not now raise ; for it is no way peculiar to Religion, but applies equally to all forms of consciousness ; and it is not a universal scepticism, but a scepticism in respect of Religion as distinguished from other kinds of consciousness, with which I am here concerned. In a certain sense, then, I should be prepared to say that the existence of God, so long as we mean by God no more than the object of the religious consciousness, is not really doubtful. That is, the religious consciousness has, like all consciousness, some object. But we have to explain why we feel doubt to be possible in this case as we do not, for example, in respect of the existence of Beauty, to revert to an illustration of which I have several times made use. The explanation of this fact I should find in the fact that the religious sentiment is a sentiment for an object which is regarded as not merely its object, but as somehow the fundamental or ultimate reality. Such a statement may well be thought paradoxical and absurd, when we remember what may be and has been at various times and in various places called God and worshipped. But I believe it, notwithstanding, to be essentially true. Worship is doubtless far older than the capacity for any such feats of abstraction as are implied in the use of such a phrase as ultimate reality. But is there not from the first in our sentiment towards the object of worship something which from the first would not be excited, except by something which is imagined as holding in itself that mystery or secret, which, as the worshippers horizon widens, we come at last to realize is the mystery of the ultimate ground of all things ? The demand for a proof that God exists is not really the demand for a proof that there is an object of religious experience. That there is such an object the existence of the experience itself affords sufficient testimony ; but that this object is truly what it gives itself out to be, the secret and mystery of existence, may certainly be doubted, and in point of fact the progress of religion is marked by the desertion one after another of idols which are found not to be what they gave themselves out to be, that is, not to be gods at all. And this, I think, is, at each stage of the history of religion, the meaning of the continually recurring doubt of Gods existence ; it means the doubt whether what we have been accustomed to call God is God at all. In the last resort of all it means the doubt whether the ultimate nature of reality, if it were known as it really is, would continue to excite the religious sentiment of reverence and worship ; whether, in fact, not merely is this or that conception of the divine inadequate to satisfy the demands of that sentiment, but whether indeed there is any satisfactory (though, as we have seen, there is certainly some) object of religious experience ; whether what seems worshipful may not prove no fundamental or ultimate character of reality, and therefore after all not worshipful at all. Were what is thus doubtfully suggested actually true, with the discovery of the truth religion must sicken and die. Such a doubt is indeed one which may and which does arise ; and perhaps such doubt is the condition of the profoundest religious consciousness, in which it becomes the measure of the inadequacy of its attainment, and thus a stimulus to further wrestling with him whose true name, as in the old legend of wrestling Jacob, is still withheld, so that even for those that so far prevailed there is something yet in store. Religious experience has so far progressively prevailed ; mankind has not ceased, and shows no sign of ceasing, despite all their far-reaching doubts, to find in the world something which excites the religious sentiment ; the veriest nightmares of doubt witness to the fact that Reality, even while offering to our view aspects which seem most unworshipful, is still divine

enough by continuing to excite the religious sentiment, to create this terrible sense of contradiction between what are both alike experienced attributes of Reality. Hence, using the word God now not merely in the sense of the object of the religious consciousness, but with the conscious implication that nothing can continue to be the object of the religious consciousness which is known not to be ultimate or fundamental, I should be disposed to think that the great question for the thinker about religion is not whether God exists, but rather what God is. But here too we shall be met by the objection that we are but playing with words ; that the plain man when he asks whether God exists does not mean by God anything so vague as we here have in mind ; he means, Does there exist a particular being, un nomm Dieu, who, we have been told, exists, whom we cannot well prove not to exist, but whom there seems no strong reason for supposing to exist ? Such an objection is raised, for example, by Dr. McTaggart, in his interesting book. Some Dogmas of Religion. Dr. McTaggart holds that the only natural and proper meaning of the word God is that of a being who is personal, supreme, and good. These expressions he further defines as follows : In calling him personal, I mean to assert that he is self-conscious, that he has that awareness of his own existence which I have of my own existence. In calling him supreme I do not mean to assert that he is omnipotent, but that he is at the least much more powerful than any other being, and so powerful that his volition can profoundly affect the whole sum of existence. In calling him good I do not mean to assert that he is perfect, but that he is, at the least, of such a nature that he would be rightly judged to be more good than evil. We might observe that Gods have not always been conceived at all stages of religious development as predominantly good. But Dr. McTaggart is quite within his rights in looking to the highest developments of religion. It is true in some of these highest developments, in Buddhism for example, there is no God in Dr. McTaggarts sense of the word, but then in Buddhism the object of religion is not described by any word which we could well render in our language by God. In the highest developments of what we may call theistic religion, or, as Dr. McTaggart expresses it, in Western theology, God is certainly held to be a being at least more good than evil. Dr. McTaggart then would insist that God is a word which is only used in a way that can honestly be regarded as consonant with the common usage of the word in plain, unphilosophical English, when it is used to imply a powerful and predominantly good person ; and using the word God in this sense, he finds no sufficient proof of the existence of such a being. But it may well be doubted whether religious people really do think of God in the way described by Dr. McTaggart. (Problems in the Relations of God and Man, Webb, 1915, pp. 140 146.) The second paragraph states the principle that consciousness must have a real object behind it, even if the object that consciousness conceives of is not commensurate with that actual object. The scientific proof that God does not exist does indeed rest upon this perfectly accurate principle, for we prove that God does not exist by showing what God is in reality, God being the figure of consciousness that represents the human animal that we are part of, the human superorganism that is. The ensuing expansion of the argument is questionable in places, where it speaks of beauty as an unquestioned reality for example. But it does make some fine points too. It is well said that the all pervading sense of the divine is a proof that something exists to stimulate this idea, and the discussion of primitive ideas being the first fumbling along the path to clarity about the true foundation of existence, raises an important issue about the ever present sense of something having a bearing on the lives experienced by all peoples, no

matter what level of social complexity they exist within. However it is in the last part that we discover the sure signs of religious bias, rather than a true search for the actual object of divine ideas. We know the human animal is a superorganism and that religion is the identity of that animal which serves to incorporate individuals into the animal being, so that the shift from raw to sophisticated models of the object of divine being is not about increasing wisdom in the person, but increasing complexity in the anatomy of human superorganic form, which is created by linguistic force elaborating a linguistic identity programme commensurate with increasing complexity. Hence ideas of the divine object become more sophisticated as the object of divinity becomes more complex, in a feedback process occurring between the information of creation and the form created. We can see as his argument proceeds, that he is a devotee of religion, handling the question of doubt, which he is seeking to reassure us is permissible, but in the end, unjustified. Even so, the line that he takes is perfect for our atheist science, as it raises the prospect of the true object of religious belief being found and revealed to be unworthy of worship, and that is certainly what has been accomplished by our Atheist Science, and indeed if our ideas could be made public they would destroy religion. Yet in 1915 the reality that society was a social organism, and hence society is the true object of divine sensibilities, was out there, the likes of Durkheim even went so far as to say as much in their discussions on the nature of religion, but not for much longer, as the process of social cleansing that would erase this consciousness of the true object of divine being from the social biomass had already begun. This conflicting consciousness of reality as it is had to be erased, because what this man describes is true, religion is annihilated by the truth. Webbs handling of the idea is the usual priestcraft, for he acts all innocent about what his ideas mean, whereas religion crushed our world in order to ensure that the true object would never be known, and that is the true nature of religion, because it is the true nature of life, red in tooth and claw. We should note that the superorganism provides a valid explanation for existence as far as the question of what existence is has any meaning for us, and in that sense the superorganism is a worthy object of divine being, possessing all the attributes of God. We derive all our amazing gifts from the evolution of this extraordinary animal that we are part of, it is responsible for our power of speech and our ability to know ourselves, and the existence we enjoy. Thus the being of the superorganism is everything that God could ever be, but it is not God, and knowing the true object for what it is, it cannot be worshipped as God, and so religion must die in the face of truth. Except, religion cannot die, for if it does then the superorganism dies, and then humans are no more. So that direct knowledge of the true object is unknowable, and that is why the emergence of this knowledge came to a critical end about the time that the above passage was written ; which might have some bearing upon why such an unusually insightful work was written at this time. Finally we have this excellent statement declaring that the question for atheists, lets say, is not if God exists ? But what God is ? And that is the best thing ever to see stated. It took me a long time to get to this realisation for myself, and certainly if I had not got there of my own accord then this man would be of no assistance, because he does not tell us that the true object of worship is the human animal as superorganism, or even that society is a midpoint in this reality. But in our search for material related to our insight, this is just the kind of thing we are looking for, we never expect to find anything confirming what we assert, but we are always searching for confirmation by approximation, and this is as good as it gets as far as approximations go. There is nothing for us in the discussion of McTaggarts views, they are included for the sake of completeness, showing something of the manner in which people might try and confound the beauty of the insight provided in the above, by Webb, by his revealing the true object of atheist interest, as in the question what God is, not whether God exists ?

At the very time when, in fulfilment of ancient prophecy, the Jewish people were in expectation of the advent of the Messiah, the Gentile nations, awaking to the consciousness that their idols were no gods and their philosophy vain, were panting for something higher and more satisfying. (Early Church History, Backhouse, 1892, p. 3.) Here we have a neat example of the idea lying behind the principle enunciated by Webb, as Backhouse speaks of the instinctive habit of worship finding itself fixated upon false objects, is made ready for the true object of divine being, Judaism in this case, but it could equally be Hoyles Thing, if Hoyle had wanted to create a new religion, or our superorganism, if anyone wanted to do science and locate the actually true object of all human worship.

II Capturing Thingness Below we have a passage from a modern book dealing with that tricky subject of information, that has become such an important concern for Atheist Science due to the manner in which we have made Information a natural force creating life, making information synonymous to life, and not existing apart from life. To arrive at this definition we have made the defining attribute of information its being read, reading being a behaviour that only living entities can engage in. This attribute of information is not a contrivance on our part, we have arrived at this position by working backwards from the realisation that the human animal is a superorganism created by linguistic force. Thus from the logic of linguistic force creating social form we have worked our way back through genetic information to the abstract principle of information as a force related to the creation of living form. This requires that a distinction be made between information contained in nonliving form that is accessed by living forms, hence we make the reading of information the defining attribute of information. Thus structural content of a nonliving form is not information unless, and until, it is read by a living form. This makes sense because the idea of information contains the suggestion of an act of reading which is not present in the structure of nonliving matter. It is the act of reading information that distinguishes living from nonliving therefore, because reading information is the basis of sensory perception from which behaviour, as opposed to reaction, arises. This reading attribute thereby draws a line between nonliving structure and living structure, where nonliving structure only becomes information when it is accessed by a living structure. This allows us to make information specific to life, and nonexistent in inanimate nature, which in turn allows us to treat humans as part of nature, a principle that must accrue from seeing the human animal as a superorganism. This suggests that the origin of life is to be defined by the act of reading, so that when complex molecules read the structure of molecules in such a way that they were able to extract energy from that structure to extend themselves, this act of reading to access energy imitated the onset of matter based on the reading of information, which reaches its pinnacle in the human superorganism. The passage below is delightful for the way it actually uses the word thing in that very place where Hoyles argument locates Thingness, in the realms of knowledge, that is information, lying above the level of individual being. Lying above the level simply means that knowledge accumulates over a time scale where individuals come and go. And it does so in a way that carries an important suggestion of Thingness as described by Hoyle, because

Gleick is saying that when talking about information being sent we must not think in terms of any thing, being handled. This is significant because it ties in with the idea of the superorganism as real, despite not existing as a material form that we can see in itself, because the superorganism only exists as a manifestation of information which, Gleick is saying, has no material existence, and only exists by virtue of the forms that carry it. And therein we capture the true nature of Thingness as it is identified by Hoyle when he uses the idea of a Thing, that we say has its true objective being in the human animal as a superorganism. We should just note before reading the selection from Gleick, that forms that carry information are created by the information they carry, so that form and information cannot be separated, and our doing so for purposes of understanding creates an artificial idea of reality that must be put back together when we are done understanding things, if we are to end with a complete picture of reality as it is. In the example employed by Gleick information is transformed from ink to electrical impulses, so that the form carrying information shifts from paper to wires, which Gleick explains means that information as such has no material existence, which, perhaps confusingly, means that information cannot be separated from the matter that carries it, in the sense that information has to take a form related to the physical carrier, which information requires in order to exist. Meanwhile, writing paper and telegraphic wires only exist to serve the carrying of information, therefore their material form is dictated by the information they carry, and at the precise moment of carrying a message that form is directly shaped by a specific act of informing, as ink lines or pulses of electricity. In this time of conceptual change, mental readjustments were needed to understand the telegraph itself. Confusion inspired anecdotes, which often turned on awkward new meanings of familiar terms : innocent words like send, and heavily laden ones, like message. There was the woman who brought a dish of sauerkraut into the telegraph office in Karlsruhe to be sent to her son in Rastatt. She had heard of soldiers being sent to the front by telegraph. There was the man who brought a message into the telegraph office in Bangor, Maine. The operator manipulated the telegraph key and then placed the paper on the hook. The customer complained that the message had not been sent, because he could still see it hanging on the hook. To Harpers New Monthly Magazine, which recounted this story in 1873, the point was that even the intelligent and well-informed continued to find these matters inscrutable :
The difficulty of forming a clear conception of the subject is increased by the fact that while we have to deal with novel and strange facts, we have also to use old words in novel and inconsistent senses.

A message had seemed to be a physical object. That was always an illusion ; now people needed consciously to divorce their conception of the message from the paper on which it was written. Scientists, Harpers explained, will say that the electric current carries a message, but one must not imagine that anythingany thingis transported. There is only the action and reaction of an imponderable force, and the making of intelligible signals by its means at a distance. No wonder people were misled. Such language the world must, perhaps for a long time to come, continue to employ. The physical landscape changed, too. Wires everywhere made for strange ornamentation, on city streets and country roads. Telegraphic companies are running a race to take possession of the air over our heads, wrote an English journalist,

Andrew Wynter. Look where we will aloft, we cannot avoid seeing either thick cables suspended by gossamer threads, or parallel lines of wire in immense numbers sweeping from post to post, fixed on the house-tops and suspended over long distances. They did not for some time fade into the background. People looked at the wires and thought of their great invisible cargo. They string an instrument against the sky, said Robert Frost, Wherein words whether beaten out or spoken / Will run as hushed as when they were a thought. The wires resembled nothing in architecture and not much in nature. Writers seeking similes thought of spiders and their webs. They thought of labyrinths and mazes. And one more word seemed appropriate : the earth was being covered, people said, with an iron net-work. A net-work of nerves of iron wire, strung with lightning, will ramify from the brain, New York, to the distant limbs and members, said the New York Tribune. The whole net-work of wires, wrote Harpers, all quivering from end to end with signals of human intelligence. (The Information, Gleick, 2011, pp. 150 151.) This quote concludes with a pleasing approach to an organicist conception of social structure taking a more organic form before peoples eyes. But the more subtle point of real interest that can be garnered from the above, apart from what we have already stated, is the use of old words to represent new ideas. As it happens there was a very good programme on TV a couple of nights ago about the discovery of the real location of the hanging gardens of Babylon, which was not in Babylon, but several hundred miles to the north of this city. A professor who could read that most wonderful of ancient scripts, cuneiform, had determined the location by examining texts and other clues, but the relevant part of this story concerns a point of confusion about the method used to move water from the level at which it was delivered by the canal system, to the upper reaches of the garden. A word of uncertain meaning was eventually interpreted as referring to a palm tree, and we were taken to a tree of the kind in question and shown how the removal of leaves over time gave it a roughly stepped appearance, sort of spiralling around the tree. The word for this fruit tree had been employed to represent the mechanical device which later became known as an Archimedess screw, a device for raising water from one level to another. It is easy to see how this story fits in with the account of new technology of communication ushering in the modern era a couple of centuries ago, but the way that Hoyle has recourse to the idea of a Thing, is also impacted by such an understanding of the way language develops knowledge through linguistic elaboration. In the nineteenth century the phrase social organism became very commonplace, the word superorganism. was known in the same regard, though it was never taken up as a popular term. The fact that Hoyle had to defer to the inherently abstruse term Thing in order to give expression to his secular idea of an overarching collective human form ruling over individuals, indicates an elaboration on this method of employing words to represent new ideas, because Hoyle was seeking to describe society as a natural entity at a time when this idea had just been made taboo, and that is why we end up with this disappointingly empty word for a fabulously wonderful form that actually exists, and is normally known by the word God ! God is the collective being of humanity, the true animal form of our species, and as such the true object of divine worship is the superorganism, and this is what Hoyle has identified by the nondescript term Thing !! Giving us a solid example of the power of religious authority to suppress freedom of thought and expression in the so called scientific age. This story of linguistic dynamics is about controlling knowledge then. If language is allowed to express something then that something exists for us, whereas, a taboo which suppresses the use of language to express an idea means that the idea in question cannot exist

in the world at large. We see this method used all the time by our political masters, who are hell-bent on turning us into a Jewish global slave body through the linguistic ruse of democracy and multiculturalism, words that serve the purposes of human biological corporate nature existing as a message written into the human genome, enacted through the material form of Judaism. And that is the point, the Thing as Hoyle sees it, is an information entity carried by a social form, a linguistic programme, as we would say, delivering the human animal in superorganic form, bearing the identity of Judaism as the expression of linguistic force that exists as a message carried within the human genome. Taking this topic of creative linguistic dynamics even further, which I cannot resist doing because I just dropped on a passage feeding my imagination in this direction, we can trace the origin of the linguistic programme that we live by, through this process of verbal extension. Which also means that the story of linguistic development over time, although it diverts us away from our usual focus on Jewish master race identity, must be the story of the living superorganisms development, and as such this linguistic process must include the rise of the Jews within it. Theory has it that the most extensive, modern languages, originate from a handful of verbal roots. The idea is that simple sounds consisting of no more than what we would represent by a single letter, nonetheless carrying a distinct meaning, served as particles of linguistic condensation drawing out the power of linguistic expression from the generator of linguistic physiology, that evolved to produce a linguistic programme. A further stage in the development of language would be marked by the addition of word to word with the object of qualifying or extending the meaning. These true compounds could be formed at a time anterior to the separation of verbal, nominal, and demonstrative stems. Human speech must have passed through such stages before it reached even the bi-literal form of Arabic bases ; because, as we think the present inquiry will demonstrate that no more than one letter can be safely allowed as the base of any word, it must follow that a base containing even two letters is the product of combination. The word letter here, and elsewhere in this book, means the uttered sound, and not the written character representing the sound. Upon arriving at the stage just spoken of language became grammatical, that is, the knowledge of the origin of vocal symbols was entirely lost, and a conventional meaning existed for a number of sounds sufficient to express the simple wants of a primitive people. Fresh sounds doubtless would obtain currency, but from that time forward language would mainly develop by the combination of existing vocables, and by their application to new uses. It has been long ago known that the complex of modern speech arose from a very limited number of bases,about two or three hundred stems proving a sufficient foundation on which to erect the Chinese and Semitic dictionaries respectively ; and Professor Max Mller conjectures that some similar number will be found to be sufficient in the case of Aryan words. This conclusion has been arrived at by a comparison of words with actual bases ; but, if we were to consider mere possibilities, then only eight or ten bases, by mutual combinations, would produce an infinitely greater number of words than is contained in the richest of languages. The actual number of words, then, in every language being much smaller than the possible combinations of the smallest number of bases ever likely to be seriously proposed for them, we have no difficulty in believing that when mans vocal utterances settled into conventionalities, the subsequent development could be effected by a mere word-building process. This view is further strengthened by considering the natural disinclination to indulge in useless toil. It is easier to combine two vocables together as attributive and nominal, than it is to cast about for a

new and appropriate vocal symbol. A people possessing equivalents for big and man would be more disposed to place one before the other, than to invent the new term giant. So, doubtless, our remote ancestors, starting from the sound i = move, accompanied its pronunciation with a rattling of the tongue to indicate rapidity, and so produced the form ri = go quickly. It has been long ago remarked that the letter r gives a sense of rapidity to a vast number of Aryan words ; and the quivering of the tongue upon the palate is certainly the simplest and most natural way of expressing rapidity by sound. The word ri, then, would be an intensive, and, as familiarity breeds contempt, by usage it would gradually lose its intensive power, and at last be used as synonymous with i, go ; as we find, in Sanskrit, to have been actually the case. The sound p, produced by a puff of breath through the lips, would aptly convey an idea like forth, forward, &c., and, as a matter of fact, the letters p, v, f (which mutually interchange) enter into a large number of words having such a meaning. Now, by simply prefixing this sound p to ri we orally describe the idea forward-go or moveon. It seems certain that such was the origin of the Sanskrit base pri, to go forth, expand ; and of the Sanskrit preposition pra, the Greek , the Latin per, the Teutonic for, forth, fore, &c., &c. (Primitive and Universal Laws of the Formation and Development of Language, G.-Liancourt and Pincott, 1874, pp. 21 24.) I have long tried to follow linguistic science but without any joy, so I happily draw on an old text like this one, having some simple ideas that make sense according to the view that the human animal is a superorganism created by linguistic force generating a linguistic programme, that serves as a genome of superorganic being. Modern science strives to avoid this scientific method by adhering to the religious principle that employs psychological principles to ensure that the person is treated as the human animal, and a such nothing can be gained from modern views of language. Ideas like that of generative grammar may have superseded early ideas on the manner in which language develops, but there is a semblance of generative grammar in this passage because, to my mind, where the basic form of a simple language using monosyllabic sounds becomes grammatical upon the process of linkage being taken up, hinting at an underlying grammatical machinery for generating this sophisticated power of speech. What is nice about this simple model of linguistic development starting right from scratch, is that it really impresses upon us the importance of social structure in the process of linguistic development, which in turn emphasises the idea of linguistic force projecting social authority into social space by generating a linguistic programme that delivers social structure. The point being that it is only by creating structure to carry meanings that words can become fixed in the external space of social form, from whence meaning/authority can be transferred to upcoming generations. And the central role of social structure in this process is self evidently, spontaneously creative, and inclined to fuel the extension of social complexity linked to linguistic sophistication, precisely because language requires social structure in order to exist, and language has to exist because human anatomy evolved to produce linguistic behaviour, which is synonymous with social behaviour, which in reality equates to superorganic being. When the authors speak of people wanting to avoid unnecessary labour in their effort to conjure up new words they are being decidedly disingenuous, by adhering to the religious principle of the individual as an end in themselves, who uses language for their own benefit. Whereas it is clear that the real reason why this spontaneous method of linguistic development would really be the origin of linguistic novelty in the pre-civilised stage of social formation, is that this creative process was not down to individuals, but rather it was

spontaneous, being driven by the pressure of linguistic force inherent in the anatomy of speech. In their preface the authors express some wonderful ideas on the nature of language being an instrument of thought which creates the faculties it enables, and how speech is part of human biological nature. Following up this idea they speak of applying Darwinian principles to language (p. 57), meaning that language has a developmental nature akin to that seen in biology. This is exquisite stuff, not understood as we would understand it in Atheist Science, but intuitively it is bang on the money, effectively saying that language is a biological phenomenon creating human social life. I like the way they reason about the rattling of the tongue invoking the idea of activity, providing a sound that can carry a meaning which in time can become letter, for this indeed suggests just how speech may well be thought to of developed from its earliest origins. But we must keep in mind our idea that language is not personal, but biological, and people are obliged to speak in order to be human, because humans must be social in order to be human, in order to live. The way to understand the process of linguistic sophistication arising from these earliest foundations, without any individual involvement in the process at any point, from beginning to end, is to think of the manner in which the product of linguistic force, as in knowledge, has developed from a like state of limited sophistication, to an immense elaboration now, which the most simple people can make use of, while remaining as intellectually simple as simple can be in themselves. In other words language is a programme that gets written to a brain, where it acts as a routine delivering action accordingly, which works irrespective of individual comprehension because the actions are always occurring in a social setting where one individual guides another, rather as a flock of starlings produce ordered patterns in the sky merely by keying into the actions of their nearest neighbours. Humans do likewise, but with the added sophistication of being programmed to act in a manner which is either affirmed or countered by constant feedback from others, and from social regulation, keeping the pattern tight across an infinitely extendable biomass. All of this is central to the idea that Hoyle senses when he talks of the Thing being created by the flow of knowledge decoupling individuals from that which arises from their eternal, cooperative existence, carried onward, accumulatively, through time.

III Facts lie Before us, only needing a true point of view Within the selection included below there is a useful allusion to the manner in which knowledge may exist as an extensive array of accurate facts, that are to no avail in delivering a true idea of reality as it is. This is another way of acknowledging the idea of alternative pivots of observation, that we make so much of in Atheist Science, where we make the individual the ruling, false pivot, related to religious based political authority, and present the superorganism as the true pivot existing in reality. In addition Smuts actually identifies the false pivot that always serves as our ideal example of scientific knowledge made false, by suspending it from a false pivot of observation, as in the Ptolemaic system of astronomy ousted by the adoption of a new, Copernican pivot, which did not require the wholesale overthrow of old facts, only a reinterpretation of knowledge already well known. We use this acknowledged example of a false pivot to show that Darwinism exploited the pivot principle to impose science based on the false pivot of individuality, whereas Smuts uses Darwinism as a further example of a new pivot serving to reimage knowledge to deliver absolute truth. All

in all a useful piece of writing for our general purposes, and one that we can draw into the discussion of Hoyle because of course that is what is missing from Hoyles piece, the application of the principle of alternative interpretation allowing him to give his vaporous Thing, a material form commensurate with the real object he is striving to identify. With regard again to the concept of life, what is most urgently required is that it should be rid of that haziness, indefiniteness, and vagueness which makes it practically worthless for all exact scientific purposes. Biological science has not in recent years made the same gigantic strides forward in the knowledge of fundamentals that physical science has taken, and yet for Biology too the sky has considerably cleared, and what two or three decades ago was still hotly disputed is to-day generally accepted. Besides, the greatest development in Biology during this century has taken place in the science of Genetics, and the trend there has been steadily away from the hard mechanical conceptions which dominated Biology more than a generation ago. The time here too may be ripe for a reconsideration of some of the fundamental concepts and standpoints. I may express the hope that the masters of this science will not concentrate all their attention on special researches, however promising the clues at present followed may be, but that they will find time for a reconsideration of the wider conceptions which is becoming urgently necessary. Unless Biology can succeed in clarifying and harmonising her fundamental conceptions there is risk of great confusion in a science in which old general ideas have persisted in spite of great progress in detailed knowledge and the elaboration of a host of new fruitful ideas. If in the sequel I join in the discussion of the foundations of Biology, not as entitled of right to speak but more in the character of a friendly spectator urging the importance of a certain point of view, I hope my presumption in so doing may be forgiven me. For welcome as any new and deeper knowledge would be on these high matters, the present situation calls even more urgently for fresh points of view. Matter, life, and mind are, so to speak, the original alphabet of knowledge, the original nuclei round which all experience, thought, and speculation have gathered. Their origin is purely empirical, their course has been shaped by tradition for thousands of years, and all sorts of discarded philosophies have gone towards the making of their popular meanings. In spite, therefore, of the great fundamental aspects of truth which they embody, the kernel of truth in them has become overlaid by deep deposits of imperfect and erroneous knowledge. Modern science and philosophy have repeatedly ventured on reforms, but the popular use of these terms tends to obliterate all fine distinctions. I do not believe that an abiding scientific or philosophic advance in this respect will be possible until a more exact nomenclature has been adopted. A particular suggestion towards such a reform I am going to advocate and develop in the sequel, but in the meantime I wish to emphasise how important it is, not merely to continue the acquisition of knowledge, but also to develop new view-points from which to envisage all our vast accumulated material of knowledge. The Copernican revolution was not so much a revolution in the acquisition of new knowledge, as in view-point and perspective in respect of existing knowledge. The most far-reaching revolutions in knowledge are often of this character. Evolution in the mind of Darwin was, like the Copernican revolution, a new view-point, from which vast masses of biological knowledge already existing fell into new alignments and became the illustrations of a great new Principle. And similarly Einsteins conception of General Relativity in the physical universe, whatever its final form may yet be, is a new viewpoint from which the whole universe and all its working mechanisms acquire a new perspective and meaning.

More knowledge is undoubtedly required, but its acquisition must go hand in hand with the exploration of new concepts and new points of view. It will not help merely to accumulate details of which, even in the special departments of the separate biological sciences, the masses are already becoming more than any individual mind can bear. New co-ordinations are required, new syntheses which will sum up and explain and illuminate the otherwise amorphous masses of material. While research is being prosecuted as never before, while in biological science great, and in the physical sciences unprecedented, progress is being recorded, the call becomes ever more urgent for a reconsideration of fundamental concepts and the discovery of new view-points which might lead to the formulation of more general principles and wider generalisations. Nowhere are new view-points more urgently called for than in respect of the fundamental concepts of matter, life, and mind, of which the reform is overdue and the present state is rapidly becoming a real obstacle to further progress. And I may point out that the formulation of new view-points will depend not so much on masses of minute details, as on the consideration of the general principles in the light of recent advances, the collation and comparison of large masses of fact, and the survey of fairly large areas of knowledge. The road is to be discovered, not so much by minute local inspection as by wide roaming and exploration and surveying over large districts. Both methods are needed, and the question narrows itself down to one of comparative values. Just as happened in the cases of Newton and Einstein, so here too the new clues are more likely to be indicated by certain crucial dominant facts than by small increments of research. It would therefore be a great mistake to let the completion of present detailed researches take precedence over the more general and urgent questions to which I am drawing attention. Let me in this connection mention one matter of crucial significance to which I think sufficient importance has not yet been attached. To-day I think it is generally accepted that life has in the process of cosmic Evolution developed from or in the bosom of matter, and that mind itself has its inalienable physical basis. I do not think that among those who have given thought and attention to these matters there are today any who seriously question this position. Life is no dove that has flown to our shores from some world beyond this world ; mind or soul is not an importation from some other universe. Life and mind are not mere visitants to this world, but not of this world. There is nothing alien in them to the substance of the universe ; they are with us and they are of us. The popular view still looks upon the association of life and mind with matter as a sort of symbiosis, as the close living together of three different beings, as the dwelling of life and the soul in the body of matter, just as in the organic world one plant or animal organism will be found normally living with and in another. This popular traditional view comes from the hoary beginnings of human thought and speculation, but it is definitely abandoned by all those who have assimilated the modern view-point of Evolution. For them in some way not yet fully understood, but accepted as an undoubted fact, both life and mind have developed from matter or the physical basis of existence. The acceptance of this fact must have far-reaching consequences for our world-view. (Holism and Evolution, Smuts, 1926, pp. 5 8.) A nice clarion call for science to come into true existence, made by a man who has no idea that this freedom is what he is calling for, because he adopts the honourable position of treating knowledge makers as honest brokers. Whereas the truth is that individuals do not exist, they are tools, in the hands of nature in the throws of creating a living organism. So that honour does not enter into the discussion, except as a ruse to prevent truth from being

known. Hoyle is a perfect example of this tooled person, he acted as an honest broker, but unwittingly he served deception, and the result is a wonderful piece of organicist sociology, the best ever written, that nonetheless tells no one anything, unless they have already discovered everything for themselves, as we have.

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Last Word
Doing the bibliography last week made me search for the details on a biography that I finally decided to buy, because it had some more general stuff on Hoyle, though it had nothing treating of his organicist sociology, but it was cheap enough, and it arrived today, Thursday, 12 December 2013. Diving in, I hit this passage towards the end, which is surely relevant to this project : The Daily Telegraph was in a small minority of publications that highlighted Hoyles more controversial work, and it did so at length. Calling him an outrageous mischief-maker who took a delight in enraging his academic colleagues, the obituary emphasized the Archaeopteryx episode, and diseases from space :
He and his close associate, Prof Chandra Wickramasinghe . . . used to make other scientists so angry that some even wrote a special sub-program for their word processors which, by pressing a single key, caused the words Contrary to the views of Hoyle and Wickramasinghe . . . to appear on the screen.

The Telegraph then reproduced some of the most stridently negative reviews of Hoyles work before acknowledging that Hoyle made many genuine and significant contributions to physics and astronomy Wickramasinghes appreciation of Hoyle also dwelt on the biological work, though with rather more optimism. Science-fiction fans mourned the passing of the author of The Black Cloud ; and Creationists commended Hoyle, though not a Biblical creationist or even a Christian, for his challenges to Darwinism and big-bang theory. Local media noted Hoyles passing : in California, the Santa Monica Mirror, with its headline, Good-bye, Sir Fred Hoyle ! spoke for Hoyles fans among nonscientists. Describing him as One of the most prominent astrophysicists of the 20th century, as well as one of the most colourful personalities, it concluded that we cannot blame Sir Fred for his ideas : he certainly was a very gifted, influential, and original thinker, and the road to understanding the world around us has always been paved by people like him. The Yorkshire Post reminded its readers that in 2000 they had voted Hoyle one of the Great Yorkshiremen of the Millennium. The ultimate local appreciation came from Matterdale Matters, in the Lake District, which remembered Hoyle as a resident of Cockley Moor and as the author of Ice, and who was one of the greatest popularisers of science in the 20th century. (Fred Hoyles Universe, Jane Gregory, p. 340.) Here we have a nice opening comment, selecting a newspaper that was notable upon Hoyles passing for bothering to say something about his controversial nature as a thinker and scientist. This is important to us because we have hit upon a work of major importance that has simply passed all notice, even from his biographers, whereby this look at the Telegraphs obituary tells us why this omission should of occurred, because Hoyle was so famously controversial that his sortie into the sociological realms of avant-garde thinking was just one more wayward extravagance of his usual eccentricity of mind. His sociology did not attract

attention for being erratic, or for being of interest to anyone who might care for the topic itself, because this idea of Hoyles that is so interesting to those of us who have rediscovered this lost scientific knowledge of human corporate nature, had already been cast firmly beyond speaking, having already been made thoroughly taboo within what passes for sociology, by the time Hoyle decided to provide this best account of the human superorganism ever written, until I came along. These observations from Gregory nicely conclude our examination of what must be Hoyles finest and most important work, a work indicating the true nature of humans as part of nature, which, when we think about the keen interest he had in placing life into a universal context, would surely of been his most important work even to himself, if he had but known exactly what the Thing was that he had gripped by the tail, only to let slip from his grasp. A work that has, like my own workthe greatest work of science ever createdif I must say so myself, passed unnoticed. This neglect does not mean it is not the greatest of his works, on the contrary, look at the great deluge of garbage-reasoning that washes over our world like a ocean, noticed endlessly, by all, for generation after generation. No, being utterly unnoticed appears almost to be a precondition of being truly great, in the realms of real knowledge of reality as it is. And perhaps in the end that is the real lesson that Hoyle lends to our Atheist Science endeavours, one that we might say the above passage alludes to when it notes that advancement in real understanding requires minds that stray from the beaten path, the path that we are mercilessly beaten into staying on by all the powers nature can muster. And, on another subject that we are led to by Gregory, I too am a Yorkshire man, by birth at least.

A Last, Last Word

I just want to make a record of this because it says it all about Islam, a more perfect demonstration of the fact that you cannot be Muslim and English, anymore than you can be an atheist and Jewish, say, could not be desired. On Channel Four News last night, 13/12/2013, they reported a declaration by David Cameron, the prime minster, saying that a university advisory code sanctioning gender segregation at the request of visiting speakers, was to be cancelled, and it duly has been. Following the report they had a discussion in the studio between a ragged up Muslim fascist, that is a women in the fascist religious garb of Islam, a headscarf and blanketnot black however, thank goodness, that is too revolting to bear, not that the usual gear is not sickening to seeand a women who was in some way a voice from the relevant alien community, but opposing the usual Islamic fascism. At the close of the debate John Snow tried to put the question why Britain, a democracy, should cater to the mores of Islam by allowing segregation, to wit the raghead said that separating women was not segregation, and the fact that in Britain we saw it as such demonstrated all that is wrong with secular Britain !!! Screw me, what does anyone want as proof of the presence of Islam being that of an enemy alien within, vastly more insidious and poisonous to our culture and freedom, than any victory on the part of the Nazis could ever possibly been ? The nasty arrogance of these religious beasts is, well we see it in their terror, we see it in their cretinous kneeling in prayer, in their garb, in every single thing they do, or say, as Muslims. Islam is only religion, a Jewish slave religion, but we had got Christianity beat until our masters waged war on us and imported these invigorated fascist breeds of serfdom, and last nights sample was a rare indication of their venom in its pure form, seen on a mainstream media propaganda show. A poison drawn because our slave leaders dared to deny these aliens the privileges that our real masters granted them after the last world war, when they started importing this evil on mass, to supplant our sublime indigenous culture that had all the appearance of having broken free of Judaism, before the power of linguistic force began to reel us in again under a new identity dispensation, giving the Thing its new knowledge formulation which this tiny moment brings to light, but will do nothing to prevent. Saturday, 21 December 2013 And yesterday on Channel Five News we were treated to an interview with the brother of the black Muslim convert that hacked a solider to death on a London street, for which action he was found guilty of murder yesterday. The brothers face was hidden but he defended the right of English Muslims to murder English soldiers in the manner of his brother, denying that it was murder, saying it was an act of war in keeping with the activities of Britain in Muslim countries.

The State as Reservoir of Linguistic Force

Just when you think you are done, something else comes along to start you off again. I have spent a long life on benefits, a wonderful way of life it has been too, until the present government announced the end of the life on benefits lifestyle choice, and began to wage war on us by redefining us lifers as virtual criminals. What the ensuing experience of being hounded off the dole has taught me about the nature of the state I wish now to share with my readers, for it has a broader lesson to teach about the nature of the state as a power over people. Why the Germans become psychopathic murders of the worst kind upon the instigation of the Nazi regime ? Is a question often put. Here is a kind of answer. The ever so decent civil service has been transformed into a criminal organisation under the licence of this government, I know this to be the case from the last two months experiences, today being Sunday, 15 December 2013. So where did this criminality come from ? That is easily understood when you dwell in the thick of it, it was always there, but it was restrained. I had encountered hatred from civil servants before but they were not allowed to act so personally, when they did I rose a furore and they got it in the neck. Now my complaints are met with criminal conspiracy running right through the whole government structure. Thus we see that the latent potential for maliciousness that we all know from our experience of individuals, exists in the body of people controlled by the state, and as such the state operates as a reservoir of linguistic force held back by law, and, when the occasion is deemed fit by our owners and masters, this force is simply released. As it has been released by the current Conservative government, against the benefits system. Do you doubt the reality of this argument ? Then think on, think about vigilantism, what prevents the butchering of sex offenders housed in society ? The law is all that stops this criminality, and as such the law constitutes the power of linguistic force contained in a social structure, or with the being of the superorganism to be more scientific about it. All it would take is for an administration to come to power who wanted to see mayhem and it would pour forth as freely as lava from an erupting volcano, that is what happened in Nazi Germany, and it is what is happening here and now, in England, in a more contained manner, within the confines of a specifically state structure. This model of human social life as a series of structures containing pent-up collective energy attached to specific triggers, perfectly accords with the idea of the nonexistence of the individual and the human animal being a superorganism. We are not here to discover solutions to the evils of life, we are only desire to present a natural history of the human animal, which allows us to make such evenhanded statements about the moral outrages of the Nazi era. Yesterday, 14/12/2013, I saw a news report, on BBC 2 I think it was, about the persecution of the Greenpeace protesters in Russia, after they tried to interfere with oil exploration in the northern seas. The ridiculous presenter put it to the Russian guest that Russians will most likely consider the activities of protesters like Pussy Riot, acting sacrilegiously in churches, to be criminal, and deserving of suppression, Russia being a deeply conservative country. The reply was that only twenty years ago Russia was an officially atheist country, and the mass of people who now appear as the conservative voice of Russia that the West takes to show the nature of Russia, are merely the dupes of a propaganda machine that in Russia, he said, is very powerful ! Ha, in Russia ! The man ought to live here, then he will learn what propaganda, done right, really is. In this country we are free, there is no propaganda worthy of the word. And that is because our propaganda

is so exquisitely fine-tuned that we cannot tell it from our own thoughts, and this business with the governments ability to turn the civil service into an actively criminal organisation, what we should call corrupt, as in flouting the law in order to achieve the end of defeating the newly defined criminally unemployed, provides evidence of how this kind of control is delivered from the centre of social power. But the ability to act in this manner is given by nature, as surely as the power to fly is given to birds by nature. And in that sense no one does these things, this is how nature ordained human life should be. When we see some nations acting morally superior and others acting almighty, they are playing roles within a unified structure, befitting their image as persons, of the kind that political scientists have spoken of in times past. Properly understood we can see that there is not one jot of difference between an oppressive state like Russia and a free state like Britain, in terms of their nature, only some differences of style, that can easily be altered to suit the occasion. These states, indeed all states, are part of the unified global Jewish superorganism. Tuesday, 24 December 2013 Two days ago I started a warehouse job, on twelve hour shifts, what they call continental shifts, bugger me they are hell, up at four and back in the house at half six, to get to bed for eight ! Sheer hell on the body and head. How long will I last ? Christmas tomorrow though, so off for two days. Anyway I read something in a book I have already used in this work, that I want to mention here, in connection with the Nazis horror. Speaking of torture Clastres makes some remarkable observations about the manner in which linguistic force is expressed in a nonverbal cultural form, that nonetheless is a product of linguistic force as the information imparted is social, and about the social constitution of superorganic being. His subject is initiation ceremonies and how the extreme pain they involve ingrains identity on the memory, in such a way as to ensure the individual is integrated into the social body through the control of their mental processes, in a manner we would probably associate with brainwashing today. There was in fact a film called the Manchurian Candidate on TV just an hour ago which the blurb said concerned two captured American soldiers from world war two, who were brainwashed into committing assassinations back in America, which continues the theme of using torture to attach individuals to a social identity, in this case that of their original enemy. Which just goes to show how manipulable our mental programming is in relation to being programmed for social functions. Thus there are two obvious functions of initiation as the inscription of marks on the body : measuring personal endurance, and giving notice of membership. But is this really all that the memory acquired in pain has to retain ? It is truly necessary for one to go through torture in order to always remember the value of the ego and maintain tribal, ethnic, or national consciousness ? Where is the secret transmitted ; where is the knowledge revealed ? VI. Memory and the law The initiatory ritual is a pedagogy that passes from the group to the individual, from the tribe to the young people. An assertive pedagogy, and not a dialogue : hence the initiates must remain silent under the torture. Silence gives consent. To what do the young people consent ? They consent to accept themselves for what they are from that time forward : full members of the community. Nothing more, nothing less. And they are irreversibly marked as such. This, then, is the secret that the group reveals to the young people in the initiation : You are one of us. Each one of you is like us ; each one of you is like the others. You are called by the same name, and you will not

change your name. Each one of you occupies the same space and the same place among us : you will keep them. None of you is less than us ; none of you is more than us. And you will never be able to forget it. You will not cease to remember the same marks that we have left on your bodies. In other words, society dictates its laws to its members. It inscribes the text of the law on the surface of their bodies. No one is supposed to forget the law on which the social life of the tribe is based. In the sixteenth century, the first chroniclers described the Brazilian Indians as people without faith, king or law. To be sure, those tribes had no knowledge of the harsh, separate law, the law that imposes the power of the few on all others in a divided society. That is a lawthe kings law, the law of the Stateof which the Mandan and the Guaycuru, the Guayaki and the Abipones know nothing. The law they come to know in pain is the law of primitive society, which says to everyone : You are worth no more than anyone else ; you are worth no less than anyone else. The law, inscribed on bodies, expresses primitive societys refusal to run the risk of division, the risk of a power separate from society itself, a power that would escape its control. Primitive law, cruelly taught, is a prohibition of inequality that each person will remember. Being the very substance of the group, primitive law becomes the substance of the individual, a personal willingness to fulfill the law. (Society Against the State, Clastres, pp. 155 156.) This is remarkable stuff, replete with invocations of the very essence of our Atheist Science, that says the human animal is a superorganism created by linguistic force, that operates by taking the blank units of individual being existing as cells of superorganic being, and stamping them with the identity of the present social setting. We slot this wonderful material in here because it suits the above mention of the Nazis in the additional sense of making the pain of the world war a mode of torture, stamping a cultural memory upon the modern world to force us all to take note of our Jewish slave identity. And we do, as we pay homage to the evil of those who hurt the Jews, as we acknowledge the sacredness of the Jews as a higher cultural form of human amongst all of us on earth. These things are not spoken, as the primitive law was not spoken, they are burnt into our brains by real life experience historygiving us our slave souls, that make us understand these linguistically elaborated imperatives of our existence. Induction into knowledge based identities is the form that this process takes today, so that we have elaborate religions, all Jewish now, that we are programmed into. But these modern forms of brainwashing from birth, and through continuing mass media, as an all pervasive propaganda, was developed through a process that has a halfway stage between the physical torment based ceremonies of preliterate societies, seen in the Greek system of induction into secret societies to be become a devotee of a cult, leading to death upon betrayal of any secrets. The contradictory idea of Western individualism flies in the face of this natural state of social integration, but this is a special cultural mode of the master identity of Judaism, a mode that is designed to cleans the world of all divergent cultures, leaving only those that are Jewish by origin, or transformation. We see this special function in the Jews reputation for exploitative business methods adapted to existing in any civlized style structure, this is a form of theft of course, compared to the egalitarianism described by Clastres. Except these words, these labels, theft, business, crime and such like, are just verbal mechanisms for inducing the appropriate cultural programming, delivering cultures in keeping with the biological function of linguistic force acting toward the creation of the human animal. Thus

culturally established individualism is a slave making programme that licences individuals to act as pirates toward all other cultures by pretending that individualism is part of our own creed, which it most definitely is not. Individualism is a modern way of setting up the insideoutside mindset that tribes have as an attitude toward all other tribes. Our system of written law makes this elaboration possible by removing the law as described by Clastres from being located in the individual, by making law a specialised organ of the social body belonging only to special classes of people, like Jews, or their slave affiliates, and whoever should be privileged amongst these cultural forms to become a lawyer or law maker, and such like. This special function of individualism as a slave making social form explains why we celebrate selfish wealth gathering and criminality so much, as in movies about heroic thieves and law breakers, The Italian Job being one such classic. This is Jewish culture at its purest, a slave making culture, for that is the function that a culture teaching its members to be criminals and seekers after wealth and materialism is all aboutenslavement. Meanwhile of course, it has its specific religious slave culture that carries the inclusive identity code, the self sacrificing of Christianity for example, that opposes individualism. This says Take everything from everybody, and bring your booty back to the master, the Jews. Just like the kind of command ants might be expected to operate under to build their nest empires. It is delightful to see the social practices described in the above manner by Clastres, but when he speaks of society not risking being divided he gives a strong sense of society existing as something natural in its own right, at the same time that he also manages to infuse the same statements with some kind of modern sense in which society exists for the individuals that it clearly possesses, and controls ! This is so maddening. Where on earth does this man think this social process comes from, why it exists ? We sense a moral overtone commending the egalitarian character of primitive society here, as compared to the authoritarian societies that we live in. But such superiority totally misconstrues the nature of the difference, which merely has to do with the level of complexity, and nothing more. It is about the superorganism being composed of one uniform identity in the primitive case, compared to a superorganism composed of many such single social identities forced into unity under one overriding identity, which necessarily requires a detachment of power creating a hierarchy of social levels, giving our society an overtly authoritarian nature relative to the individuals who experience the social order of this latter kind. This is a biological phenomenon delivered by the power of speech, rooted in linguistic force, creating the human animal as superorganism. In the Star Wars movie series, all run in sequence this festive season, the heroic catch phrase is Let the force be with you. This force is supposed to pervade the universe, like the will of God, determining all things. In reality there is such a force in our human existence, it is the force of information that our evolved anatomy has brought into existence as a linguistic force, and all the subtle ways in which the movies Jedi knights tap into this force can be related to the manner in which linguistic force acts upon us from within, where, by acting in the same way on everyone, through religion for example, linguistic force creates the form of unified order that we know as society, but in scientific terms can only be described as a superorganism. The movie is religious propaganda in secular form, so it reinforces the Great Identity Programme of Judaism and delivers a master race that are born superior, the Jedi, these are heroes, the supreme good, yet they can be turned into the supreme servants of evil. The damned shit is lifted straight from Biblical type mythology. The Jews do exist as our higher masters, as the foci of linguistic force their culture makes them inherit the status of puppeteers controlling all humanity through the structure of political organisation, such as that of state organisation. But there is no magic here, and no biological, that is genetic

foundation to Jewish power, just our linguistic anatomy playing the tune it was made to dance to by organising the human biomass into this structural hierarchy.

Footnote, Wednesday, 18 December 2013 I just examined Hoyles Encounter with the Future and found therein the only additional expression of his sociological theme as seen in Man and Materialism, but without any mention of the Thing. I have picked up a couple of items in his Encounter, however the additional points of interest I noted on the front pages of the volume yesterday, are not sufficiently inspiring to make me examine them further, but we should note the relevance of this book because there is no other example of his sociological theme that I have found. It is in this work that we find his odd ideas on privilege as a disadvantage in life, at least in terms of having the right mind for discovering truth, see page eighty.

And the Tale Wags On

Wednesday, 01 January 2014 Happy New Year ! This working lark is a grind and I have only just escaped for a couple of days, allowing me to write a little. I lifted The Biggest Secret : The Book that will Change the World by David Icke, 1999, from the shelf last week, and noticed a reference to Hoyle at the beginning of chapter two : Dr Arthur David Horn, a former professor of biological anthropology at Colorado State University in Fort Collins, once believed emphatically in the Darwinist version of human evolution, the slow development of the human species via the principle of the survival of the fittest. Purely on the weight of evidence and his own experience, he is now convinced that humanity was seeded by extraterrestrials and that a reptilian race has controlled the planet for thousands of years and continues to do so today. This is my own view, although I have taken a very different life path to reach those same conclusions. Dr Horns research is detailed in his excellent book, Humanitys Extraterrestrial Origins in which he suggests that the ones the Sumerian Tablets call the Anunnaki are this reptile race, another point with which we agree. The famed British astrophysicist, Fred Hoyle, told a London press conference as long ago as 1971 that the world was controlled by a force which could manifest in many forms. They are everywhere, he told astonished journalists, in the sky, in the sea and on the Earth . . . He said that they controlled humanity through the mind. I know this sounds utterly bizarre, but you need to read the whole of The Biggest Secret to see the wealth of evidence to support this. If you pull out now or after a couple of chapters because your belief system is in overload, thats your choice, but you will miss the opportunity to see that the almost hysterically unbelievable is actually true. (Icke, p. 19) Icke is one of the great conspiracy theorist writers of my generation, his work is beyond reason, and then some ! It does no good for our idea that Hoyles magnificent ideas on the Thing as a representation of the reality of the human animal being a superorganism, finding his name used in support of Ickes conspiracist lunacy. But the work of such people as Icke, of which there is a great genre, acts like an information immune system within the superorganism, keeping the Jewish identity programme pure by attracting any unofficial revelation of precisely the kind I have created from my life experience, towards itself, making any true speculations, like those of mine and Hoyles, fall easily into the category of conspiracy theory. Such a defence mechanism for the master identity is inevitable because finding the truth is inevitable in a world where truth is given in a false form, as in Darwinism, and all academic knowledge based upon such primary deceptions. Therefore a backup system is required to sweep up true revelations by putting them into a special category of farfetched musings, hence the official category of conspiracy theories, which requires a special caste of priest for their promulgation. The wonder of this situation is that people come forward to do this work of acting as the revealers of the great secret by putting out insane ideas that most people will baulk at. How do they know to do this ? The answer can only be that doing well in this life involves becoming a priest serving the superorganism, so that any opportunity to do this will be found, and exploited. This is the impress of linguistic

force acting like the force of information seen at the genetic level of existence, with subtlety so exquisite that it amazes us to behold its material effects, so much so we are able to conceive of this force as the creator of the universe. Perhaps it is in a way, but certainly not in anyway associated with religious ideas of God, or any other come to that. Seeking to make sense of Hoyles ideas taken notice of by Icke, I turned to my recently acquired biography of Hoyle by Gregory. In the index she lists many of his works, though not Men and Materialism. This led me to his fiction work that I have not taken notice of before, and will not delve into now. What we can do, is use Gregorys work to get an idea of the kind of thinking Hoyle might of been expressing in the interview Icke speaks of, whereby we find below, that Hoyle is thinking of information as the all pervasive attribute of universal existence, a force that pervades all things, and controls humans through the organ of their minds. This idea of information as a universal force fits well with his idea of knowledge accumulating to give rise to society as a Thing, which controls people. It also fits perfectly with our more rigorous model of information as the life force, wherein linguistic force is one specific mode that we associate most specifically with humankind. None of the political pressures on Hoyle was [were] enough to keep him from publishing fiction. In The Molecule Men, which appeared in 1971, an alien invasion comes, as in A for Andromeda, in the form of biological information, which takes material form as animals, plants, and a man called R.A. Adcock who, by taking on various identities, commits crimes to fund his entre into life on Earth. The Molecule Men was dedicated to the Hoyles friends J.B. and Jacquetta : the novelist J. B. Priestley and his wife, who told Barbara they were touched and proud to have it dedicated to us. In the novel, Adcock is arrested but makes his escape during a court appearance by turning into a swarm of giant bees. His eventual triumph, however, is to invade human beings who, despite no change in appearance, are transformed into an alien race : the Molecule Men. The strange case of R. A. Adcock is deciphered by Cambridge chemist Dr Joe West, who nevertheless does not avoid becoming a Molecule Man himself. West attributes the timing of the invasion to terrestrial radio : now that humans are using radio to communicate, and since radio waves can travel very far out into space, alien intelligences now know that we are here. Despite teaming up with a very resourceful journalist for part of his adventure, West mocks the press for being able to fake sensational stories but not being able to recognize them when they actually happen. (Gregory, pp. 242 3.) One thing is for sure, Hoyles ideas are in no way akin to the conspiracy style outpourings of Icke. Hoyles ideas, going by Men and Materialism, are well formed and structured, and connected to reality, and not at all extravagant. As we have said all along however, he always falls short of the mark, by simply failing to deliver the final logical conclusion to his thoughts by recognising that humans are a species of mammalian superorganism, whereby individuals cannot be regarded as humans in themselves, although they are obviously human, so that all aspects of our individual existence are physiological phenomenon having to do with the life of this animal, the human superorganism, that Hoyle only identifies abstractly, as a Thing. What we can see however, is that by being so imaginative and clever in his thinking upon the nature of human existence, without completing the story, he provides aid to the really malignant work of conspiracy theorists like Icke, who are hell-bent on protecting the master race from being discovered for what, and who, they really are in life ; whether or not these conspiracy theorists actually know this is what they are doing.