58th Army (III Formation) (1995-present)

• Active 1941 - current Country

Soviet Union, Russia Branch Red Army,
Russian Ground Forces
• Type Field army
• Size several corps or divisions Part of
North Caucasus Military District
• Garrison/HQ Vladikavkaz
• Engagements
1940-1944 Chechnya insurgency,
Second Chechen War, South Ossetian
Crisis Commanders Notable
commanders General-Colonel Anatoliy
Nogovitsin
 58th Army
• The 58th Army is a field army; first of the
Soviet Union's Red Army and
subsequently (since 1995) of the
Russian Ground Forces.
• It was first formed in the
Siberian Military District in November
1941, including the 362nd, 364th, 368th,
370th, 380th, and 384th Rifle Divisions
and the 77th Cavalry Division and moved
to the Archangelsk Military District, but
then the Army was redesignated the
3rd Tank Army in May 1942. It was
reestablished within the Kalinin Front in
June 1942, and in July included the 16th
and 27th Guards Rifle Divisions, the 215th
 World War II

• It was reformed in the Transcaucasian Front

from the 24th Army on August 28 1942, under
General Khomenko of the NKVD. Much of its
senior cadre also came from the NKVD, and
among its missions was to keep order in the
Caucasus, particularly in the Groznyi and
Makhachkala regions.[2] This was because of a
Chechen rising that had gone on since 1941
(see 1940-1944 Chechnya insurgency). 58th
Army later joined the North Caucasus Front. On
1 November 1942 it consisted of the 271st and
416th Rifle Divisions, and the Makhachkala
Division of the NKVD.[3] Prior to the North
Caucasus Front putting its main effort into the
Kerch-Eltigen Operation (November 1943) the
 Second Chechen War

• The headquarters was reformed in

1995 in the North Caucasus Military
District from the 42nd Army Corps at
Vladikavkaz.
During the Second Chechen War, the
Army was commanded by General
Vladimir Shamanov
 2008 Ossetia War

• On 4 August 2008, five battalions of

the Russian 58th Army commanded
by General-Colonel Anatoliy
Nogovitsin were moved to the
vicinity of Roki Tunnel that links
South Ossetia with North Ossetia[6].
On 8 August 2008 [7][8] [9] the Army
moved to South Ossetia and engaged
in combat with Georgian forces in
defense of the South Ossetian region,
 Order of Battle, 2003
• The Army operates in a close coordination with the
4th Air Force and Air Defence Army of the district, and
includes:
• 19th Motor Rifle Division - Vladikavkaz
• 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade- Budenovsk
• 136th Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade- Buynaksk,
Dagestan
• 135th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment- Prochladny,
Kabardino-Balkaria
• 291st Separate Artillery Brigade- Maikop- (equipped with
2A65)
• 943rd Multiple Rocket Launcher Regiment – Krasnooktabrsky
(Uragan 220mm MRL)
• 1128th Anti-Tank Regiment- Maikop
• 67th Separate Anti-Aircraft Rocket Brigade (SAM)- Volgograd
area (SA-11 'Buk' SAM)
• 487th Separate Helicopter Regiment (Mi-8/Mi-24)- Budenovsk
• 11th Separate Engineer Regiment- Kavkazskay
• 234th Separate Signals Regiment – Vladikavkaz
Structure 58th
Army
Москва (ракетный крейсер)
black sea naval
• Предназначен для нанесения ударов
по крупным надводным кораблям
противника, обеспечивает боевую
устойчивость корабельных
противолодочных групп.
Противовоздушная оборона
удаленных соединений, огневая
поддержка десанта.
• Вооружение Артиллерия 1x2 130-мм
артустановка AK-130, 6 6-ствольных
30-мм артустановок АК-630 Ракетное
вооружение 16 пусковых установок
противокорабельных ракет (16 ПКР
П-1000 Вулкан) Зенитное
вооружение 8x8 пусковых установок
Б-204 зенитно-ракетного комплекса
• Главный ракетный комплекс
"Базальт"-16 крылатых ракет П-
500, дальность стрельбы 500 км,
зенитно-ракетный комплекс
"Форт" (68 ракет), артустановка
АК-130 -дальность стрельбы 25 км,
ракетно - зенитный комплекс "Оса-
М" (2 шт) дальность 10-15 км по
воздушным целям, 2 пятитрубных
торпедных аппарата по
надводным кораблям, 6 установок
АК-630, калибр 30 мм, дальность 5
км, против авиации и судов
противника, скорострельность 1
 gemebi
-сторожевого корабля «Сметливый».
-десантных корабля "Цезарь Куников" и
"Саратов“
-Ямал
TU-22 Blinder
• General characteristics
• Bomber:
• Crew: three - pilot, navigator, weapons officer
• Length: 41.60 m (136 ft 5 in)
• Wingspan: 23.17 m (76 ft 0 in)
• Height: 10.13 m (33 ft 3 in)
• Wing area: 162 m² (1,742 ft²)
• Empty weight: kg (lb)
• Loaded weight: 85,000 kg (187,390 lb)
• Max takeoff weight: 92,000 kg (202,400 lb)
• Powerplant: 2× Dobrynin RD-7M-2 turbojets
– Dry thrust: rated 107.9 kN (24,250 lbf) each
– Thrust with afterburner: 161.9 kN (36,376 lbf) each
• Performance
• Maximum speed: 1,510 km/h (938 mph, Mach 1.42)
• Range: 4,900 km (3,045 mi)
• Service ceiling: 13,300 m (40,540 ft)
• Rate of climb: m/s (ft/min)
• Wing loading: 525 kg/m² (107 lb/ft²)
• Thrust/weight: 0.38
• Armament
• Guns: 1 × AM-23 23 mm cannon in tail turret
76th Airborne Division
(Russia)
• Active September 1, 1939
present Country Soviet Union Russia
Branch Airborne Troops
Type Paratroopers
Role Parachute Infantry Size 6-8,000
Garrison/HQ Pskov
Engagements World War II
Soviet-Afghan War
First Chechen War
Second Chechen War
2008 South Ossetia war
• The 76th Guards Airborne Division (76-я
гвардейская десантно-штурмовая Черниговская
Краснознаменная дивизия) is an airborne division of
the Russian Airborne Troops based in Pskov. It
originally formed as the 157th Rifle Division in 1939.
On 1 Mar 1943 it became the 76th Guards Rifle
Division. It fought at Chernigov, Odessa, Brest, and
Danzig. With 70th Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front
May 1945. Soon after the war it became an airborne
division, by 1946 as part of the 15th Airborne Corps.
• The 76th Division originally had three regiments, the
104th, 234th, and 237th, with the 237th Guards
Airborne Regiment disbanded circa 2002.
• After an experimental period, the 104th Parachute
Regiment of the 76th Airborne Division became the
first Russian ground forces regiment that was fully
composed of professional soldiers (and not of
"srochniki" - the conscripted soldiers aged eighteen).
• Elements of the 104th Regiment were ambushed in
Chechneya in March 2000.
• In 2008 the 76th Airborne Division was involved in
• Units 2009
• 76th Guards Airborne Division in Pskov
– 23rd Guards Airborne Regiment in Pskov (newly
raised regiment)
– 104th Guards Airborne Regiment in Cherekha
– 234th Guards Airborne Regiment in Pskov
– 1140th Guards Artillery Regiment in Pskov
– 4th Air Defence Regiment in Pskov
• 107th Air Defence Regiment in Pskov
• 165th Air Defence Battalion in Donskoy (from
disbanded 106th Guards Airborne Division)
– 656th Engineer Battalion in Pskov
– 728th Signal Battalion in Pskov
– 7th Maintenance Battalion in Pskov
– 242nd Military Transport Aviation Squadron in
Pskov
98th Airborne Division
• Active December 1943
present Country Soviet Union/
Russian Federation Branch Soviet, later
Russian Airborne Troops
Type Division
Role Airborne force Part of
Russian Airborne Troops
Garrison/HQ Ivanovo
Engagements World War II
2008 South Ossetia war
• The 98th Guards Airborne Division (98-я
гвардейская воздушно-десантная Свирская
Краснознаменная ордена Кутузова дивизия) is
an airborne division of the
Russian Airborne Troops, stationed in Ivanovo. It
took part in the 2008 war against Georgia.
• During the Second World War, the formation
began its existence as the 98th Guards Rifle
Division. It incorporated 296th Guards Rifle
Regiment (formerly the 18th Independent Guards
Airborne Brigade), 299th GRR (fmr 19 IGAB),
302nd GRR (fmr 20 IGAB). Formed in December
1943-January 1944 at Demitrov in the
Moscow Military District.[1] It was part of the 37th
Guards Airborne Corps, 9th Guards Army on the
Karelian front (May 1944), on the Svir river (June
1944) and near Budapest in February 1945. The
division ended the war near Prague.
• Today, its two regiments, the 217th and 299th,
are stationed near the Ivanovo Severny military-
[2]
 Units 2009
• 98th Guards Airborne Division in Ivanovo
– 137th Guards Airborne Regiment in Ryazan
(from disbanded
106th Guards Airborne Division)
– 217th Guards Airborne Regiment in Ivanovo
– 331st Guards Airborne Regiment in Kostroma
– 1065th Guards Artillery Regiment in Kostroma
– 318th Air Defence Battalion in Ivanovo
– 661st Engineer Battalion in Ivanovo
– 674th Signal Battalion in Ivanovo
– 15th Maintenance Battalion in Ivanovo
– 243rd Military Transport Aviation Squadron in
Ivanovo
 45th Separate
Reconnaissance Regiment
• Active 1994
present Country Russia
Branch Airborne Troops (direct
subordination)
GRU (operational subordination)
Type Paratroopers
Role Special operations and reconnaissance
Garrison/HQ Kubinka, Moscow Oblast
Engagements Second Chechen War
War in South Ossetia
45th Detached Reconnaissance Regiment of VDV
(Russian: 45-й гвардейский отдельный
разведывательный ордена Александра Невского
полк ВДВ or 45-й полк специального назначения
ВДВ)
is an airborne regiment of the
Russian Airborne Troops based in Moscow.
• It was raised in 1994 on the base of 901st Detached
Landing Assault Battalion (Raised in 1979) and 218th
Detached Battalion for Special Operations of VDV,
raised in 1992. Warfare.ru attributes to it 690
personnel with 15 BTR-80, and 1 BTR-D; the 218th
Battalion is homebased in Sokolniki.
• The unit is part of the Russian Airborne Troops (VDV)
and directly subordinated to VDV Headquarters.
However it is also operationally subordinate to the
GRU.
• The Regiment fought in the First and
Second Chechen Wars, and in 1994 it fought for
Dolinsky, Argun, and Groznyy, sending 400 personnel,
of which losses were 43 personnel, including 15
Critical Assessment of Russian Military Campaign
By Igor Dzhadan, Agentstvo Politicheskikh
Novostey 14/8/08
Aug 18, 2008 - 4:09:21 PM

We admit that we vacillated, is it worthwhile to initiate

a conversation about the problems, when the bodies of
the deceased soldiers and victims of the Georgian
aggression have not yet been interred. But we still
decided not to put it off and to raise a number of
serious questions already now.
It doesn't make sense to delay the "post-flight analysis"
precisely because the obvious success of the military
operation is present.
The findings can be interesting to all people, who are
interested in Russia's victory in the information
 level of equipment of the Russian soldiers
and the enemy.
Beginning with the uniforms: Russian
soldiers do not have a standard uniform and
are frequently dressed in whatever is
available. But then again, the matter
concerns not only the soldiers of the line
units but also the elite - Spetsnaz (special
forces), who are dressed in uniforms of
various generations, from Soviet to the
newest, which began to enter the troops just
last year.
If you compare the current situation with the
diverse nature of Russian soldiers' clothing
of the times of the first and second Chechen
campaigns, no progress whatsoever has
been noted in this regard, except that the
"imitation-leather boots" have finally ceased
to exist. And really the military uniform -
The servicemen often appear to be unconvincing due to their
old washed-out uniforms. Some of the photographs make no
less than a dispiriting impression, which does not at all
promote the confirmation of the hypothesis about the
Russian victory in the eyes of the unsuspecting observer.
The variety of ammunition also attests to the inadequate
level of discipline in the troops.
Things have reached the point that certain soldiers have
American helmets perched on their heads, which they took
away from Georgian soldiers, which categorically contradicts
the regulations. There are also photographs of this "playing
to the gallery".
Incidentally, the use of elements of enemy uniforms and
helmets also contradicts the international rules of the
conduct of war.
The question arises: how did it come about that the
practically constantly fighting 58 th Army has ended up
without a normal uniform?
Why, after the two Chechen wars, has the situation not
moved off of dead center in this regard?
And if this is so difficult, why has the Georgian Army
managed to resolve the issue about the transition to a new
uniform for the entire army in literally three years?
The uniform issue - is not yet that important. Later - more.
The situation with individual protective gear from bullets and
We all know that they are in the TOE in all 58 th Army
units; however the commanders do not require their
subordinates to wear helmets or body armor. The Army
spetsnaz - is another matter, helmets are inconvenient
in a number of cases there, which impede hearing in
operations in the forest, and do little to help from the
bullet of a sniper weapon.
However, there are quite a few photographs, which
prove that in a number of cases 58 th Army soldiers
and line motorized rifle subunits in a combat situation,
not to mention a march in columns, are in general not
wearing protective gear. With the fact that according to
the statistics, a helmet and body armor permit a
manifold reduction of irretrievable losses from the
shrapnel of mortar rounds and projectiles. According to
the official statements, these losses totaled 74 men
with 19 missing in action, without taking the wounded
into account. What then can you call that situation if
not official crimes by commanders, who are not
 For example, why was the 58 th Army commander himself
driving through the combat operations area in an ordinary
army motor vehicle and not in an armored transport vehicle,
as that is appropriate according to the TOE? As a result of
the Georgian commandos' attack, he himself was wounded
and his chauffer was killed. It is impossible to call this
anything other than the criminal negligence of the
commander himself. The commanders of that level must be
painstakingly concerned both about the safety of their
subordinates and also about their own safety, and not give
the example of boyish bravado.
We can imagine what the enemy side's propaganda success
would have been if the Georgian saboteurs had managed to
shoot the very operation commander at that time! Let's Shift
To Small Arms.
In this case, both sides turned out to be armed with
approximately identical types of automatic weapons. In the
majority of cases - these are various modifications of the
Kalashnikov system of assault rifles and machineguns. In the
context of the comparison of goals and capabilities, in our
opinion, this also speaks not in Russia's favor. Russia has a
number of more advanced developments which are already
undergoing testing in the units and that have already been
officially accepted into the inventory, but they also did not
• For Russia with its leading positions in the small arms
development sphere, the Kalashnikov assault rifle - is not an
entirely adequate response to contemporary needs. Georgia
is another matter: Saakashvili quite recently announced the
total rearming of his army from Kalashnikov assault rifles to
American M4 carbines, "the best in the world", as they were
told. However, now we have ascertained that the American
carbines have turned out to be not that good. First of all,
they are inadequately reliable and we have the opportunity
to observe that even Saakashvili's bodyguards are armed
with those same Kalashnikov assault rifles together with
European small arms.
The Georgian Army, including the elite units, are armed with
those same AK-74M assault rifles, which were copied by
Bulgaria and illegally sold to Tbilisi.
It is also unfavorable for Russia that the Georgian Army has
overtaken the Russians based upon the level of saturation
with sniper rifles of the leading designs and night
employment sights. Based upon their level of training,
Georgian snipers also turned out to be head and shoulders
above.
• But then again, it is difficult to provide a precise
comparative assessment in this context: a number of
Russian spetsnaz subunits have a very, very strong
sniper staff, about which the Russians' regular
victories at European army sniper competitions at
least attest.
However, according to our information, state-of-the-
art facilities for sniper training are still absent in a
number of cases. In any case, that concerns certain
spetsnaz subunits. The soldiers of one such subunit
even appealed to the RF president with an open letter
on this score approximately a year ago.
And that situation is especially sad. It turns out that
the generals haven't learned anything since the two
Chechen wars...
Right now, as we all know, the situation with the
development and production of advanced sniper
weapon systems in Russia is far from splendid. There
are a total of a few firms, which are involved with
• These rifles are being produced in inadequate quantities and a monopoly
situation permits a few manufacturers to exorbitantly raise prices. Along a
number of positions, it is cheaper for the Ministry of Defense and the
militarized departments to purchase sniper rifles abroad, which they are
doing, however, in a clearly inadequate amount.

So, it isn't surprising that in a number of photographs, which are being

disseminated on the Internet, users can note British-made sniper rifles in
the hands of Russian spetsnaz personnel.

The situation is very "interesting" in the sphere of night sights for sniper
weapons.

Russia is among the countries, which manufacture the most state-of-the-

art optical night vision sights for small arms. A large portion of this
production is being exported. Three firms throughout the world make
third-generation electro-optical matrices for them; two of them are located
in the United States and one - in Russia. Nevertheless, for some strange
reason it has turned out that it is precisely the Georgian spetsnaz that had
a predominant number of these devices, which permitted the Georgians to
shoot up the roads during the course of the three days of engagements
and to effectively maintain a humanitarian blockade of Tskhinvali.

The question arises: at that time, where were the widely advertised
Russian automated systems for sniper detection and blinding their optics
• However, the reason for that ratio - is tactical errors. One could say that
the Georgians repeated all of the Russian Army's errors, which were made
during the storming of Groznyy in the First Chechen Campaign. The tanks
were cut off from the infantry and destroyed by RPG attacks from the side
and rear axes. There was no coordination of the operations between the
tank crews of the Georgian tanks and the infantry subunits.
In contrast to the Georgians, the 58 th Army tank grouping operated
correctly in a tactical context and took into account the experience of the
two Chechen campaigns, so there were insignificant armored vehicle
losses.
But it is too early to be happy: if we compare the technical level of the
tanks, which were employed in the operation with the Georgian tanks, we
see that the Georgian tanks either correspond or substantially surpass the
Russian tanks based upon their technical level. At a time when obsolete T-
72B and T-62 tanks constitute the primary portion of the 58 th Army's tank
fleet, the modernization of the T-72 SIM1, which was supplied to Georgia
by Ukraine, is substantially more "advanced". These tanks have state-of-
the-art thermal imaging sights, in all likelihood with the use of the French
second-generation camera, which permits the gunner to identify targets,
both during the day and at night, but then again, behind a smoke screen.
What is even more unpleasant is that the Georgian T-72 SIM1 tanks
possess a gun stabilizing system, that is, they can fire on the move. The
Ukrainian specialists have adapted their Kombat guided weapon system-
antitank missiles to these tanks, which are launched directly from the tank
gun's tube. That system is newer than the similar Svir System of the 58 th
Army's T-72B tanks.
At the same time, we must point out the fact that the Georgian tank's
level of armor protection does not surpass the armor of the Russian tanks
• We must point out that as before the 58 th Army's armored vehicles are
primarily for the conduct of a counterterrorist war. Although tandem
antitank grenades and missiles are now being actively employed even in
that war, against which the old tanks are absolutely defenseless from any
axis of attack.
No one has attempted to improve that situation even in light of the
unconcealed Georgian military preparations of recent years.
Despite a significant increase of qualitatively new threats, as before we
present the upgrade of the Russian 58 th Army with "modernized" 40-year-
old T-62 tanks, with anti-shaped charge screens along the sides, as a
gigantic "leap forward". Now we were able to behold all of these "tin cans"
in South Ossetia. This is the kind of junk that the Russian military budget
is being spent on now!
It remains only to guess why the latest generation Russian tanks, which
are being manufactured by Uralvagonzavod, are not coming to the
constantly fighting North Caucasus Military District, but only to the
"ceremonial" Moscow divisions.
The same thing concerns light armored vehicles : All of the Russian
armored infantry and airborne assault vehicles that were noted in South
Ossetia completely turned out to be old Soviet-generation vehicles with
updated service lives.
Where are the BMP-3s? Where are the BMD-4s? They all remained at their
permanent deployment locations.
The generals' depraved psychology is present here: we will save the latest
weapons for a parade and for now the Army is fighting with old
equipment. We still need to decommission
• Ground Troops artillery has always been the Russian Army's strong
suit. Here contemporary Russian arms makers have preserved the
developments, of which as before our Western competitors are
incapable.
However, the enemy is not dozing: the foreign advisors managed
to teach the Georgians the contemporary tactics of artillery
employment. After an artillery raid, the Georgian artillery batteries
rapidly left their location and changed position.
It turned out to be an extraordinarily complex matter to combat
this tactic. Georgian self-propelled artillery consists of dozens of
multiple rocket launcher systems and self-propelled guns on a
wheeled chassis that were purchased in the NATO countries.
After five days of engagements, it remained undestroyed, having
ceased its operations against Tskhinvali only after Saakashvili's
panicked order about a general retreat was received.
The Russian Army will have to master this lesson, having saturated
ground troops' units with unmanned aerial vehicles, artillery fire
localization and detection radars and other operational target
designation systems for its own artillery and aircraft. Otherwise,
counterbattery combat is one more headache for our military
personnel in the next conflict.
But then again, that urgently needs to be done, having taken as an
example of efficiency - the rearming program of that same
• The active employment of unmanned aerial vehicles - is one more
"anticipated surprise", to which the Russian Army also failed to
react for some reason, although the degree of predictability of this
type of threat was approximately the same in this case as the
degree of predictability of the arrival of Tuesday after Monday. In
general, we don't understand what the generals are thinking about
on this score!
It is impossible to explain the delay with the introduction of
unmanned aerial systems in the troops either by the expense (they
are an order of magnitude cheaper than manned aircraft) or by a
technological lag (there are adequately many firms in Russia,
which offer their product at the highest level).
It remains to deduce that only tunnel vision and shortsightedness
is impeding the introduction of these extremely effective and
economical reconnaissance and strike systems in the troops.
The operation's aviation component turned out to be significant.
The famous Grach - Su-25 armored ground attack aircraft, which
distinguished themselves already in the first and second Chechen
wars, bore the primary load. It is precisely they that conducted
precision strikes against the reconnoitered positions of the
Georgian infantry and artillery. In Georgia, they also conducted
"free hunt" against enemy troop columns, while sowing panic
among the Georgian soldiers. This class of aircraft is ideal for
operations under mountain conditions: the Su-25's speed is higher
• On the other hand - the speed of this aircraft is not too high, and it is
capable of actively maneuvering between the mountain peaks, while
inflicting precision strikes with a diving trajectory.
But then again, we don't understand what is arriving to replace this
aircraft. New aircraft are already not being manufactured in Russia and
right now the question has been raised about in general not eliminating
the mothballed Su-25 production capacity.
The Georgian side also employed these aircraft, which were allegedly
modernized with Israel's participation. It turns out that Russia did not
possess technical supremacy in this class of weapons during the course of
the conflict.
Judging by everything, Tu-22M3 high-altitude, supersonic, Long Range
Aviation bombers were also employed, however the nature of the
operations with their participation has not been explained. We can assume
that the mission to suppress the Georgian air defense system and aircraft
was assigned to this class of aircraft.
The air force handled this mission with a 3+. Why Russian aircraft and
tactical missiles did not tear apart all of the Georgian takeoff and landing
strips in the very first days of the conflict remains incomprehensible.
One of the Tu-22M3 aircraft, which was involved with reconnaissance
based upon the Russian military leaders' assertion, was even shot down.
We must acknowledge the total level of losses - four aircraft - to be
satisfactory for this type and scale of operations, and also while taking
into account the powerful air defense, which was developed based upon
the Soviet medium-range Buk and long-range S-200 systems, which were
supplied by Ukraine.
• The truth is that we expected the more active employment of
helicopters by the Russian peacekeepers.
Exclusively Georgian Mi-24s, which flattened the Ossetian positions
and the peacekeepers' positions, were visible over the battlefield
in the first two days, at least if you believe the footage that was
taken and the numerous eyewitnesses.
At that time, where were the modernized Russian Mi-24s, and the
Ka-50 and Mi-28N helicopters that have been extensively
advertised and have already entered the inventory in small
quantities? It is incomprehensible...
It seems that there weren't even attempts to employ attack
helicopters, to which the zero or close to zero loss level attests. It
is possible that this turned out to be the best decision, while taking
into account the presence on the Georgian side of portable air
defense missiles and small caliber artillery. However, the question
remains: what are the generals planning to do in the future?
A program to supply hundreds of the latest helicopters to the
Russian Army inventory was quite recently made public. If now we
have ascertained that the helicopters for these operations are
inadequately armored, isn't it better to resume the construction of
modernized Su-25 ground attack aircraft in their place?
Otherwise, it turns out to be something absurd: the production of
the latest models is being increased, but when it comes down to it,
• On the other hand, it would be even more ridiculous in the 21 st century to
continue to fight using Soviet models, without attempting to completely
renew the arsenal.
In general, we must adhere to the golden rule: THE ARMY OF THE
VICTORIOUS COUNTRY ALSO MUST LOOK LIKE A VICTOR.
Otherwise, the deterrence factor is subjected to erosion. The enemy once
again can erroneously think that Russia is weak. And really it has already
occurred: in 1812, 1941, and now with Georgia...
However, we are not learning: our soldiers frequently seem to be ground-
down "weaklings", although they move mountains on the battlefield, and
the tanks and aircraft look like a heap of rusty iron, which has been lightly
covered with peeling paint.
"Obsolete weapons" can be adequately effective if you judge from the
purely utilitarian point of view. However, in the process, its external
appearance and age do not at all promote the formation of the deterrence
factor. And really, as it was pointed out long ago: the ideal weapon - that
is the weapon, which will do it in such a way that you will not have to
employ it.
The latest events have shown that Russia's deterrence factor has
experienced significant corrosion in the last two decades and its needs
"urgent resuscitation". If such a country as Georgia dared to attack the
Russian Armed Forces and Russian citizens, the situation, as they say, "has
reached the breaking point". Some sort of Latvia, while fulfilling the
American pre-election order and relying on NATO's protection, will begin a
military operation at some time for the "return" of Pytalovkskiy Rayon,
• The Russian leadership must seriously think about how it can restore the
deterrence factor. Having never been used even once, Russian nuclear
weapons are devaluing their deterrence potential with time and are
becoming an ineffective investment of resources.
The Georgian swagger is one of the examples, which confirms that
assertion.
And here it is impossible to get by with words or with military maneuvers.
Russia will have to unambiguously demonstrate in deeds at some point
that its leadership is adequately strong in order to employ all of the
weapons that it has in its arsenal, also not excluding nuclear weapons.
What's the sense of possessing these destructive weapons, if the
readiness to employ them has not been demonstrated in 60 years?!
If Russia's leadership is actually concerned about a fundamental increase
of the return from its growing military expenditures in the context of the
effective deterrence of aggression and ensuring a stable peace, it must
find the capability to demonstrate its resolve through the employment of
nuclear weapons.
We will consider this task to be the next "test" for the new president.
Otherwise, stronger states than Georgia will attempt to repeat aggression
against Russia sooner or later, while relying on their more state-of-the-art
and more numerous conventional armed forces.
Source:Ocnus.net 2008