Minucher v CAp Doctrine: Filing a motion to quash, which, in effect already waives any defect in the service of summons

by earlier asking an extension to file time to file an Answer and filing an Answer with Counterclaim. Facts: Khosrow Minucher is the Labor Attach of the Embassy of Iran in the Phil. Arthur Scalzo, then connected with the American Embassy in Manila, was introduced to him by Jose Inigo (an informer belonging to the military intelligence community). Accdg. to Inigo, Scalzo was interested in buying Iranian products like caviar and carpets. Minucher complained to Scalzo about his problems with the American Embassy regarding the expired visas of his wife, Abbas Torabian. Offering help, Scalzo gave Minucher a calling card showing that the former is an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) assigned to the American Embassy in Manila. As a result, Scalzo expressed his intent to buy caviar and further promised to arrange the renewal of the visas. Scalzo went to Minucher's residence and asked to be entrusted with Persian silk carpets, for which he had a buyer. The next day, Scalzo returned and claimed that he had already made arrangements with his contacts concerning the visas and asked for $2,000. It turned out that Scalzo prepared a plan to frame-up a Minucher and wife for alleged heroin trafficking. Both were falsely arrested and charged with violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Minucher prays for actual and compensatory damages. However, counsel for Scalzo filed a motion to quash summons alleging that the defendant is beyond the processes of the Philippine court for the action for damages is a personal action and that Scalzo is outside the Philippines. TC denied the motion. CA dismissed the motion for lack of merit on the basis of the erroneous assumption that because of the Diplomatic Note (advising the DFA that Scalzo is a member of the US diplomatic mission investigating Minucher for drug trafficking), Scalzo is clothed with diplomatic immunity. Issue: Whether or not a complaint for damages be dismissed in the sole basis of a statement complained in a Diplomatic Note.

Held: No. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by either voluntary appearance or by the service of summons. In the case, Scalzo's counsel filed a motion to quash, which, in effect already waived any defect in the service of summons by earlier asking an extension to file time to file an Answer and filing an Answer with Counterclaim. The complaint for damages cannot be dismissed. Said complaint contains sufficient allegations which indicate that Scalzo committed imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and functions. The TC gave credit to Minucher's theory that he was a victim of frame-up hence, there is a prima facie showing that Scalzo could be held personally liable for his acts. Further, Scalzo did not come forward with evidence to, prove that he acted in his official capacity. Shauf Vs. CA G. R. No. 90314 (November 27, 1990) This case illustrates another violation of Article 11(1)(b). The decision enunciates that employment should not be denied on the ground of sex, color, or origin. The protection to labor espoused by the Constitution is used hand-in-hand in upholding non-discrimination. Facts: The Education Branch of the Third Combat Support Group in the Clark Air Base opened a position for a guidance counselor. Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the U.S. Air Force, applied for the position. As per records, she possessed all the qualifications for the job at that time. According to applicable regulations, where there are qualified dependents of military or civilian personnel, who are locally available, appointments to positions shall be limited to the dependents. Instead of hiring Loida, however, one Mr. Isakson was selected for the position. The latter was not a dependent of a military or civilian personnel. In addition, Mr. Isakson, apparently, lacked certain qualifications. Loida filed a complaint for damages grounded on the acts of discrimination committed by the respondents. Held: The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court awarding damages in favor of Loida. The Constitution provides that the State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and

equality of employment opportunities for all. This is a carry-over from the 1973 Constitution ensuring equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed. US Vs. Ruiz 136 SCRA 487 Facts: The usa had a naval base in subic, zambales. The base was one of those provided in the military bases agreement between phils. and the US. Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US for the constrcution of wharves in said base that was merely awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for specific preformance was filed by him against the US. Issue: Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity. Held: The traditional role of the state immunity excempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of indepemndence and equality of states. Howecer, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually and evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietory acts. the result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts. The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. A state may be descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the conracts relates the exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the project are integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both US and phils., indisputably, a function of the government of highest order, they are not utilized for , nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. US v Guinto 182 SCRA 644 FACTS:

These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of stateimmunity. In GR No. 76607, The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force inClark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services inthe said base which was won by a certain Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award to thebid winner because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in theinvitation to bid, and subsequently, to conduct a rebidding.In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Lamachia,Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at CampJohn Hay Air Station inBaguioCity. It had been ascertained after investigation, from the testimony of Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking thevegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and thereafterreferred the case to a board of arbitrators conformably to the collective bargaining agreementbetween the center and its employees. The board unanimously found him guilty and recommended hisdismissal . Genoves reaction was to file his complaint against the individual petitioners. In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Cano O Donnell, anextension of Clark Air Bas, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individualpetitioners who are officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of SpecialInvestigators. On the basis of the sworn statements made by them, an information for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, was filed against Bautista in the RTC of Tarlac. Said officers testified against him at his trial. Bautista was dismissed from his employment. Hethen filed a complaint against the individual petitioners claiming that it was because of their acts thathe was removed.In GR No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against theherein petitioners (except theUS), for injuries sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of thedefendants. There is a conflict of factual allegations here. According to the plaintiffs, the defendantsbeat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several parts of theirbodies and caused extensive injuries to them. The defendants deny this and claim that plaintiffs werearrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest. In amotion to dismiss the complaint, theUS and the individually named defendants argued that the suitwas in effect a suit against theUS, which had not given its consent to be sued.

ISSUE: Whether the defendants were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for actsdone by them in the performance of their official duties.

HELD: The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally acceptedprinciples of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even withoutsuch affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international lawunder the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states,such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition andconsequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannotassert jurisdiction over one another.While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is alsoapplicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in thedischarge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the stateitself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the statealthough it has not been formally impleaded.

case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public placeswhere others not involved in the case could hear."Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from petitioner Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnelexplaining the change of the private respondent's employment status. So, private respondent filed for damages allegingthat the letters contained libelous imputations and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.However, petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official dutiesand that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity. However, the motionwas denied on the main ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties? RULING: Yes. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over itspersonnel, including the private respondents. Given the official character of the letters, the petitioners were being sued asofficers of the United States government because they have acted on behalf of that government and within the scope of their authority. Thus, it is that government and not the petitioners personally that is responsible for their acts.It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacitywill not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of stateimmunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability andliability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-settledprinciples are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains tothe government of a foreign state, as in the present case.Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, suchaward will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government astheir principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, theappropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against thatgovernment without its consent. The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legalright against the authority which makes the law on which the right

Syquia vs. Lopez Sanders vs. Veridano G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JRvs.HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO IIFACTS: Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station. Petitioner Moreau was thecommanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence inthe Philippines. Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed as game room attendants in the special servicesdepartment of the NAVSTA.On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanentfull-time to permanent part-time. They instituted grievance proceedings to the rules and regulations of the U.S.Department of Defense. The hearing officer recommended for reinstatement of their permanent full-time status.However, in a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report. The lettercontained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi andWyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "eventhough the grievants were under oath not to discuss the

depends. In the case of foreign states, the rule isderived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations." Our adherence to this precept isformally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that thePhilippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. WHEREFORE, thepetition is GRANTED.

The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant. It recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations. The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft.

WHO v. Aquino World Health Organization v. Aquino 48 SCRA 243

Facts: Herein petitioner, in behalf of Dr. Verstuyft, was allegedly suspected by the Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) officers of carrying dutiable goods under the Customs and Tariff Code of the Philippines. Respondent Judge then issued a search warrant at the instance of the COSAC officers for the search and seizure of the personla effects of Dr. Verstuyft notwithstanding his being entitled to diplomatic immunity, as duly recognized by the Executive branch of the government. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised the respondent judge that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and further requested for the suspension of the search warrant. The Solicitor General accordingly joined the petitioner for the quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the quashal.

ERNESTO CALLADOvs.INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE(IRRI) G.R. No. 106483 May 22, 1995/ ROMERO, J.:

Facts: Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. One day whiledriving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by theIRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager. In view of the findings, hewas charged with:(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report tosupervisors the failure of the vehicle to start because of a problem with the car battery, and (3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.

Issue: Whether or not personal effect of WHO Officer Dr. Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure under the diplomatic immunity.

Ruling:

Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him.However, IRRIissued a Notice of Termination to petitioner.

The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this case "acategorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoysimmunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been held to (PUTOL TALAGA)

Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegalsuspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.IRRIwrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legalprocess by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes suchdiplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant casefiled by petitioner, not having waived the same.While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter , nonetheless, cited anOrder issued by the Institute to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondentIRRI waives its immunity," and, accordingly, considered the defense of immunity nolonger a legal obstacle in resolving the case.The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waiveits immunity, ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and thecomplaint dismissed.In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an internationalorganization granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked inthe case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on"Guidelines on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620." Issue: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from anemployer-employee relationship? Held: No.P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides: Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Proc ess. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the director general of the institute or his authorized representative

Lasco vs UNRFNRE Case Digest_Eldepio Lasco et al v United Nations Revolving Fund For Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE) G.R. Nos. 109095-109107 February 23, 1995

Facts: Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with privaterespondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund for NaturalResourcesExploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of theUnited Nations.The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of thePhilippineGovernment and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island.Petitioners are thecomplainants for illegal dismissal and damages.Private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since itenjoyed diplomatic immunity. Issue:WON specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity Held:Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse.Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunitiesof the SpecializedAgencies of the United Nations states that each specialized agency shall makea provision for appropriate modes of settlement of (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which thespecialized agencyisa party. Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in thePhilippines.Its presence is by virtue of a joint project entered into by thePhilippine Government and theUnited Nations for mineral exploration in DinagatIsland ICMC vs. Calleja GR 85750, Sept. 28, 1990

FACTS:

the Philippine Senate through Resolution No. 91 on 17 May 1949 (the Philippine Instrument of Ratification was signed by the President on 30 August 1949 and deposited with the UN on 20 March 1950) infra; and (3) Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.

As an aftermath of the Vietnam War, the plight of Vietnamese refugees fleeing from South Vietnam's communist rule confronted the international community. In response to this crisis, an Agreement was forged between the Philippine Government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees whereby an operating center for processing Indo-Chinese refugees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be established in Bataan. ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing center in Morong, Bataan. It was incorporated in New York, USA, at the request of the Holy See, as a non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative Status, Category II. As an international organization rendering voluntary and humanitarian services in the Philippines. Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file members employed by ICMC. The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it is an international organization registered with the United Nations and, hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity. Director Pura Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), reversed the MedArbiter's Decision and ordered the immediate conduct of a certification election. At that time, ICMC's request for recognition as a specialized agency was still pending with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEFORAF). Subsequently, DEFORAF, granted ICMC the status of a specialized agency with corresponding diplomatic privileges and immunities, as evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement between the Government and ICMC. ICMC then sought the immediate dismissal of the TUPAS Petition for Certification Election sustaining the affirmative of the proposition citing: (1) its Memorandum of Agreement with the Philippine Government giving it the status of a specialized agency, (infra); (2) the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 21 November 1947 and concurred in by

ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunites to ICMC extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws. HELD: The foregoing issue constitute a categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that ICMC enjoys immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts. It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government . . . or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction. The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC is clearly necessitated by its international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or

control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions. ICMC's immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its basic rights, which are guaranteed by Article II, Section 18, Article III, Section 8, and Article XIII, Section 3 (supra), of the 1987 Constitution.

EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from Japan of onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to comply withCentral Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to regulate the importation of such non-dollar goods from Japan (as there was a Trade and Financial Agreement b/n the Philippines and Japan then). EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the said EO was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed. ISSUE: Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate. HELD: No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated agreements or protocols. The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.

For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations 17 provides that "each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party." Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC the the Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded. The immunity granted being "from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity," it is inaccurate to state that a certification election is beyond the scope of that immunity for the reason that it is not a suit against ICMC. A certification election cannot be viewed as an independent or isolated process. It could tugger off a series of events in the collective bargaining process together with related incidents and/or concerted activities, which could inevitably involve ICMC in the "legal process," which includes "any penal, civil and administrative proceedings." The eventuality of Court litigation is neither remote and from which international organizations are precisely shielded to safeguard them from the disruption of their functions. Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are said to be standard provisions in the constitutions of international Organizations. "The immunity covers the organization concerned, its property and its assets. It is equally applicable to proceedings in personam and proceedings in rem."

Commissioner of Customs & Collector of Customs vs Eastern Sea Trading on October 29, 2011 Constitutional Law Treaties vs Executive Agreements

Agustin vs Edu, 88 SCRA 195, L- 49112, February 22, 1979

Facts : This is a petition questioning the validity of a Letter of Instruction providing for an early warning device mandatory for motor vehicles. It is assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative to the constitutional guarantee of due process in as far as the rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Ferdinand Marcos aimed to prevent road accidents and in the interest of safety on all streets, highways including expressways. All motorist and motor vehicle owners shall have at all times one pair of early warning device. These hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Roads and Signs and the United Nations Organization (UN). Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207 ratified the said Vienna convention requiring the installation of road signs and devices. Herein respondent Edu in his capacity as Land Transportation Commisioner set forth the implementing rules and regulations of the said instruction. Issue : Whether or not the assailed Letter of Instruction is invalid and violated constitutional guarantees of due process. Held : The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was no unlawful delegation of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified, police power is a state authority to enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of police power was clearly intended to promote public safety. It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: The Philippines ------ adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. Our countrys word was resembled in our own act of legislative ratification of the said Hague and Vienna Conventions thru P.D. No. 207 . The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude which is, moreoever, at war with the principle of international morality. In Santiago vs Far Eatern Broadcasting Company , it was held that the constitutionality of the law will not be considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon and adequately argued. Equal protection is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but that. Petition is DISMISSED and the restraining order is lifted.

CIR v. SC Johnson & Son

(Tax Treaties) Facts: S. C. Johnson and Son, Inc. entered into a licenseagreement with SC Johnson and Son, United States of America (USA) For the use of the trademark or technology, S. C. Johnsonand Son, Inc. was obliged to pay SC Johnson and Son,USA royalties based on a percentage of net sales andsubjected the same to 25% withholding tax on royaltypayments S. C. Johnson and Son, Inc. filed with the InternationalTax Affairs Division (ITAD) of the BIR a claim for refund of overpaid withholding tax on royalties arguing that thepreferential tax rate of 10% should apply to them Issue Whether or not SC Johnson and Son, USA is entitled to the"most favored nation" tax rate of 10% on royalties as providedin the RP-US Tax Treaty in relation to the RP-West GermanyTax Treaty. Held/Ratio NO. Under Article 13 of the RP-US Tax Treaty, the Philippinesmay impose one of three rates 25 percent of the grossamount of the royalties; 15 percent when the royalties are paidby a corporation registered with the Philippine Board of Investments and engaged in preferred areas of activities; or the lowest rate of Philippine tax that may be imposed onroyalties of the same kind paid under similar circumstances toa resident of a third state.The RP-US and the RP-West Germany Tax Treaties do notcontain similar provisions on tax crediting.Since the RP-US Tax Treaty does not give a matching taxcredit of 20 percent for the taxes paid to the Philippines onroyalties as allowed under the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty,private respondent cannot be deemed entitled to the 10percent rate granted under the latter treaty for the reason thatthere is no payment of taxes on royalties under similar circumstances KILOSBAYAN, et. al. vs. MANUEL L. MORATO, et. al. G. R. No. 118910 FACTS: This is a petition seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in G. R. No. 113373, 232 SCRA 110. Petitioners contended that the amended ELA is inconsistent with and

violative of PCSOs charter and the decision of the Supreme Court of 5 May 1995, that it violated the law on public bidding of contracts as well as Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution in relation to the COA Circular No. 85-55-A. Respondents questioned the petitioners standing to bring this suit. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition. RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because some cases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of the law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. And they do not have present substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit. Tecson Vs. Comelec Case Digest Tecson Vs. Comelec 424 SCRA 277 G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004

Held: It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

Facts: Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC Case Digest FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC 174 SCRA 245 G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989

Issue: Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen.

Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and assume office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the allegation but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that his

naturalization was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting prosecution by the Martial Law Dictators agent abroad.

Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election.

citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigrationto confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expirationof her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction.The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer forpreliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed. Issue:

Held: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Held: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying aFilipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is notdisqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise,an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows thePhilippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen,provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalizationas Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through anaturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it shouldfollow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. Everytimethe citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case,Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to suchcitizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed outagain and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to havebecome a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al asEdilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced.

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure.

Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as a Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration GR L-21289, 4 October 1971 Fact of the case: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter thePhilippines. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. On thedate of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake,among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines onor before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within theperiod as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration. After repeated extensions,she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962,she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an allegedFilipino

Bengson III vs The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal on January 2, 2012 Political Law Natural Born Requirement Requirements to be a Congressman Bengson and Cruz were rivals in the 1998 elections in the 2nd District of Pangasinan. They were running for Congress. Cruz won by a significant margin over the incumbent Bengson. Bengson then filed a Quo Warranto proceeding in the

HRET alleging that Cruz is not a natural born citizen, as defined by law; hence he should be disqualified from holding office. The HRET subsequently declared and affirmed Cruz as the winner. Bengson filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that Cruz was indeed born a Filipino and he is defined under the 1935 Constitution as a natural born citizen. Cruz however lost his citizenship when he enlisted in the US Army in 1985. He also swore allegiance to the US without consent from the Philippines. Cruz, on the other hand, argued that he regained his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of RA 2630 which provides that Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Bengson insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship. ISSUE: Whether or not Cruz is a natural-born citizen. HELD: Petitioners contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain hiscitizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term natural -born citizen was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows: Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. In respondent Cruzs case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630. Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally anatural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. Aznar vs .COMELEC Post under case digests, Political Law at Saturday, February 04, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind Facts: Aznar filed a petition for certiorari to review COMELEC resolution proclaiming Osmena as the Cebu Governor. He alleged that Osmena is an American thus disqualified to run in the 1988 election. He presented evidence.

Osmena claimed that he is a Filipino. Issue: Whether or not Osmena is an American thus disqualified torun in the elections Held: No . No substantial & convincing evidence presented to prove Osmena is no longer a Filipino citizen & disqualified from running. Filipino citizenship is lost by naturalization in a foreign country or byexpress renunciation of citizenship or by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support another countrys constitution or laws (CA No. 63). No proof Osmena did any of those. Aznar assumed that the ACR & permit to re-enter were proof of such. However, only RPcourts are allowed to determine whether one is a Filipino citizen or not, regardless of whether that person is considered an American under US laws. His father is Filipino thus, without proof to the contrary, the presumption that he is a Filipino remains LABO vs. COMELEC Case Digest LABO vs. COMELEC 176 SCRA 1 Facts: Petitioner Ramon Labo, elected mayor of Baguio City was questioned on his citizenship. He was married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous. According to Australian records, Labo is still an Australian citizen. Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of the Philippines. Held: The petitioners contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, renouncing all other allegiance. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship.